

The Passion of Justice: Plato's Education of Anger in the *Republic*

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Justice, which distributes to each man what belongs to him, created for the society and community of men— how can it be in God?

-Michel de Montaigne, “Apology for Raymond Sebond”

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INTRODUCTION

Empirical social science, including political science, often considers people in terms of their “interests,” often thought of as rational desires. In its attempt to employ the scientific approach of natural sciences, political science focuses on that which can be measured and determined readily, viewing men as rational actors who maximize their preferences and welfare. Extensive polling and mining of data may be performed to determine what voters “truly” desire. Yet, does this type of interest-driven understanding of man allow us to grasp the whole of political experience? Or does politics encompass more than men’s preferences? Despite the prevalence of “rational choice models” that deny the importance of passions among political scientists, the importance of passions to politics has long remained part of the broader cultural discussion. There may be more than simply preferences that affect political action; perhaps, beyond mere preferences, are the passions of pride, resentment, love, fear, grief, and anger.

Since the 2016 United States presidential election, political commentators perhaps have focused most, out of the passions, on anger. The Washington Post reported that in the spring before the 2016 election, Pennsylvania State University’s McCourtney Institute began polling Americans’ level of anger about political events. It found then, and its successive polling continues to find, that Americans are very angry.¹ Countless think-pieces in highbrow magazines began discussing the role of anger in the Trump movement. An *Atlantic* headline asked, “Why is America so angry?”² Journalist Sarah Posner wrote in the *New Republic* that Donald Trump won the presidency because of his ability to “stoke...anger” against “global

¹ Eric Pulzer and Michael Berman, “New poll: Voters are just as angry as in 2016,” *Washington Post*, October 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/11/new-poll-voters-are-just-as-angry-as-in-2016/?utm_term=.3b48407b04af

² Charles DuHigg, “Why is America so angry?” *Atlantic*, January/February 2019 issue, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/charles-duhigg-american-anger/576424/>

elites.”³ The *New York Review of Books*, in a headline, nicknamed the Republican Party “The Party of Rage” and said that Trump identified himself “as the candidate of angry white middle class men.”⁴ The common thread of these articles is that anger is dangerous. It is anger, these articles suggest, that allowed the lesser candidate to win, against the rational interests of the nation. Martha Nussbaum’s *Anger and Forgiveness*, a recent work by a prominent scholar, takes a similar view of anger, without referring to Trump or the 2016 election. Nussbaum argues that “anger is always normatively problematic, whether in the personal or in the public realm.”⁵ In an article discussing her book, she connects her lessons to present-day political arguments and writes pithily, “If we think closely about anger, we can begin to see why it is a stupid way to run one’s life.”⁶

Yet, a contrarian perspective praises the role of anger in politics. Historian Joanne Freeman believes that the anger that Trump introduced to politics helped provoke anger on the political left, which she believes might inspire more people to involve themselves in the fight for justice. She writes in the *Atlantic*, “Channeled properly and put to purpose, outrage can prove formative, inspiring civic engagement, political involvement, and organized protest, thereby leading to reform and change.”⁷ Danielle Allen’s work *The World of Prometheus* revives the perspective of the Athenian political order which, she argues, bases its judicial punishments on anger; laws and communal memories formed “a body of past opinion about how much anger

³ Sarah Posner, “Right Makes Right,” *New Republic*, March 25, 2019. <https://newrepublic.com/article/153276/republicans-congress-court-nativist-authoritarian-leaders>

⁴ Elizabeth Drew, “Party of Rage,” *The New York Review of Books*, July 22, 2016. <https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/07/22/party-of-rage-trump-acceptance-speech-cleveland/>

⁵ Martha Nussbaum, *Anger and Forgiveness* (Oxford 2016), 3.

⁶ Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond anger,” *Aeon*, July 26, 2016, <https://aeon.co/essays/there-s-no-emotion-we-ought-to-think-harder-about-than-anger>

⁷ Joanne Freeman, “America Descends Into the Politics of Rage,” *Atlantic*, October 22, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/trump-and-politics-anger/573556/>

should be meted out for any given act of wrongdoing.”⁸ While Allen never connects her view of anger to current politics, despite currently writing extensively on contemporary political issues for the Washington Post, she suggested, at the time of her book’s publication in 2000, using concepts from her book to “ask questions about modern democratic practice.” Allen seems to believe we have not escaped the legacy of the Athenian political order entirely, although we have “shift[ed]” the “paradigms” that we use to understand our political order.⁹

Nussbaum and most popular intellectual writings suggest ridding ourselves of anger entirely, while Freeman and Allen suggest that anger lingers in our political life, perhaps unavoidably or even beneficially. What explains the differences between their views, especially between the views of the two prominent political theorists, Nussbaum and Allen? Should anger be repressed or reformed?

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One way to approach this question lies in the two theorists’ readings of Aeschylus’s *Oresteia*. Aeschylus’s trilogy of tragedies tells of the Furies, ancient goddesses of revenge, and their pursuit of Orestes for killing his mother. In order to save Orestes, who committed his deed at the behest of the god Apollo, Athena establishes law courts to replace the Furies. The Furies do not disappear, however, but are transformed to fit into the new society. Nussbaum and Allen differ in their understandings of how the Furies are transformed, causing them to differ in their understandings of the role of anger in the new society.

In Nussbaum’s telling, anger disappears entirely in the Furies transformation. The Furies “fundamentally transform” into “instruments of justice and welfare.”¹⁰ Nussbaum writes that the

⁸ Danielle Allen, *The World of Prometheus: Politics and Punishing in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 2000), 174

⁹ *Ibid.* 11, 245

¹⁰ Nussbaum 2016 3

Furies no longer are concerned with retribution for past wrongs, but only with the deterrence of future wrongs. She views this focus on the deterrence of future wrongs as the proper role of punishment within legitimate political institutions. When Nussbaum suggests that anger is “always normatively problematic,” she “takes [her] inspiration from the Aeschylean picture that [she] sketched,”¹¹ Her reading of Aeschylus suggests that she believes unjust acts can be identified and punished without passion. For Nussbaum, anger is neither part of determining nor combating injustice. The value of the new system, she maintains, is that in its dispassion, political justice can be established by reason.

In Allen’s telling, anger is reformed, but still present, in the Furies. Allen suggests that what changes is the targets, but not the existence, of the Furies’ anger; the Furies no longer are angry at Orestes, but they “retain their anger in general and can apply it against other wrongdoers and against enemies of Athens.”¹² In Allen’s interpretation, the transformed Furies apply their anger only selectively, at those judged guilty by a court of law. The court’s authority comes not from its dispassion— as it does for Nussbaum, who expects dispassion from institutions— but instead, in part, from its expression of anger.¹³ Allen’s interpretation suggests that anger both determines unjust acts and involves itself in punishing them. Thus, the value of the court for Allen is not that it is dispassionate, but that it provides final authority, limiting the endless cycle of vengeance.

In the interpretations of both of these theorists, an intervention is needed to restrain the Furies. The goddess Athena offers the Furies the promise of honors and rewards to entice them to obey the will of the court.¹⁴ Yet, while Aeschylus’s fable provokes these theorists’ reflections

¹¹ Ibid. 5

¹² Allen 2000 22

¹³ Ibid. 23

¹⁴ Nussbaum 2016 3, Allen 2000 23

on the need for anger either to be repressed or reformed in order to establish an orderly way of determining guilt and punishment, the *Oresteia* only contemplates the way that the Furies' anger is repressed or reformed. We, unlike Athena in Aeschylus's myth, cannot offer the Furies honors in order to repress or reform our anger.

In the *Oresteia*, anger could not have been reformed without the goddess Athena's intervention. Since anger was sent by a god, men were entirely incapable of reforming or repressing it. Orestes describes the Furies' goading him into avenging his father's death:

I can still hear the god –
 a high voice ringing with winters of disaster,
 piercing the heart within me, warm and strong,
 unless I hunt my father's murderers, cut them down
 in their own style...
 ... You can see them –
 their eyes burning, grim brows working over you in the dark –
 the dark sword of the dead! – your murdered kinsmen
 pleading for revenge. And the madness haunts
 the midnight watch, the empty terror shakes you,
 harries, drives you on – an exile from your city –
 a brazen whip will mutilate your back.¹⁵

Orestes exacts revenge under the influence of the Furies and the threat of their punishment. No one could persuade Orestes to subdue his angry thirst for revenge, and Orestes is incapable of resisting the Furies' impositions on him, or of persuading himself to be less angry.

The ability to persuade ourselves to be less angry may not have been available to Orestes, but it is a common experience for us, despite the lack of Athena's intervention on our behalfs. The *Oresteia* may provide a story of the way that institutions can repress or reform anger with the creation of courts, but it cannot explain the way that we begin to restrain our own anger internally. Why do our self-conceptions differ from that of Orestes, or, why do we feel as if we can restrain our anger? I argue that Plato, in his *Republic*, purposefully gives his readers a new self-conception that includes the ability to reflect upon anger, a conception that I contend has been extremely influential in both the history of philosophy and men's internal self-conceptions. In the debate over whether anger is repressed or reformed, I maintain that it has been reformed. Plato educates our anger, or what he calls *thumos* (θυμός), into the passion of justice, and asks us to reflect, oriented toward truth, before acting on this passion.

¹⁵ Aeschylus, *The Oresteia: The Libation Bearers*, trans. Robert Fagles (London 1984), lines 275-279, 290-294.

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There has been much literature written on Plato's concept of *thumos* and not all of it connects *thumos* primarily to concerns of justice. *Thumos* is described by Socrates as a part of his tripartite soul, along with reason (*logos*) and desire (*epithumia*).¹⁶ Plato borrows the word *thumos* from Homer. For Homer, *thumos* is a faculty of man, in the way that we use the words "mind" or "heart," except, unlike our use of such abstract notions, *thumos* is presumed to be actually inside of men. Translators of Homer's faculty usually translate *thumos* as "spirit" or "heart." Translators of Plato's parts of the soul translate *thumos* as spiritedness, which denotes that it is a part of man full of energy and determination.

Many scholars do not emphasize *thumos* in Plato's *Republic*. Those who do often see it as a creation of Plato for political and moral purposes. Philosopher and classicist Terrey Penner, for example, believes Plato creates *thumos* to complete his analogy between the soul and the state in Book IV.¹⁷ Likewise, Nussbaum does not discuss *thumos* in *Anger and Forgiveness* because she had dismissed it already in an earlier work as "not consistently invoked" and best collapsed into "desire" to form a single part of the soul contrary to reason.¹⁸ Even Allen, who I invoked previously for her understanding of the relationship between anger and justice, sees Plato as attempting to dismantle this relationship with his concept of *thumos*. She maintains that its use by Plato is meant to erase the Athenian conception of anger in order to found a new mode of politics based on "a suppression of anger."¹⁹ For Allen, Platonic *thumos* is not a natural

¹⁶ This part of the soul is at times described as *thumoeides*, in which the suffix *-eides* suggests that it is the "form" or "idea" of *thumos*. See Allen 2000 254 and Seth Benardete, *Socrates's Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic* (Chicago 1989), 56. I will not refer often to this occurrence in the Greek due to my deficiencies in the language, but implicit to my argument is that *thumoeides* is, in fact, Plato's education of *thumos*. Plato gives *thumos* a form or idea to which it responds.

¹⁷ Terrey Penner "Thought and desire in Plato" in *Plato Vol. II.*, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Princeton 1971), 111-113.

¹⁸ Nussbaum, *Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge 2001), 272.

¹⁹ Allen 2000 254, 269

passion of man, but an invention of Plato, used by him to suppress the actual human passion of anger.

The scholars who do see *thumos* as an important part of human nature are usually— with the notable exception of Angela Hobbs— “Straussian,” or students of the German-American political theorist Leo Strauss. Strauss writes that *thumos* “includes a large variety of phenomena ranging from the most noble indignation about injustice, turpitude, and meanness, down to the anger of a spoiled child who resents being deprived of anything, however bad, that he desires.”²⁰ Allan Bloom, a student of Strauss, calls *thumos* “the principle or seat of anger and rage.”²¹ Harvey Mansfield, who often adheres to the Straussian school of thought, offers a plethora of characteristics of *thumos*, such as that it is the part of man that allows him to insist on himself, to idealize, and to sacrifice himself. At its core, Mansfield argues, *thumos* is “rough” anger characterized by “defensiveness” of its possessor.²² In general, these authors believe that *thumos* is anger, or the part of the soul from which anger emanates; anger both in the salutary sense of righteous indignation to protect oneself, and in the pernicious sense of the cause of roughness, rage, and destruction.

Hobbs is perhaps the only scholar without Straussian influence who has dedicated a major work to defending the relevance of the subject of *thumos*, namely *Plato and the Hero*. She argues that “the essence of human *thumos* is the need to believe that one counts for something.”²³ Hobbs’s book is rich and I will draw on it for its discussion of the way that role models affect men and, specifically, their *thumos*. However, notably absent from Hobbs’s definition of *thumos*

²⁰ Leo Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago 1978), 110.

²¹ Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato* (Basic Books 2016), 449.

²² Harvey Mansfield, *Manliness* (New Haven 2006), 206-207, 220-221. Unlike Mansfield, I do not stress a difference in *thumos* between the genders.

²³ Angela Hobbs, *Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness, and the Impersonal Good* (Cambridge 2000), 30.

is its role as a passion. She writes that anger may be a result of the spoiling of one's image of oneself as counting for something; yet, as the Straussian authors point out, it appears that our *thumos* also is aroused in connection with much more mundane matters, such as those associated with petulant children whose desires for drink or food are frustrated by another (437c-e, 441a).²⁴ Hobbs's assertion that *thumos* causes us to want to believe that we count for something may be true, but in making this claim "the essence of human *thumos*," Hobbs gives *thumos* too stringent a form and only accounts for some of its presence in human nature. She defines *thumos* in Platonic terms, having already internalized Plato's intended re-conception of anger. As I will show further, it is for this reason that she misses the nature of Plato's education of his readers' *thumos* into the passion of justice: it occurs despite the ignorance of most readers of its occurrence.²⁵

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In chapter one, I discuss the methods of Plato's education of his readers. There are three levels of education that occur in the *Republic*.²⁶ Even the most careless reader is aware of the first level of education, namely, the education of the guardians of the city in speech by Socrates and his interlocutors, Glaucon and Adeimantus. The more careful reader is aware, in addition, of the second level of education, namely, Socrates's education of his interlocutors, Glaucon and Adeimantus. The most careful reader, I maintain, observes the third level of education, that of the reader, himself, who is educated while reading the *Republic*. Plato does not transcribe his philosophy as a theory, in the way that Aristotle's works read like lecture notes. He does not believe that ideas can be transmitted directly to his readers, with such readers' actions

²⁴ Plato, *Republic*, trans. Allan Bloom (Basic Books 2016). Unless otherwise noted, references and translations are taken from this edition. References to the *Republic* will be cited parenthetically by their Stephanus pagination.

²⁵ Hobbs 64-65

²⁶ Allen 2000 272

responding directly to the ideas as described abstractly. Instead, he reshapes his readers' actions by giving them images to imitate. I analyze Plato's understanding of poetic imitation as expounded by his character Socrates in Books III and X and then compare such understanding to the nature of Plato's own work. I explain that Plato's character of Socrates is an imitator, similar to the poets, and how Socrates's use of imitation provides Glaucon and Adeimantus with images that lodge in their minds, educating them to imitate these images. I argue that Plato also uses this type of imagistic education to educate his readers. The reason that many do not understand Plato's use of imitation, I contend, is that he purposefully disguises his use of it.

In chapter two, I discuss Plato's philosophic education. I maintain that Plato's discussion of philosophy does not intend to argue for the existence of true standards for action or politics, but rather intends to educate his readers: he wishes for men to be oriented toward truth and to reflect before acting on their passions. I attempt to show that Plato's *Republic* is not both philosophic—to the extent that philosophy means presenting truths—and educative, but *only* educative.²⁷ I argue that Plato conflates the philosopher, concerned with metaphysics, with the philosopher-ruler, concerned with political action, and presents this philosopher/philosopher-ruler as a role-model for his readers. I demonstrate, furthermore, that Plato discusses philosophy to instill a belief in true standards for political actions, despite denying the possibility of finding such truth. Finally, I explain how Socrates's explanation of justice lacks any specific content for Glaucon and Adeimantus to internalize and imitate; similarly, Plato does not provide his readers with examples of just actions to imitate.

In chapter three, I argue that Plato educates the passion of anger into a passion of justice. Because Plato suggests Homer's influence by using his word *thumos*, I begin by analyzing the

²⁷ I prefer the word “educative” to “educational” because the latter connotes the teaching of knowledge, while the former connotes the molding of action.

passion of anger as it exists in Homer's character Hector, a passion that responds to wrongs against oneself and one's loved ones. Plato does not take up Hector's view of anger, but perverts it by presenting Thrasymachus, who angers only on behalf of himself; in Thrasymachus, the natural human attachments felt by Hector are absent. Unlike Hector's anger, Thrasymachus's anger not only defends himself against wrongs, but also advances his own causes. In this way, Plato sets up a dichotomy between justice that advances the causes of all, and injustice that advances only one's own causes. I explain how justice and injustice are considered better as passions than as principles. Glaucon takes up the side of justice, against Thrasymachus, and provides images of justice and injustice that educate Plato's readers' anger into the passion of justice, a passion that, when felt, causes men to wish to advance all men's causes.

In chapter four, I argue that Plato educates men to privilege their passion of justice. At the beginning of this introduction, I mentioned a variety of passions that could affect political life, namely pride, resentment, love, fear, grief, and anger. Yet, it is *thumos*, or anger, and not these other emotions, that Plato designates as his third part of the soul, alongside reason and desire. In Homer's character of Achilles, grief and anger are entangled with each other, causing Achilles to act destructively. I discuss Plato's re-characterization of Achilles in his attempt to educate men to de-privilege their passion of grief. I then discuss the problem that Plato perceives with the passion of love. I examine Plato's presentation of the images of communal treatment of women and children and argue that Plato does not seek to rid men of love, but rather to make them love the most, more than their attachments to material objects or to loved ones, the search for truth and, thus, the need to reflect upon their attachments.

In my fifth and final chapter, I discuss the way in which Plato's educates men to reflect, oriented toward truth, upon their passion of justice before acting. He presents the image of

philosopher dogs in order to educate men to reflect on the distinction between good and bad causes to advance. He provides the discussion of justice as a principle in order to encourage men to reflect, oriented toward truth, before acting to promote causes within their political community. Finally, he presents the myth of Er at the end of his work, in order to cause men to reflect, oriented toward truth, before acting to advance their own causes.

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My interpretation of the *Republic* tries to improve upon other interpretations by considering the work as a whole, including its discussions of both politics and philosophy. Epistemological approaches to the *Republic* often focus on the philosophic discussion in Books V through VII without considering the context of the discussion in a work on politics. For example, Martin Heidegger's *The Essence of Truth* discusses chiefly the allegory of the cave, and provides little analysis of the rest of the *Republic*.²⁸ In contrast, the Straussian interpreters emphasizing the political aims of the *Republic*, do not account properly for the presence of the philosophical discussion. Strauss and Bloom believe that philosophy is introduced into the *Republic* in the context of the possibility of the perfectly just city; in the interpretations of these authors, Plato's goal is to show that perfect justice is not possible because philosophy and politics cannot coincide.²⁹ Yet, this interpretation fails to address why Plato would write so extensively about the existence of the truth, presenting this idea powerfully for his readers to internalize. If the Straussian interpretations are correct, it would seem that Plato would have wanted to avoid all such presentations. I concur with the Straussians that Plato does not want

²⁸ Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, trans. Ted Sadler (New York 2013).

²⁹ Strauss, 1978 125; Bloom 410.

men to aim to implement truth directly into their political action, but, unlike the Straussians, I assert that he educates men to be oriented toward the truth and reflect before acting.³⁰

My interpretation differs from Hobbs's interpretation because I do not believe that Plato seeks to educate men to become philosophers. Hobbs argues that Plato introduces the concept of *thumos* in order to make the philosophic life look more attractive to "the energetic young men who Plato is hoping to attract."³¹ Yet, in my understanding of Plato, true philosophers do not care about political concerns. Plato thus appears only to want men concerned with politics to approximate philosophers in their orientation toward truth. Philosophers believe that truth exists in natural matters and they search for it; Plato educates men to believe similarly that a truly best course of action exists. Unlike philosophers, however, he believes that political men must act. They, therefore, do not spend their lives searching for the best course of action, but rather reflect, oriented toward truth, before acting upon their passion of justice.

My interpretation differs from Allen's in that I do not believe Plato attempts to make men internalize truth. Allen writes that Plato tells "noble lies...whose consequence would be that readers who believe them would act more or less as they would if they had in fact assimilated the truth itself."³² I disagree with Allen's assessment because I do not believe that Plato expresses that he knows the truth in matters of political action. I argue against her claim that Plato is concerned with his readers' approximating that which he believes to be just.³³ Instead, I maintain, his concern is that his readers reflect, oriented toward truth, on their passion of justice. Through the process of reflecting, men will avoid impulsive actions, without Plato imparting to

³⁰ I also consider Seth Benardete's *Socrates's Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic*. I do not, however, discuss his work extensively in this paper, because it is an esoterically-written, passage-by-passage analysis of the *Republic*, lacking a clear thesis or argument. In the footnotes, I mention when I draw upon Benardete's observations and when I disagree.

³¹ Hobbs 240

³² Allen, *Why Plato Wrote* (Wiley-Blackwell 2010), 70.

³³ *Ibid.* 5-6, 89-90

them any beliefs concerning the content of the right way to act. I suggest that Allen may neglect this because she possibly does not recognize the enduring importance of the passion of justice to Plato's political education.

The intended result of Plato's educative process is that his readers' anger transforms into a passion of justice, and that his readers reflect, oriented toward truth, before acting on this passion. I argue that Plato conceives of the passion of justice as a potentially constantly-felt passion that attempts to advance the causes of all men. I distinguish between justice as a principle, which I take Plato to use only to educate his readers, and justice as a passion, which I take as Plato's actual conception of justice. Plato intends that his education will cause men to reflect upon their passion of justice before they act upon the pernicious and destructive of their impulses. At the same time, he privileges anger over other passions, viewing it as less destructive than other passions that may be involved political life. Whether Plato is successful in his education and whether such an education provides benefits to mankind are open questions that I will address in my conclusion. My hope is that this paper, in addition to analyzing Plato's education in the *Republic*, will provide insights into the ways that we should discuss the role of passion in our contemporary political debates.

CHAPTER ONE: The methods of Plato's education

Education is often regarded as a theme of the *Republic*. Plato provides extensive discussion of the education of both the guardians of the city created by Socrates and his interlocutors in speech and of the philosophers who rule the city. Allan Bloom compares the *Republic* to *Emile*, Rousseau's work with the subtitle "On Education."³⁴ Bloom writes that "education is the central theme of the *Republic*" because "the city's way of life depends on the character and hence the education of the rulers."³⁵ According to Bloom, Plato outlines the education that is necessary to establish a regime of ideal justice. However, I believe that the *Republic* not only describes education, as Bloom maintains, but also engages in it. Three levels of education exist within the *Republic*: the education of the guardians of the city in speech by Socrates and his interlocutors, the education of Glaucon and Adeimantus by Socrates, and the education of the readers of the *Republic* by Plato.³⁶ In this chapter, I argue that Plato's method of education is to create imitative images that contain within them ideas that Plato wishes his readers to internalize; his readers, upon encountering these ideas, imitate them, and thereby become educated by Plato.

Plato's use of dialogue and dialectic

Before expounding upon my argument, it first is necessary to dispel the idea that Plato's education of his readers proceeds by presenting them with rational argument to understand and implement. This is certainly how much philosophy proceeds— Plato's student Aristotle's works, for example, read like lecture notes. Yet, Plato writes in dialogues. He also propounds that truth

³⁴ Bloom xxiv

³⁵ Ibid. 350

³⁶ I borrow this idea from Allen 2000 272.

only emerges from the dialectical examination of opinions. Through the image of the divided line, Plato suggests that dialectic cannot simply ascertain truth, but examines “hypotheses” in order to attempt to ascertain truth; men are “unable to step out above the hypotheses” without examining them (511a). Plato therefore would not want to provide his readers solely with knowledge to digest because he does not believe that true knowledge can be obtained in this manner.

While Plato perhaps would want to engage in dialectic with his readers in order to reveal the truth to them, Platonic education cannot proceed by dialectic. Plato cannot engage in dialectic with his readers, but only can give them words on a page. It is impossible for readers to present to Plato their opinions on the topic of justice for examination. Perhaps then, Plato simply would want to model dialectic for his readers. By modeling dialectic among his characters, he could encourage his readers to practice dialectic. The conclusions of the *Republic*, itself, therefore would be less important than the way in which the *Republic* provides a model of dialectic, perhaps educating its readers to use dialectic, themselves. The *Republic*, as Leo Strauss says, may not have “a teaching” other than to “present the Socratic way of life as a model.”³⁷

This idea must be rejected, however, because the *Republic* rarely proceeds by dialectic. Socrates does examine the opinions of three characters dialectically in Book I, but he only reaches impasses, teaching his interlocutors that their opinions are incorrect without providing them with any sort of positive education.³⁸ Socrates’s first discussant, Cephalus, leaves the

³⁷ Strauss 1978 51. Strauss likely writes ironically here, as he probably does not believe that everyone is capable of imitating Socrates’s dialectical method. Yet, because not everyone picks up on Strauss’s potential irony the view he expresses enters the scholarly debate over Plato’s reason for choosing to write in dialogue. See, for example, Allen 2010 185-186 n.1.

³⁸ Christina Tarnopolsky suggested this idea. She writes, “Socrates’s style toward his interlocutors in Book 1 was so ineffective and frustrating...It is in fact this ability of images, symbols, or role models to embody contrary principles

conversation before he can be examined further and shown the incoherency of his opinion (331d). Socrates refutes a series of ideas about justice espoused by his second discussant, Polemarchus, before concluding his argument with Polemarchus by asking, “Since it has become apparent that neither justice nor the just is this, what else would one say they are?” (336a). After engaging in lengthy argument with his third discussant, Thrasymachus, Socrates at last makes Thrasymachus admit the inadequacy of his views of justice (354a). Yet, even here, Socrates acknowledges that he has not asserted positively “what the just is” and therefore cannot make the argument that Thrasymachus originally had asked him to make, namely, that “the one who has [justice] is... happy” (354c). Dialectic therefore succeeds at whittling away men’s beliefs, but has trouble instilling positive ones. Plato expresses his view succinctly in Book VII, when Socrates says that dialectic used indiscriminately causes men to be “filled full with lawlessness” (537e).

After Book I, Socrates educates through imagery for the remainder of the work, presenting his interlocutors with a series of images, such as the noble dog, the story of Leontius, the allegory of the sun, the image of the divided line, the allegory of the cave, and the myth of Er. For example, when, in Book II, Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates’s opinion that justice is better than injustice, Socrates does ask his interlocutors to examine his opinion dialectically. Instead, he asks, “If we should watch a city coming into being in speech, would we also see its justice coming into being and its injustice?” (369a). Socrates thus does not proceed dialectically, but instead creates an image for his interlocutors to view, one which will guide the rest of the discussion. He, of course, does not create this image simply on his own, but rather enlists help from his interlocutors. In this way, he ensures that he is educating them correctly,

that allows Socrates to overcome a temporary impasse in the discussion of the guardians that occurs early in Book 2. Tarnopolsky, “*Thumos* and rationality in Plato’s *Republic*” in *Global Discourse* Vol. 5, No. 2, 252-253.

using images that properly impart his chosen concepts. When Socrates strays too far from the images his interlocutors already have internalized, his interlocutors tell him so, presenting him with the opportunity to change his images so as to further persuade them. Examples of his interlocutors' interventions include when Glaucon interrupts Socrates's image of a simple city to say that it is an unintelligible comparison without the introduction of luxury, and when Adeimantus interrupts Socrates to say that the manner of community needs to be discussed further in order for the image to be imitable (372c, 449c-d). At other times, Socrates briefly engages in dialectic in response to his interlocutors' interventions. An example of this brief dialectic is when Adeimantus interrupts to say that Socrates should make the guardians happy, to which Socrates responds that what is crucial is not the happiness of the guardians, but the justice present in the city as a whole (419a-421c). Socrates examines and refutes Adeimantus's opinion, asserting that it would harm the very construction of the image of the perfectly just city, rather than make the image more accessible to his interlocutors.

In order to clarify my assertion that Socrates refines his images to make them accessible and capable of imparting his chosen concepts to his interlocutors, and to distinguish this concept from dialectic, I offer another example, from the end of Book VI. Socrates attempts to educate Glaucon and Adeimantus to internalize a concept of truth that exists separately from themselves. He provides them first with an analogy of the way that sun affects sight, imitating an image that is accessible to Glaucon, to his other interlocutors, and to Plato's readers because such image is part of their continual sensory experiences. In order to see, Socrates maintains, one cannot possess only the ability to see and have objects to see; one also needs a third thing (507d-e). Glaucon realizes, through his own basic knowledge of the world, that this third thing must be the sun, which creates light (508a). Socrates thus leads Glaucon to intimate that just as the sun

illuminates that which we see, the idea of the good illuminates truth (508d-509a). Although Socrates feels satisfied with this image, he needs Glaucon's input in order to ascertain if his image fails to hit its mark. He asks Glaucon to "consider its image still further in this way" (509a). Socrates says, "I suppose you'll say the sun not only provides what is seen with the power of being seen, but also with generation, growth, and nourishment although itself isn't generation," to which Glaucon concurs, "Of course" (509b). Next, attempting to connect this image back to the idea of the good, Socrates says,

Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power. (509b)

Instead of agreeing with this analogy, Glaucon finds it preposterous and says "Apollo, what a demonic excess" (509c). Glaucon is unwilling to accept this image because it does not cohere to his understanding of light and the sun; the imitation is off. While the sun causes generation, growth, and nourishment, it does not, itself, create that which it generates, grows, and nourishes. For example, we may say that the sun is involved in generating, growing, and nourishing a flower, but not that it created the seed of the flower, itself. Once Socrates realizes that his image has failed to resonate with Glaucon, he creates another image, this time of the divided line. Plato thus subtly notes the limits of his educative method: he can only convince men of his concepts to the extent that he can create images that imitate relatable phenomena and experiences.

While Socrates can refer to his pupils to make sure his images are hitting their marks, Plato can do no such thing with his readers. Certain images provided by Plato possibly will not help his readers understand his concepts; for example, those familiar with Homer's use of *thumos* would have found Plato's image of the soul, with its component of *thumos*, more compelling than Plato's modern readers, who lack familiarity with Homer's use of *thumos*. The

dialogic form “helps” Socrates, but Socrates is a literary character and, as such, truly does not need the help. Plato simply could have had Socrates provide the images without the dialogic form. Allen suggests that Plato writes in dialogic form because he wishes to “constantly valorize dialectic” in his writing.³⁹ Yet, as Allen is well aware, given her extended attention to Plato’s use of imagery, Plato’s dialogue does not exemplify dialectic, but rather the adjustment of images to meet the needs of Socrates’s interlocutors. While Plato does not exemplify dialectic, this adjustment of images does exemplify consideration and reflection. Socrates and his interlocutors are not rash in their creation of images; they go about the creative process deliberately and reflectively. This coheres with the argument I will present in chapter two, that Plato’s philosophic education attempts to make men reflect before acting. Furthermore, Plato’s demonstration that Glaucon and Adeimantus accept Socrates’s images suggests to readers that they also should accept such images.

Plato’s theory of imitation

Having established that the *Republic* after Book I mostly does not proceed dialectically, and that dialectic only can refute beliefs and cannot create them, I turn to the way that Plato, as expressed by his character Socrates, demonstrates that imitation works to educate men, as already suggested in the example of the allegory of the sun. Plato’s discussion of poetry in Books III and X differs, but his understanding of the abilities of imitation remains consistent in both books.⁴⁰ Imitation has two roles in Plato’s education of men: first, writers imitate real-

³⁹ Allen 2010 28

⁴⁰ Elizabeth Belfiore discusses the similarity of the discussions of imitation in Books III and X. Belfiore, “A Theory of Imitation in Plato’s *Republic*” in *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 114 (1984), 121-146. I also draw upon the discussion of Plato’s imitation in Eric Havelock *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge 1963). 20-35.

world phenomenon in order to create images for their readers that are consistent with the education they are attempting to provide; second, men imitate these images in such a way as to influence their actions.⁴¹ Although some may find theater more powerful than the written word at transmitting messages, Plato focuses primarily on the written word.⁴² Socrates transitions abruptly in Book III from discussing the imitation of the poets to discussing the imitation of men who read this poetry. After Socrates explains his meaning of imitation to Adeimantus, Adeimantus asks which kinds of poetry will be allowed in the city that they are creating. Socrates does not respond to Adeimantus's question, but instead says, "Now, Adeimantus, reflect on whether our guardians ought to be imitators or not" (394e). Because Adeimantus does not understand why the conversation has taken such a turn, Socrates tells him, "Haven't you observed that imitations, if they are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established habits in nature, in body and sounds and in thought?" (395d). Socrates suggests that written poetic images are powerful enough, if presented and represented continually, to cause men who read them to imitate them throughout their lives. These images have the ability to shape our "habits," "body," "sounds," and "thought" — they are a seemingly all-powerful educative tool. Plato writes that if the guardians are to be "craftsmen of the city's freedom," then "they mustn't do or imitate anything else" (395c); they must not imitate "women," "slaves," "cowards," or "madmen" (395d-396a). Through Socrates's equivalency of the words "do" and "imitate," he suggests a strong connection between action and imitation. Action and imitation are one; when man acts, he is imitating an example for action that he has internalized elsewhere.

⁴¹ My understanding of Plato's use of imitation is similar to that of Allen, expressed throughout *Why Plato Wrote*. Allen 2010.

⁴² Plato also focuses extensively on the educative power of music, but I do not have the space to address this in this paper.

The discussion of poetic images in Book X differs from that in Book III, yet Socrates remains consistent in presenting the connection between the imitation that poets use to form images and the way that men imitate the images they internalize from poetry. In between these conversations, Socrates introduces philosophy as a contrast to poetry, and discusses the effects of poetic imitation pejoratively. He says, “Imitation as an ordinary thing having intercourse with what is ordinary, produces ordinary offspring” (603b). Despite of his judgment that poetic images influence men’s action negatively, however, he still thinks that imitation in poetry creates “offspring” in men, influencing their actions. Plato believes that people respond to poetry so passionately that he speaks of “praisers of Homer who say that this poet educated Greece, and that in the management and education of human affairs it is worthwhile to take him up for study and for living, by arranging one’s whole life according to this poet” (606e). Furthermore, he shows the indelible effect of such poetic images when he says that one should not tell such followers of Homer that Homer tells falsehoods, but instead should “love and embrace them as being men who are the best they can be, and agree that Homer is the most poetic and first of the tragic poets” (607a). Images have such a strong effect on men’s psyches that men cannot be persuaded to abandon the images they have internalized.

Because of men’s inability to abandon images which they already have internalized, the way to re-educate men, in Plato’s view, is to make new images that imitate the previous ones, but possess a new educative message.⁴³ He indicates this in Book II, when he begins the discussion of the role of poetry in the best city. Socrates says to Glaucon,

It is appropriate for the founders to know the patterns according to which the poets must write their tales and from which it is necessary for them not to deviate if they make up tales but it is not necessary for us ourselves to make up the tales. (379a)⁴⁴

⁴³ I am in part indebted to Allen for this idea. See Allen 2000 266; Allen 2010 31-37.

⁴⁴ I take this translation from Allen 2000 266. Her translation better conveys my point here than Bloom’s translation. Bloom writes, the founders “must not themselves take up tales,” which suggests that the founders must

The images that poets already have created thus are repurposed for a new education, a process more effective than Plato's creation of an entirely new system of poetic imagery. Since these images already have been internalized and made powerful within the minds of men, the most forceful way to change men's habits is to repurpose such images. Plato exemplifies this when Socrates says that when he and Glaucon "discuss with" a man whom they wish to persuade, they should "mold" an image "such as the tales say used to come into being in olden times" (588b-c). Glaucon replies, "That's a job for a clever molder, but nevertheless, since speech is more easily molded than wax and the like, consider it as molded" (588c-d).⁴⁵ Through his characters, Plato expresses that it may not be easy to adapt internalized images, such as ancient tales, into new educative tools, but that, with clever image-making, such adaptation is both possible and effective.

Yet, when the writer modifies old images in order to attach new meanings to them, he leaves himself open to the possibility that the original, unmodified, old images will return to sway men's behavior. Socrates tells Glaucon that if he is presented again with poetry from Homer, his behavior may revert, "falling back into this love" that he had prior to his Socratic education (608a). In order to stop himself from becoming corrupted, Socrates tells Glaucon to "chant this speech that we are making to ourselves as a countercharm" (608a).⁴⁶ Plato implies that in order to thwart the possibility that new images will "charm" one into adopting different

not engage in poetic creation. Shorey writes, "the founders are not required themselves to compose fables." This is closer to Allen's intent and therefore gives me more confidence in her translation than Bloom's. Plato, *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, trans. Paul Shorey (London 1969), <http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng1:1.327a>

⁴⁵ I am indebted to Allen for pointing me to this passage. See Allen 2000 272.

⁴⁶ Following Allen, I translate *logos* (λόγος) referring to that which is spoken aloud, as "speech." Bloom translates it both as "speech" and "argument," but to call spoken *logos* "argument" would be to give it the connotation of being logical, which is not necessarily true. See Allen 2000 272. Also see Havelock 161 n. 25. *Logos* is always persuasive, in contrast to a purely aesthetic use of language, but one can be persuasive without being logical. Cf. Bloom 443-444 n. 25.

habits, one must make sure the images that previously molded one's habits remain at the forefront of one's mind. Men are so susceptible to the charm of poetic images, Plato suggests, that their habits can be reformed at any moment by the best of these images. Thus, for the writer who does not want his education to be forgotten or replaced, it is important to ensure that his images have staying power. Plato's images and lessons have remained in men's imaginations for millennia, making his education as successful as any. That Plato's images have staying power in men's minds is evident in the way that thinkers who have followed him tend to rely on or repurpose them. The New Testament and much of philosophy which follows Plato perhaps repurpose Plato's images: most notably, for the Bible, the myth of Er educates men to believe that the result of the afterlife depends on one's living in accordance with what is right in this life, and, for philosophy, Plato's cave educates men to believe that truth exists for the purpose of being "discovered."

Hiding imitation

It is imperative to reconcile Plato's use of imitation, on the one hand, with both Socrates's statements against using certain forms of imitation in Book III and his condemnation of all imitation in Book X, on the other. Why would Plato criticize imitation while employing imitation, himself? I contend that his criticism of imitation is an attempt to hide his own use of it. Plato ensures that men will be suspicious of future attempts to educate them through imitative images; yet, because these same men will not view his images as imitation, they will maintain the legitimacy of such images. This is the secret to the enduring influence of Plato's images and education.

When Plato introduces imitation in Book III, he drops several subtle hints that he intends to hide his use of it. Socrates first raises the idea that the poets provide imitations to Adeimantus, and Adeimantus fails to comprehend what Socrates means by imitation. He tells Socrates that he needs “a still clearer understanding of this” (392d). Responding that he must be a “ridiculous teacher, and an unclear one,” Socrates proceeds, ironically, to use imitation to teach Adeimantus about imitation (392d). Clear teachers, Socrates implies, use imitation to educate. Imitating Homer, Socrates recites lines from the *Iliad* in order to explain his point. Adeimantus appears oblivious to Socrates’s use of imitation to introduce the concept of imitation. Most scholars of Plato seem, like Adeimantus, oblivious to Plato’s method, suggesting Plato’s success at hiding his use of imitation, or at least his use of imitation to introduce the concept of imitation.⁴⁷ Much later in the dialogue, Adeimantus tells Socrates, “I suppose [you] aren’t used to speaking through images,” further showing Plato’s success in obscuring the educative method by which Socrates has been educating Adeimantus all along. Returning to Book III, Plato continues to deepen this irony, as Socrates says immediately after he quotes the *Iliad*,

The poet himself speaks and doesn’t attempt to turn our thought elsewhere, as though someone other than he were speaking... [He] tries as hard as he can to make it seem to us that it’s not Homer speaking, but the priest, an old man. (393a-b)

Plato, like Homer, tries earnestly to make it appear that he is not the speaker; in Plato’s case, he tries to make it seem like Socrates is the speaker. Plato furthers this irony, as Socrates says, “If the poet nowhere hid himself, his poetic work and narrative as a whole would have taken place without imitation” (393c-d). Socrates will continue to educate with imitation, hiding himself by claiming that he is not using imitation; Plato, likewise, will continue to speak through his

⁴⁷ An example of a scholar who has noticed this irony is Graham Parkes, *Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology* (Chicago 1994), 75-79. Cf. Allen 2010 56; Benardete 70; Belfiore 125.

characters. Both Plato and his character Socrates thus hide themselves exactly as the imitator Socrates describes.

In his discussion of the way that the guardians will be imitators, Plato suggests that Glaucon and Adeimantus also will become imitators. Socrates asks Adeimantus to “reflect on whether our guardians ought to be imitators or not” (394e). The guardians, Socrates says, should only imitate one man because “the same man isn’t able to imitate many things as well as one” (394e). Soon after, Socrates declares,

In my opinion, when the sensible man comes in his narrative to some speech or deed of a good man, he will be willing to report it as though he himself were that man and won’t be ashamed of such an imitation. He will imitate the good man most when he is acting steadily and prudently; less, and less willingly, when he’s unsteadied by diseases, loves, drink, or some other misfortune. (396c-d)

He intends that Glaucon and Adeimantus, wanting to be “good men,” will follow his lead and be willing to imitate images when such images appear steady and prudent. They will not, however, imitate images that appear rash, or what we might call irrational. If they were to imitate such rash images, they would be imitating many things, rather than the singular image of prudence and steadiness. Socrates cements Glaucon and Adeimantus’s willingness to imitate only the steady and prudent images he will provide to them and no other images, saying,

Now, as it seems, if a man who is able by wisdom to become every sort of thing and to imitate all things should come to our city, wishing to make a display of himself and his poems, we would fall on our knees before him as a man sacred, wonderful and pleasing; but we would say that there is no such man among us in the city, nor is it lawful for such a man to be born there. We would send him to another city, with myrrh poured over his head and crowned with wool, while we ourselves would use a more austere and less pleasing poet and teller of tales for the sake of benefit, one who would imitate the style of the decent man. (398a-b)

Socrates warns that other images might appear “sacred, wonderful and pleasing,” but insists on Glaucon and Adeimantus’s commitment to imitate only his own images. He secures their allegiance by providing his interlocutors with an image, that of the pleasingly moving poet.

Having secured their loyalty, Socrates will educate Glaucon and Adeimantus with his images of prudence and steadiness. Plato's readers, internalizing these same images, similarly will become primed to be educated by the images that Socrates presents.

When Plato returns to the discussion of imitation in Book X, Socrates has completed his education of Glaucon and Adeimantus. He already has given them a philosophic education that has made them believe in the existence of truth that exists outside of themselves, as I will discuss in chapter two. Although I have not yet demonstrated the argument of chapter two, I submit that Socrates successfully has educated his interlocutors, using imitation, to believe in the existence of external truth.⁴⁸ At the end of Book IX, Socrates reminds Glaucon that their city in speech most likely cannot come into existence. He gives Glaucon a message of hope, nonetheless, saying, "But in heaven, perhaps, a pattern is laid up for the man who wants to see and found a city within himself on the basis of what he sees" (592b). Socrates thus suggests to Glaucon that, in the absence of the ability to live in the best city, Glaucon should try to imitate the pattern in heaven within himself. Yet, immediately after this conversation, Socrates opens Book X by saying that he is especially glad that they did not admit

at all any part of [poetry] that is imitative. For that the imitative, more than anything, must not be admitted looks, in my opinion, even more manifest now that the soul's forms have each been separated out. (595a-b)

This statement appears to conflict with both his statement in Book III that men are to imitate the steady and prudent, and his recent statement that men should imitate the pattern in heaven.

Socrates's abrupt departure— from his suggestion to Glaucon in Book III that he should imitate the pattern in heaven to his present condemnation of all that is imitative— illuminates the way in

⁴⁸ Strauss notes that in comparison to the Book X discussion of poetry, the Book III discussion is "pre-philosophic." Leo Strauss, "The Origins of Political Science and The Problem of Socrates: Six Public Lectures" in *Interpretation*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1996), 195.

which he tries to redefine imitation. It was necessary for him to commend imitation of that which is steady and prudent in Book III in order for his education to proceed; without acceptance of such imitation, he would have been unable to introduce images, such as the sun, divided line, and cave as educative devices later. However, now that he successfully has educated his interlocutors to believe in the existence of truth that can be discovered like a pattern in heaven, he no longer needs imitation. In fact, if he can convince his interlocutors that imitating the pattern in heaven is not actually imitation, then he can dismiss imitation entirely. Covering his tracks, Socrates will ensure that his interlocutors will not accept any new images, or return to old ones, such as Homer's images, that deny the existence of truth. Plato's readers, whom he has led along the same argument, similarly will be led to reject all future attempts, and all reversions to past attempts, at using imagery to deny the existence of truth.

In order to play such a trick on his interlocutors, Socrates must redefine imitation from the way in which he defined it in Book III. In Book III, the guardians are said to "imitate the good man most when he is acting steadily and prudently" (396d). Socrates discussed imitation extensively and seemed to have a clear understanding of its properties and capabilities. In Book X, however, Socrates at first claims complete ignorance about imitation. He says to Glaucon, "Could you tell me what imitation in general is? For I myself can scarcely comprehend what it wants to be" (595c). After Glaucon punts the question back to him, Socrates says,

Do you want us to make our consideration according to our customary procedure, beginning from the following point? For we are, presumably, accustomed to set down some one particular form for each of the particular 'manys' to which we apply the same name. (596a)

In Book III, Socrates explained imitation to Adeimantus by saying that he would "cut off a part and with it attempt to make plain to you what I want" (392d-e). Here, however, Socrates attempts to move from a "part" to the "whole." Rather than explain imitation in terms of its

educative context, describing how poets imitate because their imitations contain lessons to be imitated and implemented by their readers, Socrates now explains imitation simply as imitation, regardless of educative context. Imitation, he claims, expresses ideas that contain *true* or *false* lessons. Earlier, there were no true or false lessons in Socrates's explanation of imitation, but simply lessons that could result in either steady and prudent action or chaotic action. In Socrates's Book X explanation, in contrast, imitators must "be in possession of knowledge" of what they imitate, lest their imitations will be merely "phantoms" (598b-e). The only way for a man to know whether the poet possesses such knowledge is for the man first to possess such knowledge, himself. Therefore, the man who believes in the existence of truth will not trust any imitation without first considering whether it is true. Plato thus denies the power of imitation as an educative device. Instead of some imitation helping men to be steady and prudent, all "imitation keeps company with the part in us that is far from prudence, and is not comrade and friend for any healthy or true purpose" (603a-b). The only way to access truth, therefore, is to consider what is true, oneself, and not to be led by another's imitations. By presenting this argument, Plato believes he can ensure that his readers' educations will not be for naught when they encounter another powerful education that uses imitations. His readers, he hopes, will continue to be compelled by his imitative images, and, thus, his education.

Now that I have examined the power of education using imitative images, I can look at the ways by which Plato employs such an education to educate his readers. In chapter two, I will argue that Plato uses his imitative education both to make his readers wish to imitate philosophers and to provide imitative images that cause men to internalize a conception of truth which they should attempt to reference when deciding whether to act on their passions.

CHAPTER TWO: The education in reflection

In Books V through VII, Plato's characters discuss philosophy. The conversation begins when Glaucon asks Socrates how it could be that the city which they are creating in speech could come into being. Socrates responds that the only way the best city could come into being is if "the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, and political power and philosophy coincide in the same place" (473c-d). From here, Plato begins a discussion of philosophy, which some scholars interpret as Plato asserting a metaphysical "theory of the forms" which guide action. Unlike such scholars, I do not interpret Plato as believing that there are forms that contain the truth of which actions men should or should not take. Instead, I believe that Plato discusses the forms in order to orient men toward truth, an orientation that he wishes them to have when they reflect upon whether to act upon their passions.

In this chapter, I show how Plato educates men to reflect before acting on their passions. I argue that Plato wants his readers to internalize the *existence* of truth and to understand that it is good to search for such truth. Plato wants his readers to be oriented toward truth, but he does not engage in argumentation to prove that such truth exists as a standard for action. His hope is that men will reflect upon their passions, considering the truth of the way that they should act, before acting. Plato gives his readers an image of the philosopher-ruler as a role-model to imitate, but denies them the ability to imitate the specific proposals that he provides. He provides his readers with images that suggest that men can act in accordance with truth, but does not provide the truths with which they could act in accordance. Thus, I maintain, Plato's discussion of philosophy does not intend to argue for the existence of true standards for action or politics, but

rather intends to educate his readers: he wishes for men to be oriented toward truth and to reflect before acting on their passions.

The lack of proof of the existence of truth for action and politics

Several scholars suggest that Plato provides a standard of truth for action and politics in the discussion of philosophy. Because she similarly understands Plato's aims in the *Republic* as educative, I interrogate the view of Allen. I argue that Allen's interpretation presupposes, but fails to prove, that Plato believes that men can act in accordance with truth.

In *Why Plato Wrote*, Allen regards Plato as considering the discovery of truth as a separate activity from education.⁴⁹ For Plato's educative techniques, Allen distinguishes between two kinds of poetic imitation for which Plato uses different language: the first is "model-making" (*graphein* and *plattein*), which conveys "true concepts" through symbols, and the second is "shadow-making" (*mimeomai*), which conveys, through imitation, false concepts.⁵⁰ By asserting a difference between "models" and "shadows," Allen implies that Plato utilizes a two-step process to influence men's actions: first, an act of philosophizing that determines that which is true, and, second, an act of transmitting these concepts using "models" which allow men to grasp concepts that are true.⁵¹ The problem with Allen's approach, as I see it, is that Plato does not suggest a connection between metaphysical truth and truly just actions.

I first will elucidate Allen's understanding of Plato's test of what makes a model "metaphysically sound," or in accordance with truth. She claims that the test used by Plato to determine if a model is metaphysically sound is whether the model does not result in "cognitive

⁴⁹ It is unclear whether Allen holds this opinion in *The World of Prometheus*. Cf. Allen 2000 269-271.

⁵⁰ Allen 2010 44, 55-56

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 47, 56-57

conflict” when internalized. Allen suggests that Plato illuminates his understanding of cognitive conflict through an example he gives in Book X.⁵² Socrates describes a bent oar, saying,

And the same things look bent and straight when seen in water and out of it, and also both concave and convex due to the sight’s being misled by the colors, and every sort of confusion of this kind is plainly in our soul. And, then, it is because they take advantage of this affection in our nature that shadow painting, and puppeteering, and many other tricks of the kind fall nothing short of wizardry. (602c-d)

The poets take advantage of the mirage to make a concept appear real to others; Allen considers this a false shadow that promotes cognitive conflict because “one’s eyes communicate one thing...while reason conveys another.”⁵³ Models, on the other hand, “capture reality and therefore introduce no cognitive conflict.”⁵⁴ The “model” in this example would not suggest that the oar is actually bent, but would confirm to men the truth, that the oar is straight.

In the Book X example, there is a clear distinction between what is true and what is false. The reflection of the oar is a “shadow,” while the truth is that the oar, itself, is straight. Yet, Plato does not provide a similar explanation of how one can discern whether one’s actions are true or false. Allen attempts to fill in Plato’s gaps. She writes,

The philosopher has the job of looking closely at divine order with the goal of putting that order into effect in human behavior, both “molding” his own personality to that order and trying to mold the personalities of others too (500d).⁵⁵

This is the passage to which Allen refers with her parenthetical citation:

Socrates: Do you suppose there is any way of keeping someone from imitating that which he admires and therefore keeps company with?

Glaucon: It’s not possible.

Socrates: Then it’s the philosopher, keeping company with the divine and the orderly who becomes orderly and divine, to the extent that is possible for a human being. (500d)⁵⁶

⁵² Ibid. 46

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 152

⁵⁶ I have edited this passage from Bloom’s translation to read “Socrates:” and “Glaucon:” for clarity. My edits do not leave out anything of note because Socrates provides no narration beyond indicating who said each statement.

Plato does not appear to suggest, as Allen writes, that the philosopher “molds” his personality to a divine, or true, “order.” He does not look to this order to confirm his actions as “true.” Instead, the philosopher merely “keep[s] company with” the divine. His habit of finding the truth of metaphysical matters provides him with orientation toward the truth. Unlike in metaphysical matters, Plato does not suggest that there is actually a truth that men can find to direct their action. Instead, he suggests, the philosopher is oriented toward truth, without finding such truth, because his search for truth in metaphysical matters gives him the habit of reflecting on the truth in all matters, including his action. In action, this truth cannot be found, but the philosopher still reflects as if it is possible to find it. The philosopher does not act blindly on whatever he “admires,” but rather reflects before acting. The discussion of philosophy, therefore, does not appear to suggest that there are truly just actions, but that being oriented toward truth causes men to reflect before acting. Allen presupposes that Plato believes in the existence of truly just actions, but she does not prove that Plato so believes this to be so.

Now that I have demonstrated that there is no reason to presume that Plato considers there to be true standards for action, I will review the discussion of philosophy with an open mind. I argue, first, that the discussion of philosophy serves to make men internalize the existence of truth and want to search for such truth by establishing the philosopher as a role model; second, that the use of imitative imagery aids Plato in this same process; third, that the end of this discussion shows that attempting to design politics based on truth, alone, is impossible and results in ridiculous outcomes; and last, that the result of the discussion is that men are educated to reflect before acting on their passions.

The philosopher/philosopher-ruler as a role model

I do not judge harshly the scholars who see Plato as asserting the existence of true standards for action in his discussion of philosophy, as I believe that Plato purposefully makes it difficult to distinguish his discussion of philosopher-rulers from a discussion of metaphysical philosophy. Like many of Plato's readers, Glaucon misunderstands Socrates's intentions throughout the discussion of philosophy. Socrates wishes for Glaucon to view the philosopher as a role model during much of this discussion and therefore misleads Glaucon into thinking that they are discussing the philosopher proper; likewise, Plato wishes his readers to take the philosopher as a role model and thus similarly misleads him. Hobbs also argues that Plato wishes to make the philosopher a role model in his discussion of philosophy.⁵⁷ I believe that she does not notice the way in which Socrates conflates the philosopher with the philosopher-ruler because she does not believe that Plato plays such educative tricks upon his readers.⁵⁸ Hobbs further argues that Plato wants men to embrace a philosophic life.⁵⁹ Conversely, I maintain that by making the philosopher-ruler appear the same as the philosopher proper, Plato valorizes the philosopher's search for truth and, at the same time, stays connected to political matters and aims to transform political life.

The beginning of the discussion of philosophy leaves unresolved whether the discussion will relate to philosopher-rulers or philosophy proper. Glaucon asks Socrates how this city in speech could come into being. Glaucon's *thumos* bristles at the possibility that the best city that he has helped to create will not be capable of coming into being; he is angry about the potential inability of his vision of what is right to be actualized and longs for perfect justice (as I will

⁵⁷ Hobbs 59-67, 241-244

⁵⁸ Ibid. 64-65

⁵⁹ Ibid. 241-242

discuss further in chapter three).⁶⁰ Socrates responds that if “there is to be rest from ills for the cities,” then “political power and philosophy” need to “coincide in the same place” (473d). Glaucon replies that people will find this suggestion absurd and that Socrates needs “to show the disbelievers that it is as *you* say” (474b, italics original). Socrates says to Glaucon, “It’s necessary in my opinion, if we are somehow going to get away from the men you speak of, to distinguish whom we mean when we dare to assert philosophers must rule” (474b). The following discussion, Socrates thus indicates, will discuss philosophers in the context of their ruling. Socrates does not illuminate whether he will discuss philosophers as philosophers or only philosophers as rulers; therefore, as the discussion continues, Glaucon— and Plato’s readers— will be able to read the discussion as discussing philosophers regardless of whether or not such philosophers are ruling, and to understand the activity of both philosophers and philosopher-rulers as primarily a search for truth. From the outset, however, Socrates does suggest to Glaucon— and thus Plato suggests to his readers— that the philosophers/philosopher-rulers ought to be emulated. The philosophers should “lead a city” and everyone else should not “engage in philosophy and... follow the leader” (473c), suggesting to Glaucon and Plato’s readers that philosophers are leaders and role models. Plato believes such statements will cause Socrates’s interlocutors and Plato’s readers to imitate the philosopher because they will not wish to be the sheep following the philosophers, but instead consider themselves capable of being powerful leaders.

As the discussion continues, Plato further conflates the philosopher and philosopher-ruler. Socrates concludes a speech that outlines the nature of philosophers, saying “And so, Glaucon, through a somewhat lengthy speech, who the philosophers are and who the

⁶⁰ See p. 68-75

nonphilosophers has, with considerable effort, somehow been brought to light” (484a). Yet, after this lengthy discussion of the philosophers, the discussion abruptly returns to the philosopher-ruler. Glaucon does not immediately understand why the conversation has moved back to discussing ruling and has to be led through the speech. After Socrates attempts to coax Glaucon into making the philosophers rule by giving him an option between the philosophers and the nonphilosophers, Glaucon responds, “How should we put [this notion] to speak sensibly?” (484b). The laws, Glaucon thinks, already have been established by himself, Socrates, and Adeimantus. He seems to ask, why does there need to be a leader who might change the laws that I have created? Socrates replies that the philosophers should rule because a “sharp-sighted” ruler is preferable to a “blind” one. Thus, by not stating when the philosophers actually will have to practice philosophy in order to rule, Socrates avoids the implication of Glaucon’s question (484c). Socrates continues that the philosophers look “off as painters do toward what is truest, and ever referring to it and contemplating it as precisely as possible— to give laws about what is fine just, and good” (484c). Similar to how Socrates’s assertion that the philosophers should “keep company with” that which is true does not suggest that such philosophers find the truth of how men should act, Socrates does not suggest with this statement that philosophers find true action. Instead, he states only that philosophers contemplate the “truest.” Furthermore, this still does not clarify for Glaucon why philosophers are to rule. Did not Socrates and his interlocutors proceed to create the best city in Books II through V, before the introduction of philosophy?

Adeimantus enters the conversation, unwilling simply to concede that philosophers, as they have been described, should rule. What is the connection, Adeimantus seems to ask, between the metaphysical work of the philosopher, who understands the distinction between

truth and illusion of natural matters, such as a bent or straight oar, and politics? Is not such knowledge, Adeimantus asks, “useless to the cities” and to political matters (487d)? To Adeimantus’s surprise, Socrates does not respond by explaining how philosophers can arrive at the truth of how a city can be ruled, but instead provides an image (487e). Plato uses images, as I demonstrated in chapter one, to educate men to take on the views that he wishes; here, Plato wishes to show that philosophy is in fact useful to the cities. Socrates gives an image of a ship captained by the man who is best at persuading others to let him be captain, rather than by the man who is best at navigating. Socrates suggests that a parallel reason explains why philosophers appear useless to cities: they have the knowledge to lead, but the masses do not recognize this (488a-489a). With this image of the ship, Socrates sidesteps Adeimantus’s challenge. He does not explain how philosophy provides men with the knowledge necessary for political rule, but only why the multitude would not perceive philosophers as having such knowledge. Adeimantus and Glaucon (and, given the scholarship, seemingly most of Plato’s readers) do not realize Socrates’s sleight of hand and accept that philosophers should rule.⁶¹ Socrates thus successfully conflates the philosopher with the ruler and thereby enables himself to discuss the philosopher and philosopher-ruler as if they are a single concept. By declaring that philosophy should rule, Plato therefore makes philosophy seem both necessary to political life and worthy of great honors. The philosopher, Socrates states, “must be set up as ruler and be given gifts and prizes both when he is alive and after he has died” (503a). He later says that “the city makes public memorials and sacrifices to [the philosophers]” (540b).⁶² Socrates’s

⁶¹ Benardete appears to notice the manner in which Socrates, by presenting natural philosophy as possessing the tools needed for political rule, sidesteps Adeimantus’s challenge. “Socrates convinces Adeimantus that the pre-Socratic Socrates should rule. He convinces him that pre-Socratic philosophy is competent to do what it never dreamed of doing... Socrates has never been wittier.” Benardete 146. Bloom and Allen are examples of scholars who do not appear to notice Plato’s sleight of hand. Bloom 397-401; Allen 2010 188 n.8.

⁶² Hobbs also notes the rewards to be given to the philosophers. Hobbs 241.

interlocutors, and Plato's readers, thus are made to revere philosophy and its search for truth, and to take the philosopher as an image or role model to be imitated in political life.

In order to continue the conflation of philosopher and ruler, Plato needs to remind his readers that philosophy must concern itself with politics, despite its seeming lack of concern for political matters. Glaucon continues to be confused by the difference between philosophy proper and philosophy as the art of rule, and Socrates must remind him that philosophers need to remain involved with political concerns. Socrates has made philosophy so reverential that there is seemingly no need for man to involve himself with political concerns. He says that those schooled in philosophy will believe "they have emigrated to a colony on the Isles of the Blessed while they are still alive," or a happy place where good men live forever, and Glaucon concurs (519c).⁶³ Socrates continues,

Then our job as founders is to compel the best natures to go to the study which we were saying before is the greatest, to see the good and to go up that ascent; and when they have gone up and seen sufficiently not to permit them...to remain there and not be willing to go down again among those prisoners or share their labors and honors, whether they be slighter or more serious. (519c-d)

Glaucon is confused by this statement, as he had thought that philosophy was being extolled for its own virtues and not for its political effect. No longer interested in the worldly honors that had made him revere philosophy at the beginning of this discussion, Glaucon responds, "What? Are we to do them an injustice, and make them live a worse life when a better is possible for them?" (519d). When Socrates reminds Glaucon that he has "again forgotten" that their aim was political harmony and not the creation of philosophers, Glaucon responds, "That's true, I did forget" (519e-520a). Glaucon thus has become so convinced of the merit of a philosophic life that searches for truth that he must be reminded by Socrates of political concerns.

⁶³ Bloom explains the significance of Socrates's reference to the Isles of the Blessed. Bloom 465 n. 4.

Even though Socrates reminds Glaucon of the necessity of political life, Glaucon's reverence for philosophy is so strong that he forgets again soon thereafter. Socrates momentarily defends philosophy over political concerns, perhaps in order to test Glaucon over whether he cares more for philosophy or politics, and Glaucon concurs with Socrates's defense of philosophy. To preserve the honor of philosophy, Socrates asserts, care should be taken "that men who aren't worthy [do not] take [philosophy] up" so that philosophy's detractors cannot "pour even more ridicule over philosophy" (535c, 536b). Glaucon responds, "That would indeed be shameful" (536b). Socrates, either realizing his error or perhaps determining that Glaucon has failed his test, replies,

I seem to have been somewhat ridiculously affected just now... I forgot that we were playing and spoke rather intensely. For as I was talking I looked at Philosophy and, seeing her undeservingly splattered with mud, I seem to have been vexed and said what I had to say too seriously as though my *thumos* were aroused against those who are responsible. (536b-c, capitalization original)⁶⁴

While Socrates suggests that he momentarily had been defending the cause of philosophy over the cause of justice, this, in fact, is not his intention in this discussion of philosophy. Rather, he wishes his interlocutors to give reverence to philosophy so that they will reflect upon political action as philosophers reflect upon the truth of metaphysical matters; he does not wish to give reverence to philosophy for its own sake. Socrates thinks Glaucon's *thumos* should not be aroused against those who commit wrongs against philosophy, but rather against those who commit wrongs against political life. (As I will discuss in chapter three, *thumos* is aroused against wrongdoing.) Glaucon replies to Socrates, "No, by Zeus, that's not the way you seemed to me, the listener" (536c). Glaucon still wants to defend philosophy for its own sake and fails to recognize that Socrates's aim in their discussion of philosophy is to instill in Glaucon admiration

⁶⁴ Here and throughout later chapters, I replace Bloom's word "spiritedness" for the Greek word *thumos*.

for the search for truth so that he will apply it to his political life.⁶⁵ Plato thus has to draw his readers back to caring about political matters, and I will show in chapter five the manner by which he reconnects philosophy to political concerns, by providing images that result in the need to reflect upon which and whose and which causes should be advanced.

Some of Plato's readers may be convinced, as Glaucon momentarily is, that political life is unworthy when compared to the wonders of philosophy. Strauss, in a sense, is one of these readers. He comes close to defending a philosophic life with no concern for politics, but does not do so because he realizes that philosophy is affected by political concerns. Strauss argues that for the philosopher, the reason to care about life, itself, is philosophy; the philosopher, Strauss writes, "realizing the essential limitations of the political" by reading the *Republic*, gains "the understanding...that it is better not to be born than never to have felt that charm" of philosophy.⁶⁶ When Strauss says that the philosopher only cares about political matters because "philosophy stands or falls by the city," he suggests that the reason to preserve political order is to preserve the ability of philosophers to live the philosophic life.⁶⁷ Strauss therefore justifies political involvement on the basis of the survival of philosophy. He displays a seeming lack of concern for all those who are not philosophers, or, at best, a concern for them only because they satisfy the philosopher's need for non-philosophic men whom they can observe in order to engage in that which Strauss considers political philosophy. Judging by Strauss, it appears that

⁶⁵ Cf. Allen's interpretation of the same passage, Allen 2000 270. She writes, "[Socrates] decides that he has spoken too severely out of anger before Glaucon has even noticed that he is getting angry. The philosopher will be so finely attuned to the problem of anger that he can feel and bring a halt to the onset of anger in himself before anyone else even realizes that anger has begun. Even as a *rhetor*, as a speaker and as a persuader, he will not allow anger to slip into his speech." I believe that by emphasizing the presence of anger, rather than that at which Socrates's anger is directed, Allen misses the significance of this passage.

⁶⁶ Strauss, *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss* (Chicago 1989), 162.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* Cf. Strauss's veiled critique of Heidegger in *What is Political Philosophy?* (Chicago 1959), 26-27. See also Steven B. Smith, "Philosophy as a Way of Life: The Case of Leo Strauss" in *The Review of Politics* Vol. 71 (2009), 37-53.

in describing the powers of philosophy, Plato perhaps overstates his case and makes some readers prefer the philosophic life to political life.

Plato's education to instill the existence of, and need to search for, truth

Now that I have examined the purpose of the discussion of philosophy, I return to the imitative imagery that Plato and Socrates use in order to instill so deeply within their readers and interlocutors, respectively, the existence of truth for which men should search. The existence of truth that man does not create, but discovers, seems obvious to modern readers, perhaps as the enduring effect of Plato's education. However, this same concept would not have been obvious to Plato's early readers or to the characters of his dialogue, as evidenced by Socrates's need to educate his interlocutors in these matters. Plato thus uses imitative imagery, namely the allegory of the sun, the image of the divided line, and the allegory of the cave, powerfully to educate his readers to internalize the existence of truth and to cause them to want to search for it.

I already discussed, in chapter one, Plato's use of imitative imagery to instill the existence of truth with the allegory of the sun in chapter one. In chapter one, my objective was illustrating that Socrates relies on his interlocutors' interventions to know when to adjust his images.⁶⁸ I briefly will review it again in the context of my new objective, arguing that the allegory of the sun allows Plato to suggest that something other than man is required to illuminate truth. Socrates attempts to educate Glaucon into believing that there is such thing as the "idea of the good" and that this idea is the cause of everything that exists in the world. He uses an image that he knows will be accessible to Glaucon in order to instill this concept, describing how in order to see, one must have eyes, an object that one is perceiving, and light to

⁶⁸ See p. 21-22.

illuminate the object (407d-e). As the sun provides light that illuminates what we see, Socrates says, the idea of the good illuminates truth so that we may comprehend it as knowledge (508d). Socrates thereby is able to establish, by using imagery easily accessible to Glaucon, that what illuminates truth is external to man; Plato similarly establishes this concept for his readers by using imagery easily accessible to them.

While Plato thus is able to establish that the illumination of truth occurs by an external entity, he needs to establish that truth, itself, is external to man. He therefore has Socrates attempt to extend this allegory to say that just as the sun causes “generation, growth, and nourishment,” the idea of the good causes the “existence and being” of “the things known” (509b). Yet, this imagery does not continue to imitate the sun, as the sun does not cause, for example, a seed to exist, but only helps the seed grow into a flower. Glaucon rejects this analogy as a “demonic excess” (509c). Plato therefore introduces his second image, that of the divided line. He first presents an image of a line in an attempt to show Glaucon the levels of imagination, opinion, thought, and intellection (511d-e). Glaucon understands the difference between an object of the imagination and an object that is perceived, but this image of the divided line on its own is insufficient to help him understand what Socrates means by thought and knowledge or that truth exists independently from man (510b). Socrates therefore modifies his abstract example to imitate a practice with which Glaucon already is familiar: the practice of geometry. Socrates says that just as geometers draw a single shape to gain knowledge of the truth of shapes, themselves, the “soul in investigating [the form] is compelled to use hypotheses, and does not go to a beginning because it is unable to step out above the hypotheses” (511a). The use of an image of a shape to approximate the idea of a shape, or the use of an image of truth to approximate truth, itself, is “thought.” Geometers do not create the shape, but only access the

truth of it by drawing shapes; likewise, men do not create truth, but only access it by hypothesizing and then, Socrates says, testing their hypotheses using dialectic to determine whether such hypotheses hold up to scrutiny (511c). Socrates thus has given his interlocutors, and Plato has given his readers, an image that allows them to conceptualize the existence of truth which they can access, but which they do not, themselves, create. This image does not prove the existence of such a concept as it relates to politics, because Socrates does not establish why we should view knowledge of political life as analogous to knowledge of geometric truths.

Having established the existence of truth, Plato proceeds to make men want to search for such truth. He introduces a third image, telling Glaucon, “Make an image of our nature in its education and want of education” (514a). Plato creates an image accessible to his readers, describing men wanting of education as living in a cave, in which they only view shadows of statues created for them by others holding statues in front of a light (514c-515a). These men take what they see in the cave as real, when they are only shadows. Through an arduous and painful process, a man in this situation can be led by another to realize that what he saw were only shadows, and that there is something that “*is*” that he can see “more correctly” (515d, italics original). Socrates emphasizes the pain involved in this process, saying that when this man first was forced to leave the cave, he would be “distressed and annoyed at being so dragged” (515e). By presenting the search for truth as rewarding, albeit painful, Socrates makes his interlocutors— and Plato makes his readers— want to engage in this journey. They want to search for truth, themselves, so that they can prove themselves no longer under the delusion of others. Just as Glaucon would rather be the philosopher than the nonphilosopher because he would prefer to rule than be ruled, he would rather search for truth than rely on shadows created by others because he does not want to be in the control of others. Socrates thus uses the image of the cave

to internalize in his interlocutors— and Plato uses it to internalize his readers— the need to search for truth.

While Plato earlier used the promise of great honors to make men want to be philosophers, he now revises this promise, as men are not likely to honor men who take political stances which differ from their own. The philosopher does not desire honors from the multitude and wants “anything whatsoever rather than to opine [on that which the men in the cave opine] and live that way” (516d). The man who attempts to convince other men to search for truth, such as Socrates with his interlocutors or Plato with his readers, similarly will be scorned or even killed (517a). Plato thus primes his readers for the fact that the search for truth involves hardship and that they may not be revered by their fellow men for engaging in or encouraging it. He wants men to search for truth in spite of the scorn they may receive. In the myth of Er in Book X, Plato says that men who search for truth will be more likely to enjoy happiness in their next lives, perhaps so that he can convince men to search for truth despite the scorn and hardship they may experience.⁶⁹ Even before the myth of Er, however, Glaucon accepts the image of the cave and expresses his desire to search for truth. Socrates is thus successful in educating Glaucon; Plato is successful in using the imitative images of the sun, divided line, and cave in order to instill in his readers the existence of truth and the need to search for it.

The lack of truth generated by philosophy

One might expect, given that Plato instills in his readers the need to search for truth, that the dialogue would proceed to dramatize the undertaking of this search. Socrates introduces dialectic as the manner in which one should search for truth, and he defines it as the use of

⁶⁹ See p. 98-100 for further discussion of the myth of Er.

“discussion—by means of speech without the use of any of the senses— to attain to each thing itself that *is*” (532a, italics original). It seems only natural that Plato’s next step would be to use dialectic to determine the political things. Proceeding in this fashion, it would be reasonable for the characters now to go back and revise everything that they had created through images in Books II through IV with their newfound power of dialectic so that the actual truth of such things could be found.

Plato, however, suggests that dialectic cannot, in fact, provide such concrete answers about the political things that they have already discussed. Glaucon intimates that he wishes to use dialectic to examine political life. After Socrates finishes explaining dialectic, Glaucon says, “Let’s proceed to the song itself and go through it just as we went through the prelude” (532d). However, Socrates declares that he cannot continue this journey with Glaucon. Instead, Socrates merely insists again on the importance of the education that Glaucon has just received. Glaucon must remember “that there is some such [truth] to see must be insisted on” and “that the power of dialectic alone could reveal it to man...while it is in no other way possible” (533a). Socrates reveals that dialectic does not have the purpose of securing the truth of political things, but rather an educative purpose. He says, “We have placed dialectic at the top of studies like a coping stone and... no other study can be set higher than this one” (534e). Glaucon thus is made to reverse the process of using dialectic to examine opinions without being told of the truth that results from such examination. Plato’s readers similarly are educated to want to examine their opinions.

Plato may worry, however, that using dialectic to examine opinions without providing answers may cause men to be unable or unwilling to take political action. As indicated in chapter one, the use of dialectic to examine opinions of justice results in the destruction of those

opinions without replacing them with new positive answers.⁷⁰ With no truth to be found, men may become entirely disillusioned with acting. The use of dialectic therefore may cause men to become skeptical and doubtful, rather than reflective. It thus becomes necessary for Plato to emphasize the existence of truth, so that men will continue to search for it even if they do not find it. Socrates notes that “the harm coming from the practice of dialectic these days” is that “its students are filled full with lawlessness” (537e). Such practitioners of dialectic, Socrates says,

Misuse [dialectical speech] as though it were play, always using them to contradict; and imitating those men by whom they are refuted, they themselves refute others, like puppies enjoying pilling and tearing with speech at those who happen to be near. (539b)

In order to describe this problem further, Socrates creates an image of a child who reveres his parents and follows that which they consider honorable. Such a child would be immune to flatterers’ attempts to coax him into acting perversely. However, if such a child grows up and discovers that his parents are not truly his parents, he no longer will believe in that which they found honorable. He may engage in a search for what is honorable, but if he finds no answers, just as dialectic does not provide answers, he will choose the life that “flatters him” (537e-539a). Plato suggests that “great precaution” must be taken that the philosopher-ruler who practices dialectic does not become like such a man when he fails to find truth through dialectical examination (539b). Through this image, Plato’s readers internalize that they must not become skeptical and doubtful of the existence of truth, even if they fail to find it.

In order to ensure that men reflect, rather than become doubtful and skeptical of truth, men must receive an education that instills in them the existence of truth. Socrates gives Glaucon a plan for the philosopher-rulers’ education before they are allowed to start using

⁷⁰ See p. 14-19.

dialectic. He does not at first tell Glaucon the purpose of this education because his strategy requires him to hide such purpose from Glaucon; Glaucon just received an education to believe in the existence of truth and Socrates does not want to reveal to Glaucon that the purpose of this education was to cause him to reflect before acting, rather than to educate him about how things actually are. Socrates says that the instruction for the philosopher-ruler “must not be given the aspect of a compulsion to learn,” just as Socrates’s education of Glaucon did not make Glaucon feel like he was being forced to learn, but rather that he was on a journey to find the true nature of things (536d). Despite Socrates’s concealment of the purpose of the philosopher-ruler’s education, his examples make clear from the start that the purpose of this education is to provide men with the sense that questions have true answers that can be discovered. The first part of the philosopher-ruler’s studies must be in “calculation and geometry” (536d). In calculation and geometry, there exist true answers. This mirrors the education that Socrates instills in Glaucon, using the image of the divided line, that truth exists. The second aspect of this education is that the men will be forced to compete in gymnastics. In competitions of sport, there are winners who receive “greater honors” than the losers, further instilling in men the idea of a single winner, or single truth, to be found (537b). Only once the men have received this education can they be alerted to “the kinship of these studies with one another,” which shares a kinship “with the nature of that which *is*,” (537c, italics original); as in these studies, there exists in the search for truth a correct answer to be found. Just like Socrates’s interlocutors and Plato’s readers, the philosopher-rulers are educated subtly to believe in the existence of truth that can be discovered. With an education in dialectic that does not provide them with answers, but with a belief that answers exist, these men continually will reflect. They are philosopher-rulers and not mere

philosophers, and therefore they will reflect on which political actions to take, rather than on how to live philosophic lives.

Underscoring his desire for men continually to reflect, Plato abruptly transitions to remarks that make the city in speech, which has reached its completion with the education of the philosopher-rulers, appear ridiculous. The result of these remarks is to make the specific proposals laid out in the dialogue, but not the education that resulted from such proposals, appear absurd and unworthy of emulation. Glaucon says, “Just like a sculptor, Socrates, you have produced ruling men who are wholly fair” and Socrates strangely takes this as an occasion to remark, “And ruling women, too, Glaucon. Don’t suppose that what I have said applies any more to men than to women” (540c). The concept of ruling women has only become mainstream in recent decades and would have appeared absurd to Plato’s audience. Socrates continues to say that in order for this city to exist,

All those in the city who happen to be older than ten they will send out to the country; and taking over their children, they will rear them— far away from those dispositions that they now have from their parents— in their own manners and laws as we described before...For a city that is going to be governed on a high level, women must be in common, children and their entire education must be in common...and [we must] settle the soldiers in houses—such as we spoke of before— that have nothing private for everyone but are common for all. (540e-543b)

Bloom writes of this passage, “Socrates blandly announces this condition as though the renunciation of all they live for by the whole citizen body were easy to accomplish...the perfect city is revealed to be a perfect impossibility.”⁷¹ In my opinion, Bloom sees that these proposals are meant to be viewed by Plato’s readers as absurd, but he misses Socrates’s reason for making them appear so. Bloom reveals his oversight when he says, “What then was the use of spending so much time and effort on a city that is impossible? Precisely to show its impossibility.”⁷² He

⁷¹ Bloom 409

⁷² Ibid.

correctly notices that Plato wants his readers to realize that such proposals are impossible. However, Bloom fails to see that the primary function of this exercise, that men are educated to reflect upon what is true without any specific proposals to execute. There are no concrete political answers given to men by Plato's discussion in philosophy, but only the existence of truth and the need to search for it before acting.

Plato thus leads men to examine their actions before acting by introducing the role model of the philosopher/philosopher-ruler, providing men with images that educate them to believe in the existence of truth and the need to search for it, and denying the possibility of specific truths to implement. Men are taught by Plato to consider whether their actions accord with truth before they act; because no truths are available, this education teaches men continually to reflect upon their actions. Plato's use of the philosopher-ruler as a role model and the subject of his education suggests that it is political action upon which men must reflect. However, this lesson has not been made clear yet by Plato. As I elucidated in the section relating to the conflation of the philosopher and philosopher-ruler, Glaucon often fails to recognize that Socrates discusses reflecting before taking political action, rather than, as philosophers do, reflecting about the nature of the truth, itself. How, then, can Plato ensure that men care about politics and use their new understanding of the existence of truth to reflect before taking political action? I attempt to answer this question in the remainder of this essay. In chapter three, I will discuss how Plato views anger as a spur to caring about righting wrongs and attempts to educate it into the passion of justice. It is this passion of justice upon which Plato wants men to reflect.

CHAPTER THREE: The education of the passion of anger into the passion of justice

Now that I have shown the way in which Plato educates men to reflect upon the truth before acting, I turn to an investigation of what prompts these reflections. I demonstrated Socrates's wish for men to reflect upon political action, and Glaucon's failure to internalize Socrates's lesson. If Glaucon is to act politically, rather than to engage in a philosophical search for truth, Socrates must encourage him toward political action; Plato, therefore, must take a view of what it is in men that prompts political action. Reason serves a purely reflective role for Plato, as I have demonstrated, and thus cannot, itself, prompt political action. If it is not reason, it may be passion that is necessary to spur political action.

Perhaps anger, the passion which brought about my examination of Plato because of its recent political relevance, prompts political action. I reviewed, in this paper's introduction, Allen and Nussbaum's conflicting interpretations of the *Oresteia*, in which Allen argues that anger is preserved and refined in institutional politics and Nussbaum argues that anger is repressed. Before Athena's intervention in the *Oresteia*, the anger of the Furies move Orestes to avenge his father's death. In Allen's telling, this same anger remains in a new form: it is applied "in general and... [against] wrongdoers and against enemies of Athens."⁷³ While the *Oresteia* suggests that anger must be reformed before spurring noble political action, I wish to argue that Plato understands anger also to spur our noble political actions that aim to respond to the wrongs that we and our loved ones face.

In order to make this claim, however, I must confront Allen, who sees Plato as attempting to rid men of anger. She writes that Plato views anger not as "limited, manageable, and socially useful, but rather [as] a form of behavior that introduces extreme habits of injustice to the city

⁷³ Allen 2000 22

and that must, therefore, be banished from it.”⁷⁴ Justice, Allen asserts, is “founded on a suppression of anger.”⁷⁵ Her reading coheres with the conventional reading of Plato’s tripartite division of the soul, which maintains that reason sits above, and directs, the passions of *thumos*, from which anger results, and desire; reason is thus that which is privileged in the soul, at the expense of anger. Plato uses this conception of the soul to make the philosopher-rulers analogous to reason, and their auxiliaries, the guardians who defend the city, analogous to *thumos*. In Plato’s formulation, the guardians fight on behalf of the philosopher, who reasons. Allen writes,

Anger, Socrates argues, should be based on a rational judgment about whether one has been treated justly or unjustly. In other words, anger arises *after* judgment. It is not the warning sign that it is time to judge. It is not the *reason to or inspiration to judge*. (italics original)⁷⁶

My view directly counters Allen’s: I argue that passion, such as anger, is the inspiration to act; reason’s job, as I argued in chapter two, is to reflect on, and possibly to restrain, the spurs to action presented by passion. The use of reason in dialectic leads to doubt and skepticism, rather than action. The guardians may be subservient to the philosopher-ruler, but the philosopher-ruler, as I have demonstrated, is not truly a philosopher, but only is conflated with one. The philosopher-ruler does not create from scratch judgments that the guardians implement, but instead reflects upon the best course of action based upon the political situation that already has been created by others in the city, including the guardians. Reason sits above passion in the way that it reflects on passion, but it does not arise after judgment, as Allen says; instead, reason only reflects upon possible action already presented to it by passion.

⁷⁴ Ibid. 262

⁷⁵ Ibid. 269. In *Why Plato Wrote*, Allen writes, “In contrast, the Platonic approach to psychology and politics rejected anger as a justification for action.” Allen 2010 92. I agree with this statement of Allen in that anger is not itself a justification for political action, but I still argue that she misses the way in which passions prompt our action.

⁷⁶ Allen 2000 255

Plato shows elsewhere that *thumos*, the part of the soul from which passions like anger derive, is dominant and that the reason which makes final judgments is a smaller, albeit the final, part of man's decision of whether to act. In Book IX, Plato provides an image of the soul: a many-headed hydra represents desire, a lion represents anger, and a human being represents reason (588c-d).⁷⁷ The lion, Socrates says, should be fashioned as "by far the greatest" in size and the human as "second in size" (588d). While Socrates says that the human should not be able to be "drawn where either of the others leads" (589a), this only suggests that *thumos* should not be fully in control without the restraint of reason. The lion is still the biggest and thus dominates the soul. This image helps to educate Plato's readers to see passion as the most dominant force in their actions, but as requiring the necessary restraint of reflection that reason provides.

Anger in Homer and in Plato relates to *thumos*: in Homer's *Iliad*, *thumos* is the faculty from which anger derives, and in Plato's *Republic*, it is the part of the soul from which anger derives. In Homer's *Iliad*, Hector feels anger when he and his loved ones are attacked by the Achaeans, and he is prompted to defend himself and them; Achilles also feels anger when he destructively lashes out against all. After first discussing Hector, I will begin my discussion of Plato by showing the way that Plato sets up anger, in the opening of his dialogue, to make sense as a passion that can be felt constantly, rather than as a passion that acts only responsively against wrongs. I then demonstrate how Plato privileges such passion through his methods of imagistic education. Before Plato's education, anger is a passion which responds to a wrong against oneself or one's loved ones that is perpetrated by an enemy. Plato educates anger into the passion of justice, which concerns itself with advancing the causes of all men. In chapter

⁷⁷ See p. 22 for my previous discussion of how this is an example of Plato repurposing ancient images for his educative means.

five, I will discuss how Plato provides images to educate men to reflect upon their passion of justice, so as to consider which and whose causes should be advanced. I first must show in this chapter, however, how he educates anger into the passion of justice.

***Thumos* in Homer and Plato**

Homer uses the word *thumos* to refer to a faculty, alongside other faculties, such as *nous* (νόος), *phren* (φρήν), and *kardia* (καρδίᾱ), which denote the location of “mental” and “emotional” processes.⁷⁸ However, this distinction does not mean that some of these faculties are solely emotional, while others are solely mental, such as the way we currently describe the distinction between the “heart,” with which we love, and the “mind,” with which we think. As literary theorist David Milkies writes, “In Homer, *thumos* is not simply a gut reaction that needs *logismos* [reasoning] to render it comprehensible. Instead, emotion thinks.”⁷⁹ In Homer’s *Iliad*, *thumos* is the faculty responsible for angry responses to feeling wronged. These responses may attempt to right these wrongs, as exemplified by the character Hector, or may be resentful and destructive, as exemplified by the character Achilles.

Plato similarly uses *thumos* to describe angry responses, both responses that attempt to rectify wrongdoing and responses that respond less constructively. Strauss writes that Plato’s conception of *thumos* “includes a large variety of phenomena ranging from the most noble indignation about injustice, turpitude, and meanness, down to the anger of a spoiled child who resents being deprived of anything, however bad, that he desires.”⁸⁰ Plato does not describe *thumos* as a faculty, like Homer, but instead makes *thumos* one of the three parts of man’s soul,

⁷⁸ Caroline Caswell, *A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Poetry* (New York 1990), 22.

⁷⁹ David Milkies, *The Limits of Moralizing* (Lewisburg, PA 1994), 19.

⁸⁰ Strauss 1964 110. For more on scholars’ differing understandings of Plato’s use of *thumos* and why I side with Strauss, see p 6-8.

along with reason (*logos*) and desire (*epithumia*).⁸¹ Plato had myriad possible names for his parts of the soul, and *thumos* did not present itself as an obvious choice. *Thumos* never before had been conceived as a part of the soul. In fact, the word had fallen out of use before the Greeks even contemplated the unified soul, or *psyche*.⁸² In Thucydides, *orge* (ὀργή), another word for anger, is used thirty-seven times, compared to four uses of *thumos*.⁸³ Xenophon, who lived in Plato's era, tells us that *thumos* is used solely to describe anger in horses, writing that “*thumos* in a horse is precisely what *orge* is in a man.”⁸⁴ Homer is the only author, prior to Plato, who utilizes *thumos* extensively in connection to man.⁸⁵ By utilizing this ancient word, Plato thus suggests that he refers specifically to the concept denoted in Homer.

In Homer's characters, two primary types of anger inhabit the faculty of *thumos*: indignation (*nemesis*) and bitter anger or resentment (*kholos*).⁸⁶ *Nemesis* (νέμεσις) angrily bristles at unfairness and prompts an attempt to correct such unfairness.⁸⁷ *Kholos* (χόλον)

⁸¹ For the difference between Plato's use of the words *thumos* and *thumoeides*, see p. 6 n.16

⁸² It was not until around Socrates's time that *psyche* (ψυχή) took on the meaning of unified soul. Before then, it provided life as a “breath-soul,” but was not the location of all activity. Erwin Rohde, *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and the Belief of Immortality in the Ancient Greeks* (Chicago 1988), 50-51 n58.

⁸³ According to a Perseus search on 2/11/19. Benardete's observations indicate that there were three uses of *thumos* and forty uses of *orge*. Benardete, 55.

⁸⁴ Xenophon, *Xenophon in Seven Volumes*, trans. G. W. Bowersock (Cambridge, MA 1925), 9.2, <http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0032.tlg013.perseus-eng1:9.2>. Benardete pointed me to this passage. Benardete 55.

⁸⁵ Aeschylus also uses *thumos* in this manner a few times, including three times in the *Oresteia* (Perseus search 4/10). He does not use it, however, when describing the transformation of the Furies, as the word is not used in *The Eumenides*, the final book of the *Oresteia* trilogy in which the Furies transformation is described.

⁸⁶ Renowned classicist Gregory Nagy lists three basic categories of anger that are general and do not relate directly to *thumos*. They are *menis*, *kholos*, and *kotos*. *Menis* (μῆτιν) is used nine times in the *Iliad*, including, famously, as the very first word of the work. It is used to describe supernatural anger and is never used in connection with *thumos*, a human faculty. *Kotos* is used five times in the *Iliad* and never in connection with *thumos*. Nagy describes it as “a time-bomb that ticks away until it explodes exactly in the right moment in the plot of the narrative.” See note below for why I believe that Nagy fails to consider *nemesis*. Gregory Nagy, “Menis: supernatural anger” in *Concepts of the Hero in Greek Civilization*, Fall 2008, lecture notes, <https://chs.harvard.edu/CHS/article/display/5969.core-vocabulary-of-key-greek-words>.

⁸⁷ The word is used five times: 3.156, 6.335, 6.351, 13.122, and 14.80. A. T. Murray translates *nemesis* as “indignation.” Nagy translates it as “the process whereby everyone gets what he or she deserves.” Because Nagy does not translate *nemesis* as a feeling, I believe he fails to recognize the way in which it is a type of anger. It possibly is more apparent to me because I specifically am looking at anger as it relates to the faculty of *thumos*. It is also worth noting that the Greek goddess Nemesis exacts retribution from men who express hubris. Homer, *Iliad*, trans. A.T. Murray (Cambridge MA 1924). Nagy, *The Ancient Greek Hero in 24 Hours* (Cambridge MA 2013), 689.

bitterly sulks at unfair treatment and inhabits *thumos* as harmful bile. Because of its relation to bile, it is perceived as anger without a legitimate source.⁸⁸ A third concept, *thumalges* anger (θυμαλγής), is a combination of *thumos* and grief, perhaps best translated as “heart-rending,” and is used to describe anger, usually *kholos*.⁸⁹ This modifier to *kholos* causes anger to recognize itself as legitimate, unlike *kholos* on its own, and proves to be an extreme threat to the social order.

Now that I have explained *thumos*, I will explain the way that Plato transforms it from Homer’s understanding. For Homer, *thumos* is the faculty responsible for angry responses to feeling wronged. For Plato, *thumos* is a part of the soul that, initially, is responsible for angry responses to being wronged. However, through Glaucon’s images in Book II of the *Republic*, Plato educates anger into the passion of justice, which cares about the right treatment of all at all times. Hector embodies that which can be considered a middle ground between selfish and generous anger; he angers on behalf of wrongs which he sees perpetrated against himself and his loved ones. Plato does not take up Hector’s view of anger, but perverts it by presenting Thrasymachus, who angers only on behalf of himself; in Thrasymachus, the natural human attachments felt by Hector are absent. Unlike Hector’s anger, Thrasymachus’s anger not only defends himself against wrongs, but also advances his own causes. In this way, Plato sets up a dichotomy between justice that advances the causes of all and injustice that advances only one’s own causes. I will explain how justice and injustice are better considered to be passions than

⁸⁸ The word is used fifty times in the *Iliad*. It is used with *thumos* nine times: 1.192, 6.326, 9.436, 9.459, 9.675, 14.50, 14.207, 14.306, 16.206. It is used with *thumalges* three times: 4.513, 9.260, 9.565. Thomas Walsh, *Fighting Words and Feuding Words: Anger in the Homeric Poems* (Lanham MD 2005), 220.

⁸⁹ The word is used four times: 4.513, 9.260, 9.387, and 9.565. Richmond Lattimore inconsistently translates *thumalges* as “that hurts the heart” (9.260), “heartrending” (9.387), “heartsore” (4.513), and “heart-sore” (9.565). Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago 2011). Robert Rabel translates it as “heartrending” and Adam Parry translates it as “heart-rending.” Rabel, *Plot and Point of View in the Iliad* (Ann Arbor 1997), 126. Parry, “The Language of Achilles” in *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* Vol. 87 (1956), 6.

principles. Glaucon takes up the side of justice, against Thrasymachus, and provides images of justice and injustice that educate Plato's readers' anger into the passion of justice.

Hector's anger that responds to wrongs perpetrated against himself and his loved ones

I will investigate the way that Hector thinks with *thumos* by looking at the presentation of Hector's *thumos* in Book VI of the *Iliad*. In this part of the *Iliad*, the Trojan Hector attempts to convince his brother Paris, who caused the Trojan War by taking Helen from the Spartan King Menelaus, to fight on behalf of his besieged city. In doing so, Hector shows the need to respond to perceived wrongs against himself and his loved ones. He reflects upon his need to respond to wrongs when discussing his return to battle with his wife Andromache.

Hector and Paris differ in the primary emotions they use to understand the world. Paris has refused to keep fighting in the battle and Hector rebukes him with "words of shame" (6.325):

Strange man! It is not well to keep in your *thumos* this *kholos*. The people are dying around the city and around the steep wall as they fight hard; and it is for you that this war with its clamor has flared up about our city. You yourself would fight with another whom you saw anywhere hanging back from the hateful encounter. Up then, to keep our town from burning at once in the hot fire. (6.326-332)⁹⁰

Hector's primary passion is *thumos* and his primary concern is responding to wrongs against those about whom he cares. He projects this view onto Paris. Appealing to the *nemesis* that he believes Paris should hold in his *thumos*, Hector claims that Paris similarly would fight with someone unwilling to uphold his obligation to fix harm he has caused. Hector thinks that the reason Paris is not fighting is because his *thumos* is contaminated by the bile that is *kholos*. Paris responds that he does not refuse to fight because of "*kholos* or *nemesis*" (6.335). He does not

⁹⁰ *Iliad* translations are from Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Richard Lattimore (Chicago 2011), with English words replaced by their Greek counterparts when necessary. References to the *Iliad* will be referred to parenthetically with book and line numbers.

feel anger of any kind and instead wishes “to give [himself] away to sorrow” (6.335-336). Paris makes his decision to sit in his room not because of anger, but rather because of sorrow or grief. His insistence on viewing the world through his grief illustrates the variety of ways that Homeric man can understand and react to his life.

Yet, Hector fails to recognize such diversity in the passions men feel and cannot even commend or censure Paris for his actions. He is unable to answer Paris when Paris says he is motivated by grief (6.342). Hector thinks that the faculty of *thumos* functions well when it attempts to respond to wrongs. At first, he thinks that Paris’s problem is that his *thumos* is filled with *kholos*, rather than *nemesis*. But Hector does not know how to respond to a complete rejection of anger. Grief involves passive resignation, a state of being which the angry Hector cannot recognize. He does not reflect upon his *thumos* because such reflection is not possible in Homer’s psychology; his *thumos* decisively chooses his course of action without Hector considering the possibility of a different response. While Hector fails to comprehend Paris’s lack of action, Paris comprehends and rejects *thumos* as the faculty with which to judge the world. Grief proves itself to be a powerful rival to *thumos*, capable of resisting its calls to value the attempt to right wrongs. While Hector’s anger is seemingly blind to the power of grief, Paris’s sorrowful outlook understands and rejects the claim that man should be active in caring about rectifying wrongs. Unlike the optimism of Hector’s *thumos*, Paris’s grief recognizes the plight of the human condition. It does not believe that it can change the plan that the gods have for men.

Hector primarily thinks with his *thumos* because he imitates the role models of other great Trojans. After witnessing the grief of his brother, Hector returns to his wife, Andromache, before going to battle. His desire to see his beloved family stems from fear that he will never see

them again; his haste seems borne from his pity and his expectation of his family's grief in the event of his death. Yet, Hector initially still does not speak in the language of grief. When Andromache tells him to pity her and stop fighting, he responds,

I take thought of this also, lady; yet, I would feel deep shame before the Trojans and the Trojan women with trailing garments, if like a coward I were to shrink aside from the fighting; and *thumos* will not let me, since I have learned to be valiant and to fight always amongst the foremost ranks of the Trojans, winning for my own self great glory, and for my father. (6.440-446)⁹¹

Hector is captivated by *thumos* because he has “learned” always to defend his city. The culture he inhabits prizes those who act heroically to respond to the wrongs that they collectively face and shames those who fail to do so. Hector suggests that he emulates his father, who acted similarly. Thus, Homer exemplifies Plato's understanding of the way that men imitate role models. Just as imitative education can be used to educate men to believe in external knowledge and to reflect before acting, Homer shows that it also is effective in having men choose which passionate response to have in a given situation. Hector thinks with his *thumos*, rather than succumbing to grief, because he has internalized that the best kinds of men privilege their angry passion that responds to wrongs.

Immediately following these statements, Hector's grief momentarily becomes dominant; he combines the tragic worldview of grief with the steadfast insistence, resulting from his *thumos*, that he should attempt to right wrongs. Adopting the tragic viewpoint, he says, “I know this thing well in my *thumos* and in my *phren* [mind]: there will be a day when sacred Ilion shall perish, and Priam, and the people of Priam of the strong ash spear” (6.447-449). His *thumos* is influenced by his *phren*, which is the passive faculty that affects Achilles when Achilles

⁹¹ Lattimore begins the first sentence with the phrase “all of these things are in my mind also.” I have edited it because Homer does not refer to the “mind” or a human faculty here. My translation of the phrase instead follows that of Murray.

considers his sadness over losing Briseis (1.193).⁹² Hector's tragic belief that the worst will transpire displays a worldview characterized by grief. Yet, he continues to assert that the tragic nature of the Trojan defeat pales in comparison to the possibility of Andromache becoming a Greek slave. He assumes that Andromache would experience the greatest grief not as a result of her bondage, but rather because she would be "widowed by such a man who could fight off the day of [her] slavery" (6.465). By claiming that his failure to fight for his wife's freedom would cause her to feel even more grief than her actual slavery, Hector inserts himself into Andromache's grief and continues to privilege his personal need to right wrongs. The tragic viewpoint, in which men's actions are futile in the face of a fatalistic world, does not diminish Hector's insistence on his own need to attempt to right wrongs. If he were alive, he conveys, he would attempt to save Andromache. Death can be tragic and destined, yet, as long as man lives, Hector believes, he should think with his *thumos* and attempt to respond to wrongs against his loved ones.

Hector has internalized the need to respond angrily to perceived wrongs so fervently that he wishes for his son, upon Hector's passing, to take up the cause. After his remarks concerning Andromache's potential slavery, Hector picks up his son and prays to the gods:

Zeus, and you other immortals, grant this boy, who is my son, may be as I am, pre-eminent among the Trojans, great in strength, as am I, and rule strongly over Ilion; and some say let them say of him: 'He is better by far than his father,' as he comes in from fighting; and let him kill his enemy and bring home the blooded spoils, and delight the heart of his mother. (6.476-481)

Hector prays that in the event of his death, his son will be able to take his place in righting the wrongs that his loved ones face. He wishes for his son to take him, Hector, as a role model, and

⁹² Shirley Darcus Sullivan alerted me that this is the faculty that Achilles feels at that moment and made the connection between *phren* and sadness. Sullivan, "How a Person Relates to Thumos in Homer" in *Indogermanische Forschungen* 85 (1985), 138.

thereby to be swayed by the culture that privileges *thumos*, just as Hector has been. Hector wants his son to inherit his anger and to respond on his behalf if he, himself, is unable to right wrongs in his lifetime. He prays that his son will surpass him and that he will be capable of killing the enemies that he, himself, may be unable to kill. When Hector concludes his speech to his wife by saying that both brave men and cowardly men ultimately will die (6.487-489), he demonstrates his belief that it is worth attempting to respond to the wrongs that one's loved ones come up against, even in the face of death. Thus, even as he confronts the tragic passion of grief and recognizes his personal inability to respond to all wrongs, Hector remains wedded to his attempt to respond to wrongs.

Hector's particular concerns for his wife and child, as expressed through his grief when he contemplates the possibility of their bad fates, frame the way his *thumos* understands his wrongs: he fights particularly for his loved ones and against his enemies. He further wishes to respond to the wrongs of his political community because of the honors that it will bestow upon him. Therefore, he cannot be abstracted into any interchangeable moral hero fighting on behalf of justice. He does not want to advance merely any just cause, but rather to respond specifically to wrongs committed by his enemies that could threaten the security and happiness of his own family and political community. Plato exemplifies a version of Hector's anger with Thrasymachus, albeit in a less noble form, and educates this anger to not only respond to wrongs, but also to advance causes.

Thrasymachus's anger transformed into the passion of injustice

In Homer's characters Paris and Hector, we see, respectively, one character who is passive because of grief and another who is moved to act by anger. Plato presents two similar

characters in Book I of the *Republic*.⁹³ The sorrowful Cephalus is unmoved by Socrates's rational refutation, leaving the argument without a change in his demeanor (331d).

Thrasymachus, on the other hand, angrily enters the conversation after perceiving Socrates to commit a wrong against him and does not leave until he is defeated by Socrates's dialectical refutation. The contrast of Cephalus and Thrasymachus illustrates the way in which Plato believes that *thumos* is the passion that responds to perceived wrongs.

Cephalus is the only character in the *Republic* who expresses grief. He anguishes in the face of his own death. As Allen notes, Cephalus's grief comes from a conception of the afterlife in which the poets have educated him.⁹⁴ The poet Pindar has taught him that "the man who is conscious in himself of no unjust deed, sweet and good hope is ever beside him" (330e-331a). Yet, Cephalus is not certain that he has avoided committing unjust deeds, as evidenced by his need to leave the conversation to offer sacrifices to the gods. He reveals his uncertainty when he references another teaching of the poets, saying "The tales told about what is in Hades—that the one who has done unjust deeds must pay the penalty there...now make [my] soul twist and turn because [I fear] they might be true" (330d-e). Cephalus does not credit a poet or anyone else for his belief that lying and failing to repay another for something that one owes him constitute unjust deeds (331b). His conception of unjust deeds allows him tentatively to believe that, due to his wealth and consequent lack of need to borrow money, he has avoided committing unjust deeds. He wishes not to be forced to confront the possible falseness of his belief, as such falseness may bring him further grief. Because he knows that Socrates's dialectical examination may expose his belief as unwarranted, Cephalus leaves the conversation before responding to

⁹³ I was prompted to contrast Cephalus and Thrasymachus after reading Tarnopolsky and Benardete's contrasts of the characters. Tarnopolsky 2; Benardete 20. The nature of each of their contrasts differs from mine.

⁹⁴ Allen 2010 34-35. Allen notes this in the context of the way that poetic symbols guide men's action. I concur, but emphasize the context of Cephalus and his grief as preceding Socrates's conversation with Thrasymachus.

Socrates (331d). His lack of care for Socrates's argument does not arise from a lack of concern about what will happen to him when he dies, but rather from his sense that dialectical argument will not alleviate, and perhaps may exacerbate, his grief and fear. Cephalus thinks that the best way to go about aging is to be "orderly and content" so that old age is not overly "troublesome" (329d). In other words, Cephalus seeks to avoid further grief, and learning from Socrates that his conception of unjust deeds has internal contradictions would only bring him more grief.

In contrast to Cephalus, Thrasymachus is characterized by *thumos*.⁹⁵ Thrasymachus exhibits intense anger when he enters, yet surprisingly is invested in rational argument, blushing when Socrates begins to take the upper-hand in the argument. As Cephalus demonstrates, Platonic characters do not all accept Socrates's style of rational examination. In Homer, the *nemesis* in the *thumos* of Hector (and, as I will demonstrate in chapter four, the *thumalges* anger of Achilles) finds it unnecessary to defend actions in conversation. Hector's discussion with Andromache is a one-sided affair, in which Hector considers it enough to point to the role models he imitates and the way that society has taught him to respond to wrongs.

Thrasymachus, however, is a rhetorician and his livelihood involves giving persuasive speeches. He feels compelled to respond to Socrates with speech. Because he displays his anger in the context of the discussion of the *Republic*, Thrasymachus is the perfect character through which Plato can show the way in which *thumos* is aroused by perceived wrongs. Simply transposing Hector into the *Republic* would not have accomplished this because, unlike Thrasymachus, Hector could have responded to anger with violence, rather than speech.

Like Hector, the wrongs that Thrasymachus feels are personal. Thrasymachus enters the argument just after Polemarchus and Socrates deem false the view that justice is "harm is owed

⁹⁵ Socrates says that Thrasymachus is characterized by *thumos* in the discussion of the tyrant (545a).

to enemies by the just man and help to friends” (335d). Polemarchus’s view resembles that taken by Hector, except that Hector’s responded to wrongs while Polemarchus’s also suggests the advancement of the causes of one’s friends. Refuting the dimwitted Polemarchus’s view, Socrates argues that friends actually are those who are good and enemies actually are those who are bad (334c-e); Socrates takes the personal feeling of attachment and transforms it into a matter of knowledge of the good. Socrates’s insistence that one’s personal passions have nothing to do with justice angers Thrasymachus, because it denies the legitimacy of Thrasymachus’s anger. Thrasymachus angers at the personal slight of being told that his anger does not matter. He tells Socrates,

And see to it you don’t tell me that it is the needful, or the helpful, or the profitable, or the advantageous; but tell me clearly and precisely what you mean, for I won’t accept it if you say such inanities. (336d)

The answers rejected by Thrasymachus are abstract concepts severed from any personal cares, or predicates without subjects. He thinks that every person feels angry when he feels wronged, and that it would be improper to suggest a concept of unjust acts that does not account for the man subjected to the wrongdoing. Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of pretending not to have any personal cares. He says,

If you truly want to know what the just is, don’t only ask and gratify your love of honor by refuting whatever someone answers — you know that it is easier to ask than to answer — but answer yourself and say what you assert the just to be. (336c)

He then laughs “scornfully” at Socrates and accuses him of “habitual irony” (337a). Socrates’s irony, Thrasymachus thinks, allows Socrates to hide his own personal cares.

While both Hector and Thrasymachus view anger as a response to wrongdoing connected to oneself, Thrasymachus, unlike Hector, angers only for his own cause. Thrasymachus has no loved ones. To him, justice is “nothing other than the advantage of the stronger,” and he

presumes himself to be the stronger (338c). The only cause worth defending, in Thrasymachus's view, is his own. Plato chooses not to present Hector in the *Republic* not only, as I argued previously, because Hector could respond to Socrates with violence, but also because Socrates cannot refute the worthiness of Hector's noble anger. Plato hides the nobility of Hector's anger, presenting instead a base caricature of Hector in the character of Thrasymachus. Some men possessing anger may resemble noble Hector, but other men possessing anger may resemble selfish Thrasymachus. If anger is to be educated into the passion of justice, Plato must present Hector's version of anger only in the most unflattering light, namely, as the selfish anger of Thrasymachus.

Moreover, unlike Hector, Thrasymachus wishes not only to defend his own cause, but also to advance his own cause at all times. He does not wish only to respond to wrongs which others perpetrate against him, but also to "punish as a breaker of the law and a doer of unjust deeds," who is any man who denies him his "advantage" (338e). In other words, he wants to punish the man who denies him the fulfillment of any desire he may have, not just the man who takes what deservedly is his. Soon thereafter in the argument, Thrasymachus clarifies his position as defending injustice against justice, where the unjust man "is able to get the better in a big way" (344a). Such a man not only responds to wrongdoing, but also constantly attempts to get the better of others at all times. In Thrasymachus's formulation, therefore, the unjust man's anger defends his own cause, and also advances such cause at all times. It differs from both the anger expressed by Hector and the anger with which Thrasymachus enters the argument, and is better named the passion of injustice. Although Thrasymachus presents injustice as a principle, its creation as a furthering of his anger suggests that it is better understood as a passion that drives his action. Furthermore, I demonstrated in the previous chapters that Plato does not

believe that reasoned principles can drive action, but that only passions can drive action. Plato must present injustice as a principle, rather than as a passion, because otherwise he would ruin his education of anger. If he were forthright about his education of the passion of anger into the passion of injustice, and then into its opposite, the passion of justice, his readers would recognize his educative methods and be capable of resisting them. In order to educate anger into the passion of justice, therefore, Plato must disguise justice and injustice as principles; men must consider justice as a true principle, rather merely a passion.

The transformation of anger that only *responsively* acts when confronted with wrongdoing, into a passion that also *constantly* advances men's causes results from Plato's introduction of the concept of justice. This concept is not a part of the passion of anger before Plato educates this passion, as evidenced by Hector's *thumos* that only responds to wrongdoing. Allen notes that Plato does not use the phrase to "take justice," even though his fellow Athenians understood the concept of justice as retributive in this manner;⁹⁶ the phrase "take justice" implies that the taker responds to wrongdoing. In this way, the Athenians considered "taking justice" as acting upon one's anger. Even in the *Republic*, Cephalus and Thrasymachus do not conceive of anger as including the advancement of causes, but instead as only responding to wrongdoing, until Socrates prompts them to do so. Cephalus, Socrates's first interlocutor, speaks only of "unjust deeds" that wrong men, namely cheating and lying (300d, 330e). Socrates reformulates Cephalus's assertion about unjust deeds into an assertion about "justice," which becomes "the truth and giving back to men what a man has taken from another" (331c). In Cephalus's formulation, unjust deeds are ways to wrong men that one may commit at times, while in

⁹⁶ Allen 2010 92; Allen 2000 71. Allen cites this in reference to her understanding of Plato's transformation of Athenian conceptions of punishment. I argue, on the other hand, that Plato transforms anger that responds to wrongdoing into a passion of justice that advances causes.

Socrates's formulation, justice is a way of acting that one must inhabit at all times.

Thrasymachus enters the conversation with Socrates only to respond to Socrates's wrong of telling him that his anger does not matter, and he is extremely reluctant to provide his own definition of justice (337e-338a). Thrasymachus's anger, at first, only wants to respond to his being wronged and does not want to advance his own causes. Plato thus shows how anger responds to wrongs, but does not advance causes naturally, by having his spokesman Socrates nudge his interlocutors into extending their anger toward the advancement of their causes. Anger as both a response to wrongs and an advancement of causes becomes the passion of justice or the passion of injustice, passions that men can take up at all times, regardless of whether they or their loved ones have experienced wrongs. Plato has not yet fully educated men to consider their anger in this manner, for, as I argued previously, his education occurs through images. His education of anger into the passion of justice through images occurs with the images that Glaucon soon presents.

Now that I have demonstrated the way that Plato transforms anger that responds to wrongs into Thrasymachus's passion of injustice, a passion that, in addition to responding to wrongs against oneself, advances selfish causes, I must proceed to explain briefly the way that Socrates refutes Thrasymachus's view. Despite only feeling angry on his own behalf, Thrasymachus depends on others sharing in his anger. His goal as a rhetorician is to be judged as the winner of the argument. In Book II of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Aristotle suggests that a rhetorician should attempt to arouse *thumos* in his audience in order to persuade it to take his side; by expressing and arousing anger on behalf of the defendant, a rhetorician could sway the

jurors to take his side of the argument.⁹⁷ Thrasymachus, as a rhetorician, appears to agree with Aristotle's approach. Socrates narrates,

Hunched up like a wild beast, [Thrasymachus] flung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces. Then Polemarchus and I got all in a flutter from fright... I was astounded when I heard him, I was frightened. I think that if I had not seen him before he saw me, I would have been speechless. (336b-d)

Hobbs remarks of this passage, "Thrasymachus's entry into the *Republic* is dramatic."⁹⁸

Although she does not extrapolate on Thrasymachus's entry, it is worth dwelling on the word "dramatic." No other character enters the dialogue with so much fury. Socrates compares Thrasymachus, first, to a wild beast and, second, to a wolf (336b, 336d).⁹⁹ Socrates's animal-like description of Thrasymachus resembles Achilles's fantasy of his own animal-like behavior when he wishes that his *thumos* would implore him to eat Hector's flesh (22.346-348).

Thrasymachus does not kill and eat Socrates, or even, as Achilles does to Hector, kill Socrates and drag his body around. He is neither a beast nor a wolf, and can take on these tumultuous roles only as a way to accentuate his anger and thereby persuade his observers to take his side.

Thrasymachus's attempt to make others angrily agree that anger should respond only to one's own wrongs and should advance one's own causes is doomed to fail due to the contradiction between his argument and his method. He wishes to say that he should have to take action only on his own anger, yet he needs others to share in his anger. The long, convoluted argument that follows is unnecessary to recount here, especially because Socrates admits at the end that he has argued poorly (354a-c); he wins despite arguing poorly because

⁹⁷ See Bryan Garsten, *Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment* (Cambridge MA 2009), 136-139.

⁹⁸ Hobbs 164. Also see Holly Moore, "Why Does Thrasymachus Blush, Ethical Consistency in Socrates's Refutation of Thrasymachus" in *Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought* Vol. 32 No. 2, 321-324.

⁹⁹ Bloom notes that Socrates means to characterize Thrasymachus as a wolf when Socrates says, "I think that if I had not seen him before he saw me, I would have been speechless" (336d). Bloom writes that the Greeks thought that if a man looked at a wolf first, then the man would become speechless. Bloom 444 n30.

Thrasymachus's position is untenable. Plato dismisses Thrasymachus in Book I because the challenge represented by Thrasymachus, that which Hobbs calls the "egoist challenge," is not as fierce as some of Plato's readers, including Hobbs and Allen, perceive it to be.¹⁰⁰ While Thrasymachus, as Hobbs notes, "remains unconvinced" by Socrates, Thrasymachus is powerless.¹⁰¹ Plato does not, as Allen asserts, present Thrasymachus to show that anger is dangerous and must be removed as a passion that motivates action.¹⁰² For, the man who makes clear that he only is acting on his own cause will not generate enough support to pose a real challenge.¹⁰³ The presentation of the danger of Thrasymachus's selfish anger is not a real danger, but only a way of furthering Plato's educative aims.

Plato thus presents Thrasymachus in order to establish a dichotomy between justice and injustice, without the presence of Hector's *thumos* that responds to wrongs against oneself and one's loved ones. Plato's readers internalize this dichotomy and, like Glaucon, wish to side with justice against Thrasymachus's ignoble injustice. In addition to the creation of this dichotomy, the result of Thrasymachus's conversation with Socrates is that anger is transformed from a passion that only responds to wrongs into a passion that also advances causes, the passions of either justice or injustice. In chapter five, I will show how Plato provides images for his readers to imitate in order to educate men to reflect continually upon which and whose causes should be advanced. The presentation of the passions of justice and injustice are a necessary preliminary step in Plato's education. The passion of justice, the opposite of Thrasymachus's passion of injustice, is presented by Glaucon in Book II.

¹⁰⁰ Hobbs entitles a chapter "Why should I be good? Callicles, Thrasymachus and the egoist challenge." Hobbs 137-175.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 175

¹⁰² Allen 2000 262

¹⁰³ Is there any example of a historical leader who rose from the people to a position of power without at least pretending to champion the people's causes? A tyrant who pretends to champion the people's causes while acting otherwise is, of course, a danger, but Thrasymachus is not such a man.

Glaucon's images on the side of justice

Before I discuss the passion of justice presented by Glaucon, I must clarify my intended meaning of the passion of justice. I have described the way in which Plato transforms “giving justice” which responds to wrongdoing into, justice, proper, which advances causes. Before his discussion with Thrasymachus, Socrates tells Polemarchus, “Nor is harming, in fact, the work of the good but its opposite. . . . Then it is not the work of the just man to harm either a friend or anyone else” (335d). Men acting justly, Socrates suggests, do not try to harm anyone, but instead try to advance the causes of all. In chapter five, I will demonstrate how Plato, in fact, believes it is impossible to advance all men's causes; men's wishes conflict with one another. Yet, when Glaucon defends justice at the beginning of Book II, Plato has not demonstrated yet the impossibility of advancing all men's causes. Therefore, it is the passion of justice as a passion which advances all men's causes that Glaucon defends.

When Socrates admits to arguing poorly against the repulsive Thrasymachus, Plato's readers wish for a more proper repudiation of Thrasymachus's argument. The *thumos* of Plato's readers bristles at the idea that the ignoble Thrasymachus could survive the argument without being fully repudiated; Thrasymachus's arousal of anger thus produces the opposite effect of its intention, arousing anger against him. Glaucon also opposes Thrasymachus, taking up the other side of the dichotomy between justice and injustice that Plato has just created. Yet, Glaucon does not appear to do so because of Socrates and Thrasymachus's argument. While Plato's readers are educated by Socrates and Thrasymachus's argument to internalize a dichotomy between justice and injustice, Glaucon already understands such a dichotomy and already has

chosen the side of justice.¹⁰⁴ Glaucon's passion of anger is not educated into the passion of justice, because it already exists in this manner.

In previous chapters, I discussed images that Socrates describes to educate Glaucon and Adeimantus, images that also educate Plato's readers. In this instance, however, Glaucon provides the images to educate Plato's readers. These are the only images presented by Glaucon in the entire dialogue, and it is worth pausing for a moment to reflect upon why Plato has Glaucon, rather than Socrates, present these images. Socrates, throughout the dialogue, is a supporter of truth. Yet, the education of anger, unlike the education that causes men to become oriented to the truth and to reflect upon it, is not an education that instills in men the concept of truth. Plato can use the character of Socrates to present images that cause men to reflect, oriented toward truth, upon their passions, as I discussed in chapter two; he also can use the character of Socrates to make certain passions appear not in accord with truth, as I will discuss in chapter four. Plato, in these instances, does not hide that Socrates is an educator, but rather hides the nature of Socrates's education, presenting it as an education in truth rather than as an education in images. However, Plato cannot use Socrates directly to educate the passion of anger into the passion of justice because Plato must make this passion appear to be *naturally experienced* and not the result of any sort of education. It is worth reiterating this point: the education of anger into the passion of justice cannot appear to Plato's readers to be an education. Elsewhere in the dialogue, Glaucon and Adeimantus are educated alongside Plato's readers; it is only in this instance that Plato's readers are educated when Glaucon is not. By presenting the images that educate his readers as coming from Glaucon, Plato hides the education of his readers, as the readers do not expect Glaucon to educate them.

¹⁰⁴ It is unclear whether Adeimantus's anger has been educated into a passion of justice before the dialogue begins or as a result of his brother's images.

When Glaucon enters the dialogue, his anger already presents itself as a passion of justice. In fact, even before the completion of Socrates's argument with Thrasymachus, Glaucon demonstrates his passion of justice. Socrates asks him whether he would choose the life of the just or unjust man and Glaucon chooses the life of the just man (347e). Socrates is surprised by this statement. The following passage is worth considering in full:

Socrates: Did you hear how many good things Thrasymachus listed a moment ago as belonging to the life of the unjust man?

Glaucon: I heard, but I'm not persuaded.

Socrates: Then do you want us to persuade him, if we're able to find a way, that what he says isn't true?

Glaucon: How could I not want it?

Socrates: Now, if we should speak at length against him, setting speech against speech, telling how many good things belong to being just, and then he should speak in return, and we again, there'll be need of counting the good things and measuring how many each of us has in each speech, and then we'll be in need of some sort of judges who will decide. But if we consider just as we did a moment ago, coming to agreement with one another, we'll ourselves be both judges and pleaders at once... Which is the way you like?

Glaucon: The latter. (347e-348b)¹⁰⁵

Thrasymachus has not yet given up his attempt to persuade his audience, but Glaucon already knows that he will disagree with Thrasymachus and will take the side of justice. Even though Socrates admits to arguing poorly, Glaucon is already convinced by the cause of justice before Socrates's argument. In the opening of the dialogue, Polemarchus asks Socrates, "could you really persuade if we don't listen?" and Glaucon replies, before Socrates can, "There's no way" (327c). Glaucon hears Thrasymachus, but does not truly listen to him; he cannot be persuaded. He already has decided that he wants Socrates to win the argument on behalf of justice and to persuade Thrasymachus. Because he does not want the side of justice potentially to lose, Glaucon does not want anyone to judge the argument other than himself and Socrates. Glaucon presents justice as a principle, but he already feels it as a passion. At this point in the dialogue,

¹⁰⁵ I have edited this passage from Bloom's translation to read "Socrates:" and "Glaucon:" for clarity. My edits do not leave out anything of note because Socrates provides no narration beyond indicating who said each statement.

he is unable to reflect upon his passion of justice; he cannot listen to Thrasymachus's argument, reflect upon it, and then decide whether to take Thrasymachus's side. The education of Glaucon will cause him to reflect, oriented toward truth, upon the passion of justice; Plato's readers, who undergo this education alongside Glaucon, in fact begin their education before Glaucon begins his. Through the images presented by Glaucon, Plato's readers have their passion of anger educated into the passion of justice.

Glaucon continues this new dichotomy of the just and unjust man and provides images to educate Plato's readers. He provides a story for the way that justice arises, saying that it is a "compact" formed reluctantly by men because it is better that no one suffers injustice than that everyone does (359a). The unjust man, Glaucon asserts, would be invisible when committing injustice, but visible when acting justly. This would afford the unjust man the benefit of taking unjust actions to further his own aims, as well as the benefit of being perceived as just, thereby allowing such unjust man to both avoid being viewed as breaking the compact of justice and continue to receive just treatment from others (359b-360d). Glaucon continues that the just man, who is given this same power of invisibility but always acts justly, seems "wretched" and "foolish" for not taking advantage of the power bestowed upon him. Absent from Glaucon's images is that men have genuine attachments and, for this reason, most will not want to treat all others unjustly. Glaucon's image of the unjust man involves such a man committing adultery with his king's wife and subsequently killing the king, demonstrating a lack of care about others in his political community; the unjust man does not appear to have loved ones (360a-b). Socrates responds that Glaucon "vigorously... polish[es] up each of the two men— just like a statue— for their judgment" (361d). Glaucon "polishes" his examples so that both represent the extremes, with neither representing the middle ground in which one advances the causes of his

loved ones against his enemies. Glaucon, displaying his fervent passion of justice, neglects the noble and traditional anger embodied by Hector: responding to wrongs perpetrated against oneself and one's loved ones, spurred by the passion that one feels when such people are wronged, and led to privilege this passion by the honors bestowed upon one by one's loved ones in recognition of one's response. For Glaucon, man is either isolated and advancing his own cause, or advancing everyone's causes at all times. Plato's readers, having witnessed the debate between Thrasymachus and Socrates, possibly have internalized the same dichotomy, or at least are not surprised by its presentation. The images presented by Glaucon help them to internalize this dichotomy and their anger becomes educated into not only responding to wrongs against oneself or one's loved ones, but also advancing all causes; in other words, it is educated to become the passion of justice.

Plato, perhaps realizing that the man who responds to wrongs against himself and his loved ones still appears noble, has Glaucon briefly consider such a view. Glaucon paints a picture of a man resembling Hector and, because of his passion of justice, considers him an unjust man. He says of the unjust man,

First, he rules the city because he seems to be just. Then he takes in marriage from whatever station he wants and gives in marriage to whomever he wants; he contracts and has partnerships with whomever he wants, and, besides benefiting himself in all this, he gains because he has no qualms about doing injustice. So then, when he enters contests, both private and public, he wins and gets the better of his enemies. In getting the better, he is wealthy and does good to friends and harm to enemies. To the gods he makes sacrifices and sets up votive offerings, adequate and magnificent, and cares for the gods and those human beings he wants to care for far better than the just man. So, in all likelihood, it is also more appropriate for him to be dearer to the gods than is the just man. Thus, they say, Socrates, with gods and with humans, a better life is provided for the unjust man than for the just man. (362b-c)

Unlike previously, Glaucon now speaks of the unjust man as one who has attachments and cares about those beyond himself, "those human beings he wants to care for." The picture he paints

makes the unjust man appear not particularly unjust; he is simply a man who cares, as Hector cares, more about himself and his own than he does about his enemies. The unjust man is willing to harm others to advance the causes of himself and those about whom he cares, but he provides for those about whom he cares and is pious. Yet, in Glaucon's stringent definitions of the just and unjust man, such a man must be considered as unjust because he does not act to advance the causes of everyone, but instead is willing to wrong others in order to further the causes of himself and those about whom he cares.

Socrates, as Plato's spokesman, believes that the image presented by Glaucon of a man resembling Hector unfairly characterizes such a man. The image Glaucon has presented, Socrates says, is "enough to bring me to my knees and make it impossible to help out justice" (362d). What Socrates truly wants to say— and what he will say in effect later in the dialogue— is that the man described by Glaucon does not appear quite so bad and that, therefore, justice in the stringent way Glaucon conceives it cannot be defended. When Socrates educates Glaucon and Adeimantus to reflect upon their passion for justice, oriented toward truth, the unjust man as Glaucon presents him no longer appears unjust. In fact, a man who reflects upon his passion for justice acts exactly as the man described by Glaucon. In Book X, Plato revisits Glaucon's description of this man. Socrates says,

Will you, then, stand for my saying about [just men] what you yourself said about the unjust? For I shall say that it's precisely the just, when they get older, who rule in the city if they wish ruling offices, and marry wherever they wish and give in marriage to whomever they want. And everything you said about the unjust, I now say about these men. (613d)

The just man who has been educated to reflect, oriented toward truth, upon his passion for justice, is that which Glaucon— who early in the dialogue has not been educated yet to reflect upon his passion for justice— considers the unjust man. Yet, Plato must wait until Book X to

alert his readers that the man Glaucon describes is, in fact, just, or he would undermine the education of their anger into the passion of justice. Socrates says he “had it in mind to say something” in response to this image presented by Glaucon, but Adeimantus interrupts him before he has an opportunity to so speak (362d). If Plato is to present men dichotomously as either selfishly advancing their own causes or generously advancing everyone’s causes, he cannot give Socrates’s support to the man painted by Glaucon as unjust and instead must allow Glaucon’s images to remain temporarily.

Although Glaucon’s speech is meant to show the problems with justice, it is, in fact, justice that Glaucon wishes Socrates to defend. Socrates notes the radicalness of his interlocutor’s acceptance of his new dichotomy of justice and injustice, saying of both Glaucon and Adeimantus, that he is “full of wonder at [their] natures” (367e). Glaucon, fervently feeling the passion of justice, does not realize the radicalness of his own speech. Plato’s readers, similarly, may not realize how far they have been led from their previous passion of anger which responds to wrongdoing against oneself and one’s loved ones. The images of the just and unjust man provided by Glaucon educate Plato’s readers into accepting this binary view, in which it is not enough, in order to be considered just, merely to respond to evils; one also actively must act just at all times, or, in other words, one must rely on the passion of justice to drive his actions. Presented with the dichotomy between the passion of justice and the passion of injustice, Plato’s readers wish to share in Glaucon’s passion rather than in the passion of the ignoble Thrasymachus. Plato has educated their anger into a passion for justice.

In chapter five, I will discuss the way in which Plato’s education proceeds to cause men to reflect upon their passion of justice so as to choose whose and which causes to take up. Yet, introducing the passion of justice is a necessary part of this progression; it is through this process

that Plato is able to educate anger from a responsive passion into an active one that can be felt constantly. Plato has demonstrated that anger is the passion that responds to wrongs and then has educated anger into the passion of justice. This passion *may* be constantly felt, but Plato has not yet privileged it in such a way that men will attempt to repress their other passions, choosing to act constantly upon their passion of justice, as Hector chooses to privilege his *thumos* over his grief in the *Iliad*. The explanation of Plato's education to make men privilege their passion of justice becomes my project in chapter four.

CHAPTER FOUR: The education of the passions to privilege the passion of justice

I demonstrated in the last chapter Plato's education of anger into the passion of justice, a passion capable of being constantly felt that causes men to wish to act to advance all men's causes. In chapter five, I will discuss how Plato provides images for men to imitate to educate them to reflect continually upon which and whose causes should be advanced. First, however, I must show how he educates men to privilege the passion of justice. Plato must educate men, using his preferred educative form of images, to privilege this passion over other passions that they may feel. I opened this paper by remarking that a variety of passions could affect political life, namely pride, resentment, love, grief, and anger. Yet, it is *thumos* and not these other emotions, that Plato designates as his third part of the soul, alongside reason and desire. Love is nearly absent from the *Republic*, as several Straussian scholars note, despite its strong presence in dialogues, like the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*.¹⁰⁶ In another work, the *Philebus*, Plato connects love with anger and grief.¹⁰⁷ There is thus reason to believe that Plato isolates *thumos* from these other passions particularly because of his educative project in the *Republic*.

Some philosophers concern themselves with the other passions; Thomas Hobbes considers fear in his state of nature, Jean-Jacques Rousseau considers pride with *amour-propre*, and Friedrich Nietzsche considers resentment with *ressentiment*, for example. However, these are not the passions which Plato discusses in the *Republic*. He perhaps considers fear of death as directly related to grief, as I will show in the following discussion. He cannot dismiss pride because, as I noted in chapter two and will note further in this chapter, he utilizes it to educate

¹⁰⁶ Strauss 1996, 191-3. Benardete 100. Harvey Mansfield's lecture "How to Understand Politics" is an attempt to understand human life through *thumos*. Mansfield says, "At the end someone might object: Have I left out love? The answer is yes, I have. For now. Love is a further complication." Mansfield, "How to Understand Politics," *First Things*, August 2007, <https://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/08/004-how-to-understand-politics>.

¹⁰⁷ See Nussbaum 2001 722 n. 13.

his readers, who he presumes pridefully wish to rule rather than be ruled. He perhaps considers resentment a type of anger, and might presume himself to deal with it when he educates anger into a passion for justice and when he educates men to reflect on their passions before acting. Two passions, however, appear to preoccupy Plato, as it seems that he does not presume himself capable of educating them easily: grief and love. I will discuss the problem that Achilles's grief poses to Plato, and how Plato attempts to solve this problem in Book III by making grief appear inferior and by perverting Achilles's character. I then discuss the problem that Plato perceives with the passion of love. I examine Plato's presentation of the images of communal treatment of women and children and argue that does not seek to rid men of love, but rather to make them love the most, more than their attachments to material objects or to loved ones, the search for truth and, thus, the need to reflect upon their attachments.

The threat of Achilles's grief

The first passion that Plato attempts to de-privilege is grief. In Book IX of Homer's *Iliad*, I argue, Achilles's grief causes him to act dangerously. However, Hobbs does not agree with my understanding of the threat of Achilles. Hobbs writes that Achilles presents a threat to Plato because

Plato has come to see Achilles as the archetypical exemplar of the *thumos* gone awry, a terrible warning of what can happen to a man when he is not only characterized...but is actually dominated by [*thumos*], instead of being ruled by his or someone else's reason.¹⁰⁸

I disputed the language of "ruled" by reason in chapters two and three, where I noted that I instead see Achilles as unable to be moved by the rewards that move Hector. Yet, I do not believe that Achilles's threat arises from an excess of *thumos*. As I demonstrated in chapter two,

¹⁰⁸ Hobbs 199-200

Hector thinks only with his *thumos*; Hobbs does not take up the case of Hector in her work. I maintain that the reason Achilles, unlike Hector, presents such a particular danger is that he is filled not only with anger, but also with grief. Plato responds directly to Achilles in his attempt to de-privilege grief; therefore, I will analyze Homer's representation of Achilles in the *Iliad*.

Achilles is unable to be motivated by honors, such as the honors that motivate Glaucou and Adeimantus to view the philosopher-ruler as a role model. When Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax try to convince Achilles to return to battle, he resists their pleas, telling them that "there was no gratitude given for excessive fighting against your enemies" (9.316-317). Political theorist Arlene Saxonhouse views Achilles as angry over the lack of rewards bestowed upon him for his heroic actions;¹⁰⁹ yet, he dismisses the significance of rewards entirely when Odysseus tells of the gifts and recognition that Achilles could receive in exchange for fighting. Achilles responds to Odysseus, "As I detest the doorways of Death, I detest that man who hides one thing in the depths of his heart, and speaks forth another" (9.312-313). Odysseus speaks as if gifts and recognition can compensate Achilles for his heroic feats. Achilles, however, does not consider gifts and recognition sufficient compensation because he may die on the battlefield; moreover, even if he does not die in battle, he will die eventually and lose these honors and rewards. His grief in the face of death thus will not be fixed by such rewards. Believing that Odysseus is as aware as he that such honors do not serve as replacement for the inevitability of death and will not alleviate the grief that Achilles feels, Achilles accuses Odysseus of hiding "in the depths of his heart" the truth.

¹⁰⁹ Arlene Saxonhouse, "Thymos, Justice and the Moderation of Anger in the Story of Achilles" in *Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical Investigation from Socrates to Nietzsche*, ed. Catherine Zuckert (New Haven 1987), 33.

Achilles laments that, regardless of any honors that may be bestowed upon him, he fails to feel as if he is honored. He says, “Nothing is won for me, now that my *thumos* has gone through its afflictions in forever setting my life on the hazard of battle” (9.321-322).

Saxonhouse writes that Achilles realizes that “the world of which he had been a part never functioned according to its articulated principles, and indeed never could.”¹¹⁰ Yet, while Saxonhouse suggests that Achilles’s disillusionment with the world stems from his failure to receive the honors to which he believes he is entitled, I maintain that Achilles’s problem is that such honors are not capable of ridding him of his grief. It is the confrontation of his own mortality—his life “forever” set on the hazard of battle, whether he is fighting or not—that causes him to suffer grief.

Achilles’s grief is mixed with anger. Achilles is the only character in the *Iliad* whose anger is described as having *thumalges* anger, or heart-rending anger.¹¹¹ Classicist Robert Rabel notes that the use of the word *thumalges* is “striking and unprecedented.”¹¹² Apollo and Odysseus both refer to Achilles’s *thumalges* anger. Most notably, Achilles views himself as having *thumalges* anger. In response to Odysseus’s relaying to him Agamemnon’s offer of rewards if Achilles rejoins battle, Achilles says,

He cheated me and he did me hurt. Let him not beguile me with words again. This is enough for him. Let him of his own will be damned, since Zeus of the counsels has taken his wits away from him. I hate his gifts. I hold him light as the strip of a splinter...Not if he gave me gifts as many as the sand or the dust is, not even so would Agamemnon have his way with my *thumos* until he gives back to me all this *thumalges* anger. (9.375-378, 9.385-387)¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Ibid. 33

¹¹¹ See p. 54

¹¹² Rabel 126 n. 32

¹¹³ Lattimore writes “until he had made got to me” instead of “until he gives back to me.” Rabel, citing the use of the same phrase in *Il.* 1.97, claims that the more faithful translation of “πρὶν γ’ ἅπὸ” is “until he gives back to me.” I argue that Achilles purposefully uses somewhat unintelligible phrasing. Rabel 126-127.

Hector looks forward to the material rewards of glory; his *thumos* is moved by the honors he receives. In contrast, gifts are meaningless to Achilles; his *thumos* does not long for worldly possessions. If this is all he offers, Agamemnon cannot “have his way” with Achilles’s *thumos*. Consequently, Achilles is filled with *thumalges* anger over the tragic nature of the world. The only way that Agamemnon can convince Achilles to fight, therefore, is if Agamemnon can prove that Achilles actually can rid himself of his grief in the face of death. Only then will Achilles’s grief leave his *thumos*, and will his *thumos* function as Hector’s, responding to wrongs against him and his loved ones.

Yet, Agamemnon could never provide this proof to Achilles because it is impossible for Achilles to be persuaded to respond to wrongs. As classicist Adam Parry points out, Achilles asks Agamemnon to “give back all this *thumalges* anger,” but anger is not capable of being “given back” like a stolen possession, and is not fixable in such manner.¹¹⁴ Rabel notes that Kalchas, in Book I of the *Iliad*, uses the same phrase “to give back” to describe the need to assuage Apollo’s anger by returning a girl to her father. The phrase makes sense in the context used by Kalchas; Apollo’s anger can be mitigated by giving back a tangible thing, a girl. However, the phrase is unintelligible in Achilles’s usage.¹¹⁵ Achilles’s *thumalges* anger cannot be dealt with in such a manner; grief in the face of death cannot be fixed with the return of an object. Only Achilles, himself, can fix his grief, by giving it up.

The problem of grief that Plato must confront is evident in Achilles’s triumph over Hector in Book XXII of the *Iliad*. Hector continues to think solely with his *thumos*. He tells Achilles when they meet:

Now my *thumos* in turn has driven me to stand and face you. I must face you now, or I must be taken. Come then, shall we swear before the gods? For these are the highest who

¹¹⁴ Parry 6

¹¹⁵ Rabel 126-127

shall be witnesses and watch over our agreements. Brutal as you are I will not defile you, if Zeus grants to me that I can wear you out, and take the life from you. But after I have stripped your glorious armor, Achilles, I will give your corpse back to the Achaeans. Do you do likewise. (22.252-259)

Hector will fight Achilles because he thinks it is necessary to try to respond to the wrongs committed by Achilles. Despite Achilles's brutality, Hector still believes that he should treat Achilles's body well in death because he has observed this kind of honorable behavior in his role models. Achilles, however, cares nothing for such role models and thinks only of his own grief. He tells Hector, "You will pay in a lump for all those sorrows of my companions you killed in your spear's fury" (22.271-272). He kills not for the sake of just righting wrongs, but for the sake of avenging grief. What is unfair, to Achilles's grief-stricken *thumos*, is that some people do not feel the sorrows that he and his loved ones feel. Hector wishes to respond to wrongs against one's loved ones by defending his loved ones and eliminating such wrongs, while Achilles wishes to cause grief to those who brought grief to him and his loved ones; he wants to retaliate. Achilles's *thumalges* anger, unlike Hector's anger, is destructive.

Achilles's *thumalges* anger is not only destructive, it also remains unresponsive. When, on his deathbed, Hector pleads with Achilles to allow him to have a proper burial, saying that his parents will offer gifts, Achilles once again rejects gifts. Achilles's *thumos* still cannot be moved by gifts because of the grief he feels, and he says, "I wish only that my *thumos* and fury would drive me to hack our meat away and eat it raw for the things that you have done to me" (22.346-348). With no care for anything but his own pain, he is completely unresponsive to both gifts and role models. Achilles's anger lacks an education of any kind, and he is willing to act on his most animalistic impulses. At last, Hector realizes the futility of continuing to attempt to reach Achilles, and says, "I know that I could not persuade you, since indeed in your breast is *thumos* of iron" (22.356-357). Achilles's *thumos* cannot be moved by the traditional role models and

motivations by which Hector's *thumos* is moved to act. When Achilles finally does return Hector's corpse, in Book XXIV, it is not because of the gifts ordered by Zeus to be given to Achilles to secure Hector's body. Instead, Achilles is moved to return Hector's corpse only when Hector's father, Priam, visits him and weeps at his feet (24.510). Priam's grief causes Achilles to weep and grieve for his own deceased loved ones (24.511). Achilles's recognition that Priam shares in his grief, as well as Achilles's desire for Priam to "not further make [his] *thumos* move in [his] sorrows," causes Achilles to decide to give back Hector's body (24.568). Achilles cannot be persuaded to act by monetary rewards or by a need to respond to wrongs, but can only be moved to act by the grief in his *thumos*. It is impossible to educate Achilles's grief-stricken anger into the passion of justice because his grief-stricken passion can be moved only by grief. The possibility that men may feel grief as Achilles does thus is a grave threat to Plato's education.

Plato's response to the threat of Achilles's grief

In order to respond to the threat of Achilles's fear in the face of death and grief, Plato re-characterizes both grief and Achilles in Book III. He first makes grief appear unserious by describing how the guardians should not grieve, and then he re-characterizes Achilles to make him appear motivated by monetary desire. The discussion of how guardians should grieve occurs in the context of Socrates and Adeimantus's creation of poetry for the guardians of the city they create in speech. Not all proposals concerning how to treat the guardians in the city of speech educate Glaucon and Adeimantus— or Plato's readers— to want to imitate the guardians. For example, Socrates's presentation of the noble lie, which he says is necessary to persuade men to take up the laws of the city, does not educate Glaucon and Adeimantus, or Plato's

readers, to want to imitate the guardians. When the noble lie causes Adeimantus to protest that the guardians are not being made happy (419a), Socrates responds that the guardians, are not supposed to be happy, but the city as a whole is supposed to be happy (420b). If the guardians are not happy, it seems unlikely that Glaucon and Adeimantus— or Plato’s readers— will want to imitate them. (The philosopher-rulers, on the other hand, appear to be happy and are role-models that Socrates’s interlocutors and Plato’s readers want to imitate, as I discussed in chapter two.) Yet, Socrates’s discussion of Achilles’s grief takes place before the introduction of the noble lie; therefore, the guardians have not yet been made to seem unhappy. Furthermore, Socrates does not say that grief is bad only for guardians, but instead speaks more generally, introducing his discussion of grief by saying that stories that valorize it “should not be heard, from childhood on, by men who would honor gods and ancestors and not take lightly their friendship with each other” (386a). Such men are not limited to the guardians. Plato most likely presumes that his readers, and Socrates’s interlocutors, will want to be like such men who honor gods and take friendships seriously.

Plato characterizes grief as contradictory and unserious. He says that “decent men” should not imitate the “laments and wailings of famous men” at the deaths of their loved ones because “being dead is not a terrible thing... Then, he wouldn’t lament him as though he had suffered something terrible” (387c-d). Decent men, Socrates says, have decent friends, and such decent friends have good afterlives and, therefore, are not unhappy (387d). Furthermore, decent men should not mourn the loss of their friends because a decent man is “sufficient unto himself for living well and, in contrast to others, has least need of another” (387d). Socrates’s interlocutors, and Plato’s readers, will not want to think of themselves as inferior and in need of others; as I described in chapter two, Plato presumes that Socrates’s interlocutors, and his

readers, prefer ruling to being ruled. Heroes like Achilles, Socrates says, should not be depicted as “crying and lamenting as much as, or in the ways, Homer made him do” because only those most in need of being ruled express grief (388b). Poetry should take “out the wailings of renowned men and we’d give them to women—and not the serious ones, at that— and to all the bad men” (387e-388a). Thus, by presenting grief as a passion felt by inferior men, Plato encourages his readers to deny their feelings of grief.

Plato further urges men to take life seriously. Achilles, as I demonstrated previously, is incapable of taking life seriously because he knows that life is destined to end; he takes a tragic view of life. Although Achilles does not express a comic view of life, Plato inserts, into his discussion of Achilles, a discussion of the comic view of life, demonstrating that the problems of the tragic view and the comic view are the same. Men who take a comic view of life also do not take life seriously, but for different reasons than those of tragic men; comic men do not think life matters and, instead of lamenting, they laugh off hardship. Socrates’s solution for eliminating both the tragic and comic views of life is to have men laugh at laments, but not laugh otherwise (388e). Socrates presents to Adeimantus that neither the tragic view nor the comic view allows men to rule over themselves. Men who take a tragic view of life, Socrates says, lack “endurance” and therefore give way to their inferior feelings. Similarly, a man who takes a comic view and “laughs mightily” sees a “mighty change to accompany his condition” (388e). As a result of Socrates’s uncomplimentary images of the men with tragic and comedic views of life, Socrates’s interlocutors, and Plato’s readers, understand that if they are to remain in control of their lives, they must embrace neither the tragic nor comic viewpoints and, instead, must take life seriously.

Plato further sidelines grief by re-characterizing Achilles as motivated by desire, rather than by *thumalges* anger. As I noted in chapter one, re-characterizing an already internalized image is a powerful method of education.¹¹⁶ The word *thumalges* does not appear in the *Republic*. Instead, Socrates describes Achilles as a “lover of money” (390e). He further describes him as a “confus[ed]” and unrealistic literary character for containing “within himself two diseases that are opposite to one another— illiberality accompanying love of money, on the one hand, and arrogant disdain for human beings, on the other (391c). Yet, the reason that Achilles appears in the *Republic* as an unrealistic literary character is that, as Socrates describes him, grief is not present in his psyche. I described previously how, because of his grief, Achilles does not care for the material rewards promised to him by Agamemnon. I further described how Achilles does not care for the rewards he is promised for returning Hector’s body, and only returns the body once moved by Priam’s grief. He is thus clearly characterized by grief, and not, as Socrates says, by desire and arrogance. Hobbs writes that Plato’s “criticisms [of Achilles] seem manifestly unjust.”¹¹⁷ Yet, she also tries to salvage Plato’s criticisms by saying that *thumos* in excess causes men to be materialistic.¹¹⁸ Achilles character, however, is not characterized by an excess of *thumos*, but by the presence of grief in his *thumos*. Plato’s criticisms of Achilles are, in fact, manifestly unjust, and Plato provides them in order to disguise the true motivation for Achilles’s actions. Furthermore, Plato’s conception of the soul, which contains reason, desire, and *thumos*, leaves no obvious place for grief. Plato wishes to hide grief entirely from man’s consciousness to allow him not to make grief an important part of his self-conception, and instead to privilege anger.

¹¹⁶ See p. 17-18.

¹¹⁷ Hobbs 204. Milkies, like Hobbs, claims that Achilles is characterized chiefly by *thumos*. Milkies 18.

¹¹⁸ Hobbs 204

Of course, men may feel grief regardless of whether they consider it in their self-conceptions. Plato thus takes up a discussion of grief again in Book X, and Glaucon notes that it is “impossible” that men “won’t be grieved at all” (603e). Socrates says that it is important that such a grieving man remain “sensible in the sense of pain” and do his best to “fight the pain and hold out...habituat[ing] the soul to turn as quickly as possible to curing and setting aright what has fallen and is sick, doing away with lament by medicine” (603e-604d). The part of him that grieves, Socrates says, “is irrational, idle and a friend of cowardice” (604d). Plato thus once again characterizes grief as an inferior passion. Even if we experience grief, we must fight to not make it dominant in our characters. In this manner, therefore, Plato sidelines grief and allows the passion of justice to be privileged.

The threat of love

Love, like grief, has the ability to affect men’s actions powerfully. As I noted in chapter three, Hector fights on behalf of his loved ones. Yet, love also has the power to make men oblivious to the blatant wrongdoings of their loved ones. This is evident in the *Iliad*, where Paris, in love with the beauty of Helen, wishes to take her from her husband, King Menelaus of Sparta. Helen is imbued with love for Paris by the goddess Athena and leaves with him. If Helen instead were concerned with just action, she would not have left her husband, to whom she owed fidelity. Hector fights for his brother because he loves him, despite his brother’s blatant wrongdoing. Furthermore, Helen’s love appears to make her so blind to her wrongdoing that she criticizes Paris for not fighting on behalf of the city. When Hector attempts to convince Paris to fight alongside him against the Achaeans, Helen says, “I wish I had been the wife of a better man than this is, one who knew *nemesis* and all things of shame that men say” (6.350-351). She

speaks of the need to respond to wrongs, blind to the fact that it was her own wrong, committed in love, that sparked the war. Love's ability to cause men not to care about acting justly, and to be blind to times when they fail to act justly, thus poses an extreme threat to Plato's education.

Plato recognizes the threat of love to the passion of justice, as well. Within the discussion of the laws necessary for the city in speech, Socrates says, "Have we any greater evil for a city than what splits it and makes it many instead of one?" (462a-b). The city splits into many, Socrates says, when men "utter such phrases as 'my own' and 'not my own' at the same time in the city, and similarly with respect to 'somebody else's'" (462c). When men have loved ones about whom they care more than others in their political community, Socrates implies, they will not act to advance the causes of the entire political community, but instead chiefly to advance the causes of their loved ones. Socrates also notes that love causes men to grieve more than if they did not love, as men grieve for their loved ones (464d). In chapter five, I will discuss how Plato provides images educate men to reflect upon which and whose causes should be advanced. If this education is to occur, men will not be able to take up blindly all of the causes of their loved ones. Plato thus must deal with the problem of love.

Plato's response to the threat of love

In order to respond to the problem of love, Plato first collapses love into the broader category of desire, de-privileging it among all of men's desires, and then presents the proposal of communal treatment of women and children in order to disorient readers from their attachments so that they will be able to reflect upon them. I first will consider the way that Plato reframes love as one of many desires in order to cause men not to consider love such a serious matter. In Plato's discussion of the soul, Socrates at first splits the soul into two parts, one of which is

“rational” and the other which is “irrational” (439d). The irrational part is “the part with which it loves, hungers, thirsts and is agitated by the other desires” (439d). By dividing the soul in this manner, Plato collapses love into just another desire, rather than a powerful force upon human life. Plato’s readers who internalize this conception will not think as highly of the powers of love.

Plato then proceeds to split the soul further, adding *thumos* as a third part. He provides an image of a man named Leontius, saying

Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus under the outside of the North Wall when he noticed corpses lying by the public executioner. He desired to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and made himself turn away; and for a while he struggled and covered his face. But finally, overpowered by the desire, he opened his eyes wide, ran toward the corpses and said: “Look, you damned wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.” (439e-440a)

The tripartite division of the soul that results from this image does not, as I have noted, include grief. Nor does it include love as anything more powerful than the curiosity about, or the desire to look at, dead bodies. Love, as one aspect of desire, becomes part of the soul that *thumos* is meant to restrain. Plato’s readers who internalizes this image understand that they are not supposed to act as Leontius did, but instead should assert their *thumos* over their desires, which desires include love. The job of reason in this image is to allow men to reflect and choose the right action: the action suggested by one’s *thumos* over the action suggested by one’s desires. This image thus helps Plato’s readers understand that *thumos* should be privileged over desire, including love.

In Plato’s Book IX discussion of the tyrant, the tyrant is depicted as a man who possesses only desire and lacks *thumos*. Socrates says that if the tyrant

finds in [himself] any opinions or desires accounted good and still admitting of shame, it slays them and pushes them out of him until it purges him of moderation and fills him

with madness brought in from abroad...It [is] for this reason, too, that love has from old been called a tyrant. (573b)

Once again, Plato equates the basest desires with love. Love, like our most base desires, causes men to be immoderate and unable to reflect on their action. *Thumos* attempts to restrain Leontius from acting on his desires, but fails. In the case of the tyrant, no struggle for restraint even occurs. Political theorist Paul Ludwig notes that *thumos* is notably absent from the soul of the tyrant.¹¹⁹ The tyrant privileges desire or love over *thumos* and does not consider *thumos*. The implication of Socrates's image is that if man does not wish to be a tyrant, he must consider his *thumos* more important than his love. Plato's readers, not wishing to be tyrants, understand to privilege their *thumos* in such a manner.

Plato disorients his readers from their attachments to their loved ones by presenting the proposal for the best city to have communal treatment of the women and children. Following his assertion that men cannot utter phrases such as "my own," Socrates says that there can be no families, but instead all women and children must be shared in common (461e-462c). Bloom writes of this proposal, "The effect of this is to remove anything that is natural in the family...A father, if he is anything, is the one who engenders the child."¹²⁰ The proposal even invites the possibility of incest, as no one will know the identity of their true relatives. Plato's readers can view this proposal as nothing other than absurd and undesirable. No man would want to live in such an unnatural way. Yet, by proposing that this is the only way in which the city truly can live justly, Plato causes his readers to reflect upon their own attachments. His readers will not want to give up their spouses and children, but, with this proposal internalized, will be prompted to reflect before acting on behalf of loved ones. Readers now must weigh their concern for their

¹¹⁹ Paul Ludwig, "Eros in the *Republic*" in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (Cambridge 2007), 222-223.

¹²⁰ Bloom 385

families that naturally arises from love against their concern for justice. Plato thus does not dismiss love as a passion, but rather causes men to consider questioning love and privileging their just passion to advance the causes of their city or, to use the conception of justice presented by Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of Book II, the causes of all men. The connection between grief and love is again apparent. The grieving man in Book X grieves at the loss of “a son or something else for which he cares particularly” (604e). Just as he has not eliminated grief, Plato has not eliminated love, but only asks for men to fight to make anger their dominant passion.

With the value of love and grief diminished, Plato educates his readers to privilege the passion of justice. I now have examined the way that Plato educates men to reflect, the way in which he educates anger into the passion of justice, and the way he educates men to privilege the passion of justice over their other powerful passions. At the end of chapter three, I discussed how Glaucon introduces the passion of justice that cares for all men’s causes at all times. Although such justice is not described as a passion but as a principle, it functions as a passion; Plato did not describe it this way so as not to reveal the methods of his education to his readers, which would allow them to disregard the education of which they would then be aware. However, Plato’s education continues; he does not wish for men to attempt to advance the causes for all men. In chapter five, I will discuss how Plato provides images to educate his readers to reflect continually upon which and whose causes should be advanced. With this final step, Plato finally completes his education of anger into a reflected-upon passion of justice.

CHAPTER 5: The education in reflection upon the passion of justice

In chapter two, I described how Plato wishes for men to reflect upon their actions before acting. In chapters three and four, I explained how Plato attempts to privilege a particular kind of anger, namely, the passion of justice, which not only responds to wrongdoing, but also is capable of being a constantly-felt passion to advance all men's causes. Plato educates the passion of anger into the passion of justice by having men internalize a dichotomy between, on the one hand, anger that advances all causes, as presented by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and, on the other, anger that advances only one's selfish cause, as presented by Thrasymachus. Yet, I also noted when describing this passion of justice that Plato does not intend to educate his readers to attempt to advance the causes of all men, though the passion of justice that Plato privileges appears to cause men to act in such a manner. In this chapter, I argue that Plato believes that men cannot act on their passion of justice at all times, as they often must choose some causes over others. Plato's education in anger and reflection teaches his readers to reflect upon whose causes and which causes to take up.

Because I argue that Plato understands that men's causes may conflict, it follows that he cannot promote justice as "the greatest good;" thus, he cannot promote the conception of justice upon which Adeimantus relies when he asks, near the beginning of the dialogue, for Socrates to defend justice as "the greatest good" (366e). I demonstrated in chapter three that, by the end of the dialogue, the man that Glaucon took to be unjust is demonstrated to be just.¹²¹ It therefore stands to reason that Plato does not defend justice as Glaucon and Adeimantus ask him to defend it at the beginning of the dialogue. My interpretation differs from a conventional interpretation of the *Republic*, which takes Plato's aim to be defending justice as the greatest good, a good

¹²¹ See p. 72-74.

which makes men “better off” when they “possess it.”¹²² In my interpretation, justice is not a good to be possessed, but rather a passion that Plato wishes men constantly to feel. This passion causes men to act in a particular way, just as resentment, fear, pride, grief, or love, when felt by men, cause them to act in a particular way. In the same way that men can feel love pulling them to act in a certain way, but reflect on that passion and choose not to act upon it, as I demonstrated in chapter four, men can feel the passion of justice pulling them in a certain way, but reflect on their passion and choose not to act upon it. Plato wishes for his readers, educated to view their anger as the promotion of all men’s causes, to reflect upon when, and when not, to act on this passion.

In order to demonstrate that Plato wishes men to reflect upon their passion of justice, I begin where I left off with Glaucon and Adeimantus and discuss the way that the introduction of the city, specifically the introduction of philosophic dogs, causes men to reflect on their passion of justice. With reflection, men learn to act on this passion only to advance the causes of good men. Still, the passion of justice must be moderated within the city, as men with a passion of justice may attempt to interfere too much in the affairs of the city in their efforts to ensure that the city’s causes are advanced. Plato thus educates men to reflect on their passion of justice when acting within their political community. In the myth of Er that ends the *Republic*, Plato demonstrates the need to reflect on one’s passion of justice before advancing one’s own affairs, completing his education of teaching men to reflect before acting on their passion of justice.

¹²² These arguments are fairly common. I quote here the formulation provided by Richard Kraut, “The defense of justice in Plato’s *Republic*” in *Cambridge Companion to Plato*, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge 2006), 311. See also, F.C. White, “Justice and the good of others in Plato’s *Republic*” in *History of Philosophy Quarterly* Vol. 5, No. 4, Plato Issue (Oct. 1988), 395-396; David Sachs, “A Fallacy in Plato’s *Republic*,” *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 72, No. 2, (April 1963), 141.

The philosophic dog: reflection on whose causes to advance before acting on the passion of justice

At the end of the images provided by Glaucon and Adeimantus, justice is the passion that feels the need to advance all men's causes at all times. Socrates responds to Glaucon and Adeimantus by creating the city in speech. In this city, there will be war against other cities because it will be necessary to secure the city's desire for luxury, a desire that Glaucon demands they take into consideration (372c-e, 373e). The implication is that men's wills always will conflict. Since there always will be sides to take, Glaucon and Adeimantus cannot advance the causes of all men. Glaucon seemingly forgets about his former view that justice never would involve harming another (373e). He now takes the side of advancing the causes of his fellow countrymen over that of being able to advance the causes of all.

Since justice is the passion to advance the causes of all and Plato privileges this passion, he must modify it in some way in order to stop men from acting on it at all times. In order to so modify the passion of justice, Plato presents the educative image of dogs, who are "gentle as can be with their familiars and people they know and the opposite with people they don't know" (375d-e). The guardians will be like dogs, Socrates says, because they not only will possess *thumos*, but also will be "philosopher[s]" (375e). This is the first time that Plato mentions the philosopher in the *Republic* and it occurs in an unlikely place, in the example of dogs. Glaucon is confused by Socrates's statement (376a), most likely for two reasons: first, the connection between philosophy and distinguishing between friends and enemies is not readily apparent and, second, it does not appear that dogs are philosophers. The connection between philosophy and distinguishing between friends and enemies makes sense when paired with Socrates's discussion with Polemarchus, where Socrates says that friends actually are those who are good and enemies

actually are those who are bad (334c-e). The philosopher, oriented toward the truth, reflects upon causes that are good and causes that are bad. However, Socrates does not remind Glaucon of his statements to Polemarchus. In the context of the creation of the city in speech, friends are the ones within one's political community and enemies are those outside of it. Socrates thus, only temporarily, educates Glaucon and Adeimantus—and Plato educates his readers—to reflect on the difference between those within, and those outside of, one's political community when deciding whether to act on the passion of justice.

The description of dogs as philosophers also sets up Plato to revise the notion that men should act to advance the causes of their political community. Later, he can reintroduce the distinction between friends and enemies that Socrates provides to Polemarchus, namely, that friends are those that are good and enemies those that are bad. In other words, friends are those whose causes we ought to advance and enemies are those whose causes we ought not to advance. Instead of friends and enemies remaining constant, as those in one's political community and those outside of it, such a conception of friends and enemies requires constant reflection upon the question of whose causes deserve advancement. Plato's anticipation of a later revision likely is the only reason why he would call dogs philosophers, as they clearly are not philosophers.¹²³ He does not want men to possess a hardened and unchangeable notion of who constitutes friends and who constitutes enemies, as dogs do, anticipating that he later will revise the conception of who friends and enemies are to be a matter for constant reflection. Once Plato educates his readers that philosophy looks toward truth, they will understand that to be a philosopher as Plato

¹²³ Benardete also notes that Plato's discussion of the dog anticipates a later argument, but he says that it anticipates Plato's later argument that "philosophers ought to be kings." I, on the other hand, argued in chapter two that Plato does not actually wish for philosophers to rule, but that Plato's discussion of the philosopher/philosopher-ruler serves to educate men to reflect. Benardete 57. For further explanation of Benardete's thoughts on this matter, see Michael Davis, "Seth Benardete's Second Sailing: On the Spirit of Ideas" in *Political Science Reviewer*, Vol. 32, No.1 (Fall 2003), 16-19.

describes means to reflect, oriented toward truth, rather than to presume those in one's political community to be friends and outsiders to be enemies. Plato's readers thus will return to understanding friends and enemies in the way that Socrates describes to Polemarchus, that friends are those that do good and enemies those that do bad.

Justice in the city: reflection before acting on the passion of justice within one's political community

Until the discussion of philosophy, the reflection that Plato suggests men take on the passion of justice remains fundamentally unchanged with respect to the matter of friends and enemies. However, while Plato has educated his readers to distinguish between those within and those outside of their political community when deciding whose causes to advance, the problem remains that men may act on their passion of justice too often when in their political communities. Such men would interfere too often in the affairs of their political community, causing conflict, political chaos, and even anarchy. Plato thus must educate men to reflect upon when to act on their passion of justice within their political community.

When he presents Socrates and his interlocutors to find justice in the city in speech, Plato educates his readers to reflect so as not to act too zealously on their passion of justice. I reiterate a point that I explained in chapter three: now that I have introduced Socrates's discussion of justice, there are now two uses of the word "justice."¹²⁴ The first is the "passion of justice" that I introduced in chapter three, and the second is that which Socrates uses in this passage. I maintain that this second use of the word "justice" is not actually what Plato means by justice. I do not take him to consider justice as a principle, but as a passion. However, when Glaucon and

¹²⁴ See p. 70-71

Adeimantus introduces justice in Book II and asks Socrates to defend it. Socrates says they first must search for that which justice *is*. Consequently, justice is considered, temporarily, a principle rather than a passion. Plato discusses justice as a principle because to reveal it as a passion would be to reveal his educative methods to his readers, thereby allowing them to disregard their education and return to the passion of anger that responds to wrongs. He needs his readers to consider justice as truth, and not as merely a passion, in order to educate them. The discussion of justice as a principle in Book IV has an educative purpose: teaching Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Plato's readers not to always act on their *passion* of justice in their political community. The principle of justice is not, in fact, Plato's statement of the truth of justice. If the point of the *Republic* was to find justice as a principle, the dialogue would end as soon as justice was found in Book IV. Instead, this moment in the work occurs not even halfway into the dialogue as a whole. Furthermore, if Plato actually intended to truth of justice—which, as I argued in chapter two, cannot even be found—he would do so in dialectic and not imagery. Because he uses his educative method of imagery rather than dialectic, I find it reasonable to maintain that the principle of justice presented by Plato in Book IV does not represent truth of justice, but that he instead conceives of justice as a passion, a passion about which he will continue to educate throughout the second half of the dialogue.

Plato defines the principle of justice in the city in speech in a way that educates his readers not to act on their passion of justice too zealously within their political community. When Socrates and his interlocutors complete their “hunt” for justice in the city, they find that justice is “minding one's own business” and not being “a busybody” (433a-c). Socrates expresses the fear that without such a view, all men may take it upon themselves to make sure that “no one have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of what belongs to him” (433e). Men

acting without restraint on their passion of justice would be in constant conflict, meddling in each other's affairs, because men will have different conceptions of whose and which causes should be advanced within the city. Socrates says that such "meddling [is] the destruction of the city" (434b). Instead, the rulers of the cities should decide lawsuits over men's conflicts within the city (433e). Plato's education does not solve fully the problem of anger that Aeschylus, in the *Oresteia*, suggests institutions must solve. Plato also recognizes the need for political institutions. Even when men are educated to have a passion of justice and to reflect upon it, political institutions are necessary to stop the conflict that would result from constant meddling by private men in political affairs.

Through this discussion of the principle of justice, Plato's readers are educated to reflect upon and restrain their passion of justice so as not to commit an injustice against their cities. The use of the language of the principle of justice serves to educate men's passion of justice. Meddling too much in the affairs of the city, Socrates says, is, in fact, "injustice" (434c). The use of the language of "justice" and "injustice" as principles, presented by the philosopher Socrates, causes men to internalize these principles as truth. When men reflect upon their passion of justice, oriented toward truth, they will not act upon their passion if their reflections suggest that it is, in fact, an unjust passion. Plato's readers will consider whether their actions will be considered meddling and, if they are, Plato hopes that they will choose not to act upon their passion of justice. Despite Plato educating his readers not to meddle, there remains a role for the passion of justice within the city. Socrates says that lawsuits must be brought to the ruler of the city, which implies that men are motivated to bring these lawsuits. Furthermore, actions such as serving those in need, advocating for political reforms, running for office, or voting hardly appear to be meddling. In fact, they seem necessary for a vibrant political community.

Despite the need for men to reflect upon their passion of justice within the political community, the passion still will serve an important role in politics. At this point in the dialogue, Plato's readers have been educated to reflect on their passion of justice so as to advance the causes of men they consider good over those they consider bad, and not to meddle too much in the affairs of their political community. Yet, Plato has not yet taught men how to reflect upon their passion of justice in a way useful for determining whether to act to advance their own causes. This is the next step of Plato's education of men to reflect on their passion of justice.

The myth of Er: reflection before acting on the passion of justice for one's own causes

In chapter two, I discussed how Plato educates his readers to instill in them the existence of, and the need to search for, truth in the context of political rule, but then shows the political proposals that have been demonstrated to be impossible and ridiculous. The result of this education is that men are taught to reflect continually before acting, as they search for truth but find no truths available. Plato shifts the discussion from an analysis of political rule to an analysis of private men. Private men must, like rulers, be oriented toward the truth and reflect on what is true before acting because, Socrates says, "as a city is to a city with respect to virtue and happiness so is man to man" (576d). The best men will be like the philosopher-rulers, reflecting upon their actions, while the worst men will be like the tyrant, acting on their desires without reflection. Yet, Plato does not educate his readers enough to influence their action by simply stating this. A man naturally wishes to respond most to wrongs against himself, even more than to those against his loved ones. He may, therefore, continue to act on his passion of justice to further his own causes without reflection, despite Socrates's statements to the contrary.

In order to educate men to reflect further on their passion of justice before advancing their own causes, Plato introduces the myth of Er, his final educative image. Er, Socrates says, visits the afterlife and returns to describe to men that which he has seen. Men who had chosen to act badly in their previous lives went down, rather than up to heaven, and were forced to pay penalties for their actions. Men who acted well were able to choose their next lives. Yet, even those who acted well, Er said, have the ability to cause themselves much pain in their next lives because they might choose lives that cause them much pain. Socrates says,

[In order to choose our next lives properly,] each of us must, to the neglect of other studies, above all see to it that he is a seeker and student of that study by which he might be able to learn and find out who will give him the capacity and the knowledge to distinguish the good and the bad life, and so everywhere and always to choose the better among those that are possible. (618b-c)

It is not enough merely to luck into living well because one then would not be able to choose a happy next life. The implication of this image is that a man should not trust blindly his passion of justice, even if it deeply instills in him conviction that his actions are just. Even if such conviction results in the same action that would be taken if he had reflected— if man “participate[s] in virtue without philosophy” — he will not know which life to choose for his next life (619c). In a passage reminiscent of the *Oresteia*, Socrates says that men may not blame “demons, and anything rather than himself” (619c). Plato educates men not to consider their passions capable of forcing them to act, as the Furies forced Orestes, but only capable of suggesting action. The passion of justice to advance one’s own causes, even when ardently appearing to be just, cannot force men to act, but still can be reflected upon.

Plato finishes the story of Er, and the *Republic* as a whole, by having Socrates provide one final exhortation. Socrates says,

If we are persuaded by me, holding that soul is immortal and capable of bearing all evils and all goods, we shall always keep to the upper road and practice justice with prudence

in every way so that we shall be friends to ourselves and the gods, both while we remain here and when we reap the rewards for it like the victors who about gathering in the prizes. And so here and in the thousand-year journey that we have described we should fare well. (621c-d)

Plato's final image educates men that happiness comes from practicing "justice with prudence."

The need to privilege the passion of justice and to reflect prudently upon it: nothing could encapsulate better Plato's education of his readers as a whole.

CONCLUSION

Having demonstrated the way in which Plato educates men to privilege the passion of justice, which he creates by educating anger, and to reflect, oriented toward truth, upon this passion, I consider whether we should accept Plato's education. Now that we have been made aware of such education, unlike many of Plato's readers, we may choose to rid ourselves of it. Political theorist Sheldon Wolin writes that the political philosopher "fashion[s] a political cosmos,"¹²⁵ we may choose, if we wish, to shed the political cosmos that Plato fashions for us. I will consider each aspect of Plato's education and whether we should wish to preserve it or discard it.

First, I recall the methods of Plato's education, as I described them in chapter one, and the way that Plato hides such methods from his readers. Perhaps now that Plato's imagistic education has been revealed, we may wish to avoid imagistic education entirely. To do so, however, would mean either arguing against Plato that men can be educated in political matters through reason alone, or denying all political education. If we agree with Plato that truth in political matters is merely a useful illusion, then denying his imagistic education would amount to a denial of all political education, an outcome that would result, as Wolin believes, in "political chaos."¹²⁶ However, we still could accept imagistic education, but choose to expose the way that Plato hides it. This is, in fact, what I have attempted in this paper. Doing so, I believe, allows us to consider Plato's education for what it is worth, rather than blindly abiding by that which it teaches us.

¹²⁵ Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Princeton 2004), 40.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

We could accept Plato's imagistic education in part, while discarding his education in reflection, which I described in chapter two. We could dismiss the role model of the philosopher/philosopher ruler as contrived and unworthy of our emulation, and rid ourselves of the concept of political truths that Plato wishes us to deem capable of being discovered. We could recognize that Plato fails to demonstrate the actual existence of these truths and, therefore, dispose of their illusionary existence in our imaginations. To do so, however, may be dangerous. Martin Heidegger attempted to dispense with the notion of permanent truths which exist for men to discover. Strauss writes of Heidegger,

It was the contempt for these permanencies which permitted the most radical historicist in 1933 to submit to, or rather to welcome, as a dispensation of fate, the verdict of the least wise and least moderate part of his nation while it was in its least wise and least moderate mood, and at the same time to speak of wisdom and moderation. The events of 1933 would rather seem to have proved, if such proof was necessary, that man cannot abandon the question of the good society, and that he cannot free himself from the responsibility for answering it by deferring to history or to any other power different from his own reason.¹²⁷

If we fail to continue to judge our actions against the standard of truth, Strauss suggests, we may succumb to actions that appear cruel, frightful, and abhorrent, the most powerful example of which is Nazism, which Heidegger embraced. It appears that Plato had good intentions in educating us to believe in the existence of political truths to be found. Perhaps then, instead of casting aside his education in reflection oriented toward truth, we should continue to practice it, while remaining aware that we will not, in fact, find such truths.

We could accept the necessity of continuing to orient ourselves toward truth, but deny Plato's education of anger into a passion of justice, which I described in chapter three. Recognizing the way that Plato contrives this passion of justice by displaying the false dichotomy of injustice, represented by Thrasymachus, and justice, reinforced by the images

¹²⁷ Strauss 59 26-27

presented by Glaucon, we could return to the passion of anger. We could act nobly, like Hector, and respond to wrongdoings against ourselves and our loved ones. Yet, in comparison with advancing the causes of mankind, it appears tribal simply to advance the causes only of ourselves and those to which we happen to be connected. We perhaps should defend our ourselves and our loved ones more than we defend any random stranger, but men already act in such a way, in spite of Plato's education. It may be that there is no need to change the way that we already moderate between advancing the causes of ourselves and our loved ones and advancing the causes of all mankind.

Accepting the need to reflect upon truth and the need to accept, at least in part, the passion of justice, we could choose to de-privilege the passion of justice, the passion which I describe Plato as privileging in chapter four. We could discard Plato's de-privileging of grief and love and restore them as prominent passions and legitimate reasons for acting. Then, we could read tragedies, such as the *Iliad*, and permit ourselves to share in Achilles's grief, and read romantic poetry and become moved by powerful love. Such passions add richness to human life and we possibly can experience them without making our passion of justice too inferior to them. We may decide, as I would, to revel in these passions and their powers. Perhaps, however, we will continue to rate the passion of justice as more important than these passions, concerning ourselves more with bettering the world than with sorrowing too much in the world's miseries or delighting too much in its pleasures.

After considering all this, we could be inclined to allow our passion of justice to drive our actions without reflection, in effect, the opposite of Plato's education in such matters, which I described in chapter five. We could trust in the passion of justice without feeling the need to contemplate the actions which it suggests to us. We could deny Plato's image of the philosopher

dog and choose to be like a regular dog that acts without reflection, reject Plato's forced principle of justice within one's political community as simply minding one's own business, and abandon the myth of Er as providing us with false notions of the afterlife.

Yet, the passion of justice, when not reflected upon, is a dangerous passion. Ironically, Plato's education has had the opposite of its intended effect on some men, causing them to be idealists despite Plato's attempt to demonstrate the lack of appeal of political ideals. Much bloodshed has been committed in the name of political "truths," ranging from the religious wars of the Crusades and the warring Catholic and Protestant factions in the Thirty Years' War of the seventeenth century, to modern American wars to promote democracy in the Middle East. Some modern political philosophy has attempted to address the dangerous side effects of the passion of justice. Thomas Hobbes, for example, creates the Leviathan in the context of the Thirty Years' War so that men will stop warring over that which they think is just. With his story of the state of nature, Hobbes attempts to make men view fear, rather than the passion of justice, as their primary political passion, and to agree to submit to justice as conceived by a single ruler so as not to fight with each other. Montesquieu writes that "commerce cures destructive prejudices" and suggests that the pursuit of monetary gain is more agreeable and peaceful than the pursuit of justice.¹²⁸ Perhaps we thus should reject Plato's education because its unintended consequences are inevitable, and instead choose to privilege fear or monetary gain over the passion of justice.

Regardless of whether we choose to privilege the passion of justice or some other political passion— and even if we do not privilege the passion of justice, it seems unlikely that we would choose to abandon it entirely— I maintain that political analysis should become more aware of the ways that passion, and the passion of anger from which Plato educated it, affects

¹²⁸ Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws*, trans. Anne M. Cohler (Cambridge 2017), 338.

political action. Political science, I believe, must not continue to rely chiefly on social science models that conceive of rational actors with desires. If there is one lesson that I wish readers to take from my analysis of Plato's *Republic*, it is that passion strongly impacts political life. The exact manner in which political science as social science must consider the passions are not exactly clear to me. But if political science continues to neglect passion in its current manner, it will continue to be surprised by events like the recent rise of the populist right and the far-left, a rise, I suspect, that has been driven more by passion than by interests.

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