115 Prospect Street, Rosenkranz Hall
My research is focused on two research agendas, one nested in political theory and the other in political economy. The political theory research agenda is a defense of the political association (sometimes called the state) as a qualitatively unique kind of association. I present an Aristotelian argument that the political association uniquely allows for the exercise of legitimate rule and provides for resources necessary for a truly flourishing life.
The political economy research agenda is the analysis of the institutional incentives faced by Supreme Court justices. This project uses formal theory to isolate particular mechanisms created by specific institutions. Because of the comparison the project partakes in comparative politics, the institutional focus on courts puts the project in conversation with the literatures in American politics, and the normative implications open the project to certain law literatures. My current paper looks at the different effects of life tenure and term limits in the strategic interactions between justices.
I’m pursuing a combined PhD in political science and philosophy, with a focus on political philosophy, political economy, and ethics. I completed an MA in economics in the process, which consisted in taking the first year PhD courses and the political economics second year sequence.
Before coming to Yale, I was a lecturer at ITAM’s economics department and a researcher at CNA Education. My previous studies were at Stanford, where I completed an MA in philosophy and undergrad programs in political science, economics, and public policy.