General Theory

Yale University
Department of Political Science
International Relations Reading List
2012
GENERAL THEORY
Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books, pp. 3-105, 145-91.
Bull, Headley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Columbia U. Press., chs. 1,2,10.
Doyle, Michael. 1986. “Liberalism in World Politics.” American Political Science Review 80 (4): 1151-69.
Fearon, James (1991). “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics, 43 (2), January: 169-95.
Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt. 2002. “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, editors, Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage), 5372.
Finnemore. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Cornell U. Press.
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chapters 1 and 2.
Glaser, Charles L. 2010. Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hopf, Ted. 2002. Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 and 1999. Cornell U. Press, ch. 1
Huntington, Samuel. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72(3).
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 1978.
Keohane, Robert, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), chs. 6,7.
Keohane, Robert and Judith Goldstein (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy, Cornell University Press, chs. 1, 7.
Krasner, Stephen. 1999 Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. 1-42 and 153-219.
Lake, David. 1996. “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” International Organization, 50(1).
Lake, David, and Robert Powell, eds. 1999. Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton U. Press), chs by Lake and Powell, Frieden, and Rogowski.
Levy, Jack (1992). “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping Through a Conceptual Minefield” International Organization, 48, 2, Spring, 279-312. (Review)
Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NY: Norton. Chapters 1-3.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization Vol. 51 No. 4: 513-53.
Morgenthau, Hans. 1985. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (6th ed.), Knopf, pp. 1-51.
Powell, Robert. 1991. “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.” American Political Science Review 85 (4): 1303 – 1320.
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power. States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 3-39.
Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. New York: Routledge. Chapters 1-5, 7.
Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. “What Makes the World Hang Together: Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge.” International Organization 52 (4): 855885.
Schelling, Thomas. 1963. The Strategy of Conflict. 1-52, 83-161.
Spruyt, Hendrik, 1994. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. 22-57, 67-95.
Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Book 1, paras 1-23, 66-88, 118-24, 140-46; Book 4, paras 37-51; BookV, Melian dialogue; Book 6, paras 84-116.
Tilly, Charles. 1975. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton U. Press. Pp. 3-50.
Walt, Stephen 1999. “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security, 23, 4, 5-48, and responses in 24, 2, 56-73, 97-106.
2
Walt, Stephen. The Origins of Alliances, chs 1,2.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics, chs. 4-8.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press. Ch.1, 5-8.
IPE
Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan, “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions,” Journal of Political Philosophy 2:2 (1994), 165-192.
Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast, “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (April 1997): 309-338.
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger. 1999. “An Economic Theory of GATT.” American Economic Review 89(1): 215-248.
Broz, J. Lawrence and Jeffry A. Frieden, “The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science¸ volume 4, 2001.
Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland. 2009. “Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?” Journal of Development Economics 88(1): 1-18.
Feenstra, Robert. 2004. “Political Economy of Trade Policy” (Chapter 9) in Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, Princeton University Press, pp. 300-337.
Frieden, Jeffry. 1991. “Invested interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance.” International Organization Vol. 45, 4: 425-51.
Frieden, Jeffry and Lisa Martin. 2002. “International Political Economy: The State of the Sub-Discipline.” In Katznelson, Ira, and Helen Milner, eds. Political Science: The State of the Discipline III. New York, NY: Norton, pp. 118-146.
Goldberg, Pinelopi K. and Giovanni Maggi. 1999. “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review 89(5): 1135-1155.
Gowa, Joanne, and Edward Mansfield. 1993. “Power Politics and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 87(2): 408-420.
3
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review Vol. 84 No. 4 (September): 833-850.
Hirschman, Albert O. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1969), pp. 3-70.
Hiscox, Michael. “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), 669-698.
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 5-135.
Kindleberger, Charles P. The World in Depression 1929-1939, revised and enlarged edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 288-305.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” World Politics 28(3): 317-347.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, introductory and concluding chapters, ch. by Haas.
Lake, David A. 1993. “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy.” International Studies Quarterly 37:459-89.
Maggi, Giovanni and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 1998. “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures.” Journal of Political Economy 106(3): 574-601.
Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?” European Economic Review 49 (6):1393-1691.
Mayer, Wolfgang. 1984. “Endogenous Tariff Formation.” American Economic Review 74(5): 970-985.
Milner, Helen V. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3-128.
Moravscik, Andrew. 1991. “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community.” International Organization Vol. 45 No. 1 (Winter):19-56.
Polyani, Karl. The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), chs. 1, 2 11-21.
Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization Vol. 42 No. 3 (Summer):427-460.
4
Rodrik, Dani. 1996. “The Political Economy of Trade Policy.” In Grossman, Elhanan, and Kenneth Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics. Vol. 3 Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 1457-1494.
Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade.” American Political Science Review 81, 1121–1137.
Rogowski, Ronald. “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions,” International Organization 41, no. 2 (Spring 1987), 203-223.
Rogowski, Ronald, and Mark Kayser. 2002. “Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries.” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 46 No. 3 (July):526-539.
Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?” American Economic Review 94(1): 98-114.
Scheve, Kenneth, and Matthew Slaughter. 2001. “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?” Journal of International Economics 54, no. 2 (August): 267-292.
Stone, Randall. 2008. “The Scope of IMF Conditionality.” International Organization 62(4): 589-620.
Simmons, Beth. Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 4.
Tomz, Michael, Judith Goldstein, and Douglas Rivers. 2007. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment.” American Economic Review 97(5): 2005-2018.
CONFLICT AND WAR
Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Longman, 2nd ed., chs. 1,3,5
Brooks, Stephen and William Wohlforth. World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival, chs. 1-3, 5, 6. MIT Press.
5
Dafoe, Allan. 2011. “Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor.” AJPS 55 (2): 247-262.
Debs, Alexandre and H.E. Goemans. 2010. ‘Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War.’ American Political Science Review. 104(3): 430-445.
DiCicco, Jonathan, and Jack Levy. 2003. “The Power Transition Research Program: A Lakatosian Analysis,” in Colin Elman and Mirium Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field. MIT Press.
Diehl, Paul, and Gary Goertz. 2000. War and Peace in International Rivalry (U. of Michigan Press), pp. 15-65, 143-81, 221-39.
Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (2006), chs. 2,3,5,11.
Fearon, James. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” APSR 88(3).
Fearon, James. “Signaling vs. the Balance of Powers and Interests.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2): 236-69.
Fearon, James. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49(3).
Gartzke, Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 166-191.
Gaddis, John Lewis. 1992. The Long Peace, pp. 215-45.
Gelpi, Christopher. 1997. “Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in International Crisis Bargaining.” APSR 91(2).
Gelpi, Christopher F., and Michael Griesdorf. 2001. “Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94.” American Political Science Review 95 (3): 633–47.
Gleditsch, Kristian, and Michael Ward. 2000. “War and Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization,” International Studies Quarterly 44(1).
Holsti, Ole. 1989. “Crisis Decision Making.” In Phillip Tetlock, et al.eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War.
Howell, William, and John Pevehouse. “Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force.” International Organization. Winter 2005.
6
Huth, Paul, and Todd Allee. 2002. “Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, December, pp. 754-90.
Huth, Paul, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett. 1993. “The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism.” APSR 87(3).
Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. 1993. “General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Competing Models.” APSR 87(1).
Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-3.
Jervis, Robert. 1974. Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 13-31; 217-72.
Kinsella, David. 2005. “No Rest for the Democratic Peace.” American Political Science Review.
Kydd, Andrew. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, chs. 5-9.
Lake, David. 1992. ‘Powerful Pacifists: Democratic State and War.’ American Political Science Review. 86(1): 24-37.
Levy, Jack. 1997. “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 41(1)
Maoz, Zeev. 1990. National Choices and International Processes. Pp. 9-36, 463-8, 499-540.
Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2005. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 1 and 3.
Mearsheimer, John. 2001. “The Future of the American Pacifier,” Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct.
Monteiro, Nuno. 2011/12. “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful.” International Security 36 (3).
Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapter 1.
Powell, Robert. 2006. ‘War as a Commitment Problem.’ International Organization. 60(1): 169-203.
7
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, Princeton U.P, chs. 1-3, 6-8.
Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political Science Review 97 (4): 585602.
Rosen, Stephen Peter, 2005. War and Human Nature. chs. 1, 2, 4.
Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations, chs. 1-6.
Sagan. Scott D. 1996-1997. ‘Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.’ International Security. 21(3): 54-86.
Sapolsky, Robert. “A Natural History of Peace.” Foreign Affairs January/February.
Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises.” American Political Science Review, 92 (4).
Schultz, Kenneth. 1999. “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” International Organization 53 (2): 233266.
Smith, Alastair, 1995. “Alliance Formation and War,” International Studies Quarterly 39 (4).
Smith, Alastair. 1996. “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems.” International Studies Quarterly 40(1)
Tomz, Michael. 2007. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach.” International Organization 61 (4): 82140.
Walt, Stephen M. Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 18-45.
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars, chs. 8-9, 14-17.
Weeks, Jessica. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” International Organization 62: 35-64.
Wohlforth, William. 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24 (1): 3-41.
8
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS
Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. “The Concept of Legalization.” International Organization Vol. 54 No. 3 (Summer):401-419.
Abbot, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 1998. “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1)
Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett. 1998. eds., Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, chs. 1,2.
Barnett, Michael. 2011. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarian Intervention. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Barnett, Michael. 1997. “Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations.” World Politics 49 (July).
Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization, 53, 4, September.
Burley, Anne-Marie. 1993. “International Law and International Relations Theory.” American Journal of International Law 87.
Dixon, William. 1996. “Third-Party Negotiating Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement.” International Organization 50,4
Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. Princeton: Princeton University Press), chapters 1, 2, 3, 8.
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization, 52 (4), 887-918.
Finnemore, Martha. 2000. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Cornell U. Press, introduction and conclusion.
Hafner-Burton, E. M. 2008. “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem.” International Organization 62 (4): 689-716.
Hathaway, Oona. 2002. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal 111: 1935-2042.
Hyde, Susan. 2011. “Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion.” AJPS 55 (2): 356-369.
9
Keck, Margaret and Katherine Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders. 1-38, 9-120, 199-217.
Krasner, Stephen. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 105-126.
March, John G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Order.” International Organization Vol. 52 No. 4 (Autumn):943-969.
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/95). “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security, 19, 3, Winter, 5-93 (includes responses by Keohane and Martin and by Wendt).
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1,2.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1999. “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” International Organization, 53, 2, Spring, 267-306.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1995. “Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe.” European Journal of International Relations 1 (2): 157-189.
Morrow, James. 1994. “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution vs. Information.” International Organization 48(3).
Paris, Roland. 2004. At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP) pages 1-51; 151-236.
Pevehouse, John. 2002. “Democracy from Outside? International Organizations and Democratization,” International Organization 56 (3): 515-549.
Pevehouse, Jon and Bruce Russett. 2006. “Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace.” International Organization 60 (4): 969-1000.
Russett, Bruce, ed. 1997. The Once and Future Security Council, chs. 2-4, 7, 8.
Simmons, Beth A. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review 94, 4 (December 2000).
von Stein, Jana. 2005. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.” American Political Science Review 99: 611-622.
10
11
Spruyt, Hendrik (1994). “Institutional Selection in International Relations,” International Organization, 48 (4), pp. 527-58.
Sweet, Alec Stone and Thomas L. Brunnell. 1998. “Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community.” American Political Science Review Vol. 92 No. 1 (March):63-81.
Voeten, Erik. 2005. “The Political Origins of the Legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council.” International Organization.
Voeten, Erik. 2008. “The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights.” American Political Science Review 102 (4): 417-432.
Vreeland, James. 2007. “CAT selection: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture.” International Organization.