Re-Examining Ethnic Conflict

in Sub-Saharan Africa:

A New Framework for Understanding the

Politicization of Ethnicity

By Joseph Tomchak

Yale University

Department of Political Science

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Figures and Charts

Introduction

This paper is designed to fundamentally challenge the way that ethnicity is treated in literature concerning the study of conflict, particularly examining the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The two dominant approaches to considering the correlation between conflict and ethnicity are the grievance model, which traditionally frames ethnic tensions as essentially intractable and emotional responses to historic or cultural clashes, and the greed model that finds structural variables to have the greatest importance and dismisses ethnicity as playing no part in engendering conflict.

Instead of siding in either of these domains, this paper instead argues that ethnicity is one of several identities that a person can hold. The particular traits of this identity make it a prime candidate for targeting by political leaders to gain support at key points of instability. However, while ethnicity can solidify support in the short term, the long-term consequences can lead to conflict between groups and, in many cases civil war.

The paper will begin by more thoroughly examining current theories of ethnicity, demonstrating that while each has strengths, fundamental flaws mean that they fail to create a comprehensive, coherent theory. Instead, a new theory will be an established through which political leaders activate latent ethnic identities under certain circumstances. It will then identify theoretical pathways and conditions that can cause leaders to focus on ethnic identity and connect these factors with likely outcomes. Specific historical cases will demonstrate how this theory unfolds in a given country and, finally, a brief examination of data and a model for future study will be outlined to demonstrate how future research can quantitatively treat ethnic identity given this theoretical model.

This theory does not seek to establish any singular, novel idea in the study of ethnicity or conflict. Instead, it is a reconfiguration of disparate theories into a more comprehensive view of ethnicity. In attempting to prove or disprove the effect and influence of ethnicity, political scientists have essentially ignored the causes of politically salient ethnic groups. Consequently, the research uses the wrong metrics for outcomes and oversimplification has undercut an inescapable aspect of research into conflict and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper establishes a framework to combat those flaws and more holistically approach the subject

Current Theories of Ethnicity

This section explores both the greed and grievance models of civil war. In essence, these models seek to isolate factors that contribute to the outbreak of civil wars that are defined as ethnic. Ethnic civil war is defined here as a conflict in which either or both sides are making explicit ethnic claims or a conflict in which ethnicity is the primary determining factor for how individuals normally side in the conflict. While the definition of civil war varies greatly throughout the literature, this paper does not conduct a macro-level analysis of civil wars generally, thus, does not delineate the difference between civil war and other forms of intra-state conflict.

As for the greed and grievance models discussed, they do not capture all of the interpretations of these models, but outlines some of the foundational works on the subjects. Definitions of greed and grievance explore a number of disputed variables, but the core concepts remain consistent with the works discussed below.

Greed

Structural factors, primarily focusing on metrics of potential gain, have frequently been tied to civil war and the current trend in the studies of civil wars involving ethnicity has been to examine primarily structural variables (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). These authors argue that factors such as poor economic conditions and high export yields increase the likelihood that civil war will occur. The primary argument is that when there is great financial benefit to be gained by ceasing control of the government, there is a greater likelihood for civil war. This means that poor economic conditions and low education rates create an environment of few other opportunities for financial advancement other than overturning the current system through violence and conflict. High exports, particularly commodities like oil are conducive to conflict because they tend to be relatively easy to cease, as they are usually geographically concentrated, and they yield a high price when sold (Fearon, 2005). Even as a civil war rages on, rebels can use profits from commodities to continue fighting for many decades; unlike other means of financing such as taxation, there need only be limited amounts of control that can be geographically isolated to sell commodities to an international market (Ross, 2004).

Geographical features such as mountains and proxies for low state-capacity also are found to increase the likelihood of civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The argument is that these factors make it less costly to begin conflict. Those geographical features make insurgencies more difficult to stop while low state capacity means that insurgencies do not need to be particularly well-equipped or financed to mount a reasonable challenge to the government.

The combination of low barriers to begin conflict and high gains if successful with little to lose essentially is seen as a rational cost-benefit analysis. Entering conflict comes with a clear cost and in order to outweigh this cost, the right series of conditions must be present.

These studies also find no correlation between religious and ethnic diversity or inequalities and civil war. The issue here is that they use extremely outdated metrics to measure ethnicity; they are based on a metric called ethno-linguistic fractionalization. This metric is based on a study conducted by Soviet ethnographers in the 1960s called ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) (*Atlas Narodov Mira*, 1964). In essence, this is a measure of the likelihood that two random people from a given country speak different languages. Not only is the measure outdated, but it does not account for the possibility of different ethnic groups that speak the same language.

The flaw of these studies, however, is not only in their measures, but the fundamental conceptualization as well. As other authors have pointed out, if ethnicity does not matter, then there is no rationale for why so many civil wars have sides obviously represented by ethnic groups (Sambanis, 2001). Additionally, it is insufficient to assume that diversity means conflict. As will be discussed later, the development of identity and politics is not as simple as difference being inherently feared. Group size and number of groups alone is the more simplistic view of ethnicity in a given nation and it captures none of the realistic social and political dynamics that occur.

These theories are not inherently wrong, simply incomplete. The dismissals of ethnicity are based on faulty data, but the correlation between economic and structural conditions still play a vital role in determining whether or not conflict will break out. As

4

will be explored later, the correct conditions for ethnic strife without the corresponding conditions for war can lead to other outlets of violence and conflict. The scale is not a dichotomous one between civil war and peace. Instead, a series of other outlets are possible, the exact pathways of which will be outlined later.

Grievance

Much of the basis from the grievance model comes from cases like the Balkans where the theories have been driven by notions of what is described as "ancient hatreds" (Kaplan, 2014; Sudetic, 1998). These largely journalistic or historiographical accounts of conflict trace pathways through political and cultural history and cite it as engendering modern conflict (Friedman, 1996). However, these theories have struggled to find footing in quantitative studies. There are conceptual flaws here as well. If the histories of groups make it so that there are intractable grievances that span generations, then there is no explanation for how civil wars end or why many more civil wars do not break out.

The politically relevant ethnic group (PREG) database is one of the more recent steps to update the modeling of ethnicity and politics; though many authors utilize the more nuanced view of the grievance model presented by the PREG and other studies, some still hold to definitions that much more closely resemble the ancient-hatreds model (Posner, 2004). PREG still uses the ELF database as its basis, but it also creates an updated metric, adds and removes groups, accounts for not only existence and size of groups, but also how politically important those groups are within societies. Other works re-affirming the grievance model have created other more specific metrics for the power dynamic between ethnic groups, proposing that inequality and imbalance are drivers for

conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). While these studies have come closer to incorporating the realistic and complicated nature of identity and politics, they tend to be static and are not entirely explanatory.

The PREG dataset was conducted by decade, which does not have nearly the flexibility necessary for any kind of apt predictive power. Again, given these values that remain constant for such a prolonged period, there should be far more civil wars than is the case. Additionally, the PREG is, in part, a reflection of previous and current civil wars. Looking at the highest ten PREG values for the 1990s, four countries had an ethnic civil war with two more having finished one in the prior decade.

As a rule, political scientists generally view the ten-year period from the end of a civil war as a particularly volatile period with high tensions and high likelihood for re-emergence (Collier & Sambanis, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Licklider, 1995; Quinn, Mason, & Gurses, 2007). For this reason, most political scientists will exclude periods during and immediately after civil wars when considering factors that explain civil war emergence. In fact, previous occurrence of a civil war is normally cited as the greatest predictor of future civil wars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Walter, 2004). By including immediately post-war and during war data, Posner skews creates large endogeneity issues.

As for the study conducted by Cederman et al., it uses vague definitions of categorical variables to demonstrate its point (2013). For example, it codes a group as included or excluded dependent on whether or not they have "access to central power," but lack a clear coding definition of what this means, making it a highly subjective measure that finds an effect due to bias within its own definitions. In order to avoid such

errors, it would be necessary to create a much clearer set of criteria applied across countries in the same manner, but this is rather difficult considering the varying political circumstances and structures of governments. Similarly, other studies have used concepts such as ethnic polarization to ill-define a concrete metric for considerations of ethnicity; these findings do demonstrate that ethnicity is important in some manner, but fail to isolate exact mechanisms through which ethnic identity eventually yields conflict (Garcia-Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2004).

What these studies accomplished is beginning to build is a framework for considering ethnicity that accounts for grievance in a manner that is more dynamic. Rather than being simply an artifact of some unknowable hatred, there is logic and reason behind the decisions to begin conflict and divide along ethnic lines. Even though they do not more fully explore these connections, it is a move away from the simplifications of the original grievance models. From this inferences can be drawn concerning the fact that grievance can have legitimate political basis and that discrimination and mistreatment have consequences in raising tensions.

Latent Ethnic Identities

The definition of ethnicity is a concept that is not clear throughout literature on political science. It is even describes at times as "a rather vague and anamorphous concept (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003, p. 160). Authors have metrics that consider ethnicity in slightly different ways, but few authors that examine ethnicity in quantitative studies bother to explain exactly what characteristic they mean when discussing ethnicity and ethnic identity. For this reason, it is necessary to

be explicit about what the term ethnicity is designed to mean in this paper and what impact it has on the theory being constructed.

The definition of ethnicity in this paper is derived primarily from the work of Kanchan Chandra. In her works, ethnicity is explained as an identity that can be determined based upon real or perceived characteristics (Chandra, 2006). How others perceive a person can be just as influential on its impact. To give some more explicit criteria:

Ethnic identity categories are a subset of this larger set [of identities], defined by the following restrictions: (a) They are impersonal—that is, they are an "imagined community" in which members are not part of an immediate family or kin group; (b) they constitute a section of a country's population rather than the whole; (c) if one sibling is eligible for membership in a category at any given place, then all other siblings would also be eligible in that place; and (d) the qualifying attributes for membership are restricted to one's own genetically transmitted features or to the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, region, caste, clan, nationality, or race of one's parents and ancestors. (Chandra, 2006, p. 400)

One of the key aspects of this definition is that what matters is not necessarily self-identification. Institutions such as Afrobarometer will frequently conduct surveys regarding self-identification throughout Africa and have found a continuing trend for tolerance of ethnic others and decline in ethnicity as a primary identity (*Highlights of Round 6 survey findings from 36 African countries*, 2017). However, what this does is create a false sense that ethnicity will not continue to play a role in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Even in examination of political parties, authors have found that even in absence of conflict, many nations in Sub-Saharan Africa have parties that divide along ethnic lines (Elischer, 2013). Alignment is not nearly so simple as to follow directly, thus Elischer actually creates different categories for ethnic parties ranging from mono-ethnic, where a single ethnicity supports a single party, to the catchall, parties that are compromised of an amalgamation of ethnic groups often formed in opposition to larger parties.

In this way, personal identification can resist the tendencies towards association based upon ethnicity, but societal forces can overwhelm this resistance. When treated as part of a particular group, often, one eventually begins to associate with that group. This is a key mechanism in the formation of social-identity theory wherein opposition to another group and the inter-group relationships are one of the key determinant factors for the levels of group-identification and group cohesion (Tajfel, 2010). As Chandra explains, it is not necessarily a shared ancestral bond that draws these groups together, but how primarily hereditary characteristics are perceived by society at large. A person can have many identities based on other characteristics such as gender or nationality, but the relative importance of these identities is dependent upon environmental and societal conditions (Chandra & Wilkinson, 2008).

Lastly, there are two inherent qualities about ethnic identity that make it rather prevalent and important to study. It is not changeable in the short term and it is visible (Chandra, 2009). To expand upon that, population shifts over time or policies directed at shifting ethnicity can create change, but in the interim, one cannot shift ethnic balances and due to the nature of the characteristics it entails. Additionally, ethnic identity is clearly apparent to the casual observer.

In this theory, these are the characteristics that compromise a latent ethnic identity. At any given time, a person may not consider the ethnic divide between themselves and their neighbors, but those cleavages exist within societies. Ethnic identities themselves remain relatively stable in a society. This is the reason that the ELF and PREG metrics are used throughout political science with such ease. Checking after every decade for changes in ethnic composition is probably sufficient to keep up with the changes in demographics and patterns of migration most likely to change the variables. However, ethnic identity is a construct created by society and its importance is also dictated by society. This importance is not stable and can change a great deal in short-periods of time, making decade-long overviews a poor macro-level view of an issue that manifests itself in micro-level consequences.

The term latent ethnic identity is an original term used here, but adheres to the definition of ethnic identity used Chandra outlined in this section. Her definition is distinct from how it is used by other authors because it is designed to examine the origins of politically important ethnic identities. Wherein she simply discusses that ethnic identity is only one of a series of identities that does not always have political importance, this paper separates the politically inert and politically active forms of ethnic identity, separating them into a latent identity and active identity category. It is simply designed to indicated whether or not the identity is important politically in a given society at a given point in time and to help explain what mechanisms exactly cause the fluctuations in importance. Rather than being a divergence from the literature on the concept of ethnicity, it re-examines the idea with a separation between different concepts to which authors assign the same term.

<div align="center">**Ethnic Identity Activation**</div>

If ethnicity does not always matter politically, then contributing factor must influence when people care about ethnic identity. Rather than supposing that it is an irrational and emotional response, this paper examines the potential strategic reasoning through which ethnicity becomes important: this is the process of identity activation.

Identity activation occurs in a given society at a specific point in time. Under circumstances discussed later, ruling elites will emphasize ethnicity in a manner that makes it a prevalent factor in the politics and operation of that country. This is what can help explain why societies that are highly politicized based upon ethnic identity are not in a constant state of turmoil. It is not sufficient to have a latent ethnic identity, there needs to be the causes and process of activation to bring that identity in the political forefront in a competitive, fear-evoking manner.

This section is divided into three parts: the rationale for activating an identity as a method of mobilization, an explanation for why ethnicity is an ideal identity to activate, and the specific process of identity activation.

The Strategy Behind Identity Manipulation

At the core of ethnic parties or militarized groups is the same theoretical strategy behind alliances. The primary objective of these groups is to maintain or cease power. In this way, there is a crucial role for the theories of grand strategy within the realm of studying conflict between ethnic groups as well.

In a traditional sense, great power politics is about a balance of power that exists between states. Upsets to this balance of power will cause adjusting, the shifting of

alliance, and ultimately changes to the system overall (Mearsheimer, 2003). Taking these concepts and applying them to ethnic conflict, one may immediately consider the structural factors introduced by the greed model theorists. Having a weak state or economic difficulty creates the opportunity for a de facto rising power, a rebel group, to begin a conflict. Along this line, some studies posit that growing economic, political, or demographic power of an ethnic group is a perceived shift in the balance of power, leading the state to attempt to make a correction and provoke some type of conflict (Posen, 1993).

However, these theories draw too literally from the grand strategy literature and also buy into the ancient hatreds model of ethnic conflict. The case examined by Posen is Serbs and Croats during the dissolution of Yugoslavia and he cites historic clashes as evidence that there very existence of another ethnic group creates a security dilemma (1993, p. 35-37). However, there is a way to integrate grand strategy with views of ethnicity that conform to more nuanced views of ethnicity.

Rather than examining power itself as creating balance in a system, there are theorists that posit that the balance of threat also plays a role (Walt, 1990). In essence, alliances and posturing is conducting when nations feel threatened due to the actions of other nations. Applied here, one can consider that the actions of one group's leaders can have an influence on the corresponding reaction that occurs, setting the stage for escalation and eventual conflict as will be discussed in the process section.

Building on this theory, many posit that these actions are not unintentional steps towards war, but deliberate decisions designed to provoke conflict (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). Elites seeking to gain influence can exaggerate, exacerbate, or fabricate threat for

the political purpose of creating sides and intentionally provoking a security dilemma. The consequence of a security dilemma is an arms race in which each side must compete to ensure sufficient power to check the threatening force. For an elite in control or one seeking to be in control, an arms race is exactly the type of scenario wherein there lies great potential for increased or stabilization of control.

It is impossible to consider a security dilemma without acknowledging that it is a reaction to fear. Rather than a logical or rational analysis of the present state, the security dilemmas provoked by threat are, in part, driven by fear that status will be lost. While analysts of ethnic conflict often tout the irrationality and hatred playing a critical role in the seemingly endless violence, those analyzing security dilemmas treat them as strategic reactions or miscalculations, depending on the outcomes. The point here is that conflict is not necessarily an irrational or emotional response. Even in cases in which there is little reason to have legitimate fear, in a system of imperfect information wherein elite political leaders make claims as to a danger, the logical reaction of the people that they represent is fear and an escalation in tensions. Though not all authors make the connection explicitly between grand strategy and the ethnic violence, works such as Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) are essentially studies that incorporate grand strategy (Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009).

It is important to note that both for the elites and the populous involved in these situations, a series of rational self-interested choices escalates to a situation that does not serve anyone's best interest.

Why Ethnicity is a Prime Candidate for Activation

Before explaining the process of identity activation itself, it is important to address why one would choice ethnic identities over others. Theoretically, elites may have better motivation to choose a cleavage such as class to create a societal division. The motivations for manipulation of the populous and basic strategy could remain the same. Still, of all civil wars from 1990-2000, about 70% are considered ethnic in nature; though this exact number varies slightly between author dependent on many definitions, the figure approximately holds across works (Sambanis, 2001). Clearly, there is something that drives ethnicity as an effective mobilization tool.

Due to the very qualities of ethnic identities, they offer a number of motivating mobilization factors concerning ethnicity ranging from structural issues such as economic inequalities, either real or perceived, or ethnic biases formed against groups due to a historical conflict or grievance (Gurr, 1993). While size of the group and its capacity to mobilize, a proxy for variables such as concentration geographically, matter, the historical and political contexts matters as well; even a small group may be able to mobilize if given the incentive of fear or opportunity that is great enough (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). The process of mobilization and of the motivations behind it are also not always objective; leaders and elites have the capacity to influence the interpretation and emphasis on certain events or conceptions of relations among the people that they represent (Olzak, 2006).

Getting into further detail, the most simplistic of analyses posits that in ethnic civil wars, there is absolutely no competition for loyalty because groups are entirely fixed by the hereditary characteristics that define ethnicity. The conflict itself is primarily

centered around territorial control and military strength since there is little room to sway

allegiances (Kaufmann, 1996). Not only does this overstate the strength of ethnic

mobilization capabilities, but it also ignores the reality on the ground that defections do

happen. Under the right conditions, individuals of opposing ethnic groups will cooperate

with and even actively assist whatever group is in control of their geographical area

(Kalyvas, 2008).

Still in an earlier work Kalyvas argues that by definition ethnic wars should have

opposing forces treat occupied areas of ethnic others with indiscriminate violence as a

method of pacification since it coopting the opposition is particularly hard when groups

are mobilized along ethnic lines (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). The reality is likely

somewhere in between these two perspectives. Cooptation is not impossible, but merely

difficult. The very nature of ethnic mobilization involves the creation of a system of fear.

In order to defect, one must believe that this fear was incorrect or simply believe that

one's original side has no chance of victory. Still, some cases of defection should always

be expected as one of the primary motivators of human behavior is self-preservation and

the preservation of one's immediate kin; in a situation where survival is dependent upon

defection or cooperation, it is not surprising that these are not only possible outcomes, but

likely ones (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008).

Lessons from Eastern Europe provide inside into the possible motivations for

defections verse passive and active resistance. A number of factors including how

significant occupation by opposing forces is on daily life and strength of the connections

existing in the community before occupation are significant in determining the actions

taken by a given group when their territory is controlled by the opposition (Petersen,

2001). Many lessons can be drawn from the case of Eastern Europe under Soviet occupation as the cleavages between the Soviets and various nations under their control were not only nationalistic, but, often, ethnic. The variety of responses to occupation demonstrates that there are no absolutes with ethnicity.

Even in the case of extreme fear of the enemy, a strong presence during occupation can essentially stifle all opposition. However, those actions can have the unintended consequence of providing greater grievance from others of the same kin group. That is to say that the consequence of too severely repressing a given region is to intensify the fear and fervor of the ethnic kin or other potential sympathizers in other regions. This follows a logic provided by scholars that examine dictators and autocrats wherein there is a strategic calculation of whether repression or concession will create the best system of control (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000). Concession can signify a weak position, but repression can increase the intensity and support base from which the opposition draws its power. This is the same situation as is witnessed in the case of ethnic cleavages. Ethnic tensions and even ethnic violence do not always lead to civil war. A range of responses from all sides of this issue are the ultimate determinant as to the end result of these clashed; this will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.

Furthermore, ethnicity is not mutually exclusive with other cleavages and mechanisms of mobilization. In many cases, groups that held opposing ideologies also drew bases from differing ethnic groups (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). Given that ethnic groups often correspond to both regional location and, consequently, economic status, it makes sense that there would be appeals to more than one identity. If one can mobilize not only on ethnicity, but on an additional identity with potential for benefits and a

stronger connection to a base, there is no rational reason that leaders would not attempt to utilize these stacked cleavages to reach their desired audiences.

Adding to these considerations, legacies of both colonialism and anti-colonial movements have a deep history rooted in inter-group tensions and animosity (Mamdani, 1996; Posner, 2005). These authors have found that colonial powers intentionally stoked or fabricated ethnic tensions and fear as a strategy for continued control. The essence of the strategy was that having ethnic groups fear each other made it less likely for unification against the colonial power (Bidwell, 2012). Additionally, imperial powers when ruling indirectly would often use one ethnic group to fight and control several others (Osborn, 2003). At the time of independence this immediately created divergence between ethnic group concerning whether or not independence was favored; these political divides did not also last, but in many cases set up the basis for continued political manipulation of ethnic identity. Although the extent of the colonial influence on ethnic tensions and the variability of this legacy is a topic of debate, most concede that it played some role in at least acerbating tensions. Considering, however, that many initial conflicts that have re-emerged originated in during the period of anti-colonial movements in Africa, it is unsurprising that ethnicity would continue to play a vital role in those conflicts. It not only presents an easy fault line to be exploited, but one that is related to a very legitimate source of fear.

Ultimately, ethnicity is not the only base from which elites can draw their support nor is it the only one in which they do in practice. However, ethnicity is an identity that is stronger than others. By its very definition it is visible and it provides a very clear demographic base. Wherein a cleavage such as class cannot guarantee that all class

conflicts will subscribe to the same ideology, as is seen in politics where lower-class individuals can side heavily with all positions from the far-left to far-right. Ethnicity, however, provides a clearer base. While the exact extent of mobilization is not possible to predict, the potential base of sympathizers is clear. From the moment that elites chose to utilize rhetoric and action to solidify an ethnic base, they have a sense of the maximum bounds of their support. Ethnic mobilization is not necessarily limited to a single ethnic group; in some cases, it can be based primarily as being against an ethnic group, encompassing all other groups, but appeals are made with the foreknowledge of whom it should reach and how that is to be accomplished.

The Process of Identity Activation

Ethnicity in politics is not inherently or necessarily a negative influence. Mobilization along ethnic lines is not at all an uncommon theme throughout the world and, in many cases, can represent not some insidious manipulation by elites, but, instead, a shared set of concerns. Even within the United States, voting is often analyzed and predicted with race as a crucial factor. Yet, there are few that would argue that this division would likely lead to civil war in the United States.

In the United States arguments were even explicitly made in the 2016 presidential election in which opponents of President Trump argued that his election posed a threat to non-white communities. This was designed to act as a method of increasing non-white turnout and maximizing the support that these voters demonstrated for the democratic party. The differences between theses cases and many in Sub-Saharan Africa is the case of legitimate fear. The president of the United States is limited in action by other

branches and, ore importantly, recent history has not demonstrated aggressive action taken directly against a particular ethnic group. This is not to say that the United States does not have racially and ethnically discriminatory policy or actions, but simply a statement that there are few instances to suggest that coordinator efforts to assault a particular group, such as was the case during the 1960s with the civil rights movement, have not occurred. For this same rationale, it would be unlikely for appeals of ethnicity to work in the US.

Similarly, given recent history, there is little evidence to suggest that a leader could orchestrate ethnic favoritism in any significant fashion in Tanzania given that Tanzania has made concentrated efforts to reduce the role of ethnicity (Anke Weber, 2010). This is not an intractable state; actions in Tanzania or the United States that evoked severe fear from an ethnic group could fundamentally alter the future state of ethnic relations. However, the point is that recent history and a credibility of threat and tensions are significant in the ability to raise fears. While it takes time to reduce ethnic tensions, this does provide a pathway through which they can be neutralized in the sense that they no longer pose a serious threat to social cohesion.

When there is the potential or existence of credible threat, and the motivations for mobilization along ethnic lines are present, the first step becomes to stoke tensions and fears. These fears can be fabricated or draw out existing prejudice or past experience in a given society, but, when they exist, they can be manipulated to be a dominating factor. They can be designed to be the primary method of creating a cohesive block of supporters and, when this occurs, the very foundational support of the elites that first gained power based upon these fears is then permanently tied to their perpetuation. The

need for its continuation creates a dangerous instability, especially in cases that are somewhat democratic (Chandra, 2005). This instability can begin a gradual descent into violence and war as the fear that was needed to form the groups consumes them beyond the capabilities of what the leaders can control (de Figueiredo Jr & Weingast, 1997).

At this stage, groups have a strong sentiment of fear as to what will occur in a post-election scenario if they do not win (Dijker, 1989, pp. 80-83). Consequently, groups are highly motivated to cease power or stay in power, leading to the increased likelihood that violence will ensue (David & Kadirgamar, 1989, pp. 9-13). Eventually, the animosity and need to maintain support of those now desiring violence can often force leaders to become involved directly in the violence or else claim that they will do so (de Figueiredo Jr & Weingast, 1997). It creates a certain covenant between supporters and elites in which victory means protection from this dangerous group. If the elites win, they are forced to take some form of action that is, by necessity, an act of escalation of the existing tensions. Even if the side that ultimately wins is not the one that initiated the original fear mongering, they are drawn into its narratives. All people within a nation are provoked by sentiments expressed during a struggle for power regardless of whether it is one side or many using this type of tactic. Consequently, there is a need to act upon taking power regardless of one's initial position.

Resistance to the call for mobilization and the ensuing allegiance to a particular ethnic community comes at a significant personal and societal cost to an individual. If a group is mobilized around the idea of identity, any person not siding with this division is breaking a societal norm. It can be punished with a variety of behaviors such as shunning the individual. This is not an insignificant punishment since ethnic groups are often

regionally based, meaning that it can be hard to find employment or live in a given area if the local community does not accept an individual (Kuran, 1998). The fact that the opposing side likely will not accept the individual only complicates the matter further.

Inadvertently, leaders encourage a sentiment that they cannot control when they chose to focus on ethnic identity. The very fear that gives them a certain degree of power over their people also takes away their power to stop the ensuing problems. They lack the power to pacify the people sufficiently without some sort of action against the group or groups that they claimed should be feared.

The core tenants here are not that leaders necessarily desire the instability or calls for violence. However, there is a natural progression from using incendiary language to one's advantage to actual action based upon this language.

While it is theoretically possible for the ethnic tensions to drive the elite action and rhetoric rather than the opposite, survey studies have generally found that ethnic identification increases during periods of political competition (Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010). This seems to support the idea that it is elites driving the identification rather than the reverse.

The process described above assumes a semi-electoral system in which groups, likely but not always parties, compete for support, but can exist in entirely non-democratic systems. Even in non-democratic systems there is the potential for power struggles. There is the same need to maintain sufficient support if one is in power and to gather support if challenging the existing power. Either case can lead to the same provocation of fears and inadvertent stumble into violence.

Overall, the process as a whole is rather simple. Building from the motivations of focusing on ethnic identity, there is a need to have fear of the threat of another ethnic group or groups. This fear leads to a solid base of support, but also creates tensions within society. The elites essentially create a security dilemma that benefits them in the early stages, but eventually has serious consequences. In order to stop the process, they are forced either to admit that they have been lying, an unlikely option not exhibited in any well-known case, or take some form of action that only pushes them further along the path to armed conflict. As discussed later, there are outlets that can be taken that are not full-scale civil war, but some form of violent conflict becomes inevitable.

The Causes for Identity Activation

With a further understanding of how identity is activated and why, there is still the question of when. As was mentioned, the theories of threat and power balancing require some type of shift in order to trigger the response mechanism. Other offers have posited that it is the existence of ethnic groups alone or that it is when they are shifted away from or towards power, but the theory explored here would indicate that neither of these are correct analyses. Shifts themselves are a consequence of the process of activation of identity. The power changes indicate that groups have already been formed and upset to the system is already underway.

The primary underlying cause is instability. A system that is in balance and stable will not descend into conflict. It takes a shock to the system and a moment of instability for change to occur. Crises is seen in a variety of studies as a moment during which rapid restructuring and change can occur (Daniel, Southall, & Szeftel, 1999).

A period of instability is an incredibly vague concept, however. For the purposes of this paper, two primary causes of instability will be identified based on existing studies: changes in power and protests. This is not to say that they are the only times during which change can occur, but, simply, that these are the most likely triggers. Additionally, these triggers are not necessarily entirely independent. Protests can be the result of building dissatisfaction with a regime and changes in power can be the result of outside pressures forcing a democratization process. However, these two variables are unique in that they are defined triggers.

Much of the existing literature considers what factors build to lead to conflict, but few look at actual instigation. A nation normally does not significantly change geographical features or level of ethnic inequality in any given year; yet, wars do have defined onsets. There is a time when disagreements become violent. The two variables explored here are designed to be set periods of time at which tensions should reach an apex and erupt into conflict. They are unlikely to capture all cases and further quantitative investigation could reveal other potential causes, but these are the most likely trigger events witnessed in real cases and supported in theory.

Two significant other variables arise is much of the literature that should be addressed: they are bordering conflict and economic decline. These are often listed as important variables as to conflict onset. However, while they may contribute to the rise of one of the triggers examined, they do not provide sufficient conditions to be a trigger in and of themselves.

Bordering war is not a discrete event in the same manner that protests and elections are; it should be viewed as a trigger, but as a risk factor. Examining the

literature on neighboring civil wars, it is often listed as a "bad neighbor" effect wherein battles, weapons, refugees, and other elements often spill over the border, correlating with an increased likelihood of civil war (Goldstone et al., 2010). Certainly there is an aspect of bordering conflict that extends into ideology as well. Normally people are fleeing governments or rebels that have mistreated them; this desire for improvement can have a significant effect on the country the ultimately hosts those fleeing the conflict (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008).

Also, bordering conflict, especially one that is ethnic, helps spread fear or hope to the bordering nations. This fear not only exists at the population, but also at the elite level. Unlike other causes of instability, however, the incentives here are to quell any unease (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). Igniting ethnic tensions in this scenario clearly leads to chaos and war spreading to the nation that elites are trying to control. As discussed, in these situations, they are not seeking to create conflict, but a group to support them. If tensions can be de-escalated, it is in the best interests of the elites because taking power means less if it clearly comes at the cost of war. If tensions cannot be de-escalated, then the pressures will only come to a head if there is the potential for change in leadership or if elites need to seize control of the people after protests.

Economic decline presents a slightly different set of circumstances. It creates a negative pressure on elites that does create a scenario in which elites have motivations to rally support that is divided ethnically. It is a period of instability in which elites can legitimately claim incompetence and a superior ability to govern. If in power, elites have a strong motivation to initiate economic scapegoating wherein a certain ethnic group can be blamed for the economic ills somehow, as has been exemplified in Nazi Germany or

Soviet Russia with the Jewish people (Gibson & Howard, 2007). However, the question that arises here is: when does an economic situation warrant such action? It must be sufficiently bad for the government to admit that the economic situation is dire or for the opposition to think that it presents and opportunity to gain support. Once again, power changes and protests present the best examples of indicators for elites of when to take action based upon these causes. Many historic cases demonstrate that once economic conditions sufficiently decline, instances of collective action, primarily protests, become an inevitable outlet (Weyland, 1996).

Changes in Power

Changes in power has three sub-sections; the first division is dependent on whether or not a government has any semblance of democratic process.

Where governments are at least semi-democratic, elections should serve as the potential period for power to be turned over. However, if this is not the case, then the only legitimate time for turnover to occur would be the death of a leader.

Where no elections exist, it is easily to understand why elections are not considered. However, most countries have some form of election. The key element becomes whether or not election present any element of choice (Wiseman, 1990). Since even in cases in which fraud or violence occurs, a leader has reasons to attempt to manipulate votes legitimately, in spite of any illegitimate campaign that parallels it, then the only question is there any choice at all in the election, even if an unlikely one.

Therefore, a categorical variable can separate cases in which elections were held in multi-party state or not to make this determination. It reduces any observation errors

by creating a clear definition. It is true that even in a single-party state, there may be some choices available, but those choices create a government incentive for unity rather than opposition to those in power (Geddes, 1999). In both democratic and non-democratic system, however, coups present a change in leadership that must also be considered.

Elections

Elections represent the most tangible period in a democratic or semi-democratic government during which the governing elite must gain support from the populous. Obviously, in order to stay in office during an election, some measure of real popular support is needed, barring results that are entirely fabricated. Even in elections that are manipulated through fraud or violence, there is motivation to reduce the amount of electoral manipulation necessary to win an election. Having it widely understood that election presented no real influence comes with its own cost with the potential for civil unrest (Tucker, 2007). Additionally, the increased demands of international actors on elections makes it more difficult to continue direct fraudulent actions such as polling place violence and fabricating ballots (Hyde, 2011). Still, there are a number of other factors that have an influence structurally such as polling location, arresting dissidents under false pretenses before elections, and limits to the number of parties or types of parties eligible to run (Schedler, 2002).

However, even in the cases were election are very unfair, the mere holding of elections has been demonstrated to change the expectations and opinions of those within a nation, creating a desire for greater representation (Lindberg, 2006). For this reason,

elites on any side must mobilize support. While it does not necessarily have to be ethnically based, there are many factors that make that a particularly useful tool. As discussed earlier, fear not only can motivate people to take action by voting, but it can also make defection unlikely as societal pressures even on people that would rather vote based upon policy preference would strongly influence them to vote along ethnic lines.

In cases of positive economic performance or some other extremely positive metric wherein a leader may gain high levels of popular support, there may be little reason to focus on ethnicity. However, in most cases, it provides an advantage to emphasize ethnicity and this is supported by survey data demonstrating that the periods around elections see high spikes in ethnic identification (Eifert et al., 2010).

The rise in ethnic saliency concerning elections should create a window of effect. There should be a rise beginning with the months leading up to an election, but the election itself would not necessarily be the apex. The periods after an election could de-escalate tensions, or continue to see them rise if conflict were to ensue.

Death of an Autocrat

The death of an authoritarian leader is the only legitimate means for alternation of power in a system that does not have election. As for cases that have elections that are single-party, any decision or alteration of power is an internal mechanism. The fact that it is separate from the population at large means that it would have no potential pathway for ethnic mobilization.

As for the death of a leader, authoritarian governments have strong motivations to avoid creating a strong successor as that diminishes power while in office and opens the

door to threats to power from within the regime. Thus, when leaders die, they leave a power vacuum that creates a struggle within the government (Betts & Huntington, 1985). Unlike the potential for internal mechanisms of power turnover when a leader is alive, the death of a leader is a public event that causes a public reaction. Just like the cases of elections in authoritarian governments, this is the period during which people have the potential to influence the future of the country. The elites not only have to contend with internal bidding, but must quell any potential unrest, creating motivations for ethnic mobilization.

The exception to this would be monarchical rule. In that case, the death of a leader should have an indisputable successor. Additionally, there is less reason for the current leader to not invest in a successor. A non-monarchical system attempting to implement dynastic succession, however, would create the same forms of instability that would occur if this was not the case, as has occurred particularly in Northern Africa (Yom & Gause Iii, 2012). The idea of monarchical rule may complicate those cases within the theory of ethnicity; however, within Sub-Saharan Africa the only two monarchies, Lesotho and Swaziland. For this reason, this would not be a vital consideration unless applying the theory more broadly given the small number of cases in which it could complicate.

Overall, this means that the period immediately after the death of a leader should exhibit the spike in ethnic saliency.

Coups

Coups very often inadvertently lead to further conflict. In fact, many authors find that what dictates the likelihood of a coup occurring closely follows the same factors and variable that makes civil war more and less likely, including both the economic greed incentives such as having low GPD per capita as well as the grievance model such as being part of a politically oppressed group (O'Kane, 1983). The newness of structures of governments and of states, such as states having recently gained independence from colonial powers, are also found to be important factors in motivating coups (McGowan, 2003). The essential theory here is that coups are another mechanism for the seizure of power. In most cases, if a violent overthrow of the government is the goal, a coup is the most attractive option. It yields all potential benefits of gaining power without the extensive costs of one.

However, whether or not a coup is successful, it then creates a power struggle. In many cases, this entails the involvement of the populous at large. Though elites alone can orchestrate a coup, a failed coup creates strong motivations for both sides to define support bases wherein a successful one requires that the newly installed government gain a foothold. In either case, it is a cause for extreme instability that can lead to conflict (Fearon, 2004).

Coups may be more likely in authoritarian governments, but they can and do occur in electoral systems as well (Marinov & Goemans, 2014). For this reason, this factor should apply in all cases regardless of government structure. The ethnic saliency should follow the same rule as authoritarian leader death wherein the rise occurs after the event. In most cases, coups are orchestrated by elites with tight circles of trust, meaning

that animosity again leadership might be high in society, but spikes in ethnic focus should not be triggered until after the even when elites need the populous to become involved.

Protests

An extensive and often contradictory body of literature exists as to the root causes of protests. However, for the purposes of this paper, the causes of the protests are deemed irrelevant. If correlations are found between protests, ethnic saliency, and conflict, then an interesting follow-up study might be examining the causes or underlying conditions that caused the protests, but it falls beyond the scope of the paper. The protests themselves are the action that are linked to political instability and often shifts towards increased democratization (M. Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). The protests therefore provide the regime with an element of instability wherein there is a risk that protests will cut into the power of the current regime to the point of risking a regime change. Furthermore, the size and frequency of demonstrations is correlated to the risk that they pose to a regime (Davenport, 1995). Therefore, governments, are left with strong motivations to respond to protests directly rather than let them run their course.

Regimes put in a situation of having to handle these protests have a variety of options; the two most explored theoretically are repression and concession.

Repression can take a variety of forms including arrests, beatings, harassment, and others. However, under the assumption that the regime acts rationally in its best interest, it is faced with the dilemma that repression has mixed effects. In some cases, it can eliminated the immediate threat of protests, but create long-term dissatisfaction or simply have a negative portrayal among the populous at large (Lichbach, 1987). In fact,

in many cases, repression is then used by opposition as a mobilization tool to recruit supporters that were initially unsupportive or at least unwilling to publicly appear with protestors (Francisco, 2004). In case studies such as apartheid in South Africa, there is even evidence to suggest that repression of protests creates a cyclic escalation wherein the protestors increase action followed by more repression and so on (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001). This mechanism of increasing the scope, nature, and threat of protests demonstrates the vulnerabilities to which regimes subject themselves when they make the decision to take repressive action.

Even though repression may be a bad option,, concession comes with its own risks. Unlike elections wherein opposition can be coopted in single-party states, protests represent a significant moment wherein the opposition has already publicly declared some form of demand that must be addressed (Geddes, 1999). An individual has already had sufficient issue with the regime in some manner to bridge the gap between having their private positions and their willingness to declare publicly (Kuran, 1991). However, concessions pose a risk of their own. To give in to public demands demonstrates a weakness in the regime; in thinking that a regime is vulnerable, there may be continued protests on this issue or others leading to even more instability (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000).

Given two poor choices, regimes may actually try a slightly different strategy. From Venezuela portraying opposition as US puppets to Saudi Arabia claiming protestors were implanted by Iran, regimes have a long-history of attempting to demonstrate that protestors are "others" (Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Wehrey, 2013). It is an attempt to exploit some type of in-group and out-group dynamic. If the protestors are some evil

other, then regimes hope that they can stem the growth and popularity of the protests. This strategy may have mixed success, but it demonstrates the rationale through which protests become another instance wherein ethnicity can become key.

If ethnicity is made salient at the time of protests, a regime gains the capability to repress the protestors. Rather than creating a rallying cry throughout the country for an anti-government movement, the framing becomes handling dangerous adversaries to the regime. Once the group has been re-framed as an other and a risk to the stability and security of a nation, the government benefits from the large-scale willingness of people to sacrifice basic human rights for security (Jenkins-Smith & Herron, 2009).

However, one then returns to the problem that creating this division creates seeds of fear. The opposition, even if not united ethnically at first, then have a strong basis upon which mobilization is possible. The general populous, meanwhile, begins to view a certain group as a risk to security that needs to be handled. These division can quickly follow the pathways previously discussed that lead into conflict.

Protests are not dichotomous events. Unlikely the other variables, what likely matters in these cases is not just the existence of a protest, if that were the case many open societies should have constantly high level of ethnic saliency. What matters is protest date as well as the size of the protests, frequency with which they occurred, and duration. Ethnic saliency should rise as each of these factors increases.

Activated Ethnic Identity

War does not inevitably ensue after an identity has been activated. It makes it extremely likely that some form of violence will occur, but this section will explore alternative possibilities and reasons for why initial ethnic saliency rises does always lead to full-blown civil wars. Conflict is used throughout this paper with intentional ambiguity. It is meant to include war, but also various forms of political violence that do not reach the level of war. Conflict is the umbrella category used to explain essentially any response that is described in this section. This section is not designed to solve the debate of defining conflict or civil war or even to explain in full the pathways to each. Rather, it simply gives a brief overviews of potential pathways that countries can go down once ethnic saliency has spiked.

Group Dynamics

An important question to address is what do the mobilized ethnic groups look like and how do they behave? It would not be useful to mobilize an ethnic group if it were easily discouraged, but it is important to note that there are limitations. Unlike the ancient hatred theorist, there is no claim here that conflict will ensue endlessly. Elites still have motivations to be rational in their decision-making. They may be pushed to conflict inadvertently by the groups that they lead, but the influence of war can make it easier to sue for peace under the right conditions.

To begin with individuals exhibit typical in-group out-group behavior. There is mistrust between groups and violence is a byproduct of that distrust and fear (Horowitz, 1985). Leaders can temper that violence and distrust over time or direct it, that is to say

emphasize a specific group as being the target or shift fear away from another group dependent upon alliance formation in a multi-party conflict, but they are unable to reverse it entirely without time.

Existing institutional arrangements also are very determinant factors in considering what drives the dynamics. Groups are more likely to ally with others initially dependent on how they were treated before the system was upset. Therefore, political allies of a group in power would likely remain allies wherein groups that were excluded are unlikely to initially side with those in power (McLauchlin, Pearlman, Pearlman, & Cunningham, 2012).

Still, these arrangements are not inalterable. During the conflict, leaders can make alliances and break them dependent upon the changing needs and objectives (Hardin, 1997). This is the reason that, especially in longer conflicts, one can see a variety of alliances form and break throughout the course of time. While many authors point to this as an example that the ethnic divides do not matter, others have demonstrated that this is simply a result of the fact that leaders will take whatever action most benefits them at the time and find a way to get their faction to consent to this change (Christia, 2012). This is the type of ideology-realism divide that one sees in the operation of the Islamic State as well. While there are many true believers, especially at the foot soldier level, many of the initial leaders were former Iraqi Baathist military leaders that sought a mechanism through which to gain control again (Cockburn, 2015). Even in this case where ideology rapidly overshadowed rational calculations, the Islamic State was often driven by rational operation concerns. This is even more so the case with ethnic mobilization as religious fervor can be a more difficult sentiment to control than fear and hope.

While it may take time to get those that follow them to accept these changes, the fact that it was elites to manipulate the fear in the first place, the manipulation can continue as there is a certain amount of trust between the elites and those that followed them into the conflict. In fact, the relationships that allowed the conflict to start are the same ones that direct its course. In most cases, the elites are local or regional leaders with direct connections to their populations and the leaders of opposing groups have much less direct connections to that particular region (Migdal, 1988). This is why an appeal made by an opposing leader to end violence and offers of peace are usually only accepted when the opposing elites consent and lend their endorsement to such a deal.

Types of Violence

This section is designed to explain the various types of actions included under the umbrella of conflict used in this paper. At a lowest level, there is inter-communal violence. This is a term used to describe violent clashes between citizens that can be sparse instances of violent interaction or range up to instances of violent clashes of rioters. An important part of this term is that it is not directed violence. That is to say, elites do not play a significant role in the outbreak or conduct of this violence (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004).

Formal political violence is usually different in that it comes at the direction of political elites. This is violence meant to intimidate or break-up opposition and can be conducted by militaries or police forces against civilians. It can even be conducted by militias against civilians, but usually a one-sided form of violence against a certain group (Lim, Metzler, & Bar-Yam, 2007).

When both sides actually field some armed group coordinated by elites, it becomes an irregular war. This includes guerilla campaigns, but extended beyond this in that it includes not only violence from one armed group against another armed group or elites. Irregular wars can also include coordinated attacks against civilians by these armed groups. It is not a necessary condition, but often commonly used tactic (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).

Lastly, intra-state violence and civil war have many possible definitions and some even distinguish between the two based on battle deaths per year, years ongoing, troops fielded, and other factors. No exact definition is needed here theoretically, but this is the easiest to observe of the outcomes because it is a sizeable and prolonged conflict within a state.

The escalation between these types of violence is largely based upon the actions and reactions of both sides of the conflict and likely some structural factors as well. That is to say that a case may have only have irregular war if the state is too strong or there is an insufficient supply of soldiers for a larger civil war. This is were the structural arguments likely have some significant influence. There are likely a number of interesting studies that could be conducted tracing the pathways of cases with ethnic mobilization through to see along to which point of conflict they rise, but this exceeds the capacity of this paper. For the purposes of this paper, conflict is defined broadly and, for a quantitative study, demonstrating correlation between ethnic saliency and civil war would be the most prudence next step as those have the clearest definitions and most easily observed outcomes.

De-Escalating Violence

The natural state of a society with high rates of ethnic salience should be conflict. Stopping conflict likely takes a force to truncate the progression through counteracting forces. This section briefly explores some of these possibilities.

On the most basic level, the easiest way to stop ethnic conflict is to create a system in which ethnicity is intentionally suppressed. What this looks like across time is eventually the elimination of ethnic differentiation. A very good example of this was the state of pre-revolutionary France wherein language was not centralized and culture was very divided. By modern standards, France in this period would have had many different ethnic groups (Smith, 1991). The elimination of these groups was contingent upon the conscience effort of creating a unified culture, identity, language, and education. This system, over time, created what would now be considered a unified French ethnic identity. This process certainly is not absolute, regional differences exist, religious differences are often hard to incorporate into this identity, and racial differences create complication, but, for the most part, it is a unified ethnic identity (Beer & Jacob, 1985).

In more the short term, this can be applied to a country like Tanzania wherein efforts to created a more unified national identity with language and education can be seen as creating an umbrella ethnic identity to supersede others (Miguel, 2004). While this process would take an extremely long time, the process itself would likely set up a system wherein it would be hard to stoke ethnic tensions and fears even in times of protests or elections. It would not be impossible, but it would certainly be a force to reduce tensions rapidly afterward and possibly make the bar to creating tensions in the first place much higher.

Consolidated democracies could present an issue as well. Some have found that the very ethnic division that can lead to chaos in more authoritarian-leaning governments can actually be peacefully incorporated to the operation of democratic parties in nations where consolidation has happened (Chandra, 2005, 2009). Additionally, there are certain intuitional choices that may counteract the role of ethnicity and change the calculus of governments in handling many of the causes of instability discussed in this paper (Beissinger, 2008; Miguel, 2004). In either of these cases, the system can essentially be designed and react in such a way where inter-communal violence would be the highest level of violence likely seen since institutions are constructed to avoid escalation. Still, these cases are complicated and imperfect given the difficulty in defining and sorting cases for these types of institutions or consolidation of democracy.

Additionally, while the section on group dynamics largely supported a notion that elites make decisions concerning alliances and other factors, individuals still are motivated by what is best for them. They may take cues from the elites, but there are certain insurmountable factors that can change this. For example, an area being occupied by the opposing force can push individuals to do what is necessary to survive, even if this means defection (Kalyvas, 2008)

Lastly, the state can give concessions or repress brutally. If early in the process of conflict escalation, one of these events happen, a group can either lose the motivation to continue or have their fear of the state be so high that there is no reason to continue fighting. This, however, is a very complicated dynamic that is the topic of much debate. Some observers have noted that concessions can also be a sign of weakness, leading to

further exploitation while going too far with repression can leave nothing left to lose (Shadmehr, 2014).

Theory Summary

The figures below demonstrate the theory proposed in this paper. They illustrate the actual causal pathways proposed in the paper. Essentially, latent ethnic identities can be activated by elites under certain conditions of instability. This activation leads to a rise in ethnic saliency and ethnic tensions. The state of activated ethnic identity and high rates of tensions inadvertently leads to low-level conflict. Under conditions in which conflict appears to present an opportunity for the elites, they will further drive and direct this conflict, likely leading to civil war.

Figure 1: Causes of Ethnic Identity Activation

Latent Ethnic Identity + Changes in Power or Protests → Instability → Elite Focus on Ethnicity

Figure 2: Activation of Ethnic Identity

| Latent Ethnic Identity | + | Elite Focus on Ethnicity | → | Activated Ethnic identity | → | Conflict |

Figure 3: Result of Activated Ethnic Identity

| Conflict | → | Elite Decisions and Country Conditions | → | Possible Escalation of Conflict |

This may seem overly convoluted, but breaking this down into a multi-stage process is the only way to understand how cases unfold the way that they do. Pointing to conditions that favor civil war or calls for ethnic violence by citizens and claiming that these support one theory or another fails to appreciate the complexity of the process. It examines one stage of the overall series of steps. In this way, correlations can be found, but also, it is for this reason that small tweaks in variables or case selection undercuts these findings. The process is not simple. Simplifying it makes it more manageable for consideration in individual papers, but examining only one piece of the puzzle has led to numerous misinterpretations and misconceptions about the role of ethnicity and conflict.

Cases

Two cases are examined below: the 2007 Kenyan election and the Angolan Civil War. These cases are not designed to be exhaustive features of the paper or full case studies, but simply demonstrative historical examples of the theory presented in this paper in action.

Kenya

Background

During the colonial period, the Kikuyu ethnic group had a close relationship with the British, the colonial power. However, towards the end of colonialism, the Kikuyu led the anti-British movement and given that the British had favored them under colonialism, they had the strongest economic base and highest rate of education among their citizens, making them prime candidates to take over political leadershid (Tignor, 2015).

The first president, Jomo Kenyatta, derived his support primarily from Kikuyu ethnic groups, but by 1971, he had created a coalition of related ethnic groups including the Embu and Meru ethnic groups. A Luo was chosen as the vice president in order to solidify an electoral plurality with which to win the election. Given the extensive ethnic diversity of Kenya, such a relationship was needed in order to maintain control (A. Weber, Hiers, & Flesken, 2016).

Despite Kenyatta's successor claims to move past ethnic tensions, he kept control through their manipulations. Moi, the president after the death of Kenyatta, would evoke fear among smaller ethnic groups of widespread abuse that would ensue if anyone but he were to win. In this way, ethnic identity was activated at important points such as

elections, even though Kenya was a one-party state, so that ethnic tensions would prevent Moi from losing power (Adar & Munyae, 2001). Moi's drawing support from a variety of smaller ethnic groups allowed him to consistently meet this threshold without having to look beyond ethnicity for gaining support despite a number of challenges. Moi would use ethnic language and appeals whenever challenged (Ajulu, 1998). In this way, Kenya saw periods were ethnic salience would spike with intermittent bouts of inter-communal violence. Given the relatively strong state that existed under, Moi, however, there was no room for larger-scale violence to overturn the syste,.

Since that the constitutional changes returning a multi-party system also included presidential term limits, Moi faced the end of his two terms in 2001. Despite some speculation that he may attempt to amend the constitution, he withdrew from office peacefully. His successor Uhuru Kenyatta, son to former president, failed not only to win the election, but to gain the endorsement of his party at all. Instead Kiribaki took up the mantle, campaigning on issues and unity with Raila Odinga, a Luo and the son of the former first vice-president under Jomo Kenyatta. In many ways, this transition paralleled the former. Initially, a policy focus kept the government united and saw dramatic economic change and political liberalization. However, in 2005, Kibaki introduced a proposed constitutional amendment to abolish the regional requirements of presidential elections (Gachanga, 2012). Understandably, this created a rift with other ethnic groups given that it would allow Kibaki, who increasingly isolated Odinga, to win without a coalition with the Luo or other ethnic groups (Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012).

This set the stage for a 2007 election in which ethnicity was once again a central issue. An important additional note is that Kibaki is seen as having massively benefit

from a series of corrupt dealings despite tirading against Moi's rampant corruption in 2002 (Wrong, 2010).

2007 election

With an increasing trend of voters to focus on policy rather than ethnic ties in Kenya before 2007, Kibaki faced a serious challenge in that his performance post-2005 was largely criticized, especially Kibaki largely continued with the rampant corruption seen under Moi (Branch & Cheeseman, 2009; Michael Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008).

As an overview to the rhetoric, both Kibaki and Odinga are blamed for an intense rhetoric that stereotyped and villainized the other during the campaign. Language was inflammatory as possible in an attempt to create fear tangible enough to win support (Lafargue, 2009). An important note is that media laws were changed pre-2007 to allow for the creation of local language media, which largely contributed to the broadcasting of the politically targeted ethnic biases and fears that ensued (Ismail & Deane, 2008).

While it is difficult to trace the exact moment that ethnicity was first introduced into the election, one of the key pre-election actions by Kibaki was expelling other ethnic groups from lands that the Kikuyu originally inhabited before British relocation. Kenyatta had reclaimed the lands for the Kikuyu and Moi had ceased it once again (Adebayo, 2012). In his campaign, Kibaki then created a sense of fear that the land would be lost again and that the retribution for taking it would be severe (Kanyinga, 2009). It was a re-emergence of the land battles that have been a cornerstone of Kenyan ethnic divisions.

As a result of these actions, Odinga began to portray the election of a matter of urgency to usurp the repressive control of the Kikuyu with language that focused on "41

againt one" a reference to a united front of ethnic groups against the Kikuyu (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). In a post-election analysis many authors have argued that the very nature of competition between the political parties ensured that these types of appeals would be necessary for the parties to compete (Sebastian Elischer, 2008). The resulting effect was that the 2007 election had some of the highest instances of ethnic voting wherein even Odinga's attempts at an ethnic coalition broke down, creating the rise of some minor candidates (A. Weber et al., 2016). While few believe that the extreme post-election violence was directed by political parties, many believe that the root of this violence was the rhetoric utilized during the campaigns (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The politicians created a system of extreme fear and the people simply reacted.

In order to stem the tide of violence Odinga was added as Prime Minister to Kibaki's administration. While this may seem to be an instance of concession, really it was one of cooptation. Both sides had inadvertently primed Kenya for prolonged conflict. Fear and tension reached an all-time high and the inter-communal violence was a clear sign that escalation was not only possible, but likely if no changes were made. This follows the process of ethnic identity activation around an election period precisely, peaking with the election itself when it inevitably returned an unfavorable outcome for one side.

The ability to co-opt Odinga, however, is how escalation was stopped rapidly. Odinga was given a better path to achieving power than further conflict. Had he really believed the fear-mongering statements made during the campaign, there would have been no reason for him to join the administration. However, the fact that he did is indicative of the fact that it was more political ploy than real sentiment. When his

incentives shifted, he was able to shift the direction of his supporters to best suit his needs.

Angola

Many ethnic and linguistic groups exist in Angola, arising from a variety of smaller tribal groups that were invaded during various stages of Portuguese colonization (Van der Waals, 1993, pp. 9-15). Despite eventually condensing into the three militant groups—the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA—Angola represents a far larger range of historic and ethnic groupings. UNITA, composed of primarily of the Ovimbundu ethnicity, represents both the largest ethnic group and the group that was most centralized and operating as a unit rather than a loose conjunction of smaller tribes at the commencement of occupation (Van der Waals, 1993, p. 16). Though Angola was ruled primarily indirectly, there were a number of Portuguese administrators and settlers. The main divisions were between these Europeans and the native Angolans, but there was also an element to which the Portuguese treated each region differently, working more closely with the Ambundu, the eventual source of the MPLA, near the capital and least with the Ovimbundu and other ethnicities in central and South Angola.

During the independence war period, from about 1961 when tensions initiated to 1974 when the Portuguese announced withdrawal from Angola when the fighting transitioned into civil war, there were attempts at cooperation (Van der Waals, 1993, p. 65). At the outset of the war in 1961, the groups were very loosely associated guerilla fighters attacking Portuguese soldiers. The UPA, a precursor to the FNLA, and the MPLA were not unified groups, but rather a regional network of smaller organizations

with the FNLA the as largest and most effective at the time (Van der Waals, 1993, pp. 65-70). In fact, two other primarily Bakongo ethnic groups formed with a different approach, stance, and leadership than their UPA ethnic kin (Van der Waals, 1993, p. 87). This demonstrates the mechanism for how support can be drawn regionally based on existing network. However, politically, war later would create an incentive for the parties to condense and their supports to shift.

The MPLA initially tried to form a united front with the UPA, but Roberto, UPA leader, resisted for fear that they MPLA would eventually push out the UPA and their members (Van der Waals, 1993, p. 92). Much of this fear stemmed from the far greater wealth and education of MPLA leaders and amongst the people of the capital region in general (Stockwell, 1978, p. 64). Returning to the concept of support, the MPLA represented a group with deep financial support and a base independent of the UPA and Roberto. Roberto feared that the MPLA was only using the UPA for the interim, but sought to ultimately control the country without input from the many of ethnic groups. Without the conduct of a conflict, it is very unclear if there would be this motivation for fear and the barrier to cooperation.

Eventually when UNITA formed under Savimbi, due to Roberto's refusal to extend the fighting in the South, they showed initial willingness to cooperate with both the MPLA and UPA (Telepneva, 2014, p. 117). None of these interactions show a deep-seated hatred or ethnic tensions that is claimed by some in ethnic conflict generally and specifically the Angola case. Instead, it demonstrated a clear attempt at cooperation and coordination between groups, but cooperation broke down at several points during the war when it appeared that one group was stronger than the others during the civil war and

independence war period, leading to fighting occurring between the rebel groups (Shubin & Tokarev, 2001; Stockwell, 1978; Van der Waals, 1993).

The groups began to condense and solidify around 1963 when the MPLA first courted the support of the West, but failed due to its early ties and small support from the Soviet Union, which began in 1961, especially their ties to the head of the MPLA, Neto (Guimarães, 1998, p. 60; Shubin & Tokarev, 2001, p. 607; Stevens, 1976, p. 139). The UPA managed to secure early support from the United States in 1963 after the MPLA had failed to win support due to communist ties and thus began an initial division between the groups (Guimarães, 1998, p. 61). Additionally in 1965, Che Guevara visited Angola and began the Cuban commitment there, which would remain relatively small until the 1970s (Hatzky, 2015, p. 69). In 1964, the UPA began to merge with several other Bakongo ethnic groups to form the FNLA; in 1965 when Mobutu took power in Zaire, the FNLA gained a strong ally due to Mobutu's mistrust of the Soviet Union and, thus, Soviet-backed MPLA (Bender, 1978, p. 13; Van der Waals, 1993, pp. 99-101).

This condensing of groups a vying for external support continues to demonstrate the principle that elites sought any mechanism possible for gaining and maintaining power. The initial period does not precisely exactly fit any of the causal variables explored in this paper, but generally was a power transition. The opportunity for power created the division in society that manifested themselves ideologically to gain US and Soviet support during the Cold War, but also ethnically so as to create a stable population from which to draw for protracted war.

UNITA broke from the FNLA in 1965 as the leader, Savimbi, was able to gain outside support from the Chinese (Stevens, 1976, p. 139; Telepneva, 2014, p. 118). This

represents a dimension of fear and the need to protect one's ethnic and regional group. UNITA members felt that they were risking their lives to protect areas that were not their homes. Rational concerns led Savimbi to change tactics in order to pacify his base of support and maximize his change of achieving the most power gain possible. Adding a third pole in an already complicated conflict was not ideal, but it was a necessary step for the maintenance of power.

The Angola conflict would then continue for decades with lulls in action, shifts in support and, most importantly, renewed conflict almost any time that attempts at peace accords or elections were made. These triggers symbolized a loss of power to great to overcome for leaders that had such strong regional control and support. It was in fact not until 2002 with the death of Savimbi that peace accords were possible.

A much more extensive look into Angola is possible, but the beginning stages of the conflict demonstrate its key points. It is impossible to study Angola without the role of ethnicity. Despite it also being a complicated post-colonial and Cold War era war, it was an ethnic one. Power relations and shifting ethnic alliances all demonstrate the proposed theory in this paper. What mattered was not legitimate ethnic grievance, it was power. Ethnicity only mattered because the elites pushed for it to be an important point and this gave them a base from which to operate.

While independent is not one of the change in power variables mentioned earlier, it served for the same purpose. There was the need to determine whom would have the most power in the post-colonial government and the vying for said power was what created the mobilization along ethnic lines, the vying for outside support, and the initiation of the conflict.

Applying Theory to Quantitative Study

This section is designed to outline the potential for this theoretical framework to take shape in a quantitative methodology. Through utilization of new databases that analyze news throughout the world, it will describe the potential sources of information to design a long-term quantitative study that would isolate the various steps in the process and demonstrative this theory in quantitative terms. This methodology is an improvement upon the PREG and other metrics of study for ethnic identity due to the fact that it could track changes within a country on an ongoing basis, creating not only a fine-tuned explanatory model, but also a predictive one.

The study described in the section cannot be conducted due to the fact that the primary data source for news coverage has not yet backdated its files to include more than mid 2015-the present. The updated on a daily basis keeping it available to the present, but the historical file extended back to 1979 has not yet been released. Instead, this section will also explore some of the information that is available for 2016, the only full-year available in the data.

Though the examination of 2016 will not follow the full procedures of the potential larger study, it is still an interesting look into some of the insights that can be gained in even a year. Furthermore, due to the limits on data, the quantitative data is discussed in a qualitative manner rather than a strictly statistical analysis. A true statistical study would need to examine a time period measure by decades rather than years and there are very few conflicts or events that are potential causes in 2016.

Future Study

The purpose of this study's design is primarily to connect most important piece of this paper, ethnic saliency, to instances of civil war. It will also outlines methods of examining the causal variables for ethnic saliency and tying them to the rise of ethnic saliency as a secondary object. What one study could not do is incorporate many of the more nuanced details. This is to say that it is not possible to demonstrate how ethnic saliency spikes can lead to political violence without leading to civil war. Civil war as an outcome is a much clearer metric and would be an important first step in ensuring that the study had a solid foundation. Further unpacking of the theory into a quantitative study would unveil that the relationships should improve as the more nuanced aspects were added, but the basic framework described here would demonstrate the core tenants of the theory that has been supported by this paper.

Ethnic Saliency

The key outcome of the theory that can be demonstrated quantitatively is the notion of an activated ethnic identity. It introduces a far more dynamic concept of examining not what ethnicities matter within a nation, but when ethnicity matters.

In order to test this theory, the GDELT Project data, specifically the Global Knowledge Graph Dataset would be consulted (*Global Knowlede Graph 2.0*, 2017). This dataset is able to search a variety of news sources and reports, divided into particular spans of time. For the purposes of this project, each country can be searched on a monthly basis looking for the quantity of news coverage concerning that country. Given that baseline for how frequently a nation was covered, the mentions of ethnicity in

connection to those countries can then be searched. As a result, the ethnic saliency variable would be an indicator of the frequency with which coverage of a given country mentions major ethnic groups in that nation. This saliency metric would be a better indicator that simply number of mentions of ethnicity in correlation with a country because news agencies may be more prone to discuss Sub-Saharan nations in the context of ethnicity or mention the country more overall around periods of elections and economic distress, the theorized causes of ethnic identity activation.

Therefore, by studying the fluctuations in ethnic saliency and the comparison to the baseline of other Sub-Saharan African nations should give a strong indicator as to what notions have the highest rates of activated ethnic identities and even around which periods in particular that this occurs. The theory is that these mentions should greatly spike in periods during which the governing elite are emphasizing ethnicity due to the pathways described earlier. Therefore, ethnic saliency is the reaction of people and media to the shift in focus on the part of the governing elite.

The media coverage includes international as well as local sources spanning 100 different languages. Coverage of all nations certainly will not be equal given the large span of different sources that feed into the data, but this should be accounted for within the context of a frequency metric rather than an absolute measure of mentions. Additionally, concerns over the varying degree of free press within a society should largely be inconsequential for the purposes of this data given that the theory would indicate that the leaders are trying to emphasize ethnicity themselves, therefore having little rationale to hide it from domestic or foreign audiences.

While constant survey data concerning when individuals feel both positive sentiments towards their own ethnic group and negative sentiments towards others and why would be an ideal variable to examine, this should serve as an adequate proxy. It gets as close as is realistically possible at the moment to examining real-time data across the entire region on a monthly basis.

An important note concerning this data source is how they created a list of ethnic groups. They utilized both the International Organization for Standardization's (ISO) Codes for the Representation of Names of Languages and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset in an attempt to find all ethnic groups that exist within a nation in a population size over 1,000, which has at least one member in a political organization. Although there may be some concern with this definition of potentially excluding groups that are not allowed to form political parties, the EPR dataset is designed to study marginalized ethnic groups, therefore in most cases should not miss any ethnic group that would significantly effect the study (*The GDELT Global Knowledge Graph (GKG) Data Format Codebook V2.1*, 2015).

Mentions of any ethnic group are important because in the varying political contexts, leaders may chose a strategy that negatively portrays a variety of groups, the second largest group, or another an individual group. For this reason, the decision was made not to track any mentions of a particular ethnic group, but, instead, track overall mentions.

The largest limitation of this metric is that it does not demonstrate a negative correlation. One could argue that mentions of ethnicity rise, but in a positive way. For instance, if during elections parties mentioned their own ethnicity more in a positive

manner, raising the saliency of ethnicity in a very different manner. However, examining the correlation between ethnic saliency and conflict should eliminate this possibility.

Case Selection and Inclusion Criteria

This section is designed as if the study were to be conducted at present in 2017.

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) should be the initial geographic unit of study for this study with a temporal range from 1990 to 2015. The regional designation does not represent an opinion on the applicability of this theory to other times or regions, but is designed to follow typical study of ethnic conflict, focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, the time component is a matter of incomplete and inconsistent data if one examines cases that extend too far back as well as the need for a time lag to present in order to ensure that potential conflict as outcomes of events in the time period can be witnessed. Generally, the theory should hold in most regions in post-colonial time periods.

One important note is that it is possible that the Cold War Era, especially at its height, would have another important factors to examine: external aid. This follows literature that demonstrates that the cold war suspends normal trends in the correlates of civil war and, instead, supplants them with divisions supported by the US and USSR (Ellinsen, 2000). Additionally, studies have hypothesized that the Cold War allow divisions such as ethnic ones to be fueled by the ability to readily receive aid with which to violently address grievances (Woodwell, 2004). Even in cases of minimal ethnic divisions, war could mean ethnic mobilization and the eventual solidification of ethnic identity into the conflict.

The regional definition of Sub-Saharan Africa would follow the definition of Sub-Saharan utilized by the PREG data in order to have a point of direct comparison as well as avoiding the stacked strong identities of religion and ethnicity that occur in many parts of Northern Africa. Beginning with all nations in Africa, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Comoros, and Sao Tome and Principe would eliminated with these constraints.

Initially, the theory was that Botswana, Burkina, Faso, Lesotho, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia, and Swaziland should be eliminated due to a 0 PREG value; essentially, the PREG argues that they are countries with no ethnic divisions to be exploited. However, when attempting to confirm with an analysis of current GDELT data, there were significant findings for some of the nations involved. For that reason, this rule was disregarded as the possibility for cleavages in societies with low exploitation potential may still occur given the current information available.

The final exclusion criteria should be presence of an intra-state conflict as described by the Correlates of War project within the prior decade (Sarkees & Wyman, 2010). Cases would therefore fall out of or re-enter the data in certain years. Countries would re-entered 10 years after a war's end and exit in the month in which the war began. For example, a case with war ending in January of 1983 would enter the data in February of 1993 where a country with a war starting in January of 1998 would have the last entry in December of 1997. The goal of this time shift would be to avoid months covering the start of a war and to keep out cases until the 10 year-mark. Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Zimbabwe were entirely excluded due to no time range in the studied years that fell 10 years after the end of an intra-state war.

The ten year coding rule exceeds many studies that find a greatly increased likelihood of civil war within five years of initial outbreak (Collier & Sambanis, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). However, in a number of cases, outbreak still occurs post-five years and, though the likelihood decreases across time, there is still the significant chance that there will be a greater likelihood of outbreak of conflict in the time frame after five years (Licklider, 1995; Quinn et al., 2007).

In the window after a civil war, the hypothesis of this paper should hold, however, the sensitivity of a nation recovering from civil war means that there may be a number of confounding factors that makes it far easier for not only conflict to arise, but also for ethnic tensions to be more susceptible to spiking. While a series of psychological experiments in Burundi demonstrated continued ethnic bias and tensions can persist in a post-conflict environment, a similar study in Bosnia indicated that the persistence of this animosity can fade under the right conditions (Voors et al., 2010; Whitt & Wilson, 2007). The post-war period, therefore, is not conducive to an investigation as to the causes of ethnic identity activation because the threshold for such activation is likely much lower, potentially over emphasizing some of the variables that are being examined.

Other variables

The main addition variable that would be needed is an outcome variable for the ethnic saliency. As discussed earlier, an ideal nuanced study could attempt any number of complex definitions for political violence in addition to civil war. However, the most basic test should reveal a correlation between civil war and ethnic saliency. The civil war

outcome could be measured on a number of metrics, but given that the saliency exclusion criteria used the Correlates of War Project, the same should be used for outcomes.

As for most of the other variables, the information is generally a binary. Coups, elections, and death of leaders are all events that occur or do not occur. In the case of elections, is should be noted that this applies more to the election of people rather than instances of constitutional referendums and should be strongest if a directly elected executive was up for election. However, there still should be some correlation between legislative elections, on a national scale, and ethic saliency as well.

Protests would present the biggest obstacle, as more information would be needed to analyze beyond the existence of a protest. The Social Conflict Analysis Database tracks much of this information for Sub-Saharan Africa and would be a good data source for analyzing protests across a number of dimensions (Salehyan et al., 2012).

A number of control variables would also be important to incorporate, testing ethnic saliency against metrics such as the PREG, ELF, and other measures of ethnicity as well as testing it alongside structural variables like geographic and economic data used by greed-model theorists.

Ultimately, many of the additional variables would have to be a process of trial and error alongside the primary relationship between ethnic saliency and conflict.

Analysis of 2016

The section utilizes the process of ethnic saliency calculation as described by the ethnic saliency section of a future study for the current full-year for which it is available: 2016. With this limited window, it would not be fruitful to attempt any type of

quantitative analysis as would occur in the case of a future study. However, the data is explored here qualitatively examining fluctuations and their causes.

The Data Overview

All countries discussed in the future study section that were discussed had the ethnic saliency calculated by month throughout 2016. This data is available in Table A2 in the appendix.[1]

The average ethnic saliency across all countries for 2016 was 0.4207 with a standard deviation of 0.1273. The fact that the average value was so high confirms the bias that was presented as a potential worry concerning ethnic saliency wherein discussions of Sub-Saharan Africa. It means that nearly half of all news coverage on the continent involves the discussion of ethnicity. This factor likely means that comparisons between Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the world on the basis of the study described under the potential future study section has significant problems.

The goal when analyzing the data was to examine cases of extreme fluctuation as well as to examine any cases on the extremes of ethnic saliency. In this way, both the meaning of the absolute numbers and the fluctuations themselves could be better understood.

Beginning with some macro-level numbers, the average ethnic saliency was calculated for the entire year on average for each country available in Table A1 and Graph A1. Table A1 also presents the ethnic saliency yearly average alongside PREG

---

[1] All references to tables or graphs with labels including the letter A are available in the appendix while all references with P are in the paper text.

values. Examining for a second the Tables P1-P4 below, there are the highest and lowest

ten average saliency values and for the 1990 (Posner, 2004).

Table P1: Highest Ethnic Saliencies

Mali	0.815815499	0.13
South Sudan	0.613372357	NA
Seychelles	0.576150656	0
Ethiopia	0.551943453	0.57
Niger	0.549774124	0.51
Guinea-Bissau	0.525184706	0.05
Côte d'Ivoire	0.505035943	0.49
Benin	0.486818005	0.3
Rwanda	0.485439827	0.26
Chad	0.482501022	0.66

Table P2: Lowest Ethnic Saliencies

Lesotho	0.001357803	0
Gambia	0.23478583	0.37
Malawi	0.310774897	0.55
Zimbabwe	0.313412292	0.41
Ghana	0.321957166	0.44
Cameroon	0.34172329	0.71
Madagascar	0.3517715	0
South Africa	0.351780762	0.49
Somalia	0.355920705	0
Mauritius	0.358208878	0.6

Table P3: Highest PREG Values

South Sudan	0.613372357	NA
Congo (Democratic Republic)	0.376159821	0.8
Cameroon	0.34172329	0.71
Zambia	0.397872824	0.71
Nigeria	0.374958161	0.66
Chad	0.482501022	0.66
Angola	0.410262215	0.65
Uganda	0.448931173	0.63
Liberia	0.416539219	0.62
Mauritius	0.358208878	0.6

Table P4: Lowest PREG Values

Lesotho	0.001357803	0
Madagascar	0.3517715	0
Somalia	0.355920705	0
Botswana	0.412149333	0
Burkina Faso	0.439684939	0
Swaziland	0.4593782	0
Seychelles	0.576150656	0
Guinea-Bissau	0.525184706	0.05
Mali	0.815815499	0.13
Senegal	0.414150577	0.14

The comparison to PREG scores was conducted as a way to compare the quantitative metric created by this paper to one of the most recent and supposedly accurate quantitative metrics that is currently in use by political scientists.

What is fascinating about these tables is not only the fact that they are so different, but that Mali, Seychelles, and Guinea-Bissau have three of the highest saliency values, but some of the lowest PREG scores. Similarly, Mauritius is one of the lowest

saliency scores despite being one of the top PREG scores. This differences is perhaps indicative of the fact that events within a country can defy the expectation predicted in models that are utilizing data from the last decade rather than any kind of more up to date, realistic considerations. Furthermore, several of the countries that have 0 PREG scores actually registered on the saliency metric, some even rather high.

Obviously there are serious differences in these metrics, but to demonstrate that this not a flaw with the metric put out by this paper, there are several cases that will be analyzed to demonstrate that the saliency numbers largely follow the predictions set forth earlier in the paper.

Monthly Analysis

Beginning with the extremes, the data was checked for any instances of saliency monthly scores that were either two standard deviations above or below the mean. Three countries scored two standard deviations about the mean on one or more months, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and South Sudan, while only one was two standard deviations below the mean, Lesotho. Beginning with the high scores Graph P1 below shows their scores plotted over the year period.

Mali is an interesting case, scoring a 0.13 on the PREG, but having a 0.816 average on the saliency, ranging only from 0.772 to 0.843. Despite the Tuaregs, an ethnicity classified as an Arab nomadic group, comprising only a small percentage of the population they staged two rebellions in the past in the 1960s and 1990s; largely these rebellions were seen as quelled by incorporating Tuaregs into the military (Keita, 1998). However, facing increased numbers caused by migration from Libya and a dysfunctional,

Graph P1: High Ethnic Saliencies 2016, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, South Sudan

corrupt government, the Tuaregs used the military experience to launch a coup in 2012

(Kirkland, 2014). This coup reignited violence and, despite an election in which the

winner claimed that he would reconcile the divide, the divide continued. With sporadic

cease fires in between, the conflict continued in 2016 with little signs that the

violencewould stop. Both the Tuareg Rebels and government military forces have been

accused of abuses of citizens of differing ethnic groups (*Mali: Events of 2016*, 2017).

Essentially, this is a case that does not indicate any causal predictability for the

model, but does demonstrate that it can track that a conflict is occurring at the very least.

There is little fluctuation in the ethnic saliency throughout the year, but the reports seem

to indicate that this reflects that sporadic violence that occurred throughout the year. It is

unsurprising that the PREG value is so low for Mali given that the Tuaregs make up such

a small proportion of society; however, lack in numbers does not translate to a lack of power in this case.

Moving on to Guinea-Bissau, this is another case of a long-standing war with shifting political alliance and parties that divide mainly along ethnic lines; this one originated with the independence of Guinea-Bissau in 1973 and has created a tense situation in the country ever since (Temudo, 2008). In a not unique fashion, an anti-colonial war turned into a struggle to keep and maintain power with elections and coups shifting the balance of power several times.

It is likely for this reason that the PREG value is only 0.05. It is not a case of ethnic groups creating stable parties, given that Guinea-Bissau has many small ethnic groups that have formed a series of unstable alliances. However, the country is in what is referred to as a conflict trap wherein there is a continuous struggle for power and thus constant supply of soldiers for any group pushed out of power to utilize and coopt for their own alliance and cause (Annan, 2014).

In its current iteration, fighting began with a 2012 coup, similar to Mali. During 2016, a peace accord was constructed throughout the year and finalized in September. In October, a transition began back into governance with an attempt to create a transitional plan. November and December were spent re-arranging the government and settling on a Prime Minister. Opposition claimed that these choices violated the roadmap that was worked out previously (*February 2017 Monthly Forecase: Guinea-Bissau*, 2017) .

This timeline is followed exactly by the graph of ethnic saliency. There is a decline from high ethnic salience during the peace accord process, but this reconciliation is hindered with the need to actually form a government. Competition between smaller

parliamentary parties and opposition attempts to block movement forward created a severe spike in ethnic saliency in November and December. Despite the ethnic saliency itself following the expected path, the cause definitively does not align with anything outlined earlier in the paper.

It is possible that parliamentary re-arrangement in this manner is unique to Guinea-Bissau, but it is worth some consideration that change in power is a larger umbrella concept than just changes in executives or elections. Guinea-Bissau saw a power shift not with new members of parliament, but how they were allied and what this meant for their power. Though initial considered as likely an elite level competition not involving people, elites may utilize manipulation of the populous to raise popular support and attempt to improve standing as a negotiating point.

South Sudan is a third nation embroiled in a long running conflict. Beginning with a largely Arab-African divide within Sudan, a long and bloody civil war ultimately resulted in an independent, but unstable South Sudan. Not only did it emerge without a strong government, but it inherited an issue of having many soldiers and little work with which to change the course of their careers (Johnson, 2003). In 2013 an election put President Kiir and Vice President Machar at the head of the executive, but a Nuer-Dinka ethnic and political rivalry emerged. The President and Vice President worked against each other and the enmity rapidly became insurmountable. While each side claims not to be responsible for the breakdown, either plotting by Machar or the paranoia of Kiir causes the President to dismiss his Vice President and begin the violent civil war (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006).

In 2016, the violence between the two clashing armies as well as between the armies and civilians continues. The violence is usually described as ethnically targeted and brutal (*Civil War in South Sudan*, 2017). The fluctuations in ethnic saliency would suggest some cause to bring it down around June, but this does not seem to fit any particular event within that conflict. It is possible that this is simply less a trend then normal variation.

Moving on to the low end of the spectrum, Lesotho, in essence, has an ethnic saliency score of 0. Depicted in Graph P2, one can see that it barely rises to be worth noting at all. This would adhere to the PREG predictions that place Lesotho at 0, but it was examined anyway given that so many 0 PREG scores did return significant values in ethnic saliency.

Graph P2: Very Low Ethnic Saliency 2016, Lesotho

Upon having only one case that was two standard deviations below the mean, cases were examined for being 1.5 standard deviations below the mean, returning Zimbabwe and Gambia pictures in Graph P3.

Graph P3: Low Ethnic Saliencies 2016, Gambia and Zimbabwe

Beginning with Zimbabwe, what is interesting is that Zimbabwe is that there has been clear cases of ethnic violence in the past, making it peculiar to see such a low rate of ethnic saliency. Early on in Independence, the autocrat in Zimbabwe, Mugabe, had political clashes with the Ndebele people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008). New evidence has demonstrated that not only was Mugabe complicit in the violence against the Ndebele that ensued, but he orchestrated the attacks as a political move (Doran, 2015).

Ethnic clashes have coincided with attempts to remove Mugabe from power, especially centered on the 2008 election in which Mugabe lost the first round of

presidential voting, though he refused to give up power (Godwin, 2011). Given the brutal repression that has ensued, one may imagine that low ethnic saliency is the result of no one being able to mount a realistic challenge. After the first round of elections in 2008, opposition party leaders were harassed and killed, leading to a continue hold on power for Mugabe. In 2018, there is another scheduled election, raising the possibility that there will be renewed ethnic tensions in the country.

Zimbabwe would be a place that structural variables should predict as having war or at least the onset of conflict. Not only are there poor economic conditions, but they continued to face continued and steep declines (Latham & Cohen, 2017). The fact that ethnic saliency remains low in Zimbabwe as well as the fact that it continues to decline as does the economy, there is indication here that there is must be some other factor depressing ethnic saliency scores.

It is for this reason that Zimbabwe also presents a complication to the existing theory. It is true that it see low ethnic saliency scores without any of the proposed triggers, but the fact that Zimbabwe falls well below the norm for most other Sub-Saharan Africa nations indicates that there may be a second end to the spectrum. Repressive force or regime strength may have some type of reduction effect on saliency.

Moving on to Gambia, the graph indicates very low levels of ethnic saliency until September of 2016, wherein a gradual rise is interrupted with a very high spike in November and December.

After a coup in 1996 Jammeh installed himself as president of Gambia and maintained a very tight military-based controlled of the country from that point forward until 2016 (Kandeh, 1996). Elections in December of 2016 saw the loss of Jammeh to

opponent and member of the largest ethnic group in Gambia, Jammeh is member of a far smaller ethnic group, Adama Barrow (Kora & Darboe, 2017). However, despite, this victory, Jammeh quickly went into hiding and began orchestrating attempts to thwart the election results. The crisis had resolution with some violence but without protracted conflict as Jammeh eventually stepped down in 2017.

However, what is very important to note are the tactics used by Jammeh during the elections. He made claims speaking of Barrow's ethnic group that "if they think that they can take over the country, I will wipe you out and nothing will come out of it" and "it's you people, you want to bring violence" (*More Fear Than Fair: Gambia's 2016 Presidential Election*, 2017). This is precisely the type of rhetoric that is expected of a smaller ethnic leader attempting to evoke fear of an ethnic group and evoke fear in their potential voters. The messaging is a mixture of threats if they succeed alongside claims that it is they and not he that are the cause for violence that will ensue.

Furthermore, Gambia's ethnic saliency demonstrates a very clear effect of the election with the spike fitting the expected timeline exactly. With the crisis still at its height, the ethnic saliency ended the year extreme high. What is interesting, however, is the ability of Gambia to remain so low throughout the rest of the year on the ethnic saliency metric. If this phenomena were present in a larger study, it would indicate that perhaps what would be the better metric rather than absolute ethnic saliency would be some measure of the deviations away from a baseline in each country. The low levels of ethnic saliency could have a number of causes from being a legitimate reflection of the country's disposition to some artifact of how it is covered in the media. It is fascinating that the spike is one of the largest, with ethnic saliency nearly doubling, but the absolute

metric ended barely above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, this is likely an indication that fluctuations are a better predictor than the value itself of ethnic saliency.

The last set of cases examined in this section are ones in which there were both a spike in ethnic saliency at least for one month to one standard deviation above the mean and at least one point below the mean ethnic saliency for Sub-Saharan Africa. This evaluation was conducted after it became clear that fluctuations in the saliency value were producing the most interesting results.

Graph P4 indicates the five countries that met this criteria: Côte D'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Swaziland. Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Togo were chosen for analysis because of the interesting patterns they exhibit. Sierra Leone had the single largest spike of the group that existed largely independent of a trend, but was sustained for two months. Equatorial Guinea also had a two-month spike, but with the first one exceeding the second, unlike Sierra Leone, and the remaining year trended downwards. Togo showed a rather consistent trend towards higher rates of ethnic saliency throughout the year.

Sierra Leone is a case that fits the theory in part and contradicts it in part. The primarily contradictory piece of evidence is the rise of the political conditions, as they exist at present. President Koroma was elected to election in 2012, but his strategy broke with traditional ethnic campaigning that usually occurs in Sierra Leone. While receiving the majority of support from his own ethnic coalition, he also campaigned heavily in the base of his opponent, Maada Bio. Ethnic groups are primarily regionally based in Sierra Leone, meaning that his appeals were in areas that Koroma was not even expected to visit. While Bio continued to play a traditionally ethnic appeals game, Koroma sought

Graph P4: Highly Fluctuating Ethnic Saliencies 2016

policy areas to act as a method to break through traditional support limits. The strategy

paid off as Koroma was successfully reelected with a broader base of support than was

anticipated (Faia, 2013).

The 2016 data, however, shows the spike around July and August. This coincides

with a series of protests and brutal repression of said protests, resulting in the deaths of

several in Sierra Leone (Brooks, 2016). Several smaller protests occurred and were

quickly, but less violently stopped throughout July as well as a series of arrests of

journalists. The August protests were in part responses to these actions (*Sierra Leone*

2016/2017, 2017)

The protests occurred in the Northern region of the country where Koroma unexpectedly campaigned to achieve victory. What is interesting about the data, however, is how rapidly the return to normalcy occurs in September. The protests triggered no larger-scale focus on ethnicity. This is perhaps reflective of Koroma's strategy of moving behind ethnicity to maintain his power. As a strategy to raise the attention of the protests, it is possible that opposition stoked ethnic tensions, but government pressure to de-escalate the situation and prevent deeper ethnic divides could very well be the cause of the rapid reduction.

This case is indicative of a flaw wherein potentially there needs to be greater exploration of the connection between ethnic saliency rise, responsive actions, and the process that leads from ethnic tensions and violence to full-blown war. Additionally, it demonstrates that this traps are not inescapable, merely probabilistic. It would be interesting to examine the 2012 data when the election actually occurred and whether Bio was successful in raising ethnic tensions or if the work done by Koroma kept it at bay. Koroma's strategy is a method of breaking free of the motivations to rely on ethnic groups for support in an election. Policy issues have the potential to transition ethnic political parties into a more stable system that does not risk conflict.

Moving on to Equatorial Guinea, the very small spike proceeded by a drop in ethnic saliency may be indicative of futile attempts by opposition to create some kind of cleavage during the election in April. The ruling-party, which has all but one seat in each chamber of the legislature and supposedly won re-election with over 90% of the vote, maintains strict control over society. Obviously, this was largely an election in name only. Opposition faces legal obstacles to running as well as harassment and abuse. Actual

voting also does little to reflect how actual votes are cast. Ultimately, the elections meet

very few definitions of free or fair (*Equatorial Guinea: Events of 2016*, 2017).

Still, the political opposition attempted to mount a challenge, making claims of

rights abuses, corruption, and many other charges of President Obiang looking out only

for himself ("Equatorial Guinea election: Incumbent expected to win," 2016). The small

spike might be a reflection of these attempts in the lead-up to the election wherein the fall

during the election month itself could be a result of crackdowns of the opposition just

before the election. Returns to normal after the election is indicative of the fact that the

election had no real impact.

This case is one in which the theory has difficulty defining due to its status as a de

facto one-party state while de jure operating as a multi-party state. On one hand, the lack

of real choice means that spikes in ethnic saliency were not significant or sustained,

especially given government limitations. On the other hand, having some ability to

campaign, even without real competition may have contributed to the small spike in

saliency.

Togo appears to be a case where ethnic saliency is on the rise, but has yet to be

triggered. Protests had occurred throughout 2016 in Togo and been met with repressive

force, but there has yet to be a coalescence of the protests. Protests did not spike in a

particular month or organize into a large display of dissatisfaction. Reports simply

indicate that protests continue and many are now being organized around the fact that

previous protests were repressed. Togo is a case in which one is witnessing the ethnic

saliency rise the should proceed a trigger event, like a jump in protest size or scope or an

election wherein violence would likely ensue (*Togo 2016 Human Rights Report*, 2017; *Togo 2016/2017*, 2017)

Lessons Learned

Ultimately, the lessons learned from the 2016 data are that the theory may be altered by a full examination of data, but that the current data largely supports the general theory outlined in this paper. As to not overstate the claims of this data, it was not analyzed in a quantitative fashion. Fluctuations were identified largely based on qualitative observation and cases were then examined in an attempt to support the data. This is not a true test of the theory. The actual quantitative metrics would need to be used and run in statistical analysis in order for concrete proof to exist. Additionally, null cases would need to be examined to weigh cases in which triggers were observed without a corresponding spike in ethnic saliency and spikes would need to be analyzed on a quantitative definition rather than qualitative observation. However, this is certainly an interesting first step.

At the very least the three cases of Mali, South Sudan, and Guinea-Bissau demonstrate rather conclusively that ethnic saliency is tied to conflict. The causality in this case is reversed, that is to say the conflict did not just begin, but rather, is ongoing. Thus, ethnic saliency is a response to ethnic conflict, which is hardly novel. However, it does support the use of ethnic saliency as a metric with potential for broader applications in the study of conflict and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mali is particularly interesting in that it demonstrates that it is possible for ethnic saliency to remain stable

and high when a conflict does not exhibit any significant changes. Lesotho, on the other hand supports the idea that some nations simply do not have ethnicity play a major role.

Sierra Leone and Equatorial Guinea, on the other hand, present contradictory evidence as for the direct ties between conflict and ethnic saliency spikes. Their spikes were rapidly reduced under the proper conditions. This indicates the need for the theory to more fully examine the underlying processes that tie actions during ethnic saliency crises to outcomes. Zimbabwe created a similar picture in which it appears that something is creating an active decline in ethnic saliency. No trigger events were observed, causing there to be no expectation of a spike, but there must be forces that push the data the other way, towards reduced ethnic saliency.

Lastly, Gambia presents a case that challenges the use of ethnic saliency as a value rather than a tendency. That is to say, there is little explanation for why ethnic saliency as a baseline was so low in Gambia. Even if there is a force from repression or other causes to keep the value at a low rate over time, it does not help to explain why the spike barely reached the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. While it could be an anomaly, a larger quantitative study would have to test whether or not country's should be observed as independent observations wherein absolute values do not matter, only changes to the baseline.

Overall, however, the brief look into 2016 was a good examination given its goal. It demonstrated that the ethnic saliency has interesting potential for future use as a variable to track ethnicity in politics as well as demonstrating that the theory of ethnicity presented in this paper is not only backed by historical cases and other political science literature, but current observations of the world.

Conclusion

Ultimately, ethnicity is not a simple construct. Its role in politics, similarly, is anything but simple. The fluidity of the process requires an observation of it that is flexible, but comparisons across countries requires a framework with which to apply. That has been the primary purpose of this paper. By introducing the framework of ethnic identity activation and describing mechanisms for why, how, and when this occurs is designed to re-interpret that extensive literature on the subject.

The reason that the field has such contradictory findings is that very few authors take the macro-level view. Either their interests are in civil war initiation, the conduct of civil war, the polarization of ethnicity in politics, or ethnic conflict that do not lead to civil war, but no one examines the full-picture. For this reason, each author adds very little to the collective understanding of ethnicity. The assumption is made that politicized ethnic identity operates only as it is observed in any one stage of the process.

This was the reason that this paper took such a macro-level view of the entire series of steps. From outlining power changes and protests as conflict triggers to explaining how ethnicity does not only lead to protracted conflict if elites lack the incentives to have it do so, it has looked at each stage. Any single dimension of this paper could be a smaller paper in and of itself, but, again, doing so would compromise its ability to unify a series of theories into a more cohesive framework.

The causes of rises in ethnic saliency likely are more numerous than the two pathways outlined in this paper. They are the ones with strongest support and the likely trigger events, but more trigger events may be possible; still, this would likely require the quantitative study to actually be conducted in full. Additionally, the causes of the trigger

events in itself is an interesting field of inquiry as is the after effects of ethnic saliency. Civil war is an easy outcome to measure, but as others become more commonly measured, it would be interesting to observe what range of outcomes occurs with the spikes in ethnic saliencies.

The end of the paper demonstrated the data that is already available for using the framework in future quantitative study. While the study is not complete or perfect, it is meant to signal that this framework has utility beyond the theoretical. This is an observable phenomena with modern measurements and will be easier and easier to detect as data becomes more readily available throughout the world.

The use of ethnic saliency as a measure and theoretical construct has applicability in both explaining past events and predicting future ones: this is the key finding. More extensive data analysis is certainly needed. The paper was unfortunately not able to meet its intended goal of conducting an extensive quantitative study using information from the GDELT Project to analyze decades worth of ethnic saliency across Sub-Saharan Africa due to the data not yet being released. However, the brief snapshot that was available demonstrates that it is not only possible, but a fruitful area of further study. Even with only a qualitative interpretation of the data, there are interesting trends that cannot easily be dismissed.

In the end, ethnic identity will continue to be the subject of political science literature for a number of years. It has evolved from rather dismissive explanation of why Africa has civil war to a more nuanced view, but it must still go a far way before it fully captures the complicated social and political constructs involved. In many ways this paper has used the extensive existing literature to show how the fact that so many authors

find contradictory evidence is proof not of methodological flaws, but of narrow examinations that must be broadened. The framework that this paper provides, its theories insights, and quantitative metrics, however, is a reframing of the issue of ethnic identity as it is interpreted in political science today. As stated in the beginning, these theories are not novel, but their connections had just been woefully under-considered until this point.

Works Cited

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Democratization or repression? *European Economic Review, 44*(4), 683-693.

Adar, K. G., & Munyae, I. M. (2001). Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under Daniel Arap Moi, 1978. *African Studies Quarterly, 5*(1).

Adebayo, A. G. (2012). *Managing Conflicts in Africa's Democratic Transitions*: Lexington Books.

Ajulu, R. (1998). Kenya's 1997 Elections: Making Sense of the Transition Process. *New England Journal of Public Policy, 14*(1), 5.

Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. *Journal of Economic growth, 8*(2), 155-194.

Annan, N. (2014). Violent conflicts and civil strife in West Africa: causes, challenges and prospects. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 3*(1).

Atlas Narodov Mira. (1964) *Moscow: Glavnoe Upravlenie Geodezii i Kartografii.*

Beer, W. R., & Jacob, J. E. (1985). *Language Policy and National Unity*: Rowman & Allanheld.

Beissinger, M. R. (2008). A new look at ethnicity and democratization. *Journal of democracy, 19*(3), 85-97.

Bender, G. J. (1978). Angola, the Cubans, and American anxieties. *Foreign Policy*(31), 3-30.

Betts, R. K., & Huntington, S. P. (1985). Dead dictators and rioting mobs: does the demise of authoritarian rulers lead to political instability? *International security, 10*(3), 112-146.

Bidwell, R. (2012). *Morocco Under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Areas 1912-1956*: Taylor & Francis.

Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2009). Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. *African Affairs, 108*(430), 1-26.

Bratton, M., & Kimenyi, M. S. (2008). Voting in Kenya: Putting ethnicity in perspective. *Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2*(2), 272-289.

Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*: Cambridge University Press.

Brooks, C. (2016). Several young protesters gunned down by police in northern Sierra Leone. *Global News Network.*

Buhaug, H., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2008). Contagion or confusion? why conflicts cluster in space1. *International Studies Quarterly, 52*(2), 215-233.

Cederman, L.-E., Wimmer, A., & Min, B. (2010). Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis. *World politics, 62*(01), 87-119.

Cederman, L. E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013). *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War*: Cambridge University Press.

Chandra, K. (2005). Ethnic parties and democratic stability. *Perspectives on Politics, 3*(02), 235-252.

Chandra, K. (2006). What is ethnic identity and does it matter? *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 9*, 397-424.

Chandra, K. (2009). Making Causal Claims about the Effect of "Ethnicity". In M. I. Lichbach & A. S. Zuckerman (Eds.), *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*: Cambridge University Press.

Chandra, K., & Wilkinson, S. (2008). Measuring the effect of "ethnicity". *Comparative Political Studies, 41*(4-5), 515-563.

Christia, F. (2012). *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*: Cambridge University Press.

Civil War in South Sudan. (2017). Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations.

Cockburn, P. (2015). *The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution*: Verso.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford economic papers, 56*(4), 563-595.

Collier, P., & Sambanis, N. (2002). Understanding civil war: a new agenda. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46*(1), 3-12.

Corrales, J., & Penfold, M. (2011). *Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chavez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela*: Brookings Institution Press.

Daniel, J., Southall, R., & Szeftel, M. (1999). *Voting for democracy : watershed elections in contemporary anglophone Africa*. Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate.

Davenport, C. (1995). Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions. *American journal of political science*, 683-713.

David, K., & Kadirgamar, S. (1989). Ethnic Conflict: Some Theoretical Considerations. In K. David & S. Kadirgamar (Eds.), *Ethnicity : identity, conflict and crisis* (pp. x, 303 p.). Hong Kong: Arena Press.

de Figueiredo Jr, R. J. P., & Weingast, B. R. (1997). Rationality of fear: political opportunism and ethnic conflict. *Military intervention in civil wars*.

Dercon, S., & Gutiérrez-Romero, R. (2012). Triggers and characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan electoral violence. *World Development, 40*(4), 731-744.

Dijker, A. J. (1989). Ethnic Attitudes and Emotions. In J. P. v. Oudenhoven & T. M. Willemsen (Eds.), *Ethnic minorities : social psychological perspectives* (pp. 288 p.). Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger.

Doran, S. (2015). New Documents Claim to Prove Mugabe Ordered Gukurahundi Killings. *The Guardian, 19*.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American Political science review, 94*(04), 779-801.

Eifert, B., Miguel, E., & Posner, D. N. (2010). Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. *American journal of political science, 54*(2), 494-510.

Elischer, S. (2008). Ethnic coalitions of convenience and commitment: political parties and party systems in Kenya.

Elischer, S. (2013). *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*: Cambridge University Press.

Ellinsen, T. (2000). Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches Brew? *Journal of*.

Equatorial Guinea election: Incumbent expected to win. (2016). *Al-Jazeera*.

Equatorial Guinea: Events of 2016. (2017). Retrieved from Human Rights Watch.

Faia, T. (2013). *Sierra Leone: From Swords into Ploughshares*. Retrieved from Institute for Policy Studies.

Fearon, J. D. (2004). Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? *Journal of Peace Research, 41*(3), 275-301.

Fearon, J. D. (2005). Primary commodity exports and civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49*(4), 483-507.

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political science review, 97*(01), 75-90.

February 2017 Monthly Forecase: Guinea-Bissau. (2017). Retrieved from UN Security Council.

Francisco, R. (2004). After the massacre: Mobilization in the wake of harsh repression. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 9*(2), 107-126.

Friedman, F. (1996). *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation*: Avalon Publishing.

Gachanga, T. (2012). Kenya: Ethnic Agendas and Patronage Impede the Formation of a Coherent Kenyan Identity. *At Issue E-Zine, 14*(4).

Garcia-Montalvo, J., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2004). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict, and civil wars.

The GDELT Global Knowledge Graph (GKG) Data Format Codebook V2.1. (2015). Retrieved from GDELT Project.

Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about democratization after twenty years? *Annual review of political science, 2*(1), 115-144.

Gibson, J. L., & Howard, M. M. (2007). Russian anti-Semitism and the scapegoating of Jews. *British Journal of Political Science, 37*(02), 193-223.

Global Knowlede Graph 2.0. (2017) GDELT Project.

Godwin, P. (2011). *The Fear: The Last Days of Robert Mugabe*: Pan Macmillan.

Goldstone, J. A., Bates, R. H., Epstein, D. L., Gurr, T. R., Lustik, M. B., Marshall, M. G., Woodward, M. (2010). A global model for forecasting political instability. *American journal of political science, 54*(1), 190-208.

Goldstone, J. A., & Tilly, C. (2001). Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamic of Contentious Action. In R. Aminzade (Ed.), *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*: Cambridge University Press.

Guimarães, F. A. (1998). *The origins of the Angolan civil war : foreign intervention and domestic political conflict*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

Gurr, T. R. (1993). Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization and conflict since 1945. *International Political Science Review, 14*(2), 161-201.

Hardin, R. (1997). *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict*: Princeton University Press.

Hatzky, C. (2015). *Cubans in Angola South-South cooperation and transfer of knowledge, 1976-1991*. Madison, Wisconsin : The University of Wisconsin Press.

Highlights of Round 6 survey findings from 36 African countries. (2017). Retrieved from Afrobarometer.

Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*: Univ of California Press.

Human Rights Watch. (2008). *Ballots to Bullets: Organied Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance*.

Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2008). Who fights? The determinants of participation in civil war. *American Journal of Political Science, 52*(2), 436-455.

Hyde, S. D. (2011). *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm*: Cornell University Press.

Ismail, J. A., & Deane, J. (2008). The 2007 general election in Kenya and its aftermath: The role of local language media. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 13*(3), 319-327.

Iyob, R., & Khadiagala, G. M. (2006). *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Incorporated.

Jenkins‑Smith, H. C., & Herron, K. G. (2009). Rock and a hard place: public willingness to trade civil rights and liberties for greater security. *Politics & Policy, 37*(5), 1095-1129.

Johnson, D. H. (2003). *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*: Indiana University Press.

Kagwanja, P., & Southall, R. (2009). Introduction: Kenya–A democracy in retreat? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27*(3), 259-277.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2008). Ethnic defection in civil war. *Comparative Political Studies*.

Kalyvas, S. N., & Balcells, L. (2010). Did Marxism Make a Difference? Marxist Rebellions and National Liberation Movements.

Kalyvas, S. N., & Kocher, M. A. (2007). Ethnic cleavages and irregular war: Iraq and Vietnam. *Politics & Society, 35*(2), 183-223.

Kandeh, J. D. (1996). What does the 'militariat' do when it rules? military regimes: the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia. *Review of African Political Economy, 23*(69), 387-404.

Kanyinga, K. (2009). The legacy of the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 election violence in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27*(3), 325-344.

Kaplan, R. D. (2014). *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*: Picador.

Kaufmann, C. (1996). Intervention in ethnic and ideological civil wars: Why one can be done and the other can't. *Security Studies, 6*(1), 62-101.

Keita, K. (1998). Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 9*(3), 102-128.

Kirkland, G. (2014). *Crisis in Mali*. Retrieved from: Right to Protect.

Kora, S., & Darboe, M. N. (2017). The Gambia's Electoral Earthquake. *Journal of democracy, 28*(2), 147-156.

Kuran, T. (1991). Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European revolution of 1989. *World politics, 44*(01), 7-48.

Kuran, T. (1998). Ethnic norms and their transformation through reputational cascades. *The Journal of Legal Studies, 27*(S2), 623-659.

Lafargue, J. (2009). *The General Elections in Kenya, 2007*: Mkuki Na Nyota.

Lake, D. A., & Rothchild, D. (1996). Containing fear: the origins and management of ethnic conflict. *International security, 21*(2), 41-75.

Latham, B., & Cohen, M. (2017). 'Death Spiral' Looms for Zimbabwe Economy as Cash Runs Out. *Bloomberg*.

Lichbach, M. I. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31*(2), 266-297.

Licklider, R. (1995). The consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945–1993. *American Political science review, 89*(03), 681-690.

Lim, M., Metzler, R., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2007). Global pattern formation and ethnic/cultural violence. *Science, 317*(5844), 1540-1544.

Lindberg, S. I. (2006). The surprising significance of African elections. *Journal of democracy, 17*(1), 139-151.

Mali: Events of 2016. (2017). Retrieved from Human Rights Watch.

Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*: Princeton University Press.

Marinov, N., & Goemans, H. (2014). Coups and democracy. *British Journal of Political Science, 44*(04), 799-825.

McGowan, P. J. (2003). African military coups d'état, 1956–2001: frequency, trends and distribution. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 41*(03), 339-370.

McLauchlin, T., Pearlman, W., Pearlman, W., & Cunningham, K. G. (2012). Out-group conflict, in-group unity? Exploring the effect of repression on intramovement cooperation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56*(1), 41-66.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2003). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*: W. W. Norton.

Migdal, J. S. (1988). *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*: Princeton University Press.

Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. *World politics, 56*(03), 328-362.

More Fear Than Fair: Gambia's 2016 Presidential Election. (2017). Retrieved from Human Rights Watch.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2008). Nation building in Zimbabwe and the challenges of Ndebele particularism. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 8*(3), 27-56.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2004). Citizenship, political violence, and democratization in Africa. *Global Governance, 10*(4), 403-409.

O'Kane, R. H. (1983). Towards an Examination of the General Causes of Coups d'Etat. *European Journal of Political Research, 11*(1), 27-44.

Olzak, S. (2006). *The Global Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Mobilization*: Stanford University Press.

Osborn, E. L. (2003). 'Circle of iron': African colonial employees and the interpretation of colonial rule in French West Africa. *The Journal of African History, 44*(01), 29-50.

Petersen, R. D. (2001). *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe*: Cambridge University Press.

Posen, B. R. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. *Survival, 35*(1), 27-47.

Posner, D. N. (2004). Measuring ethnic fractionalization in Africa. *American journal of political science, 48*(4), 849-863.

Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*: Cambridge University Press.

Quinn, J. M., Mason, T. D., & Gurses, M. (2007). Sustaining the peace: Determinants of civil war recurrence. *International Interactions, 33*(2), 167-193.

Ross, M. L. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war? *Journal of Peace Research, 41*(3), 337-356.

Salehyan, I., Hendrix, C. S., Hamner, J., Case, C., Linebarger, C., Stull, E., & Williams, J. (2012). Social conflict in Africa: A new database. *International Interactions, 38*(4), 503-511.

Sambanis, N. (2001). Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45*(3), 259-282.

Sarkees, M. R., & Wyman, F. (2010). *Resort to War: 1816-2007*.

Schedler, A. (2002). The menu of manipulation. *Journal of democracy, 13*(2), 36-50.

Shadmehr, M. (2014). Mobilization, repression, and revolution: grievances and opportunities in contentious politics. *The Journal of Politics, 76*(3), 621-635.

Shubin, V., & Tokarev, A. (2001). War in Angola: a Soviet dimension. *Review of African Political Economy, 28*(90), 607-618.

Sierra Leone 2016/2017. (2017). Retrieved from Amnesty International.

Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity*: University of Nevada Press.

Stevens, C. (1976). The Soviet Union and Angola. *African Affairs, 75*(299), 137-151.

Stockwell, J. (1978). *In search of enemies : a CIA story*. New York: Norton.

Sudetic, C. (1998). *Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia*: W. W. Norton, Incorporated.

Tajfel, H. (2010). *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*: Cambridge University Press.

Telepneva, N. (2014). Our sacred duty: the Soviet Union, the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, and the Cold War, 1961-1975.

Temudo, M. P. (2008). From 'People's Struggle'to 'This War of Today': Entanglements of Peace and Conflict in Guinea-Bissau. *Africa, 78*(02), 245-263.

Tignor, R. L. (2015). *Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900-1939*: Princeton University Press.

Togo 2016 Human Rights Report. (2017). Retrieved from United States Department of State.

Togo 2016/2017. (2017). Retrieved from Amnesty International.

Tucker, J. A. (2007). Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics, 5*(03), 535-551.

Van der Waals, W. S. (1993). Portugal's war in Angola, 1961-1974 (1st ed. ed.). Rivonia (South Africa): Ashanti Pub.

Voors, M., Nillesen, E. E., Verwimp, P., Bulte, E. H., Lensink, R., & Van Soest, D. (2010). Does conflict affect preferences? Results from field experiments in Burundi. *Results from Field Experiments in Burundi (January 3, 2010)*.

Walt, S. M. (1990). *The Origins of Alliance*: Cornell University Press.

Walter, B. F. (2004). Does conflict beget conflict? Explaining recurring civil war. *Journal of Peace Research, 41*(3), 371-388.

Weber, A. (2010). The Causes of Politicization of Ethnicity-A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Tanzania.

Weber, A., Hiers, W., & Flesken, A. (2016). *Politicized Ethnicity: A Comparative Perspective*: Palgrave Macmillan US.

Wehrey, F. (2013). The Forgotten Uprising in Eastern Saudi Arabia. *The full report,"ʿAbd al-Rahman Muhammad ʿAmr al-ʿAqil,"Ahdath al-ʿAwamiya wa al-Qatif,"(The Events of al-Awamiya and al-Qatif), can be found at* http://t. *co/wltovJtn*.

Weyland, K. (1996). Risk taking in Latin American economic restructuring: Lessons from prospect theory. *International Studies Quarterly, 40*(2), 185-207.

Whitt, S., & Wilson, R. K. (2007). The dictator game, fairness and ethnicity in postwar Bosnia. *American journal of political science, 51*(3), 655-668.

Wimmer, A., Cederman, L.E., & Min, B. (2009). Ethnic politics and armed conflict: A configurational analysis of a new global data set. *American Sociological Review, 74*(2), 316-337.

Wiseman, J. A. (1990). *Democracy in Black Africa: survival and revival*: Paragon House Publishers.

Woodwell, D. (2004). Unwelcome neighbors: shared ethnicity and international conflict during the Cold War. *International Studies Quarterly, 48*(1), 197-223.

Wrong, M. (2010). *It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle Blower*: Fourth Estate.

Yom, S. L., & Gause Iii, F. G. (2012). Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on. *Journal of democracy, 23*(4), 74-88.

Data Appendix

Table A1: Ethnic Saliencies 2016 Average

This is a data table describing the saliency of ethnicity as measured by the GDELT score of ethnicity mentioned divided by total number of mentions as well as the PREG data for that country (Posner, 2004).

Country	Sal	PREG	Country	Sal	PREG
Angola	0.410262215	0.65	Malawi	0.310774897	0.55
Benin	0.486818005	0.3	Mali	0.815815499	0.13
Botswana	0.412149333	0	Mauritius	0.358208878	0.6
Burkina Faso	0.439684939	0	Mozambique	0.475825716	0.36
Burundi	0.460332339	0.26	Namibia	0.370072136	0.55
Cameroon	0.34172329	0.71	Niger	0.549774124	0.51
Central African Republic	0.372716083	0.23	Nigeria	0.374958161	0.66
Chad	0.482501022	0.66	Rwanda	0.485439827	0.26
Congo (Brazzaville)	0.408304524	0.19	Senegal	0.414150577	0.14
Congo (Democratic Republic)	0.376159821	0.8	Seychelles	0.576150656	0
Côte d'Ivoire	0.505035943	0.49	Sierra Leone	0.394647906	0.56
Equatorial Guinea	0.379577274	0.19	Somalia	0.355920705	0
Ethiopia	0.551943453	0.57	South Africa	0.351780762	0.49
Gabon	0.366790445	0.21	South Sudan	0.613372357	NA
Gambia	0.23478583	0.37	Sudan	0.471709743	0.41
Ghana	0.321957166	0.44	Swaziland	0.4593782	0

Guinea	0.4389100 59	0.48	Tazania	0.3734650 98	0.59
Guinea-Bissau	0.5251847 06	0.05	Togo	0.4574931 18	0.49
Kenya	0.4525558 66	0.57	Uganda	0.4489311 73	0.63
Lesotho	0.0013578 03	0	Zambia	0.3978728 24	0.71
Liberia	0.4165392 19	0.62	Zimbabwe	0.3134122 92	0.41
Madagascar	0.3517715	0			

Graph A1: Ethnic Saliencies 2016 Average

Depiction of Table A1, Countries are sorted by PREG value from low (left) to high (right).

Ethnic Saliency 2016 Average

Country

South Sudan
Congo (Democratic Republic)
Zambia
Cameroon
Chad
Nigeria
Angola
Uganda
Liberia
Mauritius
Tazania
Ethiopia
Kenya
Sierra Leone
Namibia
Malawi
Niger
Côte d'Ivoire
Togo
South Africa
Guinea
Ghana
Sudan
Zimbabwe
Gambia
Mozambique
Benin
Rwanda
Burundi
Central African Republic
Gabon
Congo (Brazzaville)
Equatorial Guinea
Senegal
Mali
Guinea-Bissau
Seychelles
Swaziland
Burkina Faso
Botswana
Somalia
Madagascar
Lesotho

0   0.1   0.2   0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7   0.8   0.9

Table A2: Ethnic Saliencies by Month and Country, 2016

This table is the analysis of 2016 described in the paper. It lists the country,

month in 2016, and saliency, a score of the total mentions of ethnicity divided by

the total observations of the country according to the GDELT Project Data.

Country	Month	Saliency	Country	Month	Saliency
Angola	1	0.461234003	Madagascar	7	0.372419723
Angola	2	0.494786335	Madagascar	8	0.346211472
Angola	3	0.464838807	Madagascar	9	0.35497378
Angola	4	0.477907454	Madagascar	10	0.32705963
Angola	5	0.465246298	Madagascar	11	0.400050595
Angola	6	0.420867972	Madagascar	12	0.366887762
Angola	7	0.391622812	Malawi	1	0.300737642
Angola	8	0.265151656	Malawi	2	0.281646819
Angola	9	0.322455596	Malawi	3	0.339755533
Angola	10	0.361816275	Malawi	4	0.262610379
Angola	11	0.417377847	Malawi	5	0.303335137
Angola	12	0.379841524	Malawi	6	0.281400126
Benin	1	0.453756329	Malawi	7	0.317457534
Benin	2	0.47343236	Malawi	8	0.348045684
Benin	3	0.402931713	Malawi	9	0.307098668
Benin	4	0.500185254	Malawi	10	0.292306408
Benin	5	0.521793172	Malawi	11	0.392200964
Benin	6	0.455278129	Malawi	12	0.302703876
Benin	7	0.47690387	Mali	1	0.835824927
Benin	8	0.436529433	Mali	2	0.825087368
Benin	9	0.58677309	Mali	3	0.842583887
Benin	10	0.498665332	Mali	4	0.841381277
Benin	11	0.534771993	Mali	5	0.822860414
Benin	12	0.500795387	Mali	6	0.808801029
Botswana	1	0.446169509	Mali	7	0.837533719
Botswana	2	0.414702779	Mali	8	0.819085254
Botswana	3	0.349952741	Mali	9	0.802890043
Botswana	4	0.388047435	Mali	10	0.771892841
Botswana	5	0.435313117	Mali	11	0.784946864
Botswana	6	0.398494243	Mali	12	0.79689837

Botswana	7	0.389468028	Mauritius	1	0.366603335
Botswana	8	0.33358353	Mauritius	2	0.35218237
Botswana	9	0.468510244	Mauritius	3	0.364982676
Botswana	10	0.445087348	Mauritius	4	0.377987726
Botswana	11	0.448137408	Mauritius	5	0.373763805
Botswana	12	0.428325612	Mauritius	6	0.344450664
Burkina Faso	1	0.558782336	Mauritius	7	0.354100744
Burkina Faso	2	0.454454568	Mauritius	8	0.297102722
Burkina Faso	3	0.482771672	Mauritius	9	0.356760898
Burkina Faso	4	0.416653305	Mauritius	10	0.379509097
Burkina Faso	5	0.407804189	Mauritius	11	0.38428898
Burkina Faso	6	0.414673386	Mauritius	12	0.34677352
Burkina Faso	7	0.412265441	Mozambique	1	0.513068732
Burkina Faso	8	0.506382182	Mozambique	2	0.455773187
Burkina Faso	9	0.442172349	Mozambique	3	0.670397112
Burkina Faso	10	0.386802805	Mozambique	4	0.517528223
Burkina Faso	11	0.397766219	Mozambique	5	0.560085837
Burkina Faso	12	0.395690816	Mozambique	6	0.484167271
Burundi	1	0.481779007	Mozambique	7	0.493218191
Burundi	2	0.3875788	Mozambique	8	0.31431815
Burundi	3	0.458304498	Mozambique	9	0.336795322
Burundi	4	0.494144906	Mozambique	10	0.384545363
Burundi	5	0.449097095	Mozambique	11	0.431650921
Burundi	6	0.43473615	Mozambique	12	0.548360284
Burundi	7	0.489776204	Namibia	1	0.388757646
Burundi	8	0.359144989	Namibia	2	0.383545724
Burundi	9	0.417924709	Namibia	3	0.365674641
Burundi	10	0.498412362	Namibia	4	0.325997971
Burundi	11	0.547959887	Namibia	5	0.351098876

Burundi	12	0.505129458	Namibia	6	0.389675971
Cameroon	1	0.382644575	Namibia	7	0.354869752
Cameroon	2	0.341406657	Namibia	8	0.366393185
Cameroon	3	0.380155922	Namibia	9	0.343965528
Cameroon	4	0.409795233	Namibia	10	0.392815509
Cameroon	5	0.330568881	Namibia	11	0.423703704
Cameroon	6	0.330426744	Namibia	12	0.354367123
Cameroon	7	0.327605107	Niger	1	0.585840914
Cameroon	8	0.299124289	Niger	2	0.528478438
Cameroon	9	0.332045383	Niger	3	0.472848125
Cameroon	10	0.292058406	Niger	4	0.61091328
Cameroon	11	0.339042642	Niger	5	0.589213281
Cameroon	12	0.335805635	Niger	6	0.507852761
Central African Republic	1	0.384746247	Niger	7	0.561624391
Central African Republic	2	0.367669548	Niger	8	0.480513849
Central African Republic	3	0.349499063	Niger	9	0.53170631
Central African Republic	4	0.321072727	Niger	10	0.617626477
Central African Republic	5	0.348184	Niger	11	0.553940369
Central African Republic	6	0.419447482	Niger	12	0.556731299
Central African Republic	7	0.397410205	Nigeria	1	0.388468123
Central African Republic	8	0.370725923	Nigeria	2	0.353123838
Central African Republic	9	0.382884194	Nigeria	3	0.353532007
Central African Republic	10	0.404116926	Nigeria	4	0.379425107
Central African Republic	11	0.409716802	Nigeria	5	0.405180293
Central African Republic	12	0.317119877	Nigeria	6	0.380807682
Chad	1	0.621878298	Nigeria	7	0.38083791
Chad	2	0.48939498	Nigeria	8	0.344934435
Chad	3	0.459310197	Nigeria	9	0.417434394
Chad	4	0.422583881	Nigeria	10	0.368481058

Chad	5	0.596345868	Nigeria	11	0.355007406
Chad	6	0.456684066	Nigeria	12	0.372265677
Chad	7	0.474594725	Rwanda	1	0.390365519
Chad	8	0.370043655	Rwanda	2	0.453289445
Chad	9	0.444786108	Rwanda	3	0.525057655
Chad	10	0.473919107	Rwanda	4	0.563396683
Chad	11	0.495454035	Rwanda	5	0.438627062
Chad	12	0.485017342	Rwanda	6	0.419866674
Congo (Brazzaville)	1	0.443926595	Rwanda	7	0.555267062
Congo (Brazzaville)	2	0.414928534	Rwanda	8	0.469985209
Congo (Brazzaville)	3	0.430551829	Rwanda	9	0.460484325
Congo (Brazzaville)	4	0.486633633	Rwanda	10	0.478410032
Congo (Brazzaville)	5	0.419002318	Rwanda	11	0.564831176
Congo (Brazzaville)	6	0.404701465	Rwanda	12	0.505697087
Congo (Brazzaville)	7	0.413139629	Senegal	1	0.44174976
Congo (Brazzaville)	8	0.327920956	Senegal	2	0.445921996
Congo (Brazzaville)	9	0.391437169	Senegal	3	0.444990231
Congo (Brazzaville)	10	0.286377326	Senegal	4	0.422060206
Congo (Brazzaville)	11	0.450857088	Senegal	5	0.390768163
Congo (Brazzaville)	12	0.430177752	Senegal	6	0.395298407
Congo (Democratic Republic)	1	0.41392994	Senegal	7	0.460324011
Congo (Democratic Republic)	2	0.423769508	Senegal	8	0.372424023
Congo (Democratic Republic)	3	0.392171693	Senegal	9	0.36721292
Congo (Democratic Republic)	4	0.431014088	Senegal	10	0.381725888
Congo (Democratic Republic)	5	0.346966221	Senegal	11	0.420570693
Congo (Democratic Republic)	6	0.32673215	Senegal	12	0.426760629
Congo (Democratic Republic)	7	0.345200698	Seychelles	1	0.614424757
Congo (Democratic Republic)	8	0.308050324	Seychelles	2	0.611174458
Congo (Democratic Republic)	9	0.3965246	Seychelles	3	0.596442382
Congo (Democratic Republic)	10	0.32825264	Seychelles	4	0.601781926

Congo (Democratic Republic)	11	0.416795712	Seychelles	5	0.506008444
Congo (Democratic Republic)	12	0.384510283	Seychelles	6	0.509451575
Côte d'Ivoire	1	0.557764827	Seychelles	7	0.526584867
Côte d'Ivoire	2	0.452647278	Seychelles	8	0.477482088
Côte d'Ivoire	3	0.410185185	Seychelles	9	0.652123806
Côte d'Ivoire	4	0.44143596	Seychelles	10	0.640160271
Côte d'Ivoire	5	0.443207856	Seychelles	11	0.531175631
Côte d'Ivoire	6	0.420739482	Seychelles	12	0.646997661
Côte d'Ivoire	7	0.44043664	Sierra Leone	1	0.340455466
Côte d'Ivoire	8	0.479768786	Sierra Leone	2	0.397845517
Côte d'Ivoire	9	0.497689769	Sierra Leone	3	0.34734723
Côte d'Ivoire	10	0.529349438	Sierra Leone	4	0.273381065
Côte d'Ivoire	11	0.566435872	Sierra Leone	5	0.311607922
Côte d'Ivoire	12	0.634342187	Sierra Leone	6	0.326181841
Equatorial Guinea	1	0.366507747	Sierra Leone	7	0.654363701
Equatorial Guinea	2	0.37185324	Sierra Leone	8	0.667168206
Equatorial Guinea	3	0.5772314	Sierra Leone	9	0.334696131
Equatorial Guinea	4	0.497762162	Sierra Leone	10	0.360898691
Equatorial Guinea	5	0.392864638	Sierra Leone	11	0.394619516
Equatorial Guinea	6	0.374560056	Sierra Leone	12	0.327209586
Equatorial Guinea	7	0.365325659	Somalia	1	0.342319588
Equatorial Guinea	8	0.303265021	Somalia	2	0.37147995
Equatorial Guinea	9	0.322644847	Somalia	3	0.373381226
Equatorial Guinea	10	0.321283262	Somalia	4	0.29615896
Equatorial Guinea	11	0.321688501	Somalia	5	0.321386597
Equatorial Guinea	12	0.339940761	Somalia	6	0.331423559
Ethiopia	1	0.558758924	Somalia	7	0.389174342

Ethiopia	2	0.557708122	Somalia	8	0.364295199
Ethiopia	3	0.538308483	Somalia	9	0.364097993
Ethiopia	4	0.579982669	Somalia	10	0.371581173
Ethiopia	5	0.552906756	Somalia	11	0.390467869
Ethiopia	6	0.569013191	Somalia	12	0.355281999
Ethiopia	7	0.56582324	South Africa	1	0.362201344
Ethiopia	8	0.410503231	South Africa	2	0.364236325
Ethiopia	9	0.554482669	South Africa	3	0.346434552
Ethiopia	10	0.579626099	South Africa	4	0.312703091
Ethiopia	11	0.593569955	South Africa	5	0.33134183
Ethiopia	12	0.562638097	South Africa	6	0.35996326
Gabon	1	0.330445455	South Africa	7	0.377769877
Gabon	2	0.441391123	South Africa	8	0.32504014
Gabon	3	0.299859935	South Africa	9	0.345752116
Gabon	4	0.44114467	South Africa	10	0.362477995
Gabon	5	0.384596457	South Africa	11	0.394047429
Gabon	6	0.297526989	South Africa	12	0.339401187
Gabon	7	0.402434593	South Sudan	1	0.662955541
Gabon	8	0.35124719	South Sudan	2	0.587481622
Gabon	9	0.425195095	South Sudan	3	0.628824588
Gabon	10	0.352788668	South Sudan	4	0.611019315
Gabon	11	0.353670227	South Sudan	5	0.624532143
Gabon	12	0.321184942	South Sudan	6	0.48720247
Gambia	1	0.179629587	South	7	0.582851323

			Sudan		
Gambia	2	0.207139115	South Sudan	8	0.551024191
Gambia	3	0.225489039	South Sudan	9	0.62199352
Gambia	4	0.16891934	South Sudan	10	0.653282578
Gambia	5	0.15432406	South Sudan	11	0.688632858
Gambia	6	0.165118283	South Sudan	12	0.660668134
Gambia	7	0.203563765	Sudan	1	0.501503783
Gambia	8	0.25758765	Sudan	2	0.460876239
Gambia	9	0.210830272	Sudan	3	0.444723665
Gambia	10	0.235669156	Sudan	4	0.423700372
Gambia	11	0.357954107	Sudan	5	0.513481281
Gambia	12	0.451205589	Sudan	6	0.497169577
Ghana	1	0.33955186	Sudan	7	0.483353712
Ghana	2	0.352183708	Sudan	8	0.45649146
Ghana	3	0.331040889	Sudan	9	0.482416936
Ghana	4	0.353704947	Sudan	10	0.479821758
Ghana	5	0.318728726	Sudan	11	0.458675524
Ghana	6	0.327041278	Sudan	12	0.458302609
Ghana	7	0.324660671	Swaziland	1	0.46365561
Ghana	8	0.294884576	Swaziland	2	0.346165063
Ghana	9	0.308589226	Swaziland	3	0.324139743
Ghana	10	0.31690971	Swaziland	4	0.31542944
Ghana	11	0.26620017	Swaziland	5	0.472890693
Ghana	12	0.32999023	Swaziland	6	0.427361396
Guinea	1	0.308798784	Swaziland	7	0.393930719
Guinea	2	0.439773678	Swaziland	8	0.551065861
Guinea	3	0.385408943	Swaziland	9	0.567826525
Guinea	4	0.405844156	Swaziland	10	0.510711225
Guinea	5	0.488384395	Swaziland	11	0.552666373
Guinea	6	0.423141637	Swaziland	12	0.586695747
Guinea	7	0.454656863	Tazania	1	0.403779341
Guinea	8	0.357546759	Tazania	2	0.402755969
Guinea	9	0.485588221	Tazania	3	0.345054433
Guinea	10	0.478594951	Tazania	4	0.337960688
Guinea	11	0.526061981	Tazania	5	0.342525235

Guinea	12	0.513120336	Tazania	6	0.345815662
Guinea-Bissau	1	0.571575167	Tazania	7	0.435977164
Guinea-Bissau	2	0.602288984	Tazania	8	0.366643009
Guinea-Bissau	3	0.506322303	Tazania	9	0.379255534
Guinea-Bissau	4	0.524432474	Tazania	10	0.365423692
Guinea-Bissau	5	0.560773481	Tazania	11	0.393949898
Guinea-Bissau	6	0.42041656	Tazania	12	0.362440554
Guinea-Bissau	7	0.415285679	Togo	1	0.394478528
Guinea-Bissau	8	0.476672535	Togo	2	0.42415191
Guinea-Bissau	9	0.487192493	Togo	3	0.382342596
Guinea-Bissau	10	0.502362949	Togo	4	0.430014158
Guinea-Bissau	11	0.555007784	Togo	5	0.525785258
Guinea-Bissau	12	0.679886065	Togo	6	0.474533681
Kenya	1	0.473731192	Togo	7	0.507088955
Kenya	2	0.452609521	Togo	8	0.419929245
Kenya	3	0.450151799	Togo	9	0.476638319
Kenya	4	0.468094446	Togo	10	0.437587083
Kenya	5	0.467946352	Togo	11	0.551154175
Kenya	6	0.430872336	Togo	12	0.466213515
Kenya	7	0.476147504	Uganda	1	0.488635029
Kenya	8	0.374730127	Uganda	2	0.369333195
Kenya	9	0.480492025	Uganda	3	0.434990542
Kenya	10	0.447653663	Uganda	4	0.412448031
Kenya	11	0.453479134	Uganda	5	0.459255416
Kenya	12	0.454762297	Uganda	6	0.486900526
Lesotho	1	0.00193085	Uganda	7	0.523744556
Lesotho	2	0.001042309	Uganda	8	0.458804572
Lesotho	3	0.001400127	Uganda	9	0.46879801
Lesotho	4	0.000940138	Uganda	10	0.450450957
Lesotho	5	0.001412402	Uganda	11	0.410713737
Lesotho	6	0.001115926	Uganda	12	0.423099506
Lesotho	7	0.001601351	Zambia	1	0.417577578
Lesotho	8	0.000854102	Zambia	2	0.441528993
Lesotho	9	0.001145602	Zambia	3	0.425841252
Lesotho	10	0.001738582	Zambia	4	0.381114574
Lesotho	11	0.001922662	Zambia	5	0.347440945
Lesotho	12	0.001189584	Zambia	6	0.377652051
Liberia	1	0.345030434	Zambia	7	0.430623831
Liberia	2	0.392364057	Zambia	8	0.418145277

Liberia	3	0.412005391	Zambia	9	0.396442978
Liberia	4	0.350842886	Zambia	10	0.370251686
Liberia	5	0.415993697	Zambia	11	0.355063067
Liberia	6	0.468748458	Zambia	12	0.41279166
Liberia	7	0.400327162	Zimbabwe	1	0.363988552
Liberia	8	0.40182894	Zimbabwe	2	0.34934162
Liberia	9	0.347900282	Zimbabwe	3	0.3553416
Liberia	10	0.455218804	Zimbabwe	4	0.380013007
Liberia	11	0.505934525	Zimbabwe	5	0.30717193
Liberia	12	0.502275987	Zimbabwe	6	0.321730796
Madagascar	1	0.357325674	Zimbabwe	7	0.309272715
Madagascar	2	0.361901298	Zimbabwe	8	0.324358032
Madagascar	3	0.389446657	Zimbabwe	9	0.264269476
Madagascar	4	0.305953167	Zimbabwe	10	0.306019975
Madagascar	5	0.309445122	Zimbabwe	11	0.224860022
Madagascar	6	0.329583124	Zimbabwe	12	0.254579783
Madagascar	7	0.372419723			