

# Are Humans Misfits in Market Democracies?

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## The Spinach Pie Papers Takeaway Two

*Again, someone had planned to take half of his or her spinach pie (spanakopita) home and, again, had left it on the restaurant table. Wrapped around the pie was a thick folio of typed manuscript, containing, as it turned out, a mostly legible dialogue among an economist, a philosopher, and a social scientist. Under the impression that the papers might have some value, the publishers have published them for the benefit of whatever audience may be curious about root causes for the failure of our institutions.*

This is the second of a pair of books by Robert Lane. The first was *After the End of History: The Curious Fate of American Materialism*, published by Michigan Press in 2006 as the sixth in a series called “Evolving Values for a Capitalist World”. Neva Goodwin was the editor of the series as well as working closely with Lane on these two books. *After the End of History* is now available as an eBook at \_\_\_\_\_

*I saw how ordinary men were corrupted by opinions of the most foolish kind in every walk of life. I longed to find a remedy more than I hoped for success. And then I believed I had found a means whereby I could insinuate myself into those over-indulged souls and cure them by giving them pleasure. I had often observed how a gay and amusing form of advice like this had happy results in many cases.*

(Desiderius Erasmus, “Letter to Dorp” (1515)  
on the publication of *In Praise of Folly*)

Dedication:

To Neva Goodwin

Economist, Ecologist, Editor, and Friend, she first made possible the publication of *After the End of History* and then helped me to see – and to say – what I wanted to say in *Are Humans Misfits in Market Democracies?* Tolerant of a mix of familiar speech, deviant characters, and heterodox ideas, Neva Goodwin has interrupted her own important work to help me pursue my own idiosyncratic telos. I am grateful.

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# PART ONE: IMAGOS OF HUMAN NATURE

## Chapter One

### THE TRIUMPH OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

*Chapter One introduces the four spinach pie eaters and begins by defining the Behavioral-Neurological Revolution (BNR) which created the 21<sup>st</sup> century concept of human nature. Readers are then shown the not-so-mysterious ways behavioral and neurological sciences can know people's thoughts and feelings when those people do not know them themselves.*

*The adaptive unconscious (AU) is then explained and defended against the heated opposition of Adam, the economist, whose theories have always relied on rational choice, and Hypatia, the philosopher, whose faith in reason has been thought to be inherent in her discipline. Dessie, the behavioral scientist, and Charles, the biologist, show how the evolution of the adaptive unconscious was guided by survival needs, how it makes decisions more quickly than the conscious mind, recognizes patterns more readily, and, surprisingly, handles some kinds of complexity better.*

*In their defense of the adaptive unconscious, Dessie and Charles show how Freud misled the world on the content of the unconscious, how the AU uses inherited qualities, and how well AU fits patterns of behavior often thought to be guided simply by social conformity.*

*Adam and Hypatia are relieved when the two scientists then explain how this adaptive unconscious yields to Mindful Rationality (MR) under circumstances where longer term and dispassionate planning are required. But Adam and Hypatia are again distressed to find that the emotions (limbic system) usually guide MR in interpersonal dealings and even in ethical matters. Nor are they reassured by the two scientists' explanation of how the mind-brain relies on an organ (the forgettable anterior cingulated cortex), which is not available to consciousness, when choosing between AU or MR.*

*It is convenient to give identifying names to the two groups opposing each other in the ensuing argument: we shall call defenders of the traditional view of human nature, that is, Adam, the economist, and Hypatia, the philosopher, by the term that was applied to their views in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Liberals. They are the defenders of (Imago-18). The challengers, Dessie, the behavioral scientist, and Charles, the biologist, argue that a concept of human nature based on the behavioral and neurological sciences (Imago-21) should be called humanism because its advocates put human beings, not society, at the center of their analysis. But, because the Liberals claim the term means practitioners of the humanities, Dessie and Charles, unwilling to yield the term to the nonscientific study of human thought and behavior, reluctantly adopt the term New Humanists.*

\* \* \* \* \*

In Clark's, the local Greek restaurant, the secretaries, police, deliverymen, mothers with children, and professors each found a niche with ecological properties that suited their

survival needs. The police and deliverymen chose to eat at the counter in a kind of inarticulate camaraderie. The secretaries and receptionists tended, for reasons that Dessie had just figured out, to eat at the central tables which could accommodate an indefinite number of patrons without prior appointments. Professors nurturing ideas and mothers with small children chose the protective niches of the red Naugahyde booths, firmly keeping the world at a sufficient distance to protect their tender charges. All was well and in good order – except the ideas and the babies, which were often out of order.

“Did you spend the summer meditating on your disciplinary sins?” asked Dessie of his old friend Adam. Named after Desiderius Erasmus, Dessie was chubbier and more intense than Adam, especially in his mission to spread a brand of behavioral-neurological gospel that his forbear would find offensive. Adam, named after Adam Smith, had another mission. Built like a halfback, he used his bulk metaphorically to go off-tackle for short gains against non-economists. Today Adam had brought a friend, Hypatia, who resembled Shakespeare’s ‘dark lady.’ Although of Greek descent she was new to spanakopita or spinach pie, at least the American version. She was a classically trained philosopher, with the love of words and ruminative wit that comes naturally to the practitioners of this trade. Compared to Adam and Dessie, she was youngish, but she bore the burdens of being young and female in the company of self-important professors with grace and courage. Like a busy thoroughfare, she was dangerous to cross.

“This is Hypatia,” said Adam. “She has been in the philosophy business a long time and says she has been reading something called *neurophilosophy*,<sup>1</sup> which we thought might interest a paraphilosopher, like you.” Adam had considered and rejected an alternative term for Dessie, pseudophilosopher. Only oblique insults were tolerated in these spinach pie sessions.

Dessie also had brought a friend, one who knew a lot more about the brain than did Dessie and sometimes rescued Dessie from the deep waters to which he went in careless abandon. “And this is Charles,” said Dessie introducing his friend. “Charles was named after Darwin, of course,” said Dessie “and comes from a shorter line of thinkers than does your friend Hypatia, but Charles studies hominids across millions, instead of merely thousands, of years.” Charles composed his melancholy, long horse-face into a smile and bowed in 19th century fashion to Hypatia. “Enchanted,” he said with a kind of prescience of things to come.

“I thought you were Dutch,” said Hypatia to Desiderius-Dessie, with the half-smile of a philosopher, distinguishing herself by half a smile from the mien of an economist.

There was a moment of silence as Hypatia, brushing her black curly hair out of her dark eyes, studied the menu. Then, out of the blue, Dessie asked: “What is the other great change in our time?”

“Fill me in,” said Charles when he had finished studying how Clark’s might fill him up.

“Last year Adam and I enjoyed spinach pie,” said Dessie courteously, turning to Charles and Hypatia, “sadly, without your presences – while trying to figure out what the effect of increased wealth would be on people’s values and beliefs, especially what seemed to me to be an implied movement from materialism to humanism. The implications of the increased wealth were enormous, but I regret to say, for the short fifty-year period of our observations the anticipated movement away from materialism

was slight.<sup>2</sup> Following the clear – well, sometimes clear – teachings of economics, I had expected to find that an increase in wealth would lead to a decline in the value of wealth, that is, there would be declining marginal utility of wealth compared to other kinds of goods. Alas, it did not turn out that way: whereas the momentous increase in wealth in advanced countries did not make people happier neither did it lead people to search for happiness where it is most likely to be found, in their relations with other people. Still, we did clarify the human situation and the priority of humans over things. Didn't we?" he asked, looking anxiously at Adam.

"I enjoyed it, I think," said Adam looking studiously at the Coca Cola clock and smiling enigmatically to himself.

"The priority of humans over things?" queried Hypatia. "You wasted perfectly good spinach pie deciding people are more valuable than paper clips?"

Dessie smiled his half embarrassed, half superior smile. "It took a long time for the Enlightenment to establish that people had the same kind of value that God was thought to have and that people could do things on their own without His direction," he said. "It's reasonable that it might take an equally long time to establish that human well-being and development are as valuable as GNP and that people often do things for reasons other than making money." He paused for a moment and added, "But, given the way Nature leaves many obvious clues on what gives us pleasure, it is really odd that it took so long to get the people-money priorities right again after the recent extended period of monetary supremacy."

"More than that;" said Charles for whom evaluation always came only after explanation. "Dessie's 'other great change in our time' represents humanity's changed account of why and how people do what they do. We call it 'the behavioral and neurological revolution' (BNR). It is giving us a new and better picture of the way the brain and mind guide human behavior, a picture that, like a film emerging from its acid bath, is becoming clearer by the minute."<sup>3</sup> Charles preferred the Pleistocene period, which he followed more closely than modern digital photography.

### **The Adaptive Unconscious**

"Shall we start with how a society whose members think of themselves as consciously controlling their own fates cope with the lion under the throne, the unseen power, the Adaptive Unconscious?" asked Charles.

"I don't believe in the supernatural," said Hypatia, to no one's surprise, "nor ghosts, nor 'things that go bump in the night.' Please bring your unseen under the fluorescent lighting that makes this place so radiant with modern charm."

"The adaptive unconscious" said Dessie, taking a deep breath for the tough journey ahead, "is Timothy Wilson's term for the emotions and thoughts and values and goals that are 'inaccessible to consciousness but that influence judgments, feelings or behavior.'<sup>4</sup> But Charles and I use the term to cover other kinds of thinking of which the author of that thinking is unaware."<sup>5</sup>

"I am suspicious already," said Hypatia. "How can you know better than others the things that are inaccessible to *their* consciousness – but apparently not to yours?"

“We have two microscopes that the 18<sup>th</sup> century did not have,” said Charles. One is the functional magnetic imaging machine (fMRI) that shows which part of the brain is functioning (the part that processes data and/or the part that processes anger) in a given case. I will describe that later. The other is the experimental method permitting us to expose one group but not a comparable group to a stimulus providing an assessment of how the stimulus affects people. The method has the advantage that it does not rely on their introspection. We expose the Blue Jerseys but not the Red Jerseys to a vivid paragraph describing a murder victim’s appeal for help. Both groups favor a longer than usual prison term for the murderer. Members of the Blue Jerseys say their position was determined by the paragraph describing the victim’s piteous appeal for help. But that is unlikely because the Red Jerseys, who had not read that paragraph, also favored a longer than usual prison term for the murderer. Something else, working on both groups, perhaps a recent news story about a heinous murder, or a shared belief in the wickedness of human nature (what we will later call an *imago*), must have been the cause. Like others in similar situations, members of the Blue Jerseys could not tell from introspection why they favored a longer than usual prison term. That” Dessie concluded, “is how outsiders can know about the grounds for a person’s decision that are unconscious to the deciding person herself.”

“But I would like a true story about a real choice, if there are any,” said Adam with his usual skepticism.

Dessie cleared his throat. “A group of young women from a prestigious college were trying to decide whether, ‘Jill,’ a candidate for a job requiring judgment and quick decisions should be hired. Various versions of the candidate were presented: she was attractive (or plain), had good (or middling) grades, was a little aloof (or warm), had (had not) just spilled coffee on her supervisor’s desk, recently had (did not have) a car accident, would (would not) see the evaluators later. What were the grounds on which these young women chose (did not choose) the candidate? They all claimed that they chose the candidate solely on grounds of her qualifications. But the experimenters found that whether or not the evaluators expected to see the candidate later was more important than her qualifications, and that sympathy for her (spilling the coffee and having the car accident) contributed much less than the student evaluators thought it had.”<sup>6</sup>

“And, without knowing me at all, your experimenters could tell me why I am happy or depressed,” said Hypatia in scornful tones.

“A study of the accuracy with which women subjects could identify influences on their mood states is relevant,” said Dessie with patience. “Subjects reported daily for a two month period the quality of their moods and kept track of the various factors that they thought were influencing these moods, such as the amount of sleep the night before, their general state of health, sexual activity, stage of menstrual cycle, the day of the week, and the weather. At the end of the data-gathering period subjects filled out a final form assessing the importance of the various factors they had been monitoring. Subjects gave great weight to amount of sleep and almost none to day of the week. The investigators then correlated the co-occurrence of mood scores and alleged influencing factors, finding that, in fact, day of the week was most important and amount of sleep had negligible influence. Indeed, there was a slightly negative correlation between what the participants thought was important and what turned out actually to be important. ‘The more a subjects’ mood co-varied with the day of the week or weather, the less likely she was to

give weight to these factors in her retrospective report. Thus, subjects erred in assessing the impact of various determinants of their mood fluctuations, mistaking strong influence for weak ones or vice versa, and even failing to distinguish between positive influences and negative ones.<sup>7</sup> Later a different group of subjects acted as observers and was asked to make the same assessments of influences on moods, with the result that their ratings of likely influences on moods were nearly identical to those of the actors observing themselves. The evidence suggests that actors behave as observers, using common theories and benefiting not at all from their privileged insight. The fact is, dear Hypatia, that the sources of our moods are often unknown to us, that is, are unconscious.”<sup>8</sup>

“But on public policy matters, we surely are less opaque to ourselves. My friend opposes gun control and thinks it is because he fears being defenseless when confronted by a burglar with a gun. But you know better than he does why he is against gun control?”

“Your friend is superficially right,” said Dessie, “but others, equally vulnerable to burglars with guns, do not see the same risks. Recent research by a Yale law and psychology group found a deeper and unconscious cause: They find that ‘persons of egalitarian and solidaristic [communitarian] orientations worry more about the risk of gun accidents and crime in a world with too little gun control, while those of hierarchical and individualistic orientations worry more about the risk of being rendered defenseless in a world with too much gun control.’<sup>9</sup> That is, behind his fear is an unconscious ideology that is responsible for giving direction to his fears. For reasons we will have to discuss later, your friend is unlikely to know how these implicit values unconsciously influence his choices. Later, I will show you how implicit party preference undermines logic, how unconscious hormonal change insensibly alters trust toward one’s broker, how ‘mortality salience’ influences political choices – all processes of which the deciding person is unconscious.”

Adam could not stand it any longer. “Your research says one thing and our daily experience of negotiating our way through the world of choices says something else. Wouldn’t a smart person, even a behavioral neuroscientist, rely on his own experience and the evidence of his senses? After all, that’s what we have been doing all along, indeed throughout history.”

*The wisdom of the unconscious.* Charles weighed in. “Don’t be so scornful of the unconscious. The way your mind translates light waves into faces and landscapes is unconscious, the remarkable coordination of nerves and muscles that permit you to stand up without holding on is unconscious, and even your exquisite ability to use language, from glottals to sibilants, is mostly unconscious. Now just extend that a little bit to explain why Adam is an economist, Hypatia a philosopher, I am a biologist, and Dessie – well God knows what Dessie is – and you will find the roots of these crucial life choices lost in false memories and self-serving accounts that the BNR could easily explain.”

“Friends of The Age of Reason, brace yourselves; take your last look at ‘all things bright and beautiful,’ especially that creature who ‘in apprehension [is] like a god!’ for the adaptive unconscious will wash them away,” said Hypatia in a sullen mood.

“Friends of humankind, welcome the unconscious to your circle of friends,” said Charles, adding to his congenital mournfulness a dash of pain because he had to cross his new friend Hypatia. “The unconscious not only helps you to see, speak, and stand up, but

it can process more information than that pitiful consciousness you hold so dear. A team of Dutchmen asked a sample of students to choose among four cars based on a list of attributes such as age, gasoline mileage, transmission, and handling. One group of students was instructed to think about their choice for several minutes while another group was distracted by playing a game of anagrams. When the list of attributes was only 4, the students asked to think about them made wiser choices, but when the list was 12, the distracted group, relying on unconscious processing of the information, did better. Why? Because ‘the unconscious brain has a far greater capacity for information than conscious working memory.’ That distinction between simple and complex choices seems to apply quite generally. Another study by the same Dutch group found that for complex, but not simple, purchases, ‘the more time spent in conscious deliberation, the less satisfied the students were.’”<sup>10</sup> Charles looked across the table. “Adam, is your rational decision maker taking this in?”

***A tidal wave engulfs the Age of Reason?*** “What we have discovered,” said Dessie in a burst of enthusiasm, “is that we are on the cusp of a tidal wave that is about to engulf the remnants of The Age of Reason based on rational choice, human autonomy, and free will. That tidal wave is caused by a tectonic shift in the way we explain things: from the rational mind to the unconscious,<sup>11</sup> and especially from introspection and reflection to behavioral and neurological science. The unconscious, says Timothy Wilson, ‘is the system whereby [a person] selects, interprets, and evaluates incoming information and sets goals.’<sup>12</sup> It is physiologically different from sleep,<sup>13</sup> sharing more with inattention, lack of mindfulness, and the limited awareness of habitual acts.”

“Ever since Freud, we have known that our unconscious had a lot to do with our thinking,” said Adam, relieved that the tidal wave had come and gone.

“Forget the ‘id,’” said Charles. “This is serious. Freud did great damage to our concepts of the unconscious. He made it the site of lust and hostility whereas, in fact, it is the site of a lot of wisdom and the whole Behavioral Inhibition System that keeps us from acting out the impulses that he feared. Timothy Wilson’s phrase *adaptive* unconscious reflects its origins in evolution as an endowed protective device to guide hominids in their daily lives. It has emerged from evolution as a source of quick, front-line responses – to danger, of course, but also to people (first impressions), situations (how does this affect me?), symbols of the in-group (the cross and the flag), and everything in between. ‘The ability to size up our environments... and initiate behavior quickly and nonconsciously confers a survival advantage and thus was selected for,’ says Wilson. ‘Without these nonconscious processes, we would have a very difficult time navigating through the world.’”<sup>14</sup>

“Know thyself,” murmured Hypatia, envisioning the inscription above the temple to Apollo at Delphi.

“Apollo, the god of music, was a rather impulsive character with a poor behavioral inhibition system,” said Dessie. “We’ll get to that later when we see how inaccessible to consciousness are our emotions and thinking processes and self-understandings.”<sup>15</sup>

Adam wondered whether greed, if not rationality, could be considered part of the adaptive unconscious, but he was too wise to ask. Instead he asked in his most innocent manner: “Can you locate this marvelous adaptive unconscious?”

Charles smiled. For Adam reality meant something physical (a Cartesian dualist, thought Charles). “Would an address in the brain, like, say, the parietal lobe, make the idea of adaptive unconscious more persuasive (real) for you?” asked Charles, somewhat sympathetically. “Perhaps locating the organ which houses and in some sense *causes* a process to take place (like instantaneous facial recognition) reassures you that when we talk about that process we know what we are talking about. You are not alone in that – nor does it reflect a foolish materialism. The journalist asks of an event: What happened? Who did it? When? Where? How? Why? Naming the organ at least answers Where? and often contributes to Why? and What?”

“So where is this elusive adaptive unconscious, then?” persisted Adam.

“One answer is that some of its functions lie in the *autonomic nervous system*, which is distributed throughout the body and whose capacities to mobilize (and recover from) responses to challenge make this system indispensable for guidance. For Patricia Churchland: ‘The autonomic system – because of the centrality of its role in coordinating vital functions, biasing behavior choice, and giving emotional color to ongoing experience – constitutes the core of what makes an animal a coherent biological entity.’<sup>16</sup> Like Timothy Wilson’s adaptive unconscious, the autonomic system works outside the pale of awareness while performing its function of regulating ‘the ordinary business of life’.”

“Charles, my friend, Adam is asking about the absence of something, the absence of consciousness,” said Dessie, trying to be helpful.

Charles looked disappointed. “What capacities are missing is certainly part of the puzzle,” he said, “but the point I wish to make is that some of those capacities, like attention,<sup>17</sup> remain in unconscious form and some capacities, like the kinds of judgment the Dutchmen examined, are actually enhanced by unconscious processing. When the default condition of adaptive unconscious takes over, we lose some capacities of mindful rationality and gain some capacities of rapid response and even some latent capacities of memory and acuity normally associated with the conscious rational mind.”

“What happens to our *will*, whether free or not, and our *consciences*, and our *self-regulation*?” asked Hypatia, beginning to be alarmed.

“You overload my capacities with too many questions at once,” said Charles, frowning his forehead like a newly plowed field. “We will get to that troublesome problem of ‘will’ later, but conscience we might refer to the more tangible Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) which, being lodged in the cortex, is sometimes available to consciousness<sup>18</sup> (‘I really shouldn’t have let my hostility to old Smithy show’), but, as is the case of the various forms of anxiety, the BIS is sometimes quite out of conscious control.”

***The adaptive unconscious in the ordinary business of life.*** “My ordinary business of life,” said Adam, referring to Wilson’s phrase, “includes remembering the names of my students and even helping them from time to time, avoiding insulting the dean and certain of my so-called friends, remembering where I left my notes and my gloves, gathering information on the candidate for a junior position whom I favor in order to block that stupid candidate proposed by you-know-whom in my department, and remembering to come to this Spinach Pie Session on Wednesdays. If my adaptive unconscious can keep track of all these things, it is smarter than I am.”

“You are only as smart as your adaptive unconscious, the source of much memory and the guide to interpersonal relations and to the self-regulation that Hypatia asked about,” said Charles. “To apply some general research to your problems, note that there is ‘an automatic effect of perception on action’ leading you to respond to your students in ways compatible with your goals, “an automatic goal pursuit” that keeps your pursuit of your favorite candidate for the position in your department from being distracted, and a ‘continual automatic evaluation of [your] experience,’ providing feedback on how you are doing. You are hardly aware of these unconscious monitoring processes – and that’s the point. The research here applied has the charming title of ‘The Unbearable Automaticity of Being.’<sup>19</sup> Can you bear it?” Charles’ smile broke through his gloom like a sudden break in the clouds on a rainy day.

“Without more specific help, my situation is still unbearable,” said Adam.

Dessie tried his hand at diagnosing the way the unconscious helped Adam, the powerful halfback, in his ordinary business of life. “For non-autistic people,” he said, “there is a special area of the brain for thinking about faces<sup>20</sup> (an area probably better developed in Hypatia, a female, than in you). Sorry you are having trouble with remembering the names of your students, but you know, facial recognition is inaccessible to consciousness. Your ambiguous relations with what you call your ‘friends’ are governed in part by heredity. Research with twins finds that ‘a measure of social integration, based on number of friends, frequency of contact with them, and attendance at meetings of clubs and other organizations, was under the strongest genetic influence,’ that is ‘40-89% of the variance (individual differences) in this trait is due to heredity.’<sup>21</sup> What is and is not inherited, of course, is unconscious. Incidentally, the parts of the brain dealing with friendship are the same as those dealing with moral questions.<sup>22</sup> You might want to think about that. As for the dean, your response will be affected both by the way he asks you to serve on the Course of Studies Committee and your mood at the time. Research shows ‘that a negative mood produced more critical reactions and less compliance than did a positive mood, and this effect was accentuated for impolite, unconventional requests.’<sup>23</sup> As we saw earlier, people are not very good at assessing the sources of their moods since these are usually out of the reach of consciousness.” Dessie smiled a sweet-and-sour smile in the direction of Adam. “Can I help you in any other way?” he asked.

Hypatia reached out a comforting hand to Adam in a silent mark of sympathy. Turning to Charles, she said: “I think you are confounding guidance by the usual adherence to social norms and guidance by your adaptive unconscious. You have simply given a psychological name to what everybody knows as conformity or convention.” Hypatia felt oddly like a big sister to tough old Adam who had been treated so roughly by Dessie.

“Dig deeper,” said Dessie, coming to the support of his biological friend “Why are conformists generally happier than nonconformists?<sup>24</sup> Because the adaptive unconscious is primed by evolution to reward us when we receive cues of social support. And, how does that work? It works because humans are endowed with what are called ‘mirror neurons’ that remarkably tell people what others are thinking and feeling.<sup>25</sup> You simply wouldn’t have time to sit down and enumerate and evaluate even the crumbs without help from the adaptive unconscious.”

“Innovation and change happen.” said Hypatia. “I do not think that you can abolish rational thought by waving a tidal wave at us.”

“You’re right,” said Charles, grateful that Hypatia was still on speaking terms with her fellow surfers (sufferers?).

### **Mindful Rationality<sup>26</sup> as a Back-Up System.**

“I am consciously thinking right now that you are not simply following your adaptive unconscious (AU) in reporting on its properties,” said Hypatia. “My portable Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging machine says your prefrontal cortex is active whether or not your basal ganglia and brain stem, controlling your autonomic, largely visceral system, is also active.” She smiled broadly as she used a bit of the homework she had secretly assigned herself.

***Balancing the adaptive unconscious (AU) and mindful rationality (MR).*** “If rationality is defined as ‘selecting the best method of accomplishing a specific goal,’<sup>27</sup> why should we not concentrate on improving our rational capacities instead of allowing, or even encouraging, this adaptive unconscious to take over?” asked Adam, digging in his heels.

“One good reason is economy:<sup>28</sup> brains are a finite resource and rational thinking is costly; use the less costly system as much as you can. Another reason is that you don’t have much choice because the brain is not directly involved in much conscious processing<sup>29</sup> and, without the brain, no rationality of the kind you mean takes place. But perhaps the best reason is that the adaptive unconscious can do things that mindful rationality (as we conceive it) cannot do. Not only does the adaptive unconscious have links to emotional systems, it has a longer memory and is linked to the parts of the brain that process ethical questions.<sup>30</sup> Finally, you cannot use MR without relying on AU as a collateral player. It is ironic that if you rely solely on rationality and the part of the brain that does logic and calculation<sup>31</sup> you lose that intuitive ethical sense that the Age of Reason relied upon.”

Hypatia was taking it all in for later meditation. “*Mindful* rationality,” she repeated. “Is that really different from any other kind of rationality? Is there such a thing as ‘mindless’ rationality?”

“Rule-bound thinking, such as logic, can be mindless in this special sense of routine thinking. What makes anything mindful is an attention to how the situation might be otherwise; it requires attention to context and use of ‘lateral thinking’ or free association. It is a condition for creativity. I added it to conventional rationality because I wanted to extend the alternatives to the adaptive unconscious to include creativity.<sup>32</sup> The author of the mindfulness concept, Susan Langer, says it means (1) the creation of new categories when the old ones lead to failure (if the railroads had categorized their mission as ‘transportation’ instead of transport by rail, they might have seen the possibilities in buses and airplanes); (2) openness to new information (such as the level of troop requirements for *occupation* of Iraq as contrasted to requirements for *conquest*); (3) awareness of more than one perspective (such as the use of an available electric switch as a plumb-bob to permit the tying together of two out-of-reach dangling strings).<sup>33</sup> The key

meanings are creativity, questioning what has been accepted, what is routine, and the conventions of speech and manners that are used to conserve effort.”

“I am exhausted just thinking about mindfulness,” said Adam. “Remember those Dutch findings: the more you think about complexity, the worse your decisions.”

“Of the many alternatives to the adaptive unconscious, we have captured only two, mindfulness and rationality.” said Dessie. But there are others.”<sup>34</sup>

“Who is in charge?” asked Adam directly.

“That is a question that is emerging from intensive research,” said Charles, for whom ‘intensive research’ was like chocolate cake and whipped cream. “The resolution of conflicting brain messages is done by a team of organs in the prefrontal cortex mentioned earlier. One of that team, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), seems to assign duties to various organs in the brain, but contexts have ‘significant impact on the mechanism used to address the problem.’<sup>35</sup> (I’ll have a brain map for you next week.) You may feel some relief that your dreaded *unconscious* is not assigned the job of umpire, but, dear friends, the ACC operates quite outside the range of consciousness. We are programmed so that in times of danger the adaptive unconscious automatically takes over. It is ‘quicker, sees patterns more clearly, is more sensitive to negative signals, and is more directly linked to executive centers.’”<sup>36</sup>

“My rational executive center just told my malingering unconscious that it is 1:05. See you next week,” said Adam.

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## Chapter Two

### THE REVOLUTION IN IMAGOS

*In this chapter... Borrowing from biology (and ignoring Freud), the New Humanists introduce the term imago to describe the concepts of human nature that people and cultures unconsciously employ. The Enlightenment imago, developed in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century (Imago-18), claimed that humans were autonomous, rational, conscious, materialistic, self-interested but perfectible. The main method of research on which Imago-18 rested its claim was introspection, which was then believed to yield accurate self-knowledge.*

*In contrast, Imago-21, still emerging from twenty-first century behavioral and neurological research, claims that most of our life decisions are not accessible to consciousness. Because all interpersonal and moral (and many other) decisions employ parts of the emotion-processing limbic system, few decisions are undiluted products of the neocortex, the center for rational thinking. Moreover, biases and illusions about the self make introspection an invalid source of understanding. The autonomy of Imago-18 is challenged by the group-dependency of the human species and the strong guidance of a set of genetically given tropisms over which we have only occasional control.*

*Adam, whose professional cosmos was grounded on the beneficence of market choices, finds the irrationality, group-embeddedness, and the unconsciousness of Imago-21 unacceptable. He thought these qualities defied common sense (that is, his introspection). And Hypatia, immersed in a world based on reason and reflection, especially an ethics relying on individual moral responsibility, is shocked. Imago-21, she believes, is immoral and cedes the best part of civilization to the random processes of evolution.*

*The friends adjourn arguing over the alleged danger to market and democratic functioning produced by this conflict in imagos. When there is such a wide discrepancy between the imago that presided over the framing of these choice institutions and the science-based imago describing those who actually work and benefit or suffer from these institutions, are we headed for a period of disappointment, inefficiency, and general anxiety?*

\* \* \* \* \*

The urban scene that Adam found so satisfying and Hypatia so suggestive of the modernity that she disliked, was bathed in sunshine along with the perfume of diesel particulate matter.

“Do you scent hope in the air?” asked Adam.

“Do you suppose that the haze of fire and brimstone over the river Styx is worse than the diesel smog over the Quinnipiac?” asked Hypatia.

“Chemical analysis of brimstone and diesel smog give the advantage to brimstone,” said Charles, sliding into the booth next to Hypatia.

“A bit of sulphur in the soil is great for growing spinach,” said Dessie, sliding, perforce, next to Adam. “We have blocked their exits,” he said to Charles. “Now we can launch directly into our concept of *imagos* of human nature?”

“‘Imago,’ indeed!” Charles said to himself. “‘Imago’ comes from *imaginatus*, a challenging beginning for a scientific concept.”

### **The Idea of an Imago**

“Most of humankind uses some such concept,”<sup>37</sup> Dessie said in his least argumentative and most persuasive manner. “Although economists disguise their references to human nature by using the word, ‘propensities,’ philosophers are not shy about the term, “human nature” without disguises. But ‘beliefs about human nature’ is awkward so I propose that we borrow a term from biology that has already been misapplied by Freud: I propose *imago*.<sup>38</sup> Like the personae or cast of characters in a play, the *imagoes* or personae populating ideologies are numerous, though usually only implicit. *Homo economicus* populates markets, and *rational man* populates the law and infects democracies. Democracies, markets, and courts rely upon imagoes, build their justifications on them, and Ok are effective insofar as they correctly interpret these flexible images.”

“What good are these ‘imagoes’ slouching toward Bethlehem – or Chicago, as the case may be?” asked Adam

“What good is an imago? How is the imago derived from the Behavioral Neurological Revolution different from earlier versions of human nature?” asked Dessie, repeating the gist of what the partisans of traditional imagoes had asked. He wet his lips, girded up his loins, and assumed his “wiser and older” manner.

***The Copernican Revolution in Concepts of Human Nature.*** “First, why is this change so important? Superficially, the change is the one we talked about last time: the idea of the adaptive unconscious as the default system, while mindful rationality, assumed to be dominant by most people and disciplines since the Enlightenment, is seen as the backup system. What lies behind this radical change is the extension of the normal process of moving from what has in other fields been called *natural philosophy* to science. This happened earlier in chemistry and physics and medicine; now it is happening to the study of human behavior and the mind itself. This behavioral-neurological revolution has done to the analysis of human behavior what the Copernicus-Kepler-Galileo revolution did to astronomy. By relying on 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century concepts of human nature, you remain geocentric. You are using Lamarckian concepts of biology to interpret the genomic code. Come out of the fire-lit cave, my friends, into this new dawn of knowledge about our species.” All that was missing was a fanfare of trumpets.

“The Marxists thought they were the advance guard of a new truth about human nature, and so did the Freudians,” said Adam. “New prophets emerge, reach their zenith, and return to the cave quite frequently these days.”

“Why were the descendants of Versailles, residents of the elegant salons of the Enlightenment, Hegelians, Marxists, and even Freudians living in fire-lit caves?” asked Dessie, picking up the challenge. “Because they were working with the mental equipment of natural philosophy instead of science. The result, as we saw last time, was that only the products but not the processes of the mind were available to them. They had to work backwards from their thoughts and feelings to what the thinking and emotional processes that produced these thoughts and feelings *must have been*. With only an understanding of

conscious thinking, the unconscious was lost to all except Freud, and he had to interpret people's own statements by means of an imaginative but misleading theory of his own imagination, as tutored by classical and 18<sup>th</sup> century ideas and language."

For a philosopher, Hypatia was strangely open to the science of the mind and had an awkward feeling that Dessie might be right. But there was too much of the good, the true, and the beautiful at stake to let go easily. "Dessie, my friend, your corrosive application of science cannot dismantle, say, the philosophy of rights, the Confucian code, and the Vienna school, all done without help from the Behavioral Neurological Revolution or any understanding of the unconscious. Might it not be the case that ethics, as Kant argued,<sup>39</sup> is independent of an understanding of the unconscious and behavioral sciences?"

Dessie welcomed the undogmatic spirit of Hypatia's inquiry. "Last week we saw the kind of experiments necessary to assess the real or operative causes governing why people decided the way they did. That applies to ethical conclusions, as well. What is important is to note the difference between believing a creed stating what is right and good, which is only indirectly the business of the BNR, and studying how people arrive at these beliefs. Ethical beliefs, so important to all imagoes, have deep unconscious roots. More than that, trying to apply the 18<sup>th</sup> century ethics devised for people with traits that they have been found not to have is like applying the ethics of the monastery to Tahiti. It is futile. Should we not study these problems?" Dessie thought for a minute and saw how the question of ethics had derailed the general problem of the change in the basis for imagoes. "Those experiments are only five decades old and the study of the physiology of thinking and feeling, now heavily dependent on functional magnetic resonance imaging, is only twenty years old," he said. "We can no more fault the 18<sup>th</sup> century imagoes for not knowing what we now know about the unconscious than we can fault Ptolemy for not understanding the heliocentric theory of the heavens."

"I'm with you on the importance of science in understanding human nature, but I do not see how this disqualifies Adam Smith's – or Hume's – concepts of human nature and the institutions built on them," said Adam in one of his less polemical – but more obtuse – moods.

"The Liberal imagoes of the Enlightenment made most people autonomous, rational, always conscious (mindful), materially self-interested but morally sensitive, citizens of their (hierarchical, agricultural) societies. These idealized people knew their own thinking and emotional processes, and, being born with blank-slate minds, were mutable, even perfectible. Compare them to what the Behavioral Neurological Revolution today says are the likely properties of humankind. Although they believe their knowledge of themselves comes from introspection, the BNR knows that their thoughts about themselves are derived from others; they are embedded in groups; their emotional life intrudes unconsciously on their most 'rational' thinking, most of their mental processes are unconscious; their genetic heritage instructs much more of their apparently 'free' thought and action than had been supposed, and when, however tardily, they are satiated with material things, they find their sense of well-being supported far more by other people than by things they purchase. Material self-interest is less of a natural 'propensity' than is affiliation with others." He paused to review his summary of the conflicting imagoes, and added, "Consider how different the institutions

created by people informed by these different imagoes would be: they serve different purposes and are staffed by people with different characteristics.”

Of course, Adam could not accept that bit about the group-embeddedness of mankind, but would Hypatia? “Humans are social animals,” she said calmly, as comfortable with Greek thought as with the more atomistic Enlightenment. But everyone knew this was only a sliver of an endorsement.

### **The Conflict Between Traditional and 21st Century Imagoes**

Dessie relaxed the muscles of his abdomen and went on with more confidence: “This change in models has sweeping – and controversial – implications for our institutions, our practices, and our understanding of ourselves,”<sup>40</sup> he said. “Here, I have provided a handy reference to the two sets of imagoes for consultation and comment.” Dessie casually flung upon the table (as though he had not labored for several days on this project) a sheet labeled “**Table 2.1. Imago-18 & Imago-21.**”

#### Imago-18

#### Imago-21

##### *1. Genetic Control*

Genetic control is minimal: Personality is totally malleable; human perfectibility is possible through learned experience; inequality is purely a matter of social arrangements.

Capacities for intelligence, mood, and other aspects of personality are inherited. Equality is modified by genetic endowments as well as social arrangements. Human development is possible within unknown limits.

##### *2. Consciousness*

All cognitive and emotional processes are conscious or easily made conscious. These processes are available to people through the private process of introspection.

Because the *adaptive unconscious* is the default mode the sources of many of our daily activities are not known to us; our “reasons” are often rationalizations.

##### *3. Introspection*

By concentrated effort the mind can identify feelings and their sources and thoughts and the processes that produced them. Nothing is hidden from a careful investigation.

Because the brain processes leading to both feelings and thought are inaccessible to us, introspection is not a fruitful way of examining the self or, by extension, people in general.

##### *4. Reflection*

Consciousness and introspection provide the materials for reflection – the best guide to underlying truths about the self and society. Philosophy and science (“natural philosophy”) employ the same methods.

Because much of what is necessary for reflection is hidden by our unconscious and distorted by our self-protective biases, reflection has genuine but limited value.

5. *Self-Knowledge*

Through introspection and philosophical reflection a person can know herself. Self-knowledge needed to know others.

Because cognitive and affective processes and self-favoring biases are lost. People cannot know themselves well through introspection. Knowledge of others and of self are reciprocally influential.

6. *Rationality*

Reason is the best guide to standards of social conduct. People are or can be guided by their private reason if properly educated (including shame and praise by parents).

*Mindful* rationality called as needed by adaptive unconscious; influenced by involuntary signals from amygdala and limbic system; capacity for rationality is under some genetic control.

7. *The Passions*

Emotionality disrupts reason and leads undisciplined people to perform anti-social acts. Fear of the passions is a major influence on policy.

Emotions are necessary parts of whole brain problem-solving process; consciousness of emotions is partial; genetic endowments include social emotions contributing to ethical norms; only partly under cognitive control.

8. *Autonomy*

Each person is the only authentic interpreter of her or his own interests. Group influences tend to violate integrity of individual autonomy.

Each person interprets her own interests in the context of socially defined identity and values; each evaluates her own interests and performances in social contexts.

9. *Morality*

Ethical reasoning refers only to one's own reason and conscience without reference to what others think or do. Defining morality is the exclusive province of philosophy.

Ethical reasoning relies largely on social references and is governed by norms; it is also guided by biologically given 'social affects.'

10. *Self-Interest*

People are guided almost exclusively by their self-interest although this may be modified by empathy or concern for others.

Self-favoring biases influence perceptions of deserts, achievements; fraternal group interests often dominate self-interests.

11. *Individualism*

Own goals take precedence over group goals except in the case of the family. The value of individuals takes precedence over the value of society. [cf. # 10 above] Little concern for nationalism and patriotism which are associated with romanticism.

Individualism *meets collectivism*. Self-interests are usually mixed with group emotional attachment. Patriotism is an extension of concern for group interest.

*12. Materialism*

People's primary interests are material; most other satisfactions are contingent on material welfare; most other motives (e.g. desire for power) serve material interests.

The dominance of material interests is a residue of an age of scarcity, reinforced by market norms; declining utility from material gain.

*13. Choice & Free Will*

Under the aegis of 'freedom' choice is given intrinsic moral value regardless of choosers' capacities or the outcomes of choices. Satisfying choices experienced as free will is source of greatest pleasure.

Choice has no intrinsic value but many benefits (including sense of personal control) and costs (e.g., anxiety), each of which must be individually evaluated. Unexplained choice is called 'free will.'

Adam scrutinized the sheet first. "There may be something to it," he said in faint praise. "But I don't see anything that explains when, why, or how my imago knows to switch from the default adaptive unconscious to that precious gift in all imagoes, its, apparently recessive, mindful rationality."

"We are never so purely rational as we think we are," said Dessie, butting in. "But you are right: the Table does not explain when the default mode calls on one part of the brain rather than another. A full-blown account of human nature, available only in some feast of spinach pie on the shores of eternity, would do just that. Don't forget that Imago-21 is in the making day by day, with much knowledge not yet assimilated."

***An imago explains as well as describes thought and behavior.*** "The imago helps answer other, more general questions," said Charles, who knew Dessie's way of thinking and was proud of his own contribution. "Imagoes include much more than the lists of traits in Table 2.1, for, as concepts of human nature, they contain basic explanations of how these traits are formed (how much by nurturance, 'how the twig is bent' and how much by genetic inheritance). They account for the presence of feelings, such as anger and affection, as well as of thoughts, such as belief in the supernatural; they describe and explain how people (kin, friends, strangers) relate to each other and to authority (police and on-the-job bosses) – important for framing institutions. Increasingly they account for pathologies like antisocial personality and autism, giving handles on how to treat them. Increasingly, too, they include cross-cultural comparisons. For example, how do people define themselves and achieve the identities that are reference points for their behavior? If the people are Japanese they define and evaluate themselves by their relations with others; if American, by their sense of achievement.<sup>41</sup> Imagoes also take advantage of historical experiments: If moral behavior is sometimes a question of accepting responsibility in tough situations, how do people decide that 'It's up to me'? The record of rescuers of Jews in Nazi Germany gives evidence: a fundamentalist religion helps, as does being socially connected and having a general sense of responsibility for society including a relatively more egalitarian outlook."<sup>42</sup> But if you were to ask the rescuers why they took those risks, they could only tell you their indignation at the plight of the Jews and their feeling that they *should* do something." Charles took a deep breath and

added in polemical fashion, “You won’t find the answers in Locke’s associational psychology or Condillac’s theory of sensations, but you will find beginning answers in the BNR.”

“It is all so hopeless,” said Hypatia in despair. “You portray human nature as governed by unconscious forces yet somehow possessed of a rational capacity that is as much of a servant as a master of these unconscious forces. Since you seem to be in charge of this process of creation, why not create man in your own image, as a rational decision maker with a will of his own?” In her despair, poor Hypatia had lapsed into the sexist biblical habit of using ‘man’ for “humankind.”

“We are only servants of the BNR,” said Dessie modestly, “but you are partially right; we do interpret its implications,” he added less modestly. But I see you would like some hint of how a person, on her own, might escape what you think of as the determinism of genetics and social induction. Remember,” he continued, “how your former colleague Ellen Langer pleaded for more *mindful* behavior on the grounds that mindlessness could be overcome.”<sup>43</sup> Well, Langer, like other psychologists wrestling with this problem of how people might bring themselves under conscious control in a willful fashion,<sup>44</sup> suggests a solution: Try mindfully watching your own behavior and see if you can identify your own mindlessness and mindfully correct it.”

***Collapsing the centuries.*** Brightening up, Hypatia said, “But I want more than a separate peace with the BNR. I am also interested in your war of the imagoes. I agree that you have set the stage for a good drama,” she said in lighter tones. “In this imaginary spinach pie world, you are creating a duel between two great mythical characters: the *Traditional Imago* and the *Twenty First Century Imago*.<sup>45</sup> Two antagonists may be good drama but you leap over the 19<sup>th</sup> century as though John Stuart Mill, Carlyle, and Marx did not exist and you slight the late unlamented 20<sup>th</sup> century as though we had not been influenced by, say, Maynard Keynes, John Rawls and Sigmund Freud – before we rejected his dramatic conflicts of id and superego, Eros and Thanatos.”

“Please, dear Hypatia, for the sake of ease of reference, allow a brutal empiricist this abbreviated version of an intellectual history that you cherish. For American democracy, at least, Jefferson and Madison, Locke, Montesquieu, and Hume were the carriers of the imago employed in drafting the constitution. The imago used in conceiving of the rule of law is somewhat, but not greatly, different, and, while Adam Smith’s propensities have been embellished by Keynes and others, the 18<sup>th</sup> century version will do as a summary statement. So, please, dear friends, understand *Imago-18* as meaning the ideas of human nature of the 18<sup>th</sup> plus 19<sup>th</sup> plus 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. It means *traditional* imagoes. Because imago-21 is so different from all its predecessors, the contrast swallows the details.”

***Is mindful rationality only Imago-18 in disguise?*** Adam smiled at what he thought was a devious device by his antagonists. “I suppose it is appropriate here at Clark’s for you to eat your pie and have it, too,” he said. “But shouldn’t you acknowledge that in providing a mindful backup for your adaptive unconscious, you have slyly rehabilitated the 18<sup>th</sup> century model as part of your 21<sup>st</sup> century imago?”

Charles was indignant. “Mindful rationality, being part of the Age of Science, is aware of the role of the unconscious; it mindfully transcends it. The Age of Reason never even heard of the unconscious. Ask Locke. Ask Hume.”

Adam broke the silence, smiling with all his testosterone at Hypatia. “I am drawn to Imago-18’s autonomy,” he said, pleasing Hypatia. But he added, to Hypatia’s distress, “and also its understanding of self-interest. This noble pair of ideas, autonomy and self-interest, holds that one’s autonomy is quite unspoiled by consideration of other people’s utilities.” Already, there was a division within the camp of the partisans of Imago-18.

Both philosophy and economics have high stakes in this contest, for the BNR challenges both of their ways of knowing, but they are by no means comfortable forming a united front. Nevertheless, from Dessie’s and Charles’s point of view, this division of the opposition was balanced by a countervailing psychological strength.

***How the desire for control inhibits acceptance of Imago-21.*** “You know, of course,” said Charles to his two opponents, “that there is a deep, atavistic, evolutionarily ingrained, resistance to the idea of loss of conscious control. However adaptive the Adaptive Unconscious might be, as long as it remains unconscious it will seem to be a loss of control. The desire to control one’s fate is universal, shared with other species, and probably inborn.<sup>46</sup> That desire is so great that people imagine they are controlling events even when that is clearly an illusion.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, believing in one’s own effectiveness is associated, perversely, with successful efforts to change painful situations. In fact, people’s *unreasonable* expectations about their powers and chances are actually beneficial to them.<sup>48</sup> The illusion is rewarded. Under these circumstances, it is not Imago-21 but Imago-18 that will prevail because the latter feeds that illusion. Dessie, our situation is even worse than that of our friends teaching evolution to creationists because the resistance to Imago-21 has biological roots.” Charles’ mournful voice trailed off into the recesses of the Pleistocene period.

Hypatia wanted to savor this concession that Imago-18, although an illusion, was good for you, but she had something else on her mind.

### **The Social Roots of Dominant Imagoes**

“Can we turn our mindful rationalities to the question of where these interpretations of human nature that you call ‘imagoes’ come from?” asked Hypatia. “I know you have forbidden introspection, but have you also banned Rawls’ ‘reflective equilibrium’<sup>49</sup> or reflection in general? Any reflective persons, but especially philosophers [with a smile of modesty not unbecoming to this dark lady], who are practiced in the art of reflection, will use what they know about themselves in their interpretations of human nature.”

With the gentleness of a tutor to a favored but errant pupil, Dessie said: “Dear Hypatia, of course, reflective skills *are* important but they are certainly not enough. At the very least, they must be supplemented by observational skills. But we all know that we see what we are prepared to see, that is, more ponderously, what our theories say is ‘relevant’. As Francis Bacon said, we confirm our prejudices.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, we favor ourselves because of our ever-present self-serving biases, what Timothy Wilson felicitously calls our *psychological immune system*.<sup>51</sup> In short, imagoes based mainly on

self-observation are most misleading. The fact is that individual imagoes are *social* products as much as are culturally shared imagoes.<sup>52</sup> The average person can no more invent a theory of the way the mind works than can she invent a theory of the way the cosmos works. It is a fundamental error to rely on individualist explanations of shared ideas.”

Charles naturally wanted to dig deeper. “Our imagoes cannot be extensions of self-knowledge,” he said, “because, as we said last time, the self has little knowledge of its own thinking and emotional *processes*. Thinking occurs in various parts of the brain, but the center of our higher mental functions is the *neocortex*, just behind the forehead with its roughly 100 trillion connections. But consciousness of what the neocortex and other regions are doing is rarely available to us. What *are* available are the thought *products* of these processes. As we know from the images of the active brain caught by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), there are many routes to a conscious thought, some of them emotionally colored by a trip through the *amygdala*, the traffic controller for emotions arising chiefly in the limbic system. Here, it looks like this,” said Charles, drawing a rough map of these portions of the brain on a napkin.

“Do you mean that when I make a mistake in logic I can’t detect it?” asked Adam, fascinated by Charles’ explanation.

“Rule-based knowledge is a little different,” said Charles, “because that part of the brain that knows the rules can monitor the outputs that apply them. But much that is something else masquerades as logic: as Justice Homes once said, ‘the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.’”<sup>53</sup>

“You didn’t answer my earlier question,” said Hypatia. “If imagoes do not emerge from philosophical reflection and/or unaided observation and cannot tap introspection for their accounts of human nature, where do these imagoes come from?”

***Two fallible sources of imagoes.*** “How do cultures shape ideas about personality? Oh, Hypatia, what a question!” exclaimed Dessie in dismay. “But,” he continued, “tough questions are often the best ones. Last week we saw that in analyzing whether Jill would make a good counselor, the student analysts resorted to cultural stereotypes of the sources of behavior. But where do the cultural stereotypes come from? Let me cite just two of the many ways people acquire these culturally given imagoes. One is inference from the reward system of the culture: people tend to do (and then generalize about) what they think will be rewarded: the contingent reward system of Locke and Skinner.<sup>54</sup> But, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, commercial behavior may be stimulated by religious incentives, social or affiliative incentives, or pecuniary incentives.<sup>55</sup> Interpretations of human nature based on a particular incentive system are misleading: all three of Polanyi’s cases reflect human nature. When an incentive system becomes dominant, people will pretend to be motivated by those dominant incentives because of their desire to conform, as has been found to be the case with the materialist motives attributed to Americans.<sup>56</sup>

“If inferring motives from prevailing social incentives is one way to create an imago, the imitation of models of behavior presented by the media is another. For example, our imagoes shifted to track the change from “Heroes of Production to Heroes of Consumption,”<sup>57</sup> a shift showing how the ‘approval motive’ undermines the autonomy assumptions of Imago-18. Moreover, that approval motive is bountifully reinforced in the United States where conformists are truly happier than nonconformists.”<sup>58</sup>

‘I am as you desire me,’<sup>59</sup> said Adam, quoting Erich Fromm to express his contempt for conformism.

### **Imagoes Shape Institutions as Well as Responses to Institutions**

“But haven’t you reversed the proper order of things?” asked Hypatia in a more conciliatory mood. “Most scholars have been concerned with the way institutions shape or misshape human nature;<sup>60</sup> now you want to talk about how concepts of human nature shape institutions.”

“Do you get vertigo as you ride on the cusp of the wave of the future?” asked Dessie with more hubris than yet warranted. “Vertigo will inhibit perception of the true nature of circumstances and dispositions. As we shall see, the true nature is that each affects the other: while institutions influence responses and train capacities – as where discretion at work fosters the value of independence,<sup>61</sup> capacities and preferences for certain dispositions, that is, imagoes, affect the way an institutions works – as where the desire for rule-bounded environments make bureaucracies work bureaucratically.”<sup>62</sup>

“Supposing,” said Adam, “we all accept that somewhere in our inscrutable brains each of us harbors a little imago homunculus informing us of our concepts of human nature – both what it is and what it ought to be. God bless the little fellow. But then out there in the real world are these institutions of democracies, courts, and markets serving the real needs of real people. I am not sure how my little imago-fellow makes any difference.”

“He leads you to think that you are responding to economic appeals when it is the good opinion of your colleagues and family that moves you. If you actually do what your little imago-fellow tells you to do, you won’t be happy,” said Dessie. “And from a social point of view, you and others like you will promote institutions catering to these mistaken economic appeals.” But Adam’s ‘So what?’ question hung in the air the way cigarette smoke used to fill Clark’s down home atmosphere.

Charles to the rescue: “We are going to give you plenty of examples of how democracies fail to fulfill their purposes because they are working with outmoded concepts of human nature,” he said. “If you are lucky, Adam, we will refresh your memory on how markets have failed to maximize utility.<sup>63</sup> If the two of you cannot wait to know in detail how you have been wrong all these years, just say so.”

Silence.

Hypatia broke the silence. “If the Age of Reason liberated humankind three hundred years ago, but is now a source of error and a creates a poor fit between individuals and their institutions, why haven’t we adapted to or corrected these misfits?”

***Correcting the institution-imago misfit.*** “The poor fit creates a kind of *Imago-Environment Inefficiency* because institutions require responses that people cannot readily provide, and people have expectations that the institutions are not capable of satisfying,”<sup>64</sup> said Dessie, recapitulating his theory. “Neither institutions nor imagoes are subject to sufficient self-corrective forces. The Adaptive Unconscious should do it by adapting our human responses to the demands of the institutions; that is its job, a conservative one. But it is constrained by the misleading pressures of institutions. And

mindful rationality should do it by analyzing the problem of maladaptation and adjusting the institutions to something closer to real human nature. That is what Charles and I are trying to do, but, well, you can see the intransigence of vested intellectual interests.” He paused in an uncharacteristic moment of doubt, adding: “But our job is perversely difficult because social theory as we know it is framed in the language of an out-of-date imago of autonomy, rationality, and consciousness.”

“One thing at a time,” said Charles sadly. “Take the critical case of the ordinary man confronted by the maze of choices that Imago-18 says should be the glory of a civilization. But given that the individual released into this bewildering maze is not the rational, autonomous, conscious being the 18<sup>th</sup> century said she is, but rather the more limited person relying on her adaptive unconscious, can we accept the rationale for *laissez faire*?”

### **The Common Man in a Maze of Choices**

“‘In the West,’” said Dessie quoting Peter Gay, “‘the Enlightenment mainly sought ways of teaching people to take affairs into their own hands.’”<sup>65</sup> ‘Let them make their own way,’ said the philosophers: ‘*laissez faire*.’ If you want to free people from onerous authorities in a world made up mostly of peasants and artisans, that policy makes sense. Looking within themselves (in good Cartesian fashion) relatively well-off, even aristocratic, philosophers and philosophes experienced what we now call ‘personal control,’<sup>66</sup> and, having no way to know how peasants and artisans experienced themselves, assumed the world populated with people like themselves. If you freeze these views in a constitution and an ideology, then, when the world changes and knowledge of human nature develops accordingly, you have the makings of an obsolete imago, informing institutions that misinterpret their clients.”

“Ridiculous,” said Adam, in his candid style. “*Laissez faire* is the term invented by French physiocrats for an economic theory stating that market solutions work best.”

“The physiocrats were part of the Enlightenment which has appropriately been called *The Age of Reason*,” said Dessie. “Not only did it launch the idea that people could govern their own activities by the use of their own endowed Reason, but established this priority of Reason by a simple verbal device: they just assigned the ‘interests’ priority over the ‘passions.’”<sup>67</sup> We now know, however, that it is not possible for Reason, or the neocortex, to process stimuli without intrusion by the amygdala.<sup>68</sup> And even if that were possible, such an unemotional process would be generally undesirable<sup>69</sup> because, as my namesake said, ‘what [is] created [is] a kind of marble statue of a man, devoid of sense and any sort of human feeling.’”<sup>70</sup>

***Theodicy of Liberalism.*** “Whatever may be the correct image of man you finally decide upon,” said Hypatia, suddenly possessed of an insight into the religious nature of the imagoes, “the institutions you claim are undermined by their false versions of human nature actually depend for their justification on misreading Adaptive Unconscious as Mindful Rationality, on transforming what you say are unconscious decisions into conscious, mindful decisions.” Her brown eyes suddenly seemed to be back-lighting by synaptic sparks from within. “The religious justification for evil, *theodicy*, depends on

shifting the blame for evil from God to humans, on the grounds that humans have free will. They, not God, choose evil. I am struck by the close parallel of theodicy with the justifications of markets and democracies and the law for what goes wrong in their respective domains. What goes wrong, they claim, is not the institution's fault but rather the fault of their users or clients: in democracies, citizens fail to pay attention to the issues at stake; in markets, consumers do not read the labels and do not plan their purchases of consumer durables; in the law, ignorance may be the cause of a transgressions but it is not an adequate legal excuse. All these reflect a more general fault: mistaking the adaptive unconscious for mindful rationality. These institutions rely for their legitimacy on free will guided by mindful rationality, the essence of the Age of Reason."

"That is simply brilliant, my dear Hypatia," said Charles in tones of despondent admiration. "I have always thought that reverence for freedom and choice were the way democracies evaded responsibility for their shortcomings but I had never before thought of it as the Liberal's theodicy."

"Never mind the brilliance," said Hypatia, returning to the question of *laissez faire* that Charles thought best illustrated the misfit problem. "Can an ordinary person make it through today's maze of choices? Theseus, a male, had the help of Ariadne, a woman, to guide him out of the labyrinth. Who is our Ariadne to guide us today?"

"Good bye Ariadne," exclaimed Dessie fondly to a startled Hypatia. "See you next week."

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## PART TWO: KNOWING THE SELF

### Chapter Three

#### DOES FAILED SELF-KNOWLEDGE MAKE US MISFITS?

*Dessie's and Charles' arguments that introspection leads to distorted knowledge of the self aroused Adam's irritation because, if people do not know their preferences they cannot order these preferences in a rational manner. And it leads to Hypatia's downright anger because it challenges both Plato's prescription for the foundations of wisdom and the Enlightenment's use of introspection as a basis for its models of humankind. So the spinach pie-eaters try to figure out what self-knowledge is good for. They divide the task into self-knowledge's contributions to virtue, competence, and happiness. Virtue comes off best, but self-conscious kindness is less admirable than unconscious kindness. On the other hand, self-knowledge is a kind of protection against sociopathy which relies on self-ignorance. Competence is increased by distorted self-knowledge leading to self-esteem but not by veridical self-knowledge nor, when one fails, heightened consciousness of one's own contribution to that failure. Happiness is rarely a product of self-knowledge and especially not of an exhaustive review of one's own behavior and character.*

*Knowledge of one's own emotions is inhibited by the lack of connection between most emotional processes and the seats of consciousness. Nevertheless, Western individualism is more conducive to emotional self-knowledge than is Eastern collectivism. Because ethical impulses are located in the emotional part of the brain, the grounds for ethical decisions are frequently not conscious.*

*Again the spinach pie eaters end their session with speculation on whether this general lack of self-knowledge impairs the working of those great choice institutions, markets and democracies.*

\* \* \* \* \*

“Why, if we have spent 50,000 years in Northern latitudes, should we still have Seasonal Affective Disorders when the sun is a little shy over the winter months?” asked Adam.

“Because we spent two to five million years basking in the sun of the savanna,” said Hypatia settling into her usual place facing as much of the sun as ever shone on the West side of Whitney Avenue. “Don't be in a hurry.”

“What happened to our autonomy? I mean, this makes us more like flowers than beasts,” said Adam, glancing at the door just as Dessie came huffing and puffing into the familiar red leatherette setting.

“Autonomy, ha!” said Dessie, catching the one word he could always distinguish through the chaotic noises of Clark's at lunchtime. “We are a heteronymous species from way back. Ask any chimp or gorilla.”

“You mean you are about to order spinach pie more because of your responsiveness to collective taste than to your own?” asked Adam, raising the level of species a notch.

“Surely, on the matter of taste, we know ourselves better than we know others,” said Hypatia, trailing clouds of autonomy from some previous intellectual home.

### **Know Thyself to Improve Thy Life?**

Dessie’s face brightened as though exposed to another hour of sunlight. “‘Know ourselves,’ ‘Know Thyself!’ What a fortunate turn of phrase!” he exclaimed. “Dear old Plato made such a thing of it and so many other philosophers have considered it to be the very source of wisdom. But you know,” he said almost confidentially, “we can’t know ourselves very well.” He paused as he considered the paradox: “Knowing that we do not know ourselves very well is the essence of wisdom.”

“Be reasonable,” said Hypatia, appealing to reason when Dessie and Charles seemed to be depreciating its value. “A person looks at the outer world and sees trees and fields or, more likely, billboards and blank walls. She looks inside and certainly knows whether she is for or against abortion, the war in Iraq or Vietnam or wherever we happen to be fighting, whether she is angry or sad, whether she would like to be a real philosopher or pursue some ersatz behavioral version of philosophy, and whether she likes spinach pie or, of all things, pizza. These inside things are as clear to her as the trees and billboards.” Imago-18 had made its statement. “Otherwise” she added, “you populate the world with zombies, the walking dead.”

***Consciousness of Self.*** “Walking dead,” repeated Charles. “We all know that evolution does not work through conscious processes and that the outcome is a life better adapted to its environment – at least for the lucky ones. *Sapiens* herself is the product of this unconscious process. In the beginning, consciousness seems to have emerged to help keep track of the body in the environment, something necessary when locomotion took place:<sup>71</sup> ‘Don’t bump into things!’ But consciousness also had a social function, which contributed to overall fitness for social animals as a protection against giving offense to others: ‘Don’t bump into people.’<sup>72</sup> Then, the last to develop, consciousness of self emerged, the foundation of self-knowledge. But it is only a foundation, for, as I said last week, introspection is a very unreliable form of knowledge. It is unreliable because many of our emotions do not register in the hippocampus, the seat of working memory, and even our thinking processes are hidden from self-observation. To interpret our actions, we rely on our general beliefs about how people behave, rather than any private information we may have.”

“That makes it sound as though we had a choice,” said Dessie, “as though with a little more will power we could penetrate that ‘veil of ignorance.’ Actually, from conception a person is endowed with cells destined to be autonomic nerve cells as well as gray and white brain matter that will guide the person she becomes throughout life. But she will never be conscious of most of these instructions because they are written in a language not available to consciousness: these tissues do this and those tissues do that. Beyond that, there is what LeDoux calls the *synaptic self*, the self lodged in the brain not

available to consciousness.<sup>73</sup> Churchland speaks of the self as a ‘squadron of capacities flying in loose formation.’<sup>74</sup> Those capacities include many of which we are totally unconscious. For example, in refuting Locke’s *Blank Slate*, Steven Pinker suggests the nature of these inherited traits, including: ‘An intuitive psychology, used to understand others by imputing to them a mind with beliefs and desires... Language, the gift of sharing ideas from the mental database with others... [and] Self-serving biases that deceive people into thinking they are freer, wiser and more honest than they are.’<sup>75</sup> Like emotions, these capacities are used in conscious thought but are not themselves conscious. If our consciousness is much smaller than our capacities, self-knowledge is bound to be limited.”

Hypatia wanted to enter this bibliographic contest. “Don’t forget that Freud’s great American contemporary, William James, reported on many consciousnesses: ‘Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it,’ he said, ‘is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the flimsiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different.’”<sup>76</sup>

“Count me as a friend of the brain,” said Adam, extending his friendship across boundaries of which he was unaware, “but I want more of an introduction than the map you gave us last week.”

With knowledge of the terrain ahead, Dessie said, “You’ll have to wait a few weeks, Adam, before you and your new friend get to know each other.”

“Why not start now with your usual question: ‘What does knowing ourselves do for us?’” asked Adam. “*Functionalism!* Isn’t that your trademark approach to the study of ideas?”

“Adam, you are smarter than your mentors,” said Charles, managing to convert a compliment into a subtle dig. “We could take certain criteria for human well-being and de-development as a basis for this functionalism and ask: (1) What knowledge about myself would make me a better, even more *virtuous* person? (2) What would make me a more *effective* person? And (3) What would make me a *happier* person?”

***Does self-knowledge promote virtue?*** “I want to protest the use of ‘virtue’ as a stand-in for a ‘better’ person,” said Dessie. “People can be better by being more understanding, more humane, more conscientious, and so forth. We’ll get to that later, but for now consider the effect on virtue of one kind of self-knowledge, ‘objective self-awareness,’ a condition produced by placing people in a room full of mirrors or listening to their own voices on tape. Reminded of themselves in these ways, people tend ‘to find shortcomings within [themselves]... Discrepancies between aspiration and attainment [are] negative in general across virtually all people and all traits.’ Self-awareness is, indeed, ‘an aversive condition’.”<sup>77</sup> Nevertheless, that very self-awareness makes people more honest, firms up their convictions, and helps them to resist counter-attitudinal persuasion.<sup>78</sup> It stiffens the backbone and brings a person’s behavior into harmony with her attitudes.<sup>79</sup> What might be called the *Versailles effect* (after the Versailles Hall of Mirrors) turns out to be good for virtue while being bad for happiness.”

“In spite of Plato and Spinoza,” said Hypatia, now in her element, “the only way that virtue and happiness can be related is ‘by supposing that Nature is dependent on a powerful, benevolent, and moral being, who arranges that in the long run virtue shall be rewarded by the appropriate amount of happiness.’”<sup>80</sup> But that is not our problem. Our

problem is that, whether the stimulus is a mirror or a troubled conscience (yes, conscience), self-knowledge is necessary for virtue. After all, it is *intention* and not consequences that characterize virtue, and intention, I think, implies consciousness.<sup>81</sup> I am not ready to say that, because of genetic programming, a bird that warns its fellows of a predator, even at risk to itself, is virtuous.” She thought for a minute, “But is a mother virtuous who, because of oxytocin in her blood stream, takes risks to save her child? I see the problem. We can say that if self-knowledge leads to virtue it is desirable, but not that altruistic acts are virtuous if performed unconsciously under the influence of hormones.”

“I think,” said Charles, hesitantly, “that I will vote for unconscious decency, for reflexive kindness, or, as the humanistic (if Freudian) psychiatrist, John Flugel recommended: ‘conversion from moral inhibition to spontaneous “goodness.”’<sup>82</sup> That is what the adaptive unconscious might provide; it does not require insight into the self.”

“If self-knowledge is not necessary for your ethical version of the ‘better person’ and if this virtue has a better vehicle in the adaptive unconscious, and if it has negative utility,” said Adam, “I don’t see much need for this vaunted self-knowledge, though Dessie threatens a more formidable attack under the heading of self-understanding.”

***Does self-knowledge promote effectiveness?*** “One way to get at this matter of effectiveness,” said Charles, “is to ask this fundamental question: ‘Am I the origin of events in my life or only a pawn in the game I am forced to play?’<sup>83</sup> Those people who believe they are origins, people who believe in their ‘internal locus of control,’ may be mistaken about their capacity to change their lives but they are more enterprising, more resilient in defeat, have better senses of humor (especially about themselves), and are generally happier.<sup>84</sup> Does self-knowledge help a person to believe that she is the origin or cause of what happens to her in life?”

“The Versailles effect,” said Adam, using Dessie’s term for objective self-awareness produced by mirrors, “reminds people of their shortcomings and the discrepancies between their aspirations and their attainments. Self-knowledge of that kind can hardly reassure people that they are effective.” He paused for reconnaissance. “Think of this in reverse: Are effective people more likely to reflect on their inner lives? Well, if you can imagine such a thing as a ‘normal Harvard boy,’ a long-term study of such people finds that they are ‘poor at self-reflection... good at tasks, careful to follow the rules, and willing to accept all aspects of the system.’<sup>85</sup> Bertrand Russell, who was not at all careful to follow the rules and rejected many aspects of the system, advises a similar course: ‘passions and interests [should be] directed outward, not inward... avoid dwelling inward.’<sup>86</sup>

“Although, of course I believe that people are better off knowing themselves and taking responsibility for their own acts,” said Hypatia with lingering Platonism, “I worry about the relative failures of this world. If they look within and discover hidden strengths, that’s fine, but many people who ‘fail’ tend to have a sense that *they* and not their circumstances are responsible for their lack of success, a tendency more prevalent in the United States than in Europe.<sup>87</sup> Thus, poverty in the United States carries a stigma when it does not in India, under much worse circumstances.<sup>88</sup> African-Americans who partially ‘blame the system,’ are psychologically better off than their peers who blame themselves.<sup>89</sup> Taking responsibility for one’s own acts is usually healthy, but taking responsibility for one’s circumstances may be both inaccurate and unhealthy.”

“‘Creative Self-Deception,’ rather than veridical self-knowledge, seems to be the prescription of therapists<sup>90</sup> as well as what research finds is the outcome of self-searching these days,”<sup>91</sup> said Dessie, sorry about the loss of truth but not surprised at the use of ideas to serve purposes other than pursuit of truth. “Of course, *true* self-knowledge has some benefits: people with a more accurate picture of themselves are (1) less depressed;<sup>92</sup> (2) less aggressive;<sup>93</sup> and, as you might expect, (3) less conflicted.”<sup>94</sup> Self-knowledge also buffers the effects of painful, stressful events,<sup>95</sup> eases the pain of failure,<sup>96</sup> helps a person resist manipulation, say, by a salesman for Enron stock,<sup>97</sup> and gives her a sense of really being someone.<sup>98</sup> But these positive effects seem to be incidental. Here, for example, is the conclusion of a candid appraisal of people’s efforts to know themselves:

Instead of accurate self-views, most people possess overly positive self-views. This occurs, in large part, because people do not characteristically seek accurate information about themselves; they preferentially seek and accept as valid positive information. Finally, we believe that under many circumstances these tendencies are assets, not liabilities... Many searches for self-knowledge are in fact searches for positive feedback.<sup>99</sup>

If I want to be a more effective person, I cook the data in my search for my elusive self.”

Although Charles’ scientific spirit was offended by this deceptive trait in his fellow searches, he was pleased to have the truth about the deception exposed. And it chimed with what he knew about ‘self-consciousness.’ “In one study,” he said, “self-consciousness was considered a form of anxiety that made for poorer performances,<sup>100</sup> and in another study, self-conscious people were found to ‘choke under pressure.’<sup>101</sup> Of course, self-consciousness<sup>102</sup> and self-knowledge<sup>103</sup> are different, but attempting the second might well lead to the first.”

Adam was keeping track of the functional questions. “We come to the holy grail of the knights of the quality of life, happiness,” he said with a slight scorn for the hedonism that had taken the place of materialism in all this high-minded research.

***Does self-knowledge make people happy?*** “You’ve already tipped your hand on this ‘functional’ inquiry with your findings on the Versailles effect,” said Hypatia. “But you’re a little late with your smoke and mirrors. With nothing but his introspection and unaided observation to help him, Jeremy Bentham preceded you by a hundred and seventy-five years: ‘by interest,’ he said, “[man] is... diverted from any close examination into the springs by which his own conduct is determined. From such knowledge he has not, in any ordinary shape, anything to gain – he finds not in it any source of enjoyment; rather mortification.”<sup>104</sup> And of course Freud told us that the reason for resistance in therapy was that each person’s unconscious was a snake pit.”

“I have always thought it was kinder to beat a dead horse than a live one,” said Dessie in one of his lighter moods, “but I can’t help adding the findings of some imaginative scholars who discovered positive joy in self-forgetfulness. They call that joy the ‘flow experience’ of which oblivion to everything but the game or task at hand is an essential part.”<sup>105</sup> He paused in seeming embarrassment, adding: “And here we are in this Greek pizzeria talking about the self while, I think, quite forgetful of ourselves. Is spinach pie a tolerated narcotic, like the lotus flower on an earlier *Odyssey*?”

“Your mention of the joys of self-forgetfulness reminds me of a philosophical treatment of the same problem,” said Hypatia finding a link between research and philosophy. “Jean Paul Sartre claimed that happiness could never be attained because our *consciousness of consciousness* separated us from the actual world in which we are living and induced a perpetual pursuit of phantoms.”<sup>106</sup> Hypatia looked at the raised eyebrows of her empirical friends and hurried on. “Sartre also said that consciousness of death would inhibit happy thoughts and worldly enjoyment, but from what you have said about old people being more contented than young people with their lives, perhaps Sartre was wrong about that, too.”<sup>107</sup> Sartre was not Hypatia’s favorite philosopher, so she accepted that empirical work could modify philosophical ‘truths’ of that woolly French kind.

Adam was happy for he never liked Sartre, or Plato either, for that matter, and intuitively believed that all this attention to the self was a distraction from the real problems of relieving poverty and satisfying customers. “So,” he summarized with barely concealed smugness, “accurate self-knowledge is rare and hard to achieve. Which is fortunate because it is seldom a contribution to virtue (which is more blessed when unconsciously performed); it does not generally make people more effective or sure of their own competence; and it certainly doesn’t make them happy. I know that Dessie has reservations about what he calls ‘self-understanding’ and I have reservations on how self-conscious people have to be about their preferences to order them properly, but the main message is that self-knowledge, at least as it is practiced, is not all that great.” Adam smiled on his friends and on the world in general.

### Consciousness of the Emotions

When Hypatia saw a form of her beloved consciousness airily dismissed as useless, she was distressed. “But consciousness is what makes us human,” she said, tenuously hanging on to the familiar philosophical writings offering support for the idea that consciousness was the most significant characteristic separating humans from their nearest animal relatives.<sup>108</sup> “I do not like this focus on the self, but I cherish the idea that we can understand ourselves. If it isn’t selfish, the self is the most precious thing we have, an essential instrument for everything we do. It would be criminal to toss self-knowledge out the back door as so much waste material.”

“That may be true, Hypatia,” said Charles gently, “but remember that when the adaptive unconscious is in charge, the self is still deeply involved – but not the *conscious* self. Try to extend your concept of what you cherish to the unconscious; that way you will embrace your subliminal emotions as well as your conscious thoughts. For you 18<sup>th</sup> century consciousness-lovers, I would ask that you give credit to a whole host of feelings important to survival and social intercourse that do not make it to consciousness.<sup>109</sup> May I call this consciousness of emotions, *Consciousness I*?”

“Good,” said Dessie, “but don’t forget that there is a vast limbo of thought that is barely available to consciousness. People are likely to accept that not all their feelings are accessible, but resist the idea that their thoughts are often out of reach of the conscious mind. I doubt if we will get to it today, but I want to put on the agenda *Consciousness II*, the conscious awareness of our thought processes, the groundings of our opinions, the real *reasons* for our decisions. And while I’m at it, may I add my own preferred form of

consciousness, *Consciousness III*, the synthesis of these two forms of consciousness in genuine self-understanding?”

***Consciousness I: Access to emotions.*** “Your body can experience fear, anger, lust, and other primary emotions” continued Charles, “but if the signals do not reach the hippocampus or other agents of working memory associated with consciousness<sup>110</sup> you will not be able to name what you are feeling. The physiological reports on this disconnection<sup>111</sup> were anticipated by William James’ observations that we know how we feel by seeing what we do: ‘I must have been afraid, I ran away.’ The neocortex learns from observing behavior what was inscrutable to consciousness when it was registered only in the amygdala. Having an emotion and being conscious of that emotion are different, with consciousness, if it occurs at all, following only *after* the physiology of an emotion does its work elsewhere in the brain.<sup>112</sup> This is pretty strong proof that the emotion is not willed, but rather ‘has a mind of its own.’”

“Cross-cultural studies of emotions tend to emphasize the similarity of incidence and expression of emotions in different countries,”<sup>113</sup> Dessie added, as though looking down from the heavens on human foibles. “Although attitudes toward pain and pleasure do vary cross-culturally, as do tolerances of emotionality,<sup>114</sup> the main variation both within and between cultures is what we were just talking about, the degree to which the emotions register in consciousness. Across cultures, Asian collectivist cultures reveal greater difficulty in gaining access to authentic moods. In the extreme case, the Minangkabau of the Papua New Guinea do exactly what William James said people might do: they see how they behave to find out how they feel. In general, the Asian groups’ focus on relationships seems to have been characterized by a lack of awareness of their own feelings.<sup>115</sup> This makes sense because inner life in collectivist societies is less salient than in individualist societies. For example, among Japanese students self-esteem is less crucial to self-concept than among American students<sup>116</sup> and emotional ambivalence has less influence on sense of well-being of Chinese students than on American students.<sup>117</sup>

“It is my impression that consciousness of one’s emotions is far less important than being able to regulate them,” said Hypatia from some deep intuition (fortified by Tuesday reading of *Science Times* in *The New York Times*). “Some impulsive people, for example, gamblers, may know their emotional weakness but not be able to control their impulses.”

Charles looked at Hypatia with admiration. “Right,” he said warmly, “the standard therapeutic injunction to ‘keep in touch with your own emotions’ should read ‘Regulate your own emotions.’ If you like drama you can think of this problem of control as a contest between impulsivity, perhaps fueled by gene MAOA (known to influence impulsive aggression through modifying the flow of serotonin), and a behavioral inhibitory system (BIS), probably located in the dorsal anterior cingulate in the prefrontal cortex.<sup>118</sup> People live in a kind of tension between the expression of their emotions and trying to control these emotions. Learning control, greatly facilitated by college education, is part of the process of maturation.<sup>119</sup> The ethical and other emotions are lodged together in one part of the brain but the control of these emotions, often the essence of ethics, is lodged in a very different part of the brain. If you are seeking an

explanation of uninhibited aggression in modern cities, notice that stress reduces the power of the inhibitory system.”<sup>120</sup>

“Doesn’t self-knowledge of these two contesting forces fighting it out in the arena of the brain help to regulate the outcome?” asked Hypatia.

“Good,” said Charles again. “Self-knowledge permits us to compensate for a poor inhibitory system; anticipating his weakness in the presence of sirens, Ulysses bound himself to the mast. So, the gambler may tie himself to any convenient family mast. Distracting oneself is also a favored prescription. As every novelist knows, judgment and emotionality are indissolubly linked, the novelist calling the BIS by its literary name, ‘conscience.’”

“The good, the true, and the beautiful,” said Hypatia as though telling her beads. “Lack of self-knowledge, at least of one’s emotions, seems not to inhibit pursuit of the beautiful, to impair the pursuit of the true, but what about ethics, the pursuit of the good?”

***Ethics and emotional self-knowledge.*** “Knowledge and ignorance of one’s own emotions have unanticipated effects,” said Charles, trying to sort out of the various kinds of evidence. “One of these effects is ethical. Because the brain’s ethical center is stored with the other emotions,<sup>121</sup> ethical emotions (empathy, kindness) and other emotions (sorrow, anger) have common responses to various stimuli as well as common antecedents.<sup>122</sup> Awareness of other organisms is a predecessor to ethical impulses. It is linked, primarily through vision, with the limbic system’s emotional storehouse.<sup>123</sup> But perhaps the most graphic way to show the link between ethical behavior and emotional self knowledge is through the studies of sociopathic or ‘anti-social,’ personalities who are not sensitive to ethical questions and who also register as low scorers on emotionality tests. Their pathology extends beyond insensitivity to ethical questions to insensitivity to all emotions. Sociopathy is a genuinely physical condition and not just a failure of conscience. Sociopaths have lower stress responses, lower skin conductance, lower startle reflexes, lower responses to emotional words, and distinctive brain waves (EEGs).<sup>124</sup> In contrast, a sensitive conscience, if you want to use that word, is associated with knowledge and regulation of one’s own emotions.”<sup>125</sup>

“I find this fascinating, said Hypatia, caught up in the physiology of moral behavior. “In my favorite century, what we then called ‘the passions’ were universally feared. Now you say unless a person is sensitive to her emotions, she will not be sensitive to ethical questions, she will be a sociopath. But you are also saying that the regulation of these emotions by the cortex (the seat of what we used to call ‘the interests’ and now call rationality), is necessary to keep the passions, sorry, I mean the emotions, in check, that is, actually serving your longer term interests. But *you* (whoever ‘you’ are) don’t need to be conscious of your emotions if your anterior cingulate is on the job; she will do it for you. This drama could be played out without your knowing it. And that is why you said a little while ago that I should value my unconscious self as much as, or as part of, the self I do value.” She laughed out loud. “My, how the *Id* has changed! What fun!” she said without designating what it was that gave her such pleasure.

More soberly, Hypatia continued: “I take your point, Charles, that self-knowledge is not just a matter of deciding to look inward; there is a physiology behind all this that points to varying *capacities* for self-knowledge. Plato, with his belief in stratified

inherited differences, would accept that formulation – but the Enlightenment would not.” Again, Hypatia’s calling as a philosopher emerged, not so much from her knowledge of philosophy as how she was able to accept these points *philosophically*.

“I would prefer not to be too closely embraced by Plato,” said Charles, “and I used sociopaths only as an illustration; there are many other common ailments that have the same kind of self-blinding effects: Asperger’s syndrome, attention deficit / hyperactivity disorder, social and other types of clinical anxiety, and so forth.” He smiled at Hypatia. “Perhaps you will agree that maleness is a disease of this kind, for women read facial expressions more easily than men – with the exception of anger, which men recognize more quickly than women.”<sup>126</sup>

***Self-knowledge and adapting to ill-fitting institutions.*** Charles now gave the discussion a clear direction: “Our problem is to try to understand why the traditional imago of human nature that informs our institutions has not worked as well as it should: why democracies, the law, and markets have not led to better, happier people and a better quality of life. Now if people understood themselves well, we might expect that they would either adapt themselves to their institutions or take steps to change their institutions. That hasn’t happened. Why?” That last *why?* sounded like the mournful note of a ship lost at sea.

The Coast Guard was ready. “Charles, my friend,” said Dessie, “you have given us one conclusive reason: We can’t. Another persuasive reason is that the adaptive unconscious has a lot of wisdom that protects us from the foolish things we might do if we let mindful rationality take over. I am not arguing for mindlessness, but only for caution in replacing the unconscious with the conscious mind. The conscious, and to participants rational, protection of religious beliefs in the Middle East is a disaster. But what could be more important in a rational person’s preference ordering than her relationship to God?”

Dessie had not finished but Adam couldn’t wait. “Rationality is not supposed to be the route to a belief in the supernatural,” he said. “Anyway, it is the emotional goals the Middle Easterners pursue, not how they think about them, that creates the trouble. But I want to make another point about Charles’ puzzlement over why people do not either adapt to the institutions they have or, if that is too painful, change them. That is: Why do people remain misfits? Consider this: Ants are perfectly fitted to their institutions and environment, and I doubt if it could be said that they know themselves in any sense you would accept. Is it pure species-centrism for me to prefer our poor fit to ants’ perfect fit? Or should I consult the ant philosophers on this matter?”

“You would have to learn some rather intricate ant dances first,” said Charles, in his somber manner. “But you are on the right track: evolution is the story of how perfect fits became misfits when circumstances changed. But I think civilization may reverse that sequence and provide opportunities for misfits to change their circumstances to accommodate their own peculiarities. By identifying the problem of fit, the BNR is the misfits’ tool for the redress of grievances.”

“Fellow misfits,” said Adam thinking of the misfits in Huxley’s *Brave New World* who chose life on an unconditioned island of independent thinkers, “see you next week.”

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## Chapter Four

### STRANGERS TO OURSELVES<sup>127</sup>

*The four verbally over-endowed friends first review the familiar Jill case taken up in Chapter 1, showing that the reasoning behind the decision to give (not to give) Jill a job is largely specious. They then turn to the implications of that case for court opinions where the reasoning for a decision is part of the law as well as the grounds for future law. If the judges are no better informed on the grounds of their own decisions than were Jill's judges, then the magnificent edifice of the common law is in fact a structure of rationalizations, of reasons that are not causes. Acknowledgment by lawyers of Imago-21 would threaten to reveal this inconvenient truth.*

*Perhaps to avoid confronting their friends in the Law School with this heresy, the four turn to the related question of what standing to give to the values that are said to guide people's opinions. Charles says that values emerge from the pain-pleasure calculations that have influenced evolution, but, he adds, values are adopted when it is more economical to learn from experience and imitation than to develop genetically endowed behavioral tropisms to deal with a particular problem. Adam wonders if evolution is not itself a way of creating misfits as a necessary step toward changing circumstances that are not fruitful for the species. But Hypatia, of course, finds that values lose their ethical content if they are "merely" adaptive mechanisms.*

*After a disturbing excursion into the genetic basis of spirituality, Dessie is allowed to express his view that values are merely the codified expression of social norms and have little to do with principles derived from ethical thinking. He cites research showing that values are mostly truisms, shallow evaluative statements without reasoned support.*

*Abandoning this wintry view of life, Dessie shows the hopeful side of Imago-21 by pointing to how concepts of ego-development imply a kind of self-knowledge not known to Consciousness I (knowledge of one's own emotions) or Consciousness II (knowledge of one's own reasoning processes). By linking this personality development concept to the classical concept embraced by "Know thyself," Dessie finally makes Hypatia happy.*

\* \* \* \* \*

When they were seated, Hypatia tossed her hair back from her dark eyes and launched into something that had been bothering her all week. "I have been thinking about what Dessie and Charles said about self-knowledge last week," she said with some emotion. "Dessie, do you believe that you are a stranger to yourself? Here you are a fairly successful professor in a fairly decent place. Can it be that you do not know who you are or what you want or why you want it or what values inform your choices or whether you are currently depressed and if you are, why, and if you're not, why not? Dessie, my friend you are vanishing as a person before our very eyes." It was clear that Hypatia did not want Dessie to vanish, even though he was such a confounded heretic.

"Thank you," said Dessie, muttering something about his too, too solid flesh. "But I can't say I know myself very well, for the causes and reasons we went over last time: introspection is both painful and inaccurate because it is inevitably biased."

“Shame!” said Hypatia. “There must be no flinching in this endeavor.” She thought of the parable of the tree of knowledge. “Men are cowards. Will I be cast out of this little Eden [she looked around at the red plastic booths and the Coca Cola clock with ironic appreciation] if I say that we must all eat of this forbidden fruit of self-knowledge to have a healthy diet?”

### **Does our reason understand our reasoning?**

Everyone laughed at Hypatia’s new persona as Eve. As was appropriate for the first man, Adam picked up the challenge. “The funny thing about that dispiriting, indigestible spinach pie last time is that we concluded that, because it was so hard to know one’s emotional life – what we called *Consciousness I* – consciousness was a general flop. We didn’t know ourselves and were not in a position mindfully to adapt to our institutions. If we adapt unconsciously, as, to some extent, we evidently do,<sup>128</sup> we lose our sense of control. But we mentioned only in passing the problem of knowing our own thoughts or reasoning processes, which are far more important. I’ll grant you that I am on rather distant terms with my amygdala and limbic system, but my neocortex and I are on good terms and speak to each other rather frequently. So, since you like to give things names, could we address *Consciousness II*, our consciousness of our reasoning processes, and restore some health to this poor old battered *sapiens* you have so abused?” At last Adam thought he was on home ground and Hypatia, too, fresh from the Age of Reason, sighed in relief.

***Consciousness II: the grounds for our decisions.*** “The first heresy is this,” Dessie said rather abruptly, “we know the products of our reasoning much better than the processes. That is because we have little access to our reasoning processes, which, like the emotions, are also largely unconscious. I don’t mean just that we take rationalizations to be reasons derived from evidence and inference, rather than preferences seeking evidential support. Conclusions first, evidence later! I mean that instead of consulting private values and information, we consult what we think others in our position would do; we are more likely to rely on our understanding of the norms of our society to explain our own actions than on any private knowledge of our own mental processes. In our very first session this year, I told you the story of how a group evaluating ‘Jill’ could be shown to be largely mistaken about the grounds on which they decided Jill’s case. They relied more on social norms and irrelevant considerations than on information about the case in their possession.<sup>129</sup>

“I think the day has passed when ‘other-directed thinking’ and conformity were standard social science doctrine,” said Hypatia, hearing echoes of the 1960s.

But Dessie was not relying on that strand of thought. “As I said in the first session,” he added, “the experimenters in Jill’s case found that there was almost no correlation between what evaluators thought had influenced their decisions and the factors that actually were linked with their decisions. For example, they thought that Jill’s car accident had enlisted their sympathy, but it had not. They thought that the prospect of meeting Jill later in the term was irrelevant but actually it was closely related to a favorable decision.”<sup>130</sup>

“How does that say anything about reference to common norms instead of inner processes?” asked Adam, alert to any unwarranted inferences.

“When the 34 observers, who had not actually evaluated Jill, reported what they thought would have influenced the evaluators’ decisions, their reports were nearly identical with the mistaken reports of the evaluators,” Dessie patiently explained. “What was going on? The purpose of the study was: ‘(1) to show that people’s verbal explanations of their mental processes are often mistaken, and (2) that these mistaken verbal explanations are derived from widely shared intuitive theories’.<sup>131</sup> The fact that the observers’ report on what would likely influence any evaluator was nearly identical to the evaluators’ reports on what they thought they were doing supports the notion that the evaluators were not, in fact, looking inward toward their own mental processes but were looking outward to what social norms and general cultural expectations would suggest. As the psychologists monitoring this study put it, the outcome provides ‘powerful support for the hypothesis that people’s ideas about how their minds work stem not from private insights but from public knowledge,’<sup>132</sup> that is, from the norms of the society.”

“OK, so they did have a test for reference to norms instead of their own mental processes,” Adam said but then went deeper into the general plausibility of the account: “At every exam period, you evaluate your students. Are you saying that you could not tell why this one got an ‘A’ and that one got a ‘C’?” He thought for a moment and went on: “Actually, whether you could explain why isn’t so important as the fact that when several members of the faculty grade a paper their grades correlate in the very high numbers.”

“We know those things about ourselves which have objective criteria,” said Dessie. “When Jill was evaluated on intelligence, the correlation between emphasis on her intelligence as a qualifying characteristic and claims to have weighed high academic standing in the total evaluation were nearly perfect. But when judging more ambiguous things like ‘flexibility,’ ‘likeability,’ and ‘sympathy,’ our mental processes are opaque to ourselves and we use social norms, instead. As the authors of the account of this study explain: ‘Whether or not people actually think a thought or do a deed will have little bearing on the correctness of their explanations for why they did so.... *All people ever do when they explain their own thoughts and deeds is to ransack intuitive theories of what makes people tick that are widely shared within a culture* (stereotypes are one kind of intuitive theory).... We have merely absorbed popular psychological lore so completely that we do not realize that we are relying on it.’”<sup>133</sup> Dessie looked around with a little more satisfaction than was warranted by his simply reporting the results of an experiment. “Might I add,” he said, “that these young women in the experiment were drawing on the very images we have been talking about.”

“You are putting a lot of weight on one small study of a bunch of undergraduates who could not explain why they either recommended or did not recommend ‘Jill’ for a sensitive job,” said Hypatia seeing her role as a reflective philosopher somehow diminished. She had always tried to shield her philosopher cortex from contamination by Edward Wilson’s corrosive view, now painfully recalled as: ‘The hypothalamic-limbic complex automatically denies [pure] logical reduction... In this way the philosopher’s own emotional control centers are wiser than his solipsist consciousness.’<sup>134</sup> For just a moment she asked herself whether what seemed to her an authentic voice of reason was really the voice of a ventriloquist deep in the hippocampus. But, if not her own reason, who or what was questioning the source of that voice?

She emerged from this meditation with a start. “If people cannot give the grounds for their decisions, what are we to make of judicial decisions whose persuasiveness depends on the cogency of the reasons given?” she asked.

***Explaining the grounds of decisions: example of judicial reasoning.*** “The branches of law are different,” said Dessie, a little pompously, “so let’s take constitutional law, where old fashioned Aristotelian logic (inclusion and exclusion) is enlisted along with the kind of reasoning revealed in British ordinary language argument (‘What do we mean when we say “race”?’). Here, as elsewhere, judges and justices are human and therefore vulnerable to the retrospective errors revealed by the students explaining how they decided whether Jill qualified for a sensitive job. But they are also specialists in a justifying their decisions. That specialization might mean that they have learned to go from evidence to conclusion (Jill has this and this but not that qualifications which make her capable (not capable) to handle the job) rather than from conclusion (sympathy for Jill because she spilled her coffee, desire to please Jill because the ‘judge’ would meet her later) to a search for grounds to justify that conclusion (her likeability, capacity for empathy, good judgment). The reasoning in a justice’s opinion, used by lawyers to interpret the law, tells us nothing about the mental processes involved in reaching the conclusion.”

Adam interrupted: “The strange, personal mental processes used to reach a conclusion are irrelevant,” he said, firmly. “The holding *is* the law and the rationalizations, if you insist, *are* the grounds for the holding. Private mental processes should not concern lawyers.”

“Say, Jill is black and, *mutatis mutandis*, it is an affirmative action case. The written grounds have to do with the meaning of the law. Do you still say that the unwritten and unacknowledged sympathy for Jill or desire to please Jill are irrelevant?”

Charles, as *amicus*, entered the case with a different slant. “The salutary research on rational choice in economics<sup>135</sup> gives us some reasons to believe that, like economic decision makers, justices go from what they would like to be the law to evidence for their preferred version of the law. One of these reasons is the inevitable intrusion of messages from the amygdala in the most antiseptic cortical reasoning process – and the amygdala is a source of emotional preferences. Textbook logic does not enlist such limbic preferences, but judicial reasoning does. Another reason is the very meaning of rationality in normal everyday use: first decide the goal (the preferred holding) and then decide on how to get there (support from precedent, constitutional history, statute, and so forth). Will you argue, Adam, that justices are not rational?”

“I find this frightening,” said bold, fearless Adam. “The majestic objectivity of the law is disappearing in a cloud of personal, unacknowledged imagoes held by justices but which are never open to judicial notice. That is not what Benjamin Cardozo or Roscoe Pound<sup>136</sup> described as the judicial process. Handed down from precedent to precedent in an adaptive process, the Law cannot be filtered through these imagoes that you say intervene in the process without having been detected by the thousands of legal scholars who review each case in fine detail.” Adam paused long enough to curl his lip in scorn: “And your evidence is that 128 college sophomores couldn’t figure out why they wanted or didn’t want Jill to be a crisis manager.” Adam’s indignation was monumental.

Charles thought of Ibsen's *Enemy of the People* in which a resident says to the doctor: "You say that in the tannery waters above the bathing there are these tiny little animals that only you can see in this so-called microscope and you expect us to believe that?" But Hypatia headed him off. Jurisprudence is close to philosophy, so Hypatia was fascinated by this little smattering of jurisprudence (that yet managed to make consequential reasoning sound like prejudice of the case). She understood that the theory of judicial reasoning was a heritage of an earlier tradition (Lord Coke was actually 17<sup>th</sup> century and the common law was much older), but she was uncertain how reinterpreting the law to conform to Imago-21 would help prevent the human misfits that so concerned her friends. She saw the problem: How to fit the cognitive-emotional complexities of real people into the framework of a Law that assumed that they were simple rational creatures. In the firm grip of Imago-18, the law schools had not seen the need for that work. Well, let it go; she had a different axe to grind.

"I have been wondering," she said gently, "how these barely conscious people inhabiting Imago-21 acquire the values that guide their lives. These values have names, like 'honor,' and 'devotion to God,' and 'justice.' If you dissolve these things in your acid bath, you will make a wasteland of our lives. In his *Ethics*, Aristotle suggests a self-conscious way to acquire desired traits: conceive of a model of an ideal citizen and adopt those traits that best fit that model. That makes sense to me, but no doubt you have your own, less teleological, ways."

### **Whence the values that guide our lives?**

"It is an evolutionary process," said Charles at the same time that Dessie said, "It is a group process." They looked at each other in amusement and Dessie, more or less graciously, said, "biology takes precedence."

***Values as Contributions to Overall Fitness.*** "The origins of values lie in the evolutionary process," Charles said flatly. "Whereas I would like to look at the beginnings of the process, I think Hypatia might look at the end by saying that values are crucial for each of us to fulfill her telos, that is, to fulfill herself." Here he gave a little bow to Hypatia, partly to acknowledge her lovely but formidable presence and partly to acknowledge his own acquaintance with Greek philosophy. "Some of my colleagues think that values emerge as elaborations of our simple pain-pleasure calculus: what yields pleasure is a positive value and what yields pain is negative.<sup>137</sup> If you think this is simplistic, remember that there are some very sophisticated modern treatments of value that reflect this basic hedonic function.<sup>138</sup> But the more interesting question is why, over the course of evolution, we should have evolved values from that simple hedonic calculus. One tentative answer is that the adoption of a value will be adaptive 'when it is advantageous for an organism *not* to learn by experience in its environment (on its own, so to speak), but to learn [something] by copying mom, dad, or another member of its species.'<sup>139</sup> That something is copied only if it is valued. More generally, others say: 'The adaptive significance of values, at least originally, was that they produced fitness enhancing behavior in variable (novel?) environments, without the need of specifying a particular behavioral response for each environmental state.'<sup>140</sup> Biologically, values are efficient;

they can guide behavior without the elaborate processes of genetic instruction, especially in complex, changing societies. Values provide short-cuts in the learning process.”

**Darwinian ethics.** “So that’s Darwinian ethics,” said Hypatia, angrily. “If, say, integrity, compassion, and intellectual courage favor inclusive fitness, and thus, in your terms, are ‘efficient’, they will be selected; if deceit, brutality, and intellectual cowardice are more adaptive, then *they* will be selected. That may be Darwinian theory but it is certainly not ethics.” Her eyes were energized by dark matter that seemed to capture everything in their orbit.

“Hold on,” said Charles overcoming the tremor in his voice, “there is a relationship between what I have just said and ethics, but you won’t like that, either. One idea is that there is a kind of chain: from (1) *biological affects* such as fear, anger, and surprise, to (2) such *higher level emotions* as pride, shame, moral indignation, which, in turn, are said to have physiological links to (3) *values*, such as piety and materialism. These original biological affects are genetically endowed, passed on from generation to generation.<sup>141</sup> But notice that the higher level emotions, although based on the biologically given affects, ‘respond to challenges in the social and terrestrial environments, and ... therefore *exist relative to events outside the organism*, including ‘events in memory and imagination.’<sup>142</sup> With universally endowed biological origins, cultural variations emerge with different values allowing for different degrees of human-institutional fit.”

“So misfits occur when culture deviates from what evolution gave us?” asked Adam, wondering whether misfit might be the name for a creature more ethical than, say, hominids of the Pleistocene period, fresh from their African journey.

“Well,” continued Charles “there is likely to be some undiagnosed strain if we disregard our biological heritage but, if we know what we are doing (that is, if we have BNR consciousness) we can cope with that strain. What we cannot avoid is the fact that ‘those values and ethics that effectively served our ancestors, whose genes we carry ... remain in some fashion encoded in our cognitive and behavioral apparatus.’<sup>143</sup> So, if the values hominids once adopted to maximize their fitness have links to these biological emotions, those links are encoded in modern humans. In some interesting research on the heritability of attitudes, it has been found that efforts to change inherited attitudes produce symptoms of stress not present when the same efforts are made with non-inherited attitudes.”<sup>144</sup>

“I refuse to be trapped by biological or any other history,” said Hypatia, shaking the bars of her cage.

**A possible genetic base for piety?** Adam went back to Charles’ earlier hint that some values have genetic bases. “Were you saying that piety, so variable over history, has a genetic basis?” he asked, incredulously.

“Well, not in the form of religious doctrine, Buddhism, Protestantism, and so forth, but apparently in the general form of a tendency toward spirituality. One body of research has found that people with one variant of the gene VMAT2 ‘tend to be more spiritual; and those with another, less so’.<sup>145</sup> The argument is that a predisposition to spirituality may have had such evolutionary advantages as tempering aggression or encouraging reflection on purposes derived from animal instincts. Other evidence

suggests that ‘personal devotion is under strong genetic control,’ but type of religion, e.g., religious conservatism, is not.”<sup>146</sup> Charles, for all his sobriety, was chuckling to himself over the emotional revolution he knew he was creating among his friends, even Dessie, the least pious of the group.

“We are strangers to ourselves because even in the most sacred of our decisions we are partially the puppets of our manipulating genes,” said Hypatia, reviewing this assault on the autonomy of thought in religion, philosophy’s next-door neighbor. “So,” she said, “medieval piety was caused not so much by the dominance of the Christian Church as the dominance of the God gene.”<sup>147</sup> The sarcasm grew more biting: “Funny how this genetic control weakens in the most modern countries.”

Charles was no longer chuckling to himself. “My dear Hypatia,” he said in his usual sober, courteous manner, “you know as well as I do that all causal explanations in social science are conjunctive, that is, they rely on plural causation which permits one variable (say, a cultural one) to assume major causal role at one time and another variable (say, a genetic one) at another time. And I think you know the rule about modernity and evolution: modernity, with its increasingly complex culture and cognitive requirements, weakens, although it does not stifle, the force of evolution.”<sup>148</sup> In a burst of unaccustomed eloquence, the psychobiologist Ross Buck reminds us that ‘the biological affects constitute voices of the genes that are always present at some level in human experience, if usually at an unnoticed whisper.’”<sup>149</sup>

Adam, tired of subjectivity, saw a way to divert attention away from the Charles-Dessie campaign for the prevalence of self-ignorance: “Are you saying that because evolution has lost its directive capacity in modern times, that these two great forces, Modernity and Evolution, may be at war with each other?” he asked without revealing his strategy. “Or that Modernity is a sport or aberration in the evolutionary process? Or, to be more precise, that the triumph of science and its epistemology, of command over nature, of secularism, of urban living, of ethnic tolerance and cosmopolitanism, of enough trust to warrant market economies – that all these things are uncongenial to the forces of evolution? So the survival and flowering of the advanced societies has nothing to do with the survival of the fittest?” He laughed but he failed to realize that Hypatia would see his ironic version of the Evolution-Modernity conflict as creating an opportunity to escape from the constraints of both forces.

***Values are not inferences from experience or deductions from higher principles but are absorbed from social norms.*** Charles had given genes their appropriate time in this little court. Now it was Dessie’s turn to present his case on the power of social norms again. “There is some evidence that people’s values are acquired in the same way that their self-knowledge is acquired,” he said. “They pick them up from their society without really understanding their implications.”<sup>150</sup> And, for the most part, their attitudes are not inferences from overarching values, but rather, as one piece of research puts it: “These findings demonstrate conditioning of attitudes without awareness of their antecedents.”<sup>151</sup> Perhaps this is one reason why behavior is so loosely related to attitudes, and attitudes so loosely related to values.<sup>152</sup> These points on social induction are quite contrary to philosophers’ assumptions that people’s values are logically derived from reasoned premises and guide their judgments and behavior.”<sup>153</sup>

Adam thought he might venture again into this strange world of quasi-philosophy. “Look,” he said, “I agree with Hypatia. Assume that all sensible people have certain principles and values that mean a lot to them. Since we have not yet abolished logic (have we?) why not let them deduce from their values what their moral and prudential beliefs must be and use those deductions as the basis of their self-knowledge?” If that was philosophy, he decided he could play and that he rather enjoyed the game.

Dessie brought a chill to that enjoyment. “Do your sensible friends actually know their principles and values? If values are the cognitive representations of emotions,<sup>154</sup> people’s values will often be rationalizations of unknown or even disavowed emotions – as in the case of the bullies who really believe that *they*, themselves, are victimized and are only pursuing the respected value of self-defense.<sup>155</sup> They do not derive their values from reasoned principles. It is true that most people can answer questions about their values without much hesitation – and these values are fairly stable,<sup>156</sup> at least until they are challenged.<sup>157</sup> But the reason they are stable is not individual commitments but because their values are grounded in social norms. Changing these norms is like turning around an aircraft carrier: call it friction or inertia or whatever you like – it is slow. That,” he said in an aside, “is why the humanist values that actually yield more happiness than money do not quickly overcome materialism.”

Materialism was a distraction from the main issue of the source of values, but Adam saw how he could use it. “The persistence of materialist values is explained by people’s preference for material things,” he said, returning to his earlier argument with Dessie.<sup>158</sup> “That is not only an example of a perfect fit between the values we have inherited from evolution and our adaptive institutions that cater to these values, but it suggests the real source of values in *preferences*.”

“Oh Adam, what you learned over the course of last year’s spinach pie session you unlearned over the summer in your association with your colleagues. Like other members of academic disciplines, you are a perfect example of the group-embeddedness of ideas. But, old boy, please note that misfits are most likely to occur when people are mistaken about the outcomes of their values.<sup>159</sup> We now know that materialism has a low yield in utility; it does not make people happy.<sup>160</sup> Why don’t people recognize that? In an illuminating study of the cognitive grounding of people’s values Gregory Maio and James Olson ‘tested the general hypothesis that values are cultural truisms – that is, beliefs that are widely shared and rarely questioned.’ When the experimenters challenged respondents’ values, ‘It was ... found that analyzing one’s reasons for particular values caused the values to change, a finding that would be expected if individuals lack cognitive support for their values.’<sup>161</sup> More support for my social induction theory of values. Few people have ever questioned their materialist values which have been inherited with much else from Imago-18.”<sup>162</sup>

“I think you are coming around to the classical view that contemplative self-examination has its intended purpose: value clarification,” said Hypatia, who didn’t at all like Dessie’s casual discounting of Platonic and Aristotelian views but was beginning to believe that spinach pie sessions in Greek restaurants were the modern answer.

“If a person’s values are integral to her personality, as some of your philosopher friends allege,”<sup>163</sup> said Dessie, agreeing with philosophers only to disagree, “then we have found another reason why people do not know themselves. They do not know themselves partly because their values are shallow and rooted in their adherence to

norms. They are conformists. In any event, to discover that one's values are internally inconsistent is important only if one puts a high value on consistency, which is, itself, a value that comes only with education.<sup>164</sup> In one experiment, of those subjects whose inconsistent values were challenged, only those with higher education perceived the inconsistency and valued consistency enough to modify their value statements."<sup>165</sup>

"That's because your experimenters focused on *logical* consistency rather than affective or emotional consistency," said Charles, who used his cognitive powers to study emotions as well as cognition. "Had they looked at their subjects' *affective* consistency,<sup>166</sup> their tendencies to cluster together in one bundle the events and people they liked and in another their disliked events and people, you would have found everyone concerned with consistency. Call it *limbic logic* if you like. Try telling someone that her best friend has body odor or that her enemy has a winning smile and see how quick they are to respond to affective inconsistency." He looked at Hypatia: "Does philosophical reflection increase limbic logic?" he asked as though he expected Hypatia to know the answer.

Adam thought for a moment and yielded to his tendency to tidy things up. "So the sources of our values are not so much inferences from principles as (1) the instructions of our genes, (2) social norms, (3) our preferences, and (4) consistency, logical consistency for the educated and affective consistency for everybody." Secretly, Dessie wished that Adam were on his side.

Hypatia offered a less congenial summary: "You have stripped humans of their capacity to govern themselves," she said. "They are ignorant of themselves and of why they do what they do; they act but cannot justify their acts; their reasoning is ad hoc; their values mere truisms. I do not insist upon immortal souls, but do insist upon the basic stuff of humanity. You have overdone it, for the very lack of consciousness and self-knowledge that prevents people from understanding their reasoning and their values will prevent them from understanding each other, dissolving the group basis that you use to attack individualism while undermining the very purposes for which we gather together." Seldom had Hypatia been more electrified, her hair charged with static electricity, a powerful release of norepinephrine bubbling in her system.

There was an awkward pause in the dialogue as Hypatia's friends digested her indignation.

### **Consciousness III: Self-Understanding**

"My solidarity with all spinach pie eaters everywhere, but especially this one, is intact and my purpose, namely to contribute to human development, is firm," said Dessie, calling on the best of his mindful rationality. "Although there are many ways to support human development, as every kindergarten teacher knows, I have no doubt that self-understanding, the next step beyond self-knowledge, helps. Because self-understanding goes beyond one's understanding of one's emotions (*Consciousness I*) and beyond understanding of one's thinking processes (*Consciousness II*) let us call self-understanding *Consciousness III*. Referring to a measure of 'ego-development,' I find that self-understanding has much in common with the higher stages of that ego development, which is actually characterized as a level of self-understanding 'whose

chief characteristics are complex thought processes, awareness and acceptance of internal conflicts, a combination of independence and interdependence, and consciously seeking self-development and the fulfillment of one's potentials.”<sup>167</sup> Dessie paused and, knowing that Hypatia would immediately measure herself along that dimension, added, “That’s a direction of development rather more than a stage of achievement.”<sup>168</sup>

***Consciousness III is both a modern and a classical ideal.*** But Hypatia was not thinking of herself. “The language of the BNR is different but its thrust is the same as the classical injunction to Know Thyself and the more recent perfectibility theme of the Enlightenment,” she said, glad to be in harmony with her friends but strangely regretting the loss of controversy. Of course, it was Consciousness III (C-III) that captured her enthusiasm, but she could not quarrel with the earlier consciousnesses. “After all,” she said, “each represented a victory against an opposing internal force. C-I was really a variation of the familiar injunction to keep in touch with one’s deepest feelings – if one accepted the idea that values were cognitive representations of emotions<sup>169</sup> and had to overcome the equally familiar (from Bentham to Freud) fear of what one might find in one’s ‘deeper self.’ C-I also involved the tricky problem of different labels for identical physiological phenomena such as dopamine flow. C-II, Consciousness of thinking processes, was what I thought was a common possession of humankind, anyway. Both had to overcome the pathologies of self-consciousness, too much focus on the self. And C-III, the higher stages of ego-development was itself a triumph over the forces of conformity and convention that kept most people at lower stages. No conflict of imagoes here. Perhaps,” she added wistfully, “by making conscious the identities that people use but rarely define, we would add some resistance to the shaping and misshaping of our natures by the institutions we create and then worship.” She glanced at the Coca Cola clock in some alarm. “See you next week,” she said reluctant to leave her friends at this moment of precarious intellectual agreement.

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## PART THREE: AUTONOMY & CHOICE

*The problem of just who is thinking and feeling and deciding when, as Imago-21 claims, people are responding to genetic prompts and group cues and pressures, haunts many of the sessions of this discussion. It is a problem with roots in the concept of individualism that emerged long before the Enlightenment but came to articulate fruition with Enlightenment thinkers. But individualism is only understood in contrast to its alternatives, variously called gemeinschaft, communitarianism, and collectivism. Hence, in Chapter Five the conflict between Imago-18 and Imago-21 engages those alternative patterns and visions of society.*

*(Chapters Six and Seven address the issues of “Thinking for Oneself” and the ambiguous benefits of choice without guidance by free will. Can Imago-21 inform these partly philosophical and partly empirical issues?)*

### Chapter Five

#### INDIVIDUALIST OR COLLECTIVIST IMAGOS?

*Hypatia’s quandary is the liberal Western quandary: she wants to keep the autonomy of individualism and the idea of individual development but she does not like the implied selfishness and she rather prefers collectivism’s priority of the good-of-all over the good of the individual. But the conformity of collectivism is a problem. Dessie, Charles, and even Adam try to show her that you cannot say I’ll take a little of this and a little of that without damaging the coherence of the two patterns. One reason, they say, is that each has its own epistemology, which Adam attributes to their roots in ways of earning a living, and Dessie to their historical family patterns.*

*But Charles gives Hypatia comfort in pointing out the evolutionary endowments of both individualism and collectivism. The syncretic adaptation of collectivist Asia to the demands of market capitalism suggest one way of mixing the two patterns but this bit of history implies the inevitable triumph of individualism with its implied lower concern for the good-of-all.*

*If that meant the end of human development, none of the spinach pie-eaters would be happy, but Charles argues that most measures of human development show collectivist Asian samples quite as “developed” as individualist Western samples. Dessie ends the discussion on a hopeful note: when the supply of two rival goods changes, the increasingly abundant good becomes relatively less attractive. Thus, as the supply of individualist goods increases, preferences will shift toward such collectivist goods as community, close friendships, and shared welfare.*

\* \* \* \* \*

Sitting alone in the red booth, Hypatia was pondering the ‘I-We’ problem that devilled the conflict between traditional and 21<sup>st</sup> century imagos. She favored the individualism of 18<sup>th</sup> century but that doctrine implied too much ‘I’ and sounded too selfish or at least

self-focused than she would like.<sup>170</sup> When Charles came in the back door he surprised her with his question: “Do you think of yourself more as an individual or as a member of a group?”

Hypatia was torn but said politely, “I was more of an individual ten seconds ago but now I am more a member of a group.”

“As soon as individuals become members of a group they start to define themselves in opposition to other groups,” Charles replied, thinking of the research on the boys in *Robbers’ Cave* where the arbitrary assignment of individuals to ‘red’ and ‘blue’ groups immediately created color-coded group pride, rivalry, and conflict.”<sup>171</sup>

“Just because the group in the next booth is having pizza and we are having spinach pie, doesn’t mean that we are rivals,” said Hypatia, adding with a broad smile, “although I did notice that they are rather shabbily dressed. Do you like wooden beads?”

Dessie came in for the last line and caught the drift. “I have always suspected pizza-eaters of gluttony,” he said. “They order these enormous pies which no normal person could possibly finish. Do you suppose that it is the pizza that accounts for their loud, rough voices?”

Adam, the soup-eater, came in. “A plague on both your houses,” he said. “The crusts of neither pies or pizzas are as delicate and flaky as they once were. I am an individualist. Did you know that Herbert Hoover held that ‘selfish individualism’ had been ‘neutralized by equality of opportunity,’ and that in its place there had emerged an ‘individualism of service’?”<sup>172</sup>

“I was an individualist until you said that about Hoover,” said Hypatia.

### **Individualism & Collectivism: Where Imagoes Divide**

“Last week we found that Nature endowed collective behavior with affects and skills preparing people for group life, but that doesn’t mean that such individual behavior as competition and self-preference is not endowed, as well,” said Charles, in his despondent manner. “The interesting issue is how these two endowments are used by our institutions for the benefit (or not) of the species. How, in the West, do we enlist or stifle the collectivist endowment? And how, in Asia, which is predominantly collectivist, do they combine familism with, say, the rule of law and the impersonality of the market?”

“Do we know what we are talking about?” Adam asked with a kind of mock innocence. “Are we arguing about the meaning of individualism, Hypatia cherishing it because it implies the value of the individual person, and Dessie trashing it because it means selfishness?”

“Don’t be impatient,” said Dessie. “Of course we don’t know what we’re talking about. That’s why we are here: agreement on meanings comes from conversation, especially if assisted by spinach pie and coffee.” He was filled with good cheer for he was where he most wanted to be, doing what he most enjoyed doing. Without even clearing his throat, he went on: “Topographically, individualism is a giant mountain range, the glacial deposit of cultural history on which such features as autonomy and individuality are built. We cannot understand modern imagoes without understanding individualism. The anthropological approach says individualism is ‘a social pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals who ... are *primarily motivated by their own*

*preferences*, needs, rights, and the contracts they have established with others; [they] give priority to their *personal goals* over the goals of others.’<sup>173</sup> In contrast to this, a collectivist society is defined as ‘closely linked individuals who...are willing to give priority to the goals of [their] collectives over their own personal goals.’<sup>174</sup> The distinction is established by which goals have priority: mine or ours. The other tradition in individualism is philosophical and best rendered by a philosophical sociologist: ‘The individual is an end; society is a means... This idea has the logical status of a moral...axiom which is basic, ultimate, overriding, offering a general principle in moral argument.’<sup>175</sup> The distinction is a matter of whether the individual is the end which society serves, or society is the end which individuals serve. The anthropological definition I just mentioned makes this clear by defining collectivism as a culture where individuals serve social ends.” Dessie hesitated for a moment and plunged ahead: “And, dear friends, I must confess that Imago-21 shares some of this collectivist view in spite of the ‘moral axiom.’”

“And you are saying that imago-18 is based on the philosophical definition, that is, society serves the cause of individual benefits,” said Hypatia. “But in the anthropological version individual goals take precedence over social goals.” She made a face distorting her classic profile into an amusing caricature of itself. “But I think it is right for society to serve the cause of individual happiness and growth, whereas I don’t think it is right for individual goals to take precedence over collective goals.” She turned in mock anger on the source of her pain: “Dessie, how cruel can you be?”

“Here are the questions used by National Election Studies to define individualism in an individualistic society” said Dessie without remorse:

1. It is better to fit in with people around you. [or] It is better to conduct yourself according to your own standards even if that makes you stand out.
2. When raising children, it is more important: (1) to encourage them to be independent-minded and think for themselves, or (2) to teach them obedience and respect for authorities.
3. It is more important to be a cooperative person who works well with others. [or] It is more important to be a self-reliant person able to take care of oneself.<sup>176</sup>

So, Adam, you want meanings? Here are three, a cross-cultural one, a philosophical one, and one designed to differentiate more ‘individualistic’ people from less individualistic ones in an individualist society. The beauty of the last one is that it reveals connections with other islands in this archipelago: other-directedness,<sup>177</sup> authoritarianism,<sup>178</sup> internal locus of control,<sup>179</sup> and so forth.”

“At high tide, these islands tend to disappear,” said Adam. “I like the view but I am not in the real estate market for tidal islands just now.”

“Your feet aren’t even getting wet, you dope,” said Dessie, wishing he had remembered how metaphors were treated literally by economists. “The fact is that the individualism-collectivism construct tells us a lot, such as what cognitive styles are used in the two kinds of culture, what moral behavior to expect, what kinds of a friend a person is likely to be, and even something about politics.” Dessie almost said it was a *pregnant* construct, but feared what Adam might do with that metaphor.

***Alternatives to Individualism.*** “Before we even begin to choose between individualism and collectivism, we should consider some alternatives to individualism not embraced by the relatively benign collectivism of the advanced Asian countries,” said Hypatia, who was willing to have individualism judged the least bad, if not the best possible, of the human nature patterns considered. She knew that there were other ways of thinking about individualism<sup>180</sup> but she was eager to get on with its appraisal and, if possible, its certification by this little group of friends. “We have to think about varieties of collectivism that are far worse. The German-American philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, influenced by the rise of totalitarianism in Europe, held an imago that scares me: ‘It is the deep desire of the individual to be freed from the fetters of individuality,’ he said, ‘to lose its identity, to be absorbed in the whole of nature.’<sup>181</sup> The reason this sounds like Fascism is that it explicitly echoes a Fascist doctrine: ‘For the Fascist, everything is in the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State.’<sup>182</sup> And the Nazis ‘exulted over the conquest and subjugation of traditional humanism, whose orientation [Jaeger claimed] had been excessively ‘individualistic.’”<sup>183</sup> By contrast, individualism, even if it means that humans are exiled from their group homes, looks pretty good.”

Dessie agreed, but wanted to draw attention to something closer to home. “My good friends promoting communitarian solutions represent a more subtle seduction that is not so much a threat as a diversion,” he said. “They put their faith in small face-to-face communities without confronting the parochialism, ethnocentrism, bullying, and pettiness in, for example, *Middletown, Yankee City, Plainville, USA, Small Town in Mass Society, Village in the Vaucluse, Akenfield, and Tezpotlan*. In my opinion, small town communitarianism, perhaps best portrayed in the Lynds’ *Middletown*, needs a concentrated dose of cosmopolitanism from its nearest metropolis; in the case of Middletown from Chicago, of all places!”

### **The Roots of Individualism and Collectivism**

“You know,” said Adam. “Imago-21 seems to be arrested in Erikson’s adolescent stage of development, when wishing the world different is thought to be self-enacting – if you wish it, it will happen. Cultural traits like individualism don’t just happen: they have deep roots, roots which must be changed before the culture can be changed.” He thought for a minute and added: “Charles will think they have evolutionary roots; Dessie will think they have psychological roots,<sup>184</sup> and I happen to know that they have economic roots.”

***Evolutionary support for individualism and collectivism.*** “The division of labor is a source of prosperity,” said Charles, with a wry smile. “But since every kind of behavior, including learned behavior, must rest ultimately on some endowed capacity, we must expect both individualism and collectivism to have evolutionary roots. As I said last time, each of us is endowed with both individual and collective affects or emotions and these ‘affects fulfill individualistic (selfish) functions (arousal, approach-avoidance, agonistic) and pro-social (cooperative) functions... Selfish and cooperative functions are associated respectively with the right and left hemispheres.’<sup>185</sup> They constitute the physiological bases for higher level social affects, such as pride, affection, and pity, and what are called

'cognitive affects' such as curiosity, and even moral affects, such as guilt and shame.<sup>186</sup> Because these affects tend to be based on even more basic feelings of attachment, which some say derive, in turn, from lust<sup>187</sup> and, I would add, from parental feelings in mammals, one might say that it is the collectivist origins of the primates that give rise to our moral and kinder selves. For collectivist animals, like primates, individualism is, indeed, an unnatural way of living.<sup>188</sup> But it is certainly not an unnatural response, as the dominance drive among females as well as males suggests. Only human primates rationalize their dominance drives in terms of the public interest."

"Charles, my friend," said Hypatia, "'unnatural' is not a criticism. You, yourself, have said that Darwin could not stand the cruelty of the winnowing method of evolution."

"As I was saying," said Charles, for whom 'natural' *was* an endorsement, "among humans sometimes self-interest dominates and sometimes group-interest does."<sup>189</sup> After Tennyson's 'Nature red in tooth and claw,' the social instincts may be more surprising, but the ways for natural selection to favor members of groups that take care of each other are often obvious.<sup>190</sup> For example, kin selection for martyrs is the most familiar, but think of how birds warn their fellows of predators even if that warning cry draws the predator's attention to the warning whistle-blowers. Inherited capacities for communication are necessarily social."<sup>191</sup> Charles began to hint a smile. "The amusing thing to me is the natural selection among human observers: social scientists tend to find that group-interests dominate<sup>192</sup> while economists tend to find – well, they don't actually *find* – that self-interest dominates, but rather *assume* that that is the case."

Before Adam could protest, Dessie chimed in. "The inherited emotional capacities for both self-interest and group-interest are nicely illustrated by Pinker's review of the writings on the 'blank slate,' writings that we once read as fetuses in the womb as well as later in post-partum life. Among the self-interested motives, says Pinker, is: 'a drive for dominance and a willingness to use violence to attain goals.' Among the group-interested motives are: 'a moral sense, biased toward kin and friends,' and 'ethnocentrism and other forms of group-against-group hostility,'<sup>193</sup> illustrated a moment ago by the pizza versus spinach pie lineup in this very place. Among these possible orientations, history selects the one that is most congenial for the times. As Sir Henry Maine<sup>194</sup> said more than a hundred and forty years ago, the drift in modernity has been toward individualism."

***Perceptual and cognitive roots.*** Adam had been watching from the sidelines with an amused, detached air, expressing, with Puck: "Lord, what fools these mortals be." "Dear friends," he said, ominously, "you talk about *choosing* an orientation that is the product of centuries of economic and religious development. The orientations you have in mind, individualism and collectivism, are important because they organize a lot of related attitudes and beliefs, but for that very reason you can't just say 'a half a pound of collectivism, three oranges, and some toothpaste, please.' I agree we would all be better off if there were a market for these kinds of orientations, but, alas, there isn't."

"What a remarkably deep young man, this deep young man must be," said Dessie from the height of his ten-year seniority (and with the help of Gilbert and Sullivan). "Of course! Collectivism and individualism are ways of perceiving and explaining things as well as ways of relating to people and goals. In the West, we tend to see and analyze the object of our attention *in itself*: What is it? What does it do? For example, Aristotle saw the tendency of things to fall as reflecting the property of objects having *gravity*, and of

things to float as having *levity*. In contrast, in the collectivist East people tend to see things in *relation to their contexts*. They ‘saw the world as interpenetrating and continuous, their attempts to understand it caused them to be oriented toward the complexities of the perceptual or conceptual field taken as a whole.’<sup>195</sup> They are collectivists because *relational* harmony is so important to them.” Dessie could be excused for feeling a little “deep,” himself.

Charles, who tended to think that all *social* science was a little less “deep” than real science, nevertheless read things about perception that helped him with his work on the development of the optic nerve (in fruit flies but not roundworms). “What is so extraordinary is how in reporting murders American individualist reporters emphasized ‘the personal attributes of the murderers’ while the Chinese collectivist journalists emphasized situational factors.”<sup>196</sup> Those of you who know something about how people explain things will recognize what has been called ‘the fundamental attribution error’<sup>197</sup> in the American style, that is, explaining events by reference to personal dispositions rather than by the circumstances by which those persons were influenced.”

“Fascinating!” exclaimed Dessie. “Is the individualist at a disadvantage at this basic level of perception?” He paused to think it over and came up with a worried look. “I’m not so sure,” he said. “Other studies, in the individualist West, to be sure, show that people who focus on the target, the thing-in-itself, rather than the thing-in-context, can see the parts of any perceptual whole, and seeing the parts can see their respective properties, recombine them, use them flexibly. Moreover, those who focus on the thing-in-itself have a more ‘developed sense of separate identity – that is, they have an awareness of needs, feelings, attributes which they recognize as their own and which they identify as distinct from others.’<sup>198</sup> In these studies those who focus on the thing-in-context see only the gestalt, are unable to recombine the parts, and rely ‘on external sources for definition of [one’s own] attitudes, judgments, sentiments, and view of [oneself].’<sup>199</sup> So far, it seems that a person is, in this sense, either an individualist, who sees things-in-themselves, *or* a collectivist, who sees things-in-context. Both are valuable.”

“By discouraging diversity, do collectivist societies encourage a focus on contexts rather than a focus on target objects?” asked Hypatia, unfamiliar with the perceptual tests but no stranger to epistemology.

“Authoritarian governments clearly do,”<sup>200</sup> said Dessie. “But I suspect that any force that compels consensus, whether by authority or by convention, would do the same. For example, when the Herman Witkin group measured the effect of varied norms of ‘conformity to authority’ in two villages each in the Netherlands, Italy, and Mexico among 9-11 and 13-16 year olds they found that children in communities with less social conformity showed more differentiation in their thinking than children where there was more social conformity.”<sup>201</sup> He sighed. If the attractive interpersonal style of collectivism implied or entailed this unattractive cognitive style, conformity, how was a person to choose? Or *could* a person brought up to think one way choose to think in another way? Could a person unthink the Aristotelian heritage and think like Lǎo Tse, instead?<sup>202</sup> Western converts to Buddhism could tell him more about that. But – Ha! If these religious converts could choose, perhaps epistemologies *could* be chosen, after all. Adam broke that train of thought.

***Economic Roots of Individualism and Collectivism.*** “Why should there be this East-West difference in cognition and perception?” Adam asked, rhetorically. “Obviously, because of the way people earned a living. Li-Jun and his colleagues trace the difference to the collective farming required by Eastern rice culture as contrasted to the individualism encouraged by the longer period of hunting and herding in the West, and even by the cultivation of other grains. They generalize their findings as follows:

Cross-cultural research indicates that hunting and herding peoples as well as people who live in the relative freedom of modern wage economies, emphasize autonomous functioning in child rearing and have a relatively loose social structure... In contrast, sedentary agricultural groups stress interpersonal orientation and conformity in child rearing and they have a tight social structure, in which group members need to accommodate each other and strive to regulate one another’s behavior.<sup>203</sup>

“Knowledge is functional,”<sup>204</sup> said Dessie. “In frontier areas in both the U.S. and Japan (Hokkaido) these relatively isolated, self-sufficient people tend to explain outcomes by references to personal skills and dispositions.<sup>205</sup> People learn most easily what is useful to them in their environments, although they may justify what they learn in metaphysical or ideological terms.”

Charles was right there. “And the brain responds accordingly,” he said, “developing dendritic arborization in the brain areas called upon; typists but not salesmen develop ‘large differences in trunk and finger neurons.’”<sup>206</sup>

“I don’t like it,” said Hypatia plaintively, “but I understand that the three of you are telling me that we do not *choose* to believe in individual responsibility or the priority of the public interest but that these convictions are decided for us by economic or social causes whose pawns we are. Or probably you are saying that what you call ‘the variance,’ meaning the differences among individuals, is mostly circumstantial, but that you will allow a small residual variance for individual choice. I know your game. All right, I accept the leavings you allow me but I cannot help wondering what difference it makes for this institution-human nature misfit claim that we are all interested in.”

### **What Difference Does it Make?**

“How could the Asian collectivist societies adapt so well to the market institutions which those in the West claimed required ‘rugged individualism?’” asked Dessie in response. “By keeping their cherished social relations intact, they were able to adjust their business forms to accommodate this priority,<sup>207</sup> just as Christianity and other religions adapt to the local cultures where they seek converts. A report on South Korean adaptation claims that the *personalistic ethic*, involving an obligation to help others and to preserve proper rites, was compatible with market requirements: ‘The market may be able to liberate people from traditional bonds by providing new opportunities and teach them how individually to compete against others, but the market does not necessarily preach that they should do so.’<sup>208</sup> The secret in Korea was a syncretic merger of utilitarianism and this personalistic ethic. Over time, the adaptation in the Pacific Rim became more and more complete as even their ideas of freedom were Westernized.<sup>209</sup> Although people in Asian countries are markedly more collectivist in their attitudes toward each other, and somewhat more

collectivist in their attitudes toward self-reliance,<sup>210</sup> like the West in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the last half-century or so of change in Asia has been toward individualism. ‘As wage earners migrate to the city, often leaving children behind, as both parents work more often; as old people live longer and find the family a less reliable source of social services, family networks are breaking down,’<sup>211</sup> So far, in both East and West, when individualism, chiefly in the form of market capitalism, confronted collectivism, individualism has won.”

“We have not come to the *End of History*<sup>212</sup> yet,” said Charles. “In the great economic crisis of Asia of 1997-98, *giri*, reciprocal obligations in interpersonal relations, was thought to have so interfered with least cost contracting and prudential banking that even the adaptation of familism to market requirements seemed threatened. Even more serious is the difficulty encountered by the personalistic ethic of Korea and other Asian countries in applying the impersonal standards of the rule of law.<sup>213</sup> This is not a matter of taste but of principle, equality before the law, and hence it is a misfit that must be addressed. And on the other side of this Great Divide, the collectivization of risk (sometimes called ‘the welfare state’) is expanding even in the United States, even under President Bush, and the attention paid in Britain and the United States to the quality of life in whole communities is growing.”<sup>214</sup>

“Maybe so,” said Adam, “but notice that within the United States it is the most individualistic states that have the highest level of social capital (higher levels of trust and of political participation) and across 42 countries the same relationship between individualism and social capital prevails. Compared to collectivism (with its familistic traditions) individualism makes people more dependent on society and therefore more socially engaged.<sup>215</sup> The preferred outcome in the conflict between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* or between collectivism and individualism is still unclear.”

### **The Moral Consequences of Individualism and Collectivism**

“One formulation makes collectivism automatically more moral,” said Dessie with a twinkle. “If you accept that social norms are the sources of what we conceive to be ‘moral,’ then the cross-cultural finding that the individualist consults her emotions for guidance and the collectivist consults the norms of her culture<sup>216</sup> gives you a quick answer. But the cannibal norms lingering in New Guinea might give you pause. There are some better clues. For example, it seems we can roughly identify Carol Gilligan’s concept of justice as a form of caring<sup>217</sup> with collectivism and Lawrence Kohlberg’s concept of justice as a form of formal cognition<sup>218</sup> with individualism. Some studies give support to this view.<sup>219</sup> At a more concrete level, there is the comparison between Icelandic and Chinese children (ages 7-15) regarding their sense of obligations in close interpersonal relations. ‘Overall, Icelandic participants referred more often to self-interest and contractual concerns, whereas Chinese participants focused on altruistic and relationship concerns.’”<sup>220</sup> Dessie looked closely at Hypatia. “For imago-18, with its focus on morality, this is distressing news. What will you do if it turns out that collectivist morals appeal to you even though the collectivists are not autonomous or thinking for themselves in any meaningful way? And, because ethics is above all a universalizing philosophy, how will you feel about the parochialism inherent in

collectivism, e.g., familism, and, I regret to say, the associated ethnocentrism? Finally, dear Hypatia, what will you do if you think that the collectivist agenda of putting the public interest ahead of private interests is morally superior, but that human development proceeds more rapidly and surely in individualist societies?" Dessie was not playing imago games but was genuinely sympathetic with Hypatia's dilemmas.

### **Is Human Development Inherently Individualistic?**

Now Charles was upset. "Dessie, there is not the slightest evidence that the Chinese are less humanly developed than are Europeans or Caucasian Americans. Quite the opposite. I don't mean just that the IQs among Taiwanese and Japanese students are higher than the IQs in the U.S., but the moral evidence from such studies as we just saw contrasting the respective values of Chinese and Icelandic children, in the more generous obligation to help a person in distress found among East Indian compared to American students,<sup>221</sup> and in the evidence that compared to more materialistic Canadians, Koreans are made relatively happier by love partners (or 'significant others'), spirituality or religious fulfillment, fulfillment in their life missions, and recognition by others.<sup>222</sup> I think we must conclude that human development, even the kinds of development that we Westerners prize most, is probably higher among collectivists."

***Individualism as Progress.*** "But isn't it true that the emergence of the individual from the anonymity of the group is what civilization is all about?" asked Hypatia from the shores of Imago-18. "You know the litany: the Greek playwrights, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment in various ways all nudged individualism forward. Capturing the name of *progress* for a movement endorses it and gains adherents. Sir Henry Maine, for example, characterized as 'progressive' those societies marked by 'the gradual dissolution of Family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place.'<sup>223</sup> Herbert Spencer found that history, itself, was a process of increasing individual and social complexity such that people were increasingly individualized, 'exhibiting a more marked individuality.'<sup>224</sup> Under the name of 'autonomy,' that separation of individual from group is what John Stuart Mill, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and even Robert Nozick prize above everything else.<sup>225</sup> As a humanist [with a hard stare at Dessie], I unabashedly use the term *progress* to describe this movement."<sup>226</sup>

"And the *public* interest can be left to take care of itself?" asked Dessie.

"And the social affects that underlie the social bonding that is our greatest source of satisfaction<sup>227</sup> can wither away for lack of exercise?" asked Charles.

***Does anyone want individualism?*** "You are all central planners," said Adam in disgust. "The first question is 'What is the demand for individualism?' We all know why history is moving us in that direction: it is because wherever it is tried, individualism has turned out to have higher utility than collectivism. In a paradox of the social sciences we find that although people are more anxious in individualist countries<sup>228</sup> individualists tend to report themselves as happier than people in collectivist countries, even with income controlled.<sup>229</sup> Any thoughtful person would know the reason: with more freedom of choice – in careers, in spouses, in where to live and whom to live with, in styles of life –

they can indulge their preferences and satisfy these varied preferences more completely.”<sup>230</sup>

“And worry about living in a society where people’s only commitment is to themselves,” said Dessie, gratuitously. “Two-thirds of the world is collectivist, you know, which suggests something about demand outside this provincial continent.”

“Come to think of it,” said Hypatia, “that means that the tendency to borrow one’s thoughts from one’s neighbor, in Kant’s term, *heteronymy* (instead of autonomy) is the norm.”<sup>231</sup> Poor old Kant – after so many years.”

“Do people really want individualism?” asked Dessie, repeating Adam’s question. “Even within this individualist province of ours,” he continued, “it is doubtful whether people really *choose* individualism. Or do they have it thrust upon them by forces larger than themselves? If individualism has anything to do with individuality, please note that in one experiment on feelings of undistinctiveness, only after the interviewer told the subject about *thirty* times ‘that’s what most people say,’ did the subject grow restless and show signs of NOT wanting to be like everybody else.”<sup>232</sup> Similarly, in one of the early studies of American subjective well-being, the authors found that those few who thought they were ‘unusual’ were, in fact, hardly different from others in their responses to questions about their lives.<sup>233</sup> The social approval motive is too strong to allow much pleasure in distinctiveness in the U.S.<sup>234</sup> Conformists are happier than nonconformists.<sup>235</sup> But when you turn to another facet of individualism, belief in one’s ability to control one’s own fate, Americans rank higher than citizens of most other countries.<sup>236</sup> As Erik Erikson says somewhere, in the U.S. if you ask a sedentary man to sit down, he will stand up, and if you ask a vagrant to move on, he will sit down.<sup>237</sup> The fact is that people want to have distinct (if not distinctive) identities and social identities at the same time.”<sup>238</sup>

“Who prefers individualism?” asked Adam. “Individualism is beneficial to those with life skills that allow them to take advantage of certain choices and opportunities offered but it yields more pain than benefits to those without those skills.”<sup>239</sup> That pattern is a market pattern; it distresses friends of the underdogs, but makes for fewer underdogs.”<sup>240</sup>

### **Choosing Both Horns**

“I doubt if you can have the benefits of either individualism or collectivism without their associated costs,” said Hypatia in a burst of clarity. “On the other hand,” she continued, “you treat these two major cultural themes of individualism and collectivism as though they were incompatible opposites when we know that society and individuals need both. What was a useful rhetorical device has become an obstacle to clarity.” Charles distinctly saw a glow radiating from her neocortex that might have been mistaken for a halo on anyone else. Glad for this confirmation of her heavenly quality, Charles was nevertheless heard to murmur: “That’s what I meant twenty minutes ago when I said there were evolutionary endowments for both traits: individualism and collectivism. Thus, assuming that everyone is individualist in some respects and collectivist in other respects, we could characterize *persons* by their proportionate emphases on individuals or groups.”

“As a mugwump, myself,” said Dessie using his father’s phrase from the 1884 campaign, “I would go further: I would also characterize *situations*”<sup>241</sup> by the way they

elicit individualist or collectivist thought and behavior. For example, in combat, the army squad enlists perhaps 90 percent collective attachment and loyalty.<sup>242</sup> On the other hand, in a boxing match combatants are perhaps 96 percent self-interested. Team interests make partial but not total collectivists because the players, while identifying with their teams, are still more pleased at their own superior performances. Most situations are like that.<sup>243</sup> If we say collectivist imagoes for collectivist societies and individualist imagoes for individualist societies, we mugwumps are not well represented.”

“‘Liberalism for the Liberals, Cannibalism for the Cannibals,’”<sup>244</sup> muttered Hypatia. “That takes the bones out of imagoes, and makes them responsive to the preferred human nature of policy makers, rather than vice-versa. ‘You want an imago to fit market society? Well,’” she said in an altered tone of voice, “‘here is economic man.’”

***The Declining Marginal Utility of Individualism.*** Dessie moved his crumpled napkin to the middle of the table, withdrew it and substituted his water glass. The dear old boy was nervous. He said softly, “I have a theory.” His friends stifled their laughter, wondering what had happened to this confident prophet of the improbable.

“Building on Hypatia’s insight,” said Dessie, recovering, “I suggest that there is a declining marginal utility for each of these two orientations, individualism and collectivism. When history becomes self-consciousness upon the arrival of Imago-21, people see that they are not limited to their historically given emphases on material welfare, social solidarity, religious devotion, or whatever. Over the long term, cultural values are mutable. As Hegel observed as he watched the French Revolution unfold: institutions are ‘man-made’ and can be changed by ‘man.’<sup>245</sup> As people’s social histories unfold, the value of the underemphasized goods rise relative to the value of the good that is more emphasized in each society. This is economic theory of sorts: as the supply of one good increases relative to another, the good with increased supply declines in relative value. This new consciousness of relative values supplied by Imago-21 creates the condition for another Great Transformation.<sup>246</sup> But we, ourselves must do the work.”

“‘Teaching people to take affairs into their own hands’ is what Peter Gay said was the message of the Enlightenment,”<sup>247</sup> said Hypatia, supporting Dessie’s “theory.”

“I unite the ‘enlightenment’ of our century, Imago-21, with the Enlightenment of the 18th century,” said Dessie radiating good will, Kant’s *summum bonum*.

Adam smiled. “‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it,’”<sup>248</sup> he said in the familiar phrase (carved on Marx’s tombstone) and confident that he was dealing with one more philosopher. “See you next week.

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## Chapter Six

### THINKING FOR ONESELF

*The assumptions of Imago-18 hold that each voter, juryman, consumer, and producer is capable of assessing for herself the outcomes of elections, trials, and markets most likely to satisfy her interests and values. Moreover, each understands how to achieve those outcomes. But when it turns out that these assessments and understandings are largely processed unconsciously and heavily influenced by genetic programs and social cues of which the choosing person is unaware, is this Imago-18 assumption still valid?*

*Charles scolds Hypatia for rejecting the unconscious as part of the valued self and for thinking of unconscious processes as somehow less likely to reflect her interests and values. Repeating the lesson of their first session, Charles says again that the unconscious is often “smarter” as well as quicker in responding to stimuli and threats from the environment than the conscious mind. Dessie supports Charles by pointing out how the contextualist thinking processes of Asians often succeed where the individualist (item-by-item) processes of the Americans fail.*

*Since most research shows that it is not possible to think ethically without enlisting processes lodged in the limbic (emotional) system, purely rational (cortical) thinking is undesirable as well as impossible (without lesions to the hypothalamus). Given the power of circumstance to affect outcomes, it is paradoxical that falsely believing that one is the master of one’s fate leads to greater fate control. That false belief, however, is built into the market, legal, democratic, and evolutionary systems that enlist it and reward it.*

*Whether or not “free will” – as a not-yet-discovered process of the brain, or as a mysterious uncaused cause, or simply the name we give to unexplained variance – is necessary to market and democratic justifications is pretty well left up in the air by these sage, but not omniscient, spinach pie eaters.*

*Turning the question of “thinking for oneself” back on the skeptics, Adam asks who is thinking about “thinking for oneself” if Charles is not doing that right now. Having claimed all along that introspects leads to invalid conclusions, Charles turns to his theory (the BNR) and summarizes the internal forces and external stimuli that characterized the process. Without sufficient analysis of Charles’s answer, the group drifts off into a comparison of progress in understanding thinking guided by the two imagoes: 18<sup>th</sup> century Cartesian idea that thinking is unique and invulnerable to science versus the 21<sup>st</sup> century empirical investigation. Not much doubt about who wins that one.*

*The clinching arguments on “free will” are indirect and come from examples of how hormones and neurotransmitters change decisions regarding (1) trust in an investor, (2) appetite control, (3) courage, and (4) male dominance. But the victory is at the cost of Hypatia’s piteous appeal for retaining concepts of individual moral responsibility.*

\* \* \* \* \*

On her way through slushy streets to her weekly rendezvous with her friends at Clark’s Hypatia was wondering what happened to her claim that an essential part of any proper imago was the capacity to “think for oneself.” She was slightly hurt that they had not

taken this up, but realized that her companions had never been careful readers of Kant, the Mills, T. S. Greene, Isaiah Berlin and other philosophers from whom she had learned so much.

Meanwhile, moving too briskly for safety down slippery Trumbull Street, Charles was saying to himself, “Thinking for oneself? What could that possibly mean?” He met Hypatia at Clark’s crowded doorway and as he held the door for her, Charles remarked, “I was just thinking about what you said last week about thinking for oneself.” They spotted the others in their familiar booth and were already launched when they sat down.

### **What is *Free* About Free Will?**

“But don’t you see that the two kinds of opinions are very different,” Hypatia was saying. “When a person is thinking for herself, her opinions are generated from her own experience and her own values; they are both *authentic* and *autonomous*. They are her very own.”

“And the other kind, the kind of opinion that is not ‘her very own’?” asked Charles, wondering when he quoted Darwin if he had gained ‘ownership’ of an opinion or merely borrowed something which he should return. But to whom?

“Well, to start with,” said Hypatia, “there is a qualitative difference between the mindless responses which you claim are the default version of thought in this society, and which could be one’s own habitual, unconscious, characteristic response to things, but would not qualify as *thinking* for oneself. And then there is the backup mindful rationality that we call upon when, in fact, we want to think through a problem. Only the second is thinking for oneself.”

***Bringing the unconscious back in.*** “Why have you disowned your unconscious,” asked Charles in a puzzled tone as though Hypatia had identified the unconscious with an alienated Id. “When you do that you shed some of the better parts of your self: most of your emotions, and along with them the sources of your ethical impulses like empathy, maternal feelings, and affiliative impulses. As we said last time, even your values have deep sources in the unconscious. Hypatia, my dear, on reflection, your native decency will lead you to rethink and reject your 18<sup>th</sup> century distrust of what they called ‘the passions.’”

Hypatia was visibly shaken, but rallied. “It’s not that my unconscious is not part of myself, it’s that my unconscious is not part of the *thinking* that I associate with ‘thinking for myself.’ You must agree that it stretches things to say that being in touch with and acknowledging my emotions, while valuable, is the same as thinking.”

Charles knew that some insightful psychologists had distinguished two stages of response to stimuli: an initial *affective* response and a slower *cognitive* response, where the affective response was faster and often more trusted, but the cognitive response was more reliable and took into consideration longer term consequences.<sup>249</sup> But that was before the functional magnetic resonance imaging studies had shown the intimate relationship of affective and cognitive processes, where each completed the other, and where cognitive calculation without affect was found to be amoral.<sup>250</sup> But Hypatia was marching to a different drummer. “Remember,” said Charles, “from our very first

meeting this year those Dutchmen found that in their experiments on evaluating automobiles ‘the unconscious brain has a far greater capacity for information than conscious working memory.’<sup>251</sup> And remember Timothy Wilson’s characterization of the unconscious as the system whereby a person ‘selects, interprets, and evaluates incoming information and sets goals.’<sup>252</sup> That is certainly an important part of thinking. Please, my dear Hypatia, make room in this Age of Reason for the unconscious as a wonderful part of that reason.”

It was a dilemma: Could the Age of Reason embrace The Age of Science? Could Kant be wrong when he said ‘everything empirical is not only quite unsuitable as a contribution to the principle of morality, but is even highly detrimental to the purity of morals.’<sup>253</sup> Well, if she had to choose between the truth of a spinach pie session and Kant, she just might (Good Heavens!) choose spinach pie. One departing thought: “Maybe,” she said, “but the stakes are high: For me, thinking for oneself is part of being human – in Aristotelian language, an *essentialist* point of view.”<sup>254</sup>

***The value of thinking for oneself – and of thinking one is thinking for oneself.*** “Would you say that Asians are somehow less human than Americans?” asked Dessie, somewhat unkindly. “A study about ten years ago of Asian and American values found that compared to American leaders, Asian leaders were more likely to value ‘respect for authority,’ ‘preserving harmony for the group’ and ‘an orderly society’ but that Americans were more likely to value ‘personal freedom,’ ‘individual rights,’ and ‘thinking for oneself.’ On that last item, Asians scored only 10 while Americans scored 59, a very significant difference.”<sup>255</sup> Then looking at Hypatia, he added: “You are too young to remember the spate of conformity studies, led by David Riesman’s allegation that far from being independent thinkers, Americans are largely ‘other-directed.’<sup>256</sup> And the relief when a 1973 study of Detroit found that the majority of an American urban sample preferred their children to ‘think for themselves’ rather than to try to ‘fit in’ and ‘get along’ with their schoolmates.<sup>257</sup> We take our values from Imago-18, even if we behave according to the rules of Imago-21.”

“It was you who said ‘opinions are functional’ last week,” said Charles reminding Dessie of a theme that he seemed to have forgotten. “What function does this value of ‘thinking for oneself’ play in the economy of the psyche of these would-be independent thinkers?”

“One function is just the opposite of what Imago-18 says is the case,” Dessie replied, glad to be reminded. “It is to defend people’s sacred values regardless of facts or consequences; rational choice to maximize utilities and reasoned inquiry to find the truth are both irrelevant. The function of their ‘thinking for themselves’ is to defend against threats to their beliefs held on other grounds.”<sup>258</sup>

A little piqued at this dismissal of rational choice, Adam pressed the case for reasoned discourse with a utilitarian purpose. “So why isn’t the religious defender of her values not legitimately seeking gratification in *her* way?” he asked.

“With that line of argument, *all* statements are utilitarian, thus emptying utilitarianism of any content,” said Dessie. “A much more interesting problem is why people ‘act against their self-interest in full knowledge that they are doing so,’ often experiencing ‘a feeling of “being out of control.”’ The answer, according to a careful review of this problem is ‘the operation of ‘visceral factors,’ which include drive states

such as hunger, thirst and sexual desire, moods and emotions, and physical pain.’ The important point here is that the drive states ‘tend to crowd out’ other goals and consideration of the future. They demand instant action.<sup>259</sup> We have run across the intrusion of the limbic system on neocortical processes before, but here is a case where people are aware that they have lost control and are helpless to think for themselves. The limbic system has no sense of the future.”

“The passions dominate the interests again, just as the 18<sup>th</sup> century feared they would,” said Adam. “They were right.”

Dessie hadn’t finished his functional analysis of free will: “What Hypatia has defined as free will is cherished not only because it seems to give humans a kind of dignity (as Skinner once observed),<sup>260</sup> that is, it is a kind of decoration to hang around the neck of *sapiens* as she emerges at the top of the phylogenetic ladder. Free will is also a central part of the belief that one controls one’s own destiny, a sense of *competence*<sup>261</sup> or of *internal attribution*<sup>262</sup> holding that one is the author of one’s own acts and opinions. We are all actors in the various dramas we enter, and the belief that we *choose* our roles, choosing commodities to accommodate our self-concepts<sup>263</sup> and candidates to accommodate our political identities,<sup>264</sup> is powerfully satisfying.”

“What a pity that this sense of choosing is an illusion,” said Adam sarcastically.

“If,” continued Dessie, “one tries to sort out the contribution to an outcome of a person’s antecedent circumstances, compared to the contribution of her dispositions, it will likely be found that her dispositions and skills account for less of the explanation than do her circumstances.<sup>265</sup> (Hence, the discussion of ‘I am the master of my fate’ as a ‘Noble Lie’ in *After the End of History*.)<sup>266</sup> Why is it noble? Because people who believe, however contrary to fact, that they are themselves responsible for their outcomes tend to be more successful in their occupations and to have happier marriages.”<sup>267</sup>

Adam had been following this exchange with his usual skepticism but, for once, he liked what Dessie said. “So we do not have to rely on ‘dignity’ or other essentialist arguments to support what we all know from our own experiences,” he said looking slyly at Hypatia “Rather, we can rest our arguments for free will on the part these arguments play in convincing people that they are effective causes, which, it turns out, is good for them.” Then, looking at Dessie, he asked: “Does it disappoint you, my friend, that what everybody knows turns out to be true?”

“If you want to say that what is called ‘free will’ cannot be defended on any grounds other than its benefits, that it has the epistemological standing of a life-giving myth, I can agree. It is quite compatible with my own definition of free will as that part of the variance left unexplained after an exhaustive effort at explanation.” Dessie had hoped to avoid this contentious issue, relying more on the neurophilosophical discussion of the way the brain handles the act of willing,<sup>268</sup> but he felt his hand had been forced.

“False myths may be satisfying, but to survive they must be somehow reinforced,” said Hypatia, quite unhappy with what Dessie had just said.

***Institutional support for free will.*** “Like other popular myths, this one is reinforced by society. The important point is that our institutions rely on and require something like free will, that is, the doctrine that each person is responsible for her own thoughts and acts. It follows from any attempt to *explain* these thoughts and acts, that is, from the need for attribution. In democracies, this requirement is most obvious when we hold elected

officials *accountable* for their acts and policies, but also in the belief that elections reflect what people authentically want, their free choices. The same is true for the law where people again are held responsible for their acts, but not for their thoughts (at least in democracies). The doctrine of diminished responsibility for those considered unable to distinguish right from wrong is explicit in this respect.<sup>269</sup> The market, however, is a little different (Isn't it Adam?) because of its impersonal character. Nevertheless, sellers may be said to be responsible to their firms and domestic buyers to their households.<sup>270</sup> This indispensable doctrine of responsibility implies free will to be morally acceptable. To be responsible is to have chosen freely."

Hypatia, no stranger to arguments on free will,<sup>271</sup> looked surprised. "I had not thought that modern institutions cared much about free will and authentic choices but I am delighted to find such powerful allies for the essentialist, humanist argument I made earlier." She beamed.

***Justice requires free will.*** "Justice must by its very nature consider persons, and in so doing takes into account whether an act is willed or not.<sup>272</sup> As children grow older they understand that intention is more important than seriousness of outcome in meting out rewards and punishments.<sup>273</sup> Thus, a child is more appropriately reprimanded if she accidentally breaks one teacup while trying to steal a cookie than if she accidentally breaks a whole tray of teacups while trying to help her mother. And intention means willing something. Both courts and persons understand that distinction between intention and seriousness of outcome." She thought for a moment and added: "But neither markets nor evolution understands it."

"So," said Adam, summarizing again, "It isn't just these well-intentioned philosophers who support the idea of free will on the grounds that it is of the essence of humanity, but it is also our own sense of justice that demands it and our cherished institutions that require it for their purposes of justifying themselves." He looked at Charles and Dessie: "I know that you would like to dissolve free will into an infinite regress of causation, but there is too much at stake for that to be persuasive. Moreover, if you were to succeed you would find that the whole concept of thinking for oneself also disappeared, which raises the question of what we are doing here if we are not thinking for ourselves." The idea of a 'pre-emptive strike' had been in the news recently and Adam took advantage of it.

### **What is the Meaning of "Thinking for Oneself"?**

"It is easier to say what 'thinking for oneself' is not," said Hypatia who assumed everybody knew the problem from their reading of Kant and John Stuart Mill. "It is *not* thinking guided solely by genetic programming, like ants (Darwinism?);<sup>274</sup> it is *not* thinking while in the grip of some mental illness, like obsessive-compulsive symptoms; it is *not* conformity to social norms without reflecting on them, a kind of mindlessness we have already criticized,<sup>275</sup> nor, obviously, is it parroting the ideas of another person, nor, on reflection, do I consider that the kind of thinking confined by narrow self-interests (economism, rational choice)<sup>276</sup> to be thinking for oneself, nor when inferences from a person's social position dominate her conclusions (sociology of knowledge).<sup>277</sup> When the

voter's vote is guided solely by her group memberships, as reported in the early voting studies,<sup>278</sup> (a group grip now said to be relaxed by what some call 'sociological release'),<sup>279</sup> I doubt that her decision should be called 'thinking for herself.' In general, it is the opposite of 'other-directedness,' 'following convention,' and imitation. Further, given that it is psychologically painful to think one thing and say another, the conditions of free speech affect people's ability to think for themselves." This was getting more complicated than Hypatia had anticipated, and she decided not to mention free access to information and to alternative views as necessary requirements for thinking for oneself.<sup>280</sup> "Let me stop here for now," she said, "but I would say that at a minimum 'thinking for oneself' implies volition and direction, that is, it is purposeful."

***Marginal productivity of and value added by free will.*** As the conversation bordered on speech or thought *production*, Adam tuned in. Turning to Hypatia, he said: "Your review of what thinking for oneself is *not*, leaves a big space for filling in what it *is*. If it is not repetition or conformity, then it must be a contribution to thought, perhaps not at the level of Darwin's contribution but something like Charles's helpful notes on how evolutionary processes affect institutions. We economists have two ways of conceiving of contributions to production: *marginal product*, the contribution of, say, the last person or equipment added to the productive process (as contrasted to the average contribution), and *value added*, that is, from production to final sale each process contributes something to the final value of a good; that something is the value added. If you want to assess the worth of 'thinking for oneself,' why not use these time-tested methods?" He thought for a minute and added: "Furthermore, if, as you say, free will is a necessary condition for thinking for oneself, these two methods of assessment will give you an indirect measure of the value of free will: what is its marginal contribution to productivity? Or what is the value it adds to what we know?" Aware that this would distress Hypatia, Adam smiled only a muted inward smile.

Dessie thought he saw a paradox: the idea of free will actually detracts from what we *know*, stifling explanations, but adds something to what we *are*, enhancing our sense of responsibility. That was too complex. So he sought to change the subject, bringing the discussion back to the problem of fitting imagoes to institutions.

***Defining thinking for oneself also defines current institutions.*** "I want to go back to what we were saying about how institutions require free will," said Dessie. "The relationship is broader than that. The more one specifies what this thinking for oneself entails, the more one defines the institutions that were created with this thinking creature in mind. Just as prevailing imagoes were those of rational, autonomous, fully conscious and self-interested persons, so the institutions were characterized by rules and a logic to match the interests and capabilities of these rational, autonomous persons. The market and democracy used and profited from individual decisions, which they thought were made by autonomous people, and they offered rewards to people whom they taught to be primarily self-interested. Furthermore, I think that Adam was hinting that free speech has an economic production function, as well, and plenty of people would agree with him.<sup>281</sup> Of course, the reigning imago is of persons who offer what institutions demand, partly because the imago and the institutions were created at the same time and often by coterie of the same people (e.g., David Hume and Adam Smith)."

## More Impediments to Thinking for Oneself

After this review of their theory, Charles used his wrecking bar with restraint. “Hypatia,” he said, moving the ketchup out of harm’s way, “you said that one did not think for oneself if one’s thoughts were genetically programmed or the product of some synthetic chemical condition. We covered some of these problems earlier in discussing why people failed to know themselves, and much of this terrain has been well plowed by cognitive psychologists.<sup>282</sup> Furthermore, there has been a recent spate of books that treat the physiology of consciousness and thought in some detail.<sup>283</sup> Perhaps, however, there is some less explored territory in the question of who is thinking of, or for, whom when one is thinking *for oneself?*” It was a question.

**For Oneself.** Adam, folding his napkin into a flimsy paper boat, heard those phrases about automatic thinking and looked up from his task in time to ask Charles: “I think you will have to explain *who* is thinking, right now, about thinking for oneself, if it isn’t you.”

“Adam, you want me to say ‘I must be thinking about ‘thinking for myself,’ and therefore I am illustrating the very thing that I am questioning. We have already talked about the invalidity of introspection,<sup>284</sup> so I cannot simply look inside and see who is thinking. Rather, I consult my friend, the BNR. I ask politely: ‘Dear BNR, who is thinking?’ She says ‘Charles, ignore last season’s learning theory message that you are merely the product of your past experiences (contingent reinforcements) and, instead, consider yourself better than that; you are the product of (1) your genetic endowments (intelligence, mood, biological affects, cortex-limbic system circuitry [consolidated only in late adolescence], reward system (vulnerable to corruption), hormonal balance – (especially serotonin, epinephrine, norepinephrine, and dopamine). But, ‘dear Charles’ she says, ‘please note that these hormonal flows and circuits [yes, circuits] are (2) affected by your current and past experiences, which, in turn, are (3) interpreted by your culture and your previous learning.’” Charles looked around him with a wary smile.

“Pull yourself together, Charles,” said Adam, who liked physical explanations but feared their consequences for any discipline or institution based on choice.

Dessie chimed in: “I understand why you declined the invitation to look within. The subjective experience of unity of self as well as ‘thinking for oneself’ is quite different from what the BNR is telling you, Charles.” He paused, as he saw what was coming next. “Sorry, here we need a bit of history. Direct, unmediated access to one’s own thoughts made Descartes assign these thoughts to a category of substance different from all other things. And I regret to say, dear Hypatia, that three hundred years of that kind of dualist analysis never led to any further insights into either self or thinking. With characteristic candor, a much later philosopher, Thomas Nagel said he could find no philosophical bridge to take him from the subjective experience of freely choosing to the scientific holding that all phenomena are caused.<sup>285</sup> Only when the BNR took over from philosophers did we make some headway on the actual processes of thinking and willing. Incidentally, through the study of addiction, there has been some progress in the study of willing: ‘Motivation or *will* can be regarded as a brain function that is damaged by addiction, just as language or movement can be damaged by a stroke.’ And just as in the case of strokes, other parts of the brain assume the functions of the injured region, ‘in the same way, treatment for addiction may be able to make use of the remaining parts of the

motivation system to repair the damage.’<sup>286</sup> The situs of your will may be moved around!”

“Stop moving my will around like a piece of furniture,” cried Hypatia in mock anger. More seriously, she said: “Can you explain in a little more detail how one’s will does not control one’s thoughts and character?”

### **Genetic and Hormonal Influences on Thinking**

Charles took a deep breath. “Your moods,” he said, “are dependent on nature’s supply of serotonin; your will power is affected by norepinephrine; Adam’s dominance behavior is influenced both by his testosterone and his gonadatropin releasing hormones; my shyness is influenced by the way my amygdala processes stimuli and is under some kind of genetic control.<sup>287</sup> Just as you might take calcium supplements for your aging calcium-deficient bones, so might you take appropriate hormone supplements to help the chemistry of your brain. What gets in the way? It is Imago-18 seeking to moralize these processes by reference to faults of character.”

“Never mind my character,” said Adam. “Can you actually change a person’s thoughts or decisions by your wizard chemistry?”

“Would an experiment showing the effect of chemicals on interpersonal trust qualify?” asked Charles modestly. “Ernst Fehr and colleagues used an investment game to test the effect of trust on willingness to turn over to a trustee sums available for investment. In an experiment with 178 male college students, student investors were given 12 monetary units of which they could send 12, 8, 4, or none to an unseen, anonymous ‘trustee.’ Apparently, the trustee was a smart investor since the number of monetary units tripled when the trustee handled the funds. The catch was that the trustee could unilaterally decide how much of this gain to share with the investor who had turned over the money to him. In games prior to the one reported here, investors had been very cautious about handing over their money to the trustee.”

“But of course, if he’s rational and this is a one-off occasion, that wily investor would keep most of it for himself” said Adam, well schooled in the ‘school solution.’

“In the experiment reported in *Nature* by Fehr and his colleagues,” continued Charles, “the experimenters had one group inhale oxytocin, a hormone-like substance that serves as ‘a kind of brain messenger that primes animals to overcome their natural aversion to others;’ while a control group inhaled a placebo. Those who inhaled oxytocin before playing invested an average of 10 monetary units with the trustee, 17 percent more than the placebo group. Of the oxytocin group, 45 percent invested *all* their money, compared with only 21 percent of the controls.<sup>288</sup> So the oxytocin group won more. Shall we say that the group that inhaled oxytocin won the pot *because* they thought for themselves? Or that the administrators of the hormone won the pot via their randomly chosen pawns?”

“Actually,” said Dessie, “oxytocin is normally generated in women by sexual intercourse (vasopressin is the male equivalent).<sup>289</sup> Perhaps women, suitably primed of course, should be given more investment funds.”

Hypatia thought that was amusing, but Adam, tuned to his feminist ear, quickly wiped away the smile that started to spread across his face and he turned to an analogy:

“Do you award the blue ribbon to the runner who decides to use steroids and wins a race or give the ribbon to the drug dealer who persuaded him to use steroids? Actually, the judges strip the runner of his victory on the grounds that *he*, in his natural state, did not win it. And the drug-dealer goes to jail.”

“Because both oxytocin and steroids also vary substantially in their natural distributions, Nature is the usual drug dealer,” said Charles, enjoying the paradox. “Nature is not a criminal but here, as in the cases of intelligence and happiness, she is quite unjust.”

“Don’t muddle things any more than is necessary,” said Adam, coming back to the question of personal responsibility. “Whether in thinking for oneself one is fairly or unfairly assisted by Nature is not the issue. It can’t be too difficult to sort out whether a person is using her natural endowments in her thinking, or is coached or drugged by some outside agent.”

What are the natural endowments that qualify a person to be judged as thinking for herself? Charles was willing to take on this new test: “*Courage* is one of the virtues that Aristotle commends as midway between Rashness and Cowardice,” said Charles, apparently irrelevantly. “D’Artagnan, Nathan Hale, and John Paul Jones were all commendable because of their bravery. Right? Should they, however, be commended because they had the longer version of gene SLC6A4 which controls fear? Inheritance of the shorter version, along with early frightening experiences, makes people more anxious over most of their lives.<sup>290</sup> On the other hand, the exploratory person, or mouse, seeking new experiences probably has inherited a particular version of a different gene, ‘dopamine D4 receptor (D4DR).’<sup>291</sup> If you commend the exploratory person for her independence and curiosity, you should commend the mouse, as well.” Charles had never had a better time in these spinach pie sessions.

“Are you suggesting that character or personality is simply a function of genes?” asked Adam. “Surely experience makes a difference.” Having asked for examples, tough old Adam was having trouble with these reductive cases.

***Experience changes hormones and circuitry.*** “Of course it does,” said Charles, slightly irritated that he should have been so misunderstood. “The main lesson of physiology is that behavior is a joint function of genetic endowment and experience. What is more, experience can actually change the circuitry of the brain and the hormonal flows that, as we saw, directly affect behavior. Take appetite and the will to diet. That will is partly under the control of a hormone called *leptin* that ‘can fundamentally change the brain’s circuitry in areas that control appetite.’ Without natural supplies of leptin, humans and animals become incredibly obese.<sup>292</sup> Now, will power is usually considered an important feature of personality. But is it fair that a person with a leptin deficiency should be thought to have a deficiency in will power? On the advice of her doctor, she takes artificial leptin to reduce her appetite, which actually *changes her brain circuitry*. She now has will power. If configurations of the brain are controllers of personality, when she changed her brain circuitry and acquired ‘will power,’ she changed her personality. Who is thinking for what self?”

“Put bluntly,” said Hypatia, “*you* decide to take leptin and your brain circuitry is changed. *You*, not your physical brain, are in charge.”

“I am really not surprised that drugging people changes their behavior and even their capacities to control their own behavior,” said Adam, hanging in there like a creationist in the face of geological evidence on the age of the earth. “What would impress me is evidence that a change in circumstances changed the brain and its domineering hormones.”

“Will circumstantial change of fish behavior and hormones do?” asked Charles for whom fish and humans were quite interchangeable. “After all, Lorenz taught us a lot about human aggression from his examples of stickleback fish.”<sup>293</sup>

“The fish brain is different; could you do something with dolphins?” asked Adam, trying to meet Charles half way.

“Ah dolphins,” sighed Charles, lost in rapture. “But this time it has to be fish. In aggressive males that command a large territory and keep other males at bay, the brain cells in the hypothalamus that allow the fish to mate are six to eight times larger than are equivalent cells in mild-mannered males with no social clout. ‘Genetic,’ you say, but wait. Put these aggressive males in a milieu where they are relatively subordinate and put the mild-mannered fish in situations where they are dominant, and their hypothalami reverse their previous relative size rankings. Furthermore, experiments show that usually ‘the behavioral changes occur first, and that they in turn spur dramatic growth in brain cells responsible for producing a compound called gonadotropin-releasing hormone.’<sup>294</sup>

“Oh well, fish!” Adam said with scorn.

“One of the experimenters, Dr. Russell Fernald, suggests that the architecture of the human brain may also be affected by a person’s behavior,”<sup>295</sup> said Charles.

Adam looked at Charles and Dessie and decided he was the dominant male in this group but he wasn’t at all sure that Hypatia knew that. If only he could offer a display of feathers, like the peacock, to convince her. Ah well, he was thinking too much *about* himself and turned to the problems of thinking *for* himself. “Hypatia, my love,” he said showing off his feathers, “are you sure that thinking for oneself is such a good idea? It might be a disease, as in autism,<sup>296</sup> or it might be a sign of immaturity, as in Piaget’s *egocentricity* where only what is in one’s own head is real.<sup>297</sup> Are you quite sure that, regardless of the content of the thought, you want to make independence from nature and society a criterion for the individualistic thinking that you cherish?”

Hypatia looked over his feathers with a critical eye, and looked away. “I am waiting for Charles’ other shoe to drop,” she said, unconsciously looking at Charles’s disreputable shoes under the table.

***Love, passion, and moral responsibility.*** “Enough on fish,” said Charles, “could we talk about fruit-flies for a moment.” He made it sound as though he was offering candy bars to hungry children. “If one inserts a male sex-gene in a female fruit-fly, she/he switches targets and seeks to mate with females, engaging in the elaborate mating foreplay dance of normal males. Instructions for that intricate dance are all given in that one microscopic gene. If with fruit-flies, possibly also with human romantic rituals, raising questions of the role of choice versus genetic endowments in this vital romantic area of life.”

“Have they discovered which portion of the fruit-fly romance gene decides whether to give chocolates or flowers to his or her paramour?” asked Adam with raised eyebrows.

“The passion of human lovers newly smitten is visible by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),” said Charles, barely smiling, “as increased activity in the caudate nucleus, a region of the brain dense with cells that produce or receive dopamine. As the new love matures, brain activity moves from the caudate to a region of the brain associated with long-term commitment.<sup>298</sup> Normally, these changes in the brain *precede* consciousness of changed feeling.<sup>299</sup> As the feelings change from passion to commitment, who or what is thinking for her/himself?”

As Charles feared and everyone else expected, Hypatia was aroused. She represented the better part of human kind. “How can you so casually dismiss all responsible thinking about moral choice and accountability?” she asked with all flags flying. “How can you do this to yourself – making yourself into a pawn of your genes and the programs laid down in your brain by evolution? Steven Lukes warned that individualism was incompatible with determinism<sup>300</sup> and I now see why. When we started out on this theme of thinking for oneself, I thought the enemy was the group coercion or collectivism we discussed last time, but I now see that it is less the group than genetic and physiological determinism that threatens our autonomy.” She was breathing fire and her black hair was charged again with static electricity (possibly because of the rapid firing of the synapses in the underlying gray matter just under the scalp).

“See you next week,” she said, relieving Charles’ fear that they would not see her next week.

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## Chapter Seven

### THE FUNDAMENTAL LIBERAL ERROR

*In this chapter we see that... Because of their faith in individual reason and reasoning, Enlightenment thinkers made individual choice the cornerstone of both economic and political institutions (and, as Maine points out, their marital institutions, as well). As reported earlier, our current knowledge of the way the mind and brain work suggests that faith in reason is misplaced.*

*By a natural but impermissible inferential leap, Enlightenment figures went on to find intrinsic merit in choice, itself. Their arguments showed that they understood that the benefits of choice lay in its selected consequences, but they, and especially their successors, often ended an argument by saying that when the choice was in response to “demand” or in response to “the people’s choice” it therefore had merit. The Fundamental Liberal Error is this pervasive, underlying belief in the intrinsic merit of choice.*

*The New Humanists attempt to expose this error by showing how the differences between liking and wanting, and among anticipating, experiencing, and recalling the pleasures of a particular choice, make that choice an uncertain route to pleasure. The physiology of pleasure adds to their argument. When appeal is made to the general desirability of letting people choose what they want to choose, the two New Humanists point out the circularity of the argument: people want to choose because they have been given institutions that require and condition them to want choices.*

*Of course, this criticism of choosing produces the familiar appeal: because choices have to be made, who will choose the choosers: the police chief or the liberal, ecumenical constitution with its broader cast of characters? But the New Humanists claim they are not selecting among choosers but among the kinds and levels of choice that improve choice, itself. Their conventional friends attack them as elitist (the more educated are likely to be favored; rich societies became rich with the help of the very choice institutions the New Humanists seem to undermine – poor countries should be allowed to take the same route), but the New Humanists say that because their criteria include weighing the consequences of choice, they have taken care of these arguments.*

*The terms of the argument shift to an assessment of the circumstances that make choice burdensome and reasoned choice less satisfactory than unconscious choice. The New Humanists make a familiar point, that choices have so proliferated that new choices must be weighed in the context of the entire field of choices, something that neither markets nor democracies provide. Studies that show the detrimental effects of adding more product information to consumer choices, studies of student choices made worse by more options, and the generally unhappy effects of those who seek to “maximize their utilities” support the New Humanists’ position. So does evidence on consumer remorse. Against the acknowledged value of most choices, the heretics point to the values of fidelity and commitment that are undermined by constant choices. The final heresy is Dessie’s suggestion of a declining marginal utility of choice, itself.*

*Returning to the relative advantages of adaptive unconscious (AU) vs. mindful rationality (MR), the New Humanists acknowledge that most choices in markets and democracies are made by the adaptive unconscious, which, for all its hidden wisdom, is*

*not up to the task. Is the solution to rely more on mindful rationality? Using evidence presented in their very first session, the New Humanists remind their friends of studies showing that in some cases the more the choosers thought about their choices, the poorer the choices. And using indirect evidence, they argue that mindful rationality is probably not itself a source of happiness.*

*Finally, because traditional ethics weights intentionality more than consequences, Hypatia asks if the adaptive unconscious (where conscious intention is missing) can be ethical. She recalls that it can be if the test is “What are the consequences of an act?” this is just as well, since the limbic system, which can have no intentions because it is always unconscious, is the main source of empathy, with its associated moral feeling.*

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“If you *had* to eat spinach pie every Wednesday for sixteen weeks, you would begin to gag at the very thought of green food,” said Adam watching Dessie move his water glass to make room for the approaching plate of spinach pie.

“Okay. And if you were forbidden to eat spinach pie, you wouldn’t be about to order that fiberless, high calorie, low vitamin minestrone soup that your dwarfed taste buds find tolerable,” said Dessie. “So, voluntary choice is what we enjoy, not the food. That is such a spiritual, nonmaterial view of food, Adam, I wonder that you do not just choose your food, cancel it, and watch us actually eat our food. You would save money that way, although Marian might ask you to pay rent for the profitless space you occupy.”

“You do not appreciate Adam’s high-minded position,” said Hypatia from her usual corner seat in the four-person red booth. “He is thinking of how choosing helps us to grow in self-confidence, develops our decision making skills, and adds gray matter to our brains. You do know that rats in enriched environments with lots of choices have larger brain mass than those reared in simple cages.”<sup>301</sup> Then, trying not to look at Dessie’s waistline, she added, “Brain mass is generally the preferred kind of mass to have.”

“If I choose not to choose, does that add to my brain mass?” asked Charles, wondering if philosophers had greater brain mass than biologists. “Since exercise of a function leads to local dendritic arborization,<sup>302</sup> I would guess that in philosophers’ brains a special region dealing with language (just under the frontal lobes running along a midline between the two hemispheres) is more developed whereas a region in scientists’ brains just to the sides of the forehead that specializes in abstract calculations is more developed.”

To check things out, everybody unconsciously touched first their philosophical frontal lobes and then the mentioned scientific regions just to the side of the forehead. To an outsider, like Marian, Charles’s three companions seemed to be piously crossing themselves at the level of the forehead.

“Hail Mary,” muttered Marian as she set down their respective spinach pies (and soup) with a worldly clatter.

## The Paradox of Choice

“If choosing spinach pie does not nourish you, what good is choosing?” asked Charles with a sigh from deep in his ever-present *weltschmerz*.

“If you prefer minestrone soup, no good at all,” said Adam. “If you prefer spinach pie, choosing it gets you what you want. You can’t find a higher good than that in the secular world.”

***The Fundamental Liberal Error.*** Dessie pounced. “Thank you, Adam,” he said. “You could not have given a better example of what I call ‘the fundamental liberal error’ the belief that there is intrinsic merit in the act of choosing. Freedom and Liberty mean choice and little more. Under these rubrics, choice is honored in many national anthems’ paeans to liberty, in the Declaration of Independence, and in the long record of sacred texts from Pericles through the American First Amendment and from John Stuart Mill to the Charter of the United Nations. Its opposite is thought to be constraint, denial, and bondage. At their worst, these texts represent confusion, and at their best a misleading short-hand for the truth. The truth is that if the *consequences* of choice are good, then choosing is good. and the consequences *are* usually good. Usually the consequences are good, for choosing often produces a sense of control, self-respect; it teaches by trial and error; it is a means of getting what gives a person satisfaction. But choosing can also lead to bewilderment, strain, regret, injury to others, and irremediable error. Choice and liberty are only conditional goods; they are means to ends and, like all means, borrow their value from their consequences.” Dessie looked around him with a wary glance. He did not mind breaking icons but he knew from experience that a dispassionate examination of “freedom” usually prompted a kind of theological hostility.

With her classic profile inflamed, Hypatia gave the classic reply: “And when the police chief decides that the consequences of *your* use of freedom are bad, and that our spinach-pie sessions are likely to be subversive, do you reply politely that there is no accounting for taste? Oh, Dessie, shame!”

“Do you prefer to let this imaginary police chief decide in advance whether or not you can even consider whether choice is sometimes bewildering and stressful? That is called ‘prior restraint’ and is odious to all lovers of free speech,” said Dessie. “My dear Hypatia, in the face of the imaginary police chief, let us have the courage to challenge the sacred texts and make an honest cost/benefit analysis of the choices society thrusts upon us.”

Charles chimed in. “In the secular world that Adam invited us to enter, there are no sacred texts. Further,” he said more tentatively, “So far as I know, the costs of choosing are externalities in both economic analysis...” He looked at Adam: “Don’t tell me those costs are included in prices; they are not because the sources of anxiety are usually unknown.” He continued. “Nor are the costs included in democratic theory, as the rational choice people never tire of pointing out (the probability that you will have an accident on the way to the polls is greater than the probability that your vote will decide an election). In fact, there is no forum or market for choosing how much choice people want or can tolerate. That cumulative set of opportunities for choice is not itself chosen, at least not by individuals in the ordinary business of life.”

Adam found this argument unfamiliar; it challenged the unarticulated premise, not the findings, of economics. “The fact that people *want* choices, that there is a demand for choice, is unpersuasive to you,” he said in a meditative, perplexed and yet challenging tone. “That certainly explains the rise of choice. But, for you, it does not justify it.”

“Giving people what they want has never had much ethical standing,” said Hypatia, thinking of the difference between the low ethical standing of “satisfaction” and the much higher standing of “happiness,” especially of merited happiness or *eudaimonia*.

“Giving people what they want is an uncertain route to satisfaction, whatever its ethical standing,” said Dessie entering this paradox with the weight of a Nobelist behind him. “It turns out that *wanting* and *liking* diverge: people may want what they do not like (as in addiction) and like what they do not want<sup>303</sup> (as where ownership gives liking a post-decision boost). Moreover, the types of pleasure derived from anticipation are different from those derived from experience, which, in turn, are different from those derived from remembering that experience (as in the kinds of satisfaction incident to intercourse).”<sup>304</sup>

“Moreover,” said Charles, “the physiology of positive affect, dopamine flow across the nucleus encumbens, is not well synchronized with what we call ‘satisfaction’ or ‘pleasure.’ The experiences that produce dopamine flow are not always the ones we think they are, the limbic system being only loosely connected to the neocortex.”<sup>305</sup>

“I cannot challenge these findings,” said Adam retaining his grasp on the world he knew, “but if you do not frame your policy to accommodate what ordinary people experience as wanting, that is, as articulate or inarticulate demand, you are in deep trouble.”

Of course Adam was right, but it was of the very nature of Charles’ and Dessie’s argument that much of what they were talking about was outside of consciousness and that their vision was of a political-economic world that developed what they thought of as “better people” whose capacities and feelings and thoughts were not known to themselves but were known to science. It was a dangerous vision.

“Demand, itself, has to be explained; it isn’t just ‘there’ to be exploited,” said Dessie using a pejorative term on purpose. “Put yourself back in the 18<sup>th</sup> century – or before. With such exceptions as my ancestor, Erasmus, and Spinoza and Montaigne, all the heavy thinking had been done by the priestly class constrained by Christian dogma. The partial lifting of this constraint must have made choice seem like an exhilarating experience, something to be extended under the name of liberty. In the century just ended, Berlin comments on the ‘newness’ of the concept of liberty.<sup>306</sup> We have lost that sense of ‘newness’ but at the time, surely ‘Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive’ and a sense that this relatively new freedom was possible was part of that euphoria.”

“At last,” said Hypatia, vicariously enjoying this recalled (if slightly misappropriated) sense of bliss.

“So institutions born of the Enlightenment emphasized choice, not because of a groundswell of demand, but because an elite extended to others (sometimes grudgingly – remember the Framers worry over direct popular rule) the institutions of choice. And the institutions, thus framed and thus constructed, demanded that goods and offices were to be chosen by general publics. It is congenial to the theories of the Enlightenment to think that these institutions were themselves chosen by popular demand, but, while partly true, it is also true that the institutions required, demanded that the public choose. Those

interests gaining something by market and democratic institutions then become partisans of choice.”

“And who, aside from a few elitist spinach pie-eaters who know better than others what is good for these others, is against choice?” asked Adam with scorn. He continued, “I have not heard such disparagement of free choice since I read Nietzsche and Leo Strauss. Dessie, old boy, the company you keep does you no credit.”

“About two thirds of the public favor restricting people’s choices of purveyors of health insurance by instituting a single-payer plan,” said Charles. “People’s choices to pollute the air and water and even their choice of whether to drive cars with high CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are limited by publicly endorsed regulation. The point is that choices are already judged by their consequences. All we are saying is to recognize and extend this principle as the criterion for freedom of choice – and stop this nonsense about freedom to choose being a good in itself.”

Hypatia answered before he was finished. “In much of the US the enemies of freedom would be the people who would suppress atheists, communists, homosexuals, and abortionists (that is, those who call their support of abortion ‘pro-choice’); in Saudi Arabia, the enemies would be those opposed to these same pariahs plus Christians, Jews, and Shiites; in China, your allies would be those who suppress outspoken supporters of democracy and free speech. Adam is right, Dessie; the company you keep is a disgrace.”

“But there is a difference between seeking to silence a particular voice and seeking to reduce the stress, regret, and anxiety of choice overload,” said Dessie, with the pathos of a man who believes he is a sane humanist but whose audience is determined to misunderstand him. “It is the difference between a hunter with a knife to the jugular and a surgeon excising a cancer with a scalpel. The hunter seeks to kill his prey; the surgeon seeks to save the life of his patient.” The metaphor was apt but it did not seem to persuade. Dessie took another tack. “*Cuius bono?*” he asked in lawyerese to impress his little circle of friends. “In the market, choice benefits those with money; in politics, it benefits those with influence; in general, it benefits those who acquire greater choosing skills by education. Freedom, the glow word that means more choice, may be formally available to all, but in practice it is biased in favor of those with resources, especially mental resources like professors.”

“Spoken like a true elitist from a rich country,” said Adam. “The former finance minister of Pakistan, writing for the UN, said that economic development meant ‘insuring that individuals lead fuller lives and *enjoy more choices*.’<sup>307</sup> Not everybody suffers from the choice overload of modernity. Your humanism should demand that you look across the North-South divide and limit your generalizations to the smaller group in the North. But even in the rich pastures of modernity, you slight the poor. You give Mindful Rationality to the college educated (the ruling class – ‘the men of knowledge’)<sup>308</sup> and leave Adaptive Unconscious to the others.”

That was unfair because both Dessie and Charles had pointed out the universality of Adaptive Unconscious. But Dessie had another point to make: “We have been focusing on markets and democracies as though they existed outside of society.<sup>309</sup> But, in fact, social choices have proliferated just as fast as have market choices, a crucial fact in considering overload.”

## The Proliferation of Choices

“You mean instead of arranged marriages we have marriages where the couple must choose each other,” said Adam with traces of a smirk.

“That and other instances where custom has given way to choice,” said Dessie with a sobriety that was quite smirk-erasing. “As Henry Maine said almost 150 years ago, ‘Starting... from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved toward a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals.’<sup>310</sup> In my opinion,” said Dessie, “the movement that Maine calls ‘progressive’ has come to fruition in the stress and anxiety<sup>311</sup> that plagues American society. Each individual must now *choose* things that once were more or less given: choice of education (where? how much? what subjects?); choice of occupation for working class youth and of careers for middle class youth (where once much was predetermined by father’s occupation for males and much foreclosed for females); choice of sexual and marital partners (and with what degree of commitment?); choice of where to live; choice of religion and, for immigrants and their children, choice of national identity, where both religion and nationality were once ascriptive; the vaunted choices in the markets, made more complex by more discretionary income and the proliferation of types of goods; choice of dress, complicated by the relaxation of dress codes; choice of leisure pursuits (television, movies, workouts at the gym, picnics in the park) and of vacation; medical choices starting (in the US) with complex choices among insurance policies; and political choices that are made more difficult by the weakening of party identifications. The consequence is that: ‘with limitless choice... we feel worse about them.’”<sup>312</sup> Dessie had exhausted himself with this inventory of choices and waited for the opposition to cheer the choices that exhausted him and so many others.

“What a wonderful addition to gray matter that inventory betokens,” said Adam with a touch of sarcasm to mask his surprise at how few of the choices were market choices. “As with the rats whose gray matter grew with the enrichment of their environments (more choices),<sup>313</sup> so must our own gray matter flourish as the brain takes over new tasks from the enriched – and therefore anxiety producing? – culture.” Here Adam added irony to his touch of sarcasm.

“By giving these enriched rats conflicting signals you can give these poor little chaps nervous breakdowns,” said Charles, as concerned for the rats as he was for people.

## Costs of More Choices

“‘Choice’ is almost as gross a term as ‘freedom’ or ‘autonomy,’”<sup>314</sup> said Dessie seeking firmer ground. “Concretely, what are the kinds of costs that are likely to be incurred from expanding choices as our society has done now for a century or more?”

“Fine,” said Adam: “What are the costs of the benefits gained when more options satisfy more people’s special tastes?”

**Poorer choices.** “More options often mean poorer choices,” said Dessie, sharply. “An experiment with detergents offered different student samples 1, 2, and 4 attributes on 2, 4,

and 8 different brands (up to 32 possible combinations): as information increased there was at first an increase and then a decrease in the ability of consumers to select the qualities they said they preferred before the experiment started.<sup>315</sup> A similar experiment using breakfast cereals offered information on 35 characteristics on each of 16 brands (560 cells): a fifth of the consumers wanted none of that information and of the 560 bits of information, the mean number of bits used was about 11.<sup>316</sup> In summarizing these and other experiments (with housewives as subjects), the authors of these studies say that the general confirmed principle was: ‘that there are finite limits to the ability of human beings to assimilate information... and that once these limits are surpassed, behavior tends to become dysfunctional.’<sup>317</sup> Adam, that is not the way to maximize utility.”

Adam was aware of some of these consumer studies but discounted them. “Of course there are finite limits to how much information people can assimilate, but that doesn’t keep them from shopping and buying, does it? Information overload is simply the cost of competition. Would you prefer less information at the price of less competition?” It was a ploy; Adam knew that more competition did not always mean more information.

**Reduced sales.** “Do more choices discourage buying?” asked Dessie, repeating Adam’s first question. “Wilson’s experiment with gourmet jams presented a small array in one condition and a much larger array in another. When the larger array was presented, there were more tasters and *fewer* buyers. If you do not care for jam, try chocolates. After tasting from a large or small array of chocolates, subjects were offered a choice between a gift of chocolates and a gift of money. In the larger array condition, more people chose money than chocolates as their gift. And if you think food is different, these experimenters also offered students choices among either six or thirty topics for a required essay. The six-topic condition produced more satisfaction and better essays.<sup>318</sup> Why so much resistance to the proliferation of choices that you, Adam, find so satisfying? One reason is that with more attractive options but not more money, more of these options must be turned down, with consequent regret (buyers remorse). Another is that in addition to giving something up, trade-offs require effort. The combination is painful.<sup>319</sup> And the more thought invested in such choices, the worse they will feel about any possible loss of satisfaction from items not chosen. People who maximize experience more remorse than those who satisfice their utilities (settling for a product that is ‘good enough’). This remorse especially haunts those ‘creative thinkers’ whose counter-factualism takes the form of ‘if only...’<sup>320</sup> Again: more thought, more pain. Again, Adam, more painful deciding means more avoidance of decisions and less buying.”<sup>321</sup>

**When does responsibility become too burdensome?** “I find it amusing,” said Adam, ignoring Dessie’s evidence on how choices *reduce* buying, “that Barry Schwartz, the man who perversely finds freedom is a kind of tyranny,<sup>322</sup> should also find that the responsibility of choosing is a heavy burden rather than an opportunity to control one’s own life. Making a sow’s ear out of a silk purse is a triumph of perverse craftsmanship. Isn’t it strange that Langer and Rodin found that vesting inmates of retirement homes with responsibility for caring for a plant actually lengthened their lives.”<sup>323</sup>

“That experiment with the elderly was anything but overload,” said Dessie. “Anyway, Schwartz agrees that ‘every choice we make is a testament to our autonomy.’<sup>324</sup> That’s a pretty sensitive ear for your ordinary sow! But Schwartz also

recognizes that, beyond a certain point, more responsibilities can be burdensome. Did you ever decide that you just could not take on another lecture or referee another paper for a journal? And after each refusal, why did you feel guilty? Proliferation of choice is a proliferation of obligations. Of course you want *responsible* people but you can't have them without having people who constantly worry whether they are meeting their *obligations* to each other. I think that one of the causes for our epidemic of anxiety is choice overload."

***The diminishing returns to choice.*** "Have you heard of the declining marginal utility of choices or the diminishing returns to choice?" asked Dessie in the avuncular style that Adam found so irritating. "As choices increase in number and complexity, sense of control first increases and then decreases as bewilderment takes the place of feeling in charge. The rule applies to political choices as well as market choices and student choices. If freedom means more choice, one could, if one is brave enough, speak of the diminishing return to freedom." Dessie was now more impish than avuncular.

***Perpetual choice implies lack of commitment.*** "If the cost of freedom is a higher rate of anxiety, I'll pay the price," said Adam. "Imagine Patrick Henry saying, 'As for me, give me freedom from anxiety or give me death.'"

Hypatia was heard to mutter, "'certain inalienable rights... among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit' of dopamine flow."

"I forget whether Patrick Henry was married or not," said Charles, "but if he was, he might have recognized that some kinds of choices are best made with a sense of commitment rather than with a blessing for the freedom that made them revocable. Patrick Henry was a patriot. Would he have agreed that his choice of country was also revocable, that he was free to choose another country tomorrow if that were more appealing? Were his chosen friends constantly under review to see if they met his preference criteria? Marital choice, choice of loyalty or disloyalty to one's country, choice of friends, and to some extent choice of religion (where belief is said to be a condition for understanding) all suggest choices that are best made with commitment. In ethics, keeping promises is the classic intuitive moral prescription and *fidelity* is always honorable. Since ethical merit requires that a person *choose* the right and the good, ethical support for commitment, fidelity, and loyalty is not a denial of the value of choice but rather a specification of when choices should be binding, a narrowing of future choices."

There was silence. To those who asked, "Who could be against freedom?" the answering question, Who could be against fidelity and commitment? was unexpected and distressing.

Adam broke the silence. "You left yourself a loophole which I would now like to explore. You said that when people needed to plan ahead and weigh one thing against another they could escape from the adaptive unconscious into mindful rationality. If so, I can accept quite a bit of this adaptive unconscious business."

## Does the Benefit of Choice Depend on Using Mindful Rationality?

“Before getting into that,” said Dessie defending the Adaptive Unconscious as though he had invented it, “I want to remind you that the AU is the normal default system with enormous resources not available to Mindful Rationality. “Not only does it translate light waves into visible, recognizable objects, as we said earlier; it also makes it possible for all of us to *learn* languages; it enables us to recognize the emotions expressed by faces in all parts of the world, to respond automatically to the cry of a baby (which unconsciously activates the anterior cingulate cortex of its parents),<sup>325</sup> to experience empathy,<sup>326</sup> and to adapt to ‘triumph and disaster’ in the ways that Kipling said we might when at our best.<sup>327</sup> The adaptive unconscious does not complete this learning process, but by making the process possible the Adaptive Unconscious gives people choices that cultures further refine and help people use. The adaptive unconscious offers *capabilities* – and a reward system giving initial hedonic guidance on how to use them. But against resistance, the AU does not *require* us to use these capabilities; we are not ants. Think of Amartya Sen’s idea of “Capability as Freedom.”<sup>328</sup> Sen’s freedom is a step beyond what Mill prescribed in *On Liberty* and beyond the provisions of the Bill of Rights; it is a kind of positive freedom, enlarging opportunities. Without the Adaptive Unconscious, no amount of freedom from restraint would help; we would be helpless. But notice that Sen does not say that more freedom increases our capabilities; it may or it may not.”

***Markets and democracies rely on the adaptive unconscious.*** In her position as reluctant learner, Hypatia accepted this but wanted more. “It’s not quite enough to say the Adaptive Unconscious gives us sight and language and makes us human. Fine!” she said. “But specifically, is the AU a sufficient tutor for the complex choices we make as consumers and voters? If the AU prompts people to make market choices by habit and routine, markets will not maximize authentic satisfaction. The justification for the market is undermined. And if voters do not see the links between, on the one hand, the candidates, parties, and issues, and, on the other hand, the voters’ individual and group welfare, democracies also lose their justification. Does the adaptive unconscious instruct consumers and voters on how to register their authentic, long-term preferences in these two separate venues?”

“Come out with it,” said Charles proud of Hypatia’s probing question. “The plain answer is ‘No, the Adaptive Unconscious doesn’t offer sufficient guidance.’ There is a mismatch between the kinds of choice required by both markets and democracies and the default choice system of humankind. Neither markets nor democracies were designed for the Adaptive Unconscious; they were designed for people constantly employing their back-up Mindful Rationality systems. The mismatch could be relieved in two ways: (1) consumers and voters could live on the leading edge of their capabilities, always alert, always thinking of how things might be better with their attention fully engaged,<sup>329</sup> always ‘maximizers’ in an endless quest for the best.<sup>330</sup> That is too stressful; people can’t live that way. Or (2) the mismatch could be corrected by changing the 18<sup>th</sup> century imago implicit in markets and democracies so that their demands on people could actually be met. Those better-informed imagoes would then acknowledge the fact that people were likely to choose from the more limited repertoire provided by the adaptive unconscious. By reducing their expectations of human performance, markets and democracies would

satisfy more people. As things now stand, markets and democracies do not offer the scaffolding that would help to make people's choices more satisfying." Charles' naturally sorrowful manner made it seem that he bitterly regretted having to explain how markets and democracies failed, but, in fact, he had long wanted to explain his view of the sources of this relative failure.

"Of course you are right, Charles, but not today," said Dessie, gently. "Today we really ought to focus on the general problems of freedom and choice, of which market choice and democratic choice offer important cases. I'm sure we'll return to the general problems of freedom in some later session."

***Cultural norms and cues help guide the adaptive unconscious.*** "I am not frightened by the unconscious," said Hypatia, as though she were declaring herself on good terms with snakes. "You want to appropriate it for our genetic endowments, but that is misappropriation for, in fact, most of the unconscious is made up of the cultural norms and beliefs we absorb with the air we breathe: if people are queued up for tickets, take your place at the end of the line; if your neighbor injures you, do not hit him back but take him to court; owning possessions normally implies respect,<sup>331</sup> not allegations of theft. The reason the adaptive unconscious can guide us without disasters through the maze of choices we encounter is that, in spite of what Dessie says, there *is* a scaffolding to guide us: it is *culture*. We are not zombies, the walking dead; we are *automata*. That is [she smiled, self-consciously], most of the variance in buying and voting is explained by custom and group identification."

"Good point," said Dessie, "but as custom provides less and less guidance, the adaptive unconscious threatens to be overloaded. Does that mean more reliance on Mindful Rationality?"

### **How Mindful Rationality Spoils Decisions**

Charles had discussed this switchover from Adaptive Unconscious to Mindful Rationality earlier in these spinach pie sessions,<sup>332</sup> but thought some analogies might add clarity. "The unconsciousness of the AU is like a sleeping mother, alert to the signs of distress in her baby whose call can bring her instantly to wakeful consciousness. It is like emotions working beneath the radar screen of consciousness but available to consciousness when the emotions are urgent enough. Similarly, the Adaptive Unconscious can call into service its backup Mindful Rationality when needed. Don't forget, however, that when an emotion becomes conscious, the underlying physiology of that emotion is silently doing its work in the limbic system, a system generally outside the realm of consciousness. Consciousness does not know its own physiology – except maybe the hippocampus' working memory." Charles knew this was inadequate but figured that at least it broke the either-or mindset.

***When mindful rationality does worse than the adaptive unconscious.*** "You should be worrying more about the capacity of the MR to help than about the transition problem," said Dessie, eager to confront his fellow intellectuals with evidence that thinking is not always helpful. "Two psychologists compared the judgments of students who had been

asked to analyze their preferences for a variety of jams with the judgments of students who were simply asked which ones they liked best. The judgments of students who did *not* analyze their preferences corresponded better with the judgments of jam experts.”<sup>333</sup>

“*De gustibus non est disputandum*,”<sup>334</sup> said Adam, showing off his Latin (borrowed from a famous article in the *American Economic Review*).

“Wilson and his colleague compared expert opinion with the judgments of students asked to make two kinds of analysis of various college courses: one group of students was asked to give reasons for their preferences, and another group was asked to evaluate all attributes of all courses. Compared to a control group whose members merely expressed their judgments, both groups of the evaluating, ‘thinking’ students did worse, using expert opinion as a standard. Why? The authors hold that: ‘analyzing reasons can focus people’s attention on non-optimal criteria, causing them to base their subsequent choices on these criteria. Evaluating multiple attributes can moderate people’s judgments, causing them to discriminate less well between the different alternatives.’”<sup>335</sup>

“So the students liked the courses with easy grading and the experts preferred courses like Hypatia’s with substance to them,” said Adam with a little smile for Hypatia.

“Remember the Dutchmen of our first session who found that for complex questions the unconscious produced better results than explicit thought on the task assigned?” asked Charles, interrupting. “The authors of the study said that ‘the unconscious brain has a far greater capacity for information than conscious working memory.’”<sup>336</sup>

“Do you paint?” asked Dessie of Adam, apparently irrelevantly. “Wilson and colleagues presented students with a set of posters, some with reproductions of van Gogh and Monet and some with topical, kitschy subjects. The students were asked to choose among posters and allowed to take home their favorites. If they wrote essays on their choices, they chose the funny kitschy posters. If they did *not* write essays, they were more likely to choose the van Goghs and Monets and were more likely to hang them on the wall when they took them home. Why? Because in writing the essay it was easier to justify and *verbalize* the choice of the funny contemporary posters than the more serious and ambiguous ones.”<sup>337</sup>

“Be careful what you say, Dessie,” cautioned Adam, laughing; “you may come to believe it.”

“We’re all lecturers here,” said Dessie, wishing to share the onus of speech. “Other students of this indefatigable Wilson, students who were in an affectionate relationship at the time, were asked to write about either their relationship or their major. Writing about their relationship made them more likely to break it off. The authors believe that verbalizing distorts authentic feeling,<sup>338</sup> but in my opinion, the cause could be more serious. Certain activities in the cortex interfere with the production of hormones characteristic of people in love (cortisol and phenylethylamine),<sup>339</sup> but that is just a hypothesis. Professors can be great lovers, but not while they are thinking.”

“There’s not much joy in your world, is there Dessie?” asked Hypatia sympathetically. “Is that because thinking makes people unhappy? Or because unhappy people think more?” She sighed in sympathy with unhappy thinkers, including some philosophers she knew.

***Does mindful rationality make people happy?*** “Does thinking make a person happy? Are professors, who are supposed to be more often mindfully rational than others, happier than others?” asked Dessie in a reflective mood. “Since there is no positive correlation between mood and IQ or level of education,<sup>340</sup> I doubt it. ‘Maximizers’ calculating the last ounce of pleasure and perfection in their choices, are certainly less happy and less satisfied with their choices than are the more casual ‘good enough,’ satisficers.<sup>341</sup> But of course what one thinks about is crucial: stimulated to think about happy things, people are put in a good mood that spills over onto other things, while thinking about unhappy things makes them sad.<sup>342</sup> Is the self a ‘happy thing?’ Apparently not: being reminded of oneself by mirrors or taped recordings of one’s own voice tends to make a person actively conscious of her personal deficiencies.<sup>343</sup> Bad moods follow. When one has troubles, distraction is a better route to a good mood than is rumination.<sup>344</sup> Worriers are not good thinkers. As Susan Langer says: ‘Anxiety is not mindful, and mindlessness is not relaxing. Indeed stressful events are probably less stressful when considered from multiple perspectives.’”<sup>345</sup> As Pollyanna said much earlier, think happy thoughts, think about others rather than the self, brighten the corner where you are.<sup>346</sup> And,” added Dessie, “keep away from me.”

***Does happiness encourage mindful rationality?*** “What about the other way around: does happiness encourage mindful rationality?” asked Hypatia.

“Creativity, yes,” said Dessie: “‘Positive emotions... encourage people to look beyond the normal problem-solving method to try different options.’ But at the same time, happy people tend to simplify complex problems, relying on intuition and guessing; and they are less accurate in predicting what will happen because they think fortune will continue to smile upon them and that the misfortunes of others will pass them by.”<sup>347</sup>

“I begin to see why the 18<sup>th</sup> century’s happiness project flourished while its perfectibility project languished,” said Hypatia, ruefully. “They travel different paths that may, but often do not, intersect.”

### **Can the Adaptive Unconscious Qualify as Ethical?**

***The ethical assessment of the adaptive unconscious is wholly consequential.*** But, returning to her ethical concerns, Hypatia saw a problem: “Because ethical merit is earned by good intentions, I think the more mindful the choice, the more likely it is to qualify as an ethical choice.” She said, and then paused, suddenly aware of the un-traveled territory ahead of her. “I hesitate to say that behavior sponsored by the adaptive unconscious is not ethical,” she continued, more cautiously. “After all, good intentions, like love, may be influenced by hormonal balances that are not themselves the product of good will.” She paused again. “Friends, I would like frankly to admit that my 18<sup>th</sup> century philosophy is not equipped to comment on the ethics of the adaptive unconscious.”

Charles looked at Hypatia with pride. “The philosophical tradition cherishes wisdom over doctrine and can generate its own rebirth,” he said. “The Renaissance is born again, shedding new light on the Enlightenment. See you next week.”

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## PART FOUR: THE MATERIALIST DILEMMA

### Chapter Eight

#### FROM DEARTH TO ANXIETY

*In a revolution congenial to the New Humanists' emphasis on the behavioral-neurological aspects of life, these iconoclasts claim that in advanced countries the main problem of mankind is not poverty or scarcity but rather anxiety, loss of peace of mind. This diagnosis fits well with their emphasis on well-being instead of prosperity, on human feelings instead of human circumstances, on unconscious decisions taking the place of conscious ones. Theirs is a monumental revolution, dictated as much by the success of economics in guiding nations to prosperity as by the discoveries of the behavioral-neurological sciences. And the implications for social policy are also monumental: from economic growth to human development, from food for the body to nourishment of the mind, from objective circumstances yielding to fiscal policy to subjective conditions yielding to more subtle socio-cultural change.*

*Much of the friends' discussion is devoted to laying out the evidence for the decline of (absolute) poverty and the growth of anxiety in Western nations. The evidence on the rise of anxiety is multifold but relies heavily on the 2001-2003 World Health Organization study of mental disorders in fourteen countries, including substantial samples in China and Japan. This large study shows that the United States has by far the largest proportion of depressed and anxious people and Japan and China by far the lowest. With the help of other studies focused on the role of interpersonal relations in causing anxiety, the two heretics argue that it is the failure of materialist, market societies to foster close human ties that accounts in large part for the rise of anxiety. It does not help Adam's case for the market that a prevalent economic insecurity is also a major predictor of anxiety.*

*Back to the dispute over the two imagoes: The Enlightenment occurred just at the time when it seemed that poverty was no longer an essential part of life, leading Enlightenment thinkers to developed an imago designed to address the newly mutable poverty: humans were consciously rational, materialist, and self-interested. Presented both by a different problem and better knowledge of human nature, the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries developed Imago-21: humans behaved under the guidance of their adaptive unconscious, did not separate emotions from cognitions, and inherited in their genes much of their guidance system.*

*In order to complement this internal guidance system with an objective set of cues and stimuli, The New Humanists return to a concept introduced in the previous session, scaffolding. After offering some examples of how society can provide help for difficult choices they argue that the historical culture of individualism fails to take seriously the need to support people in the maze of choices they must somehow negotiate.*

\* \* \* \* \*

As something of a Latin scholar, Charles sat musing at the window looking out on what he called the *via doloro* because of its heavy traffic of weary scholars burdened, he sadly thought, with their many duties and responsibilities.

Adam-the-wary came in and settled across from Charles in the red plastic booth. “Greetings,” he said warmly. And with a friendly smile belying the perverse nature of his question, he asked: “If you really believe that the brain is the source of ideas, why not identify them by their brain location?”

By coincidence (although Charles feared something more), Dessie and Hypatia came in together, chatting amiably, in a kind of truce, about Descartes’ dualism. Clark’s really was a strange place. “If ideas are not phenomena separate from the changes in neurotransmitters, why don’t we refer to Marxism by identifying the neuromodulators, probably in the frontal lobes, that light up when we speak of Marxism?” she was asking as they sat down.

An old hand at escaping from uncomfortable corners, Dessie spread out his paper napkin and pretended to look at the menu.

Just then, Marian came to take their orders: “Three spinach pies, one minestrone, and four coffees, two black,” she announced from memory before the four had a chance to exercise their neuromodulators.

“Take Marian,” said Adam. “She has a job that she does well, has an income that helps her put her daughter through the local college. She does not need to know that she is a puppet of economic forces beyond her power to control, that Yale’s education and research are growth industries providing her with the patrons lost when Winchester and Gilbert left New Haven and when their city lost its economic base as a railroad center. Can anyone doubt that the fundamental basis of a good life for Marian and everybody else is the state of the economy, the conquest of poverty?” Adam had wanted to make this point to to his psycho-cultural detractors for a long time. He felt better.

“Supposing it were the case that the very forces that gave Marian and others (including us) jobs and incomes at the same time gave us neither happiness nor opportunities to develop our skills and express our personalities?” asked Dessie.

“Supposing a slave economy were so productive that the slaves themselves had filet mignon for dinner and feather beds at night?” asked Hypatia, risking misinterpretation in order to support Dessie’s point.

### **From Traditional Scarcity to Modern Anxiety**

“Okay,” said Adam, “I accept that we may have paid too little attention to the strains on our endowed capacities, but you guys seem to be saying that the ages old human struggle to earn a living and enjoy the fruits thereof is no longer satisfying. Are you saying not only that society has changed but also that human beings, themselves, have changed and are no longer what they once were? If you are saying that, I wonder if the former plowman living in a village would not instantly recognize the family and budgeting problems of the modern mechanic living in Detroit whose adolescent son is dating the wrong girl and going with the wrong crowd. There is continuity in human life that makes your alarm about fitting the right shoe on the right foot rather, well, alarmist. If the shoe fits...” he trailed off with his sentence unfinished but his meaning fairly clear.

This made Hypatia restless: the implied acceptance of modernity and the slighting of the changes it had brought to the human scene were upsetting. “You know, of course,” she said, “that even in Micronesia and in the American Indian reservations the rates of change are closely related to suicide rates.”<sup>348</sup>

Charles looked at Dessie with a “you go first” kind of look.

“As ‘the plowman homeward plods his weary way,’ said Dessie, “he is thinking of dinner – perhaps whether that side of mutton will last until the spring lambs come this year. He is hungry, perhaps worried, but not anxious. As the Detroit mechanic, stuck in traffic, homeward wends his weary way, he is thinking of whether the new Buick models will be sufficiently attractive to keep the factory going another year, whether his adolescent son is on drugs, what his boss meant by that remark on his ‘many years of service,’ whether his wife got that job in the library, whether his medical insurance will cover his daughter’s appendectomy, and, intermittently, whether that ping under the hood means the gasket is finally giving out. He is not hungry but he has enough worries to make him anxious and to distract him so that he misses the familiar exit from the expressway and is late for dinner.”

“If you add Goldsmith’s ‘Deserted Village’ to Gray’s ‘Elegy,’ you will find your plowman worrying about another closing, the enclosure movement: ‘where wealth accumulates and men decay.’ But never mind,” said Adam. “Please come either to your topic sentence or your ‘thus we see’ paragraph.”

“You know what he’s going to say because he told it to you last year,”<sup>349</sup> said Hypatia, torn between the pathos of Dessie’s account of the Detroit mechanic and admiration for Adam’s flowering into poetry. “He’s going to tell you in more detail than you want that in rich countries increased income is not associated with much, if any, increase in well-being. Money doesn’t make you happy, but friends do.”<sup>350</sup> And I agree with him even if it is a simplistic diagnosis that short-cuts all the complexities of *eudaimon* or the most noble and just life.”<sup>351</sup>

“Is that all?” asked Adam, sulking.

“Thank you,” said Dessie to Hypatia’s classic, if inflamed, profile. “But I have moved on from my theme of last year to another one that explains the lag in the imago better. May I try it out on you?” He would rather not talk with spinach pie in his mouth but sometimes he forgot. “Tedseezofourtym,” he said before excusing himself and starting over. “The disease of our time,” he said, “is no longer poverty or dearth or lack of food and housing and clothing. Gray could write of the ‘simple annals of the poor’ but neither Steinbeck nor Upton Sinclair, nor Dos Pasos would call the Detroit mechanic ‘poor.’ The Detroit mechanic is relatively well paid, although quite insecure. And my African-American cleaning lady has a car and color TV.”<sup>352</sup> In 1994 about 15 percent of the population was below the poverty line while only 8 percent did not have television in their homes. Have you tried to give to Goodwill the clothing you just took off and had laundered? The frayed collars you wore yesterday disqualify them for the ‘poor.’ Malnutrition in the U.S. includes some undernourished children, but the most common form of malnutrition is obesity from junk food. Although the numbers are small, it is relevant that three and a half times as many people die of hypertension as of nutritional deficiencies in the U.S. Poverty in the old sense is not the problem; insecurity, including economic insecurity, is. Anxiety is.”<sup>353</sup>

*The costs of anxiety.* “Is this poetry from Auden’s ‘Age of Anxiety’?”<sup>354</sup> asked Adam scornfully, forgetting that he had cited Goldsmith a few minutes earlier.

Hypatia did not like that scorn. “There is a poetic justice in finding that the wages of materialism are anxiety,” she said briskly to her sometime ally.

Dessie was prepared: “The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, which is about as prosaic as sources get,” he said, “recently reported that a study in 2001-2002 found ‘23 million [11.08 percent of the population] meet criteria for independent anxiety disorders (including panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and specific and social phobias).’<sup>355</sup> Does that put Auden in perspective?”

“Humph,” said Adam, coolly, “you know as well as I do that raw statistics tell nothing of trends or causes.”

“Try this,” said Dessie, “a meta-analysis of a large number of studies found that over the 1952-1993 period ‘Americans have shifted toward substantially higher levels of anxiety and neuroticism in recent decades. Both college students (adult) and child samples increased almost a full standard deviation in anxiety between 1952 and 1993 (explaining about 20 percent of the variance in the trait.)’ For example, ‘The average American child in the 1980s reported more anxiety than child psychiatric patients in the 1950s.’”<sup>356</sup>

“I still don’t see why now,” said Adam sounding a little defeated but still assertive.

“The authors of the analysis make some inferences from correlations, a risky process but not unknown in economics,” said Dessie. “They suggest that ‘decreases in social connectedness’<sup>357</sup> may be substantially responsible for this rise in anxiety, but their inadequate economic indicators leads them to miss the sources of anxiety in high job-turnover.”

“Just as psychoanalysts used to find all sources of distress in family relations, so, it seems to me, social psychologists tend to find such sources in social connectedness,” said Adam, perversely sorry that economic factors were not found more responsible. “What makes you think it is weakening of social connections that account for the rise in anxiety?”

“You want before and after studies and there are a few. For example, when you recognize that what Anglos call anxiety, Latinos call *ataque de nervios*, it turns out that these *ataques* generally occur ‘as a direct result of a stressful life event related to family or significant others (e.g., death or divorce).’ Recent research on Puerto Ricans in the U.S. finds ‘an association between social disruptions (family and immediate social networks) and the experience of *ataques*. But lest you think it is only these volatile Latinos that have a relation between anxiety and social disruptions, let me remind you that the Japanese-Americans show a similar pattern, if not directly with anxiety, at least with heart-disease. Thus, another study reports: ‘Some kinds of cultural cohesion may protect against heart disease. In a 1976 study of Japanese-Americans those who preserved their traditional customs had a lower rate of coronary artery disease.’<sup>358</sup>

“The examples you have chosen reflect only the peculiar strains of assimilation into the difficult American culture. What about mainline Americans?” asked Adam with decreasing confidence.

“As it happens, the World Health Organization (WHO) has recently conducted a 14 nation study of mental illnesses (and their lack of treatment) in the 2001-2003 period.

Based on standardized definitions of four classes of mental illness (anxiety, mood [major and bipolar depression], impulse control, and substance abuse) the study found that the American national sample had higher rates of disorder in almost all categories (all except substance abuse) than any other advanced country measured and, most interesting, much higher than the two Asian nations, Japan and China (samples in Beijing and Shanghai).<sup>359</sup>

“Fascinating and disturbing,” said Hypatia, hanging closely on Dessie’s account. “And what happened to all those ‘temperamental’ Latinos that Adam thought were just naturally given to *ataques de nervios*? And all those emotional Mediterranean types, like the Greeks?” Her limbic system smoldering, Hypatia couldn’t help attacking Anglo ‘superiority’ as she pursued her genuine interest in the vulnerability of moderns.

“It goes like this” said Dessie: “For the populations you mentioned, percentages of the population qualifying for diagnosis of anxiety severe enough to need treatment, are: United States (18.2), for the two Latin American nations included: Columbia (10.0), Mexico (6.8), for the three Mediterranean nations included: Lebanon (11.2). France (12.0), and Italy (5.8).<sup>360</sup> Note that in the U.S. there are about a fifth again as many people ill with anxiety as there are people below the poverty line in a bad year.” Then, turning to Hypatia, he added, “Sorry, nothing on Greece,” adding, for Adam’s benefit: “Incidentally, when one relates these data to income per capita, one finds either no relationship or an inverse relationship.”

“I don’t see what your account has to do with social disconnectedness,” said Adam, ignoring an opportunity to make a point in favor of affluence.

“For that, you have to remember something about scores on a cultural measure of individualism and collectivism that we discussed two weeks ago,” said Dessie trying, but not too hard, to avoid sounding patronizing. “In a nutshell, individualist nations put individual goals ahead of group goals while collectivist nations do the reverse, putting group goals ahead of individual goals.<sup>361</sup> Japan and China and other Asian nations are consistently more collectivist; the U.S. comes through as the most individualist of all nations with the Netherlands ranking close behind. This is relevant to the social disconnectedness thesis, because individualist nations emphasize personal happiness whereas collectivist nations emphasize harmony of interpersonal relationships.”

Charles couldn’t wait. “Give us the scores, please,” he said.

“As I mentioned, the U.S. had 18.2 cases of certifiable anxiety per thousand; the Netherlands had about half of that with 8.9 cases; Japan had 5.3 and in Beijing there were 3.2 and in Shanghai there were only 2.4 such cases per thousand. Aside from Nigeria (also a collectivist culture) the two Asian nations had the lowest rates of anxiety of all the counties measured. Since, as you know, anxiety and depression have relatively high co-morbidity rates, note that the same ranking prevails for mood disorders, with the U.S. again the most morbid of all the nations studied.<sup>362</sup> I made a little table of the data,” said Dessie pushing a slip of paper across the table. “You will think I favored my case by selecting the U.S. as the representative of the individualist cultures, but Japan and China have lower per capita rates of anxiety and depression than *any* of the seven European countries in the study.<sup>363</sup>

Adam, a rational man as well as an economist, was impressed and tried to be helpful in an enterprise he deeply suspected. “So you are saying that instead of poverty and dearth, which have been the main problems of mankind and possibly of all primates

**Table 8.1**  
**Twelve-Month Prevalence of Mental Disorders: U.S. vs. Japan and China**<sup>364</sup>

<u>Country</u>	<u>Anxiety</u>	<u>Mood</u>	<u>Impulse-Control</u>	<u>Substance-abuse</u>	<u>Any</u>
United States	18.2	6.8	6.8	3.8	26.4
<i>Collectivist cultures</i>					
Japan	5.3	3.1	1.0	1.7	8.8
China					
– Beijing	3.2	2.5	2.6	2.6	9.1
– Shanghai	2.4	1.7	0.7	0.5	4.3

for the past several million years (and for roundworms, too, for all I know), we now are faced with a quite different main problem, the problem of anxiety, or, perhaps, of mental illness more generally. And it would follow that civilization’s adaptive solution to poverty, the market economy, is not necessarily the solution to this New Age illness. It can’t be true,” he said with pathos that wrung Dessie’s heart, “My world would be shattered.” He used the conditional tense.

“All you have to do is to put a cost price on anxiety and devise institutions that minimize that cost,” said Dessie. “But I wonder if the market isn’t itself a source of both the commodities that make some people happy *and* the insecurity that makes more people anxious.”<sup>365</sup> In his effort to find a silver lining for Adam, Dessie was only making matters worse.

***How does Imago-18 contribute to the substitution of anxiety for poverty?*** Charles had been following this tale of economic woe with mixed feelings. Ever since the economists had ignored Veblen’s invitation to make economics an evolutionary discipline,<sup>366</sup> he had been suspicious, but his affection for crusty old Adam led him to search for a less dismissive answer. Imago-18 said people were materially self-interested and, in the words of one Enlightenment worthy, “property... is the foundation of happiness.”<sup>367</sup> But Imago-18 had not a word about security and insecurity. Could that legacy be the source of the modern failure to adapt as the salient problem shifted from poverty to anxiety? “A social focus on high GNP per capita at the cost of economic insecurity would be one way our dominant imago misleads us,” he said somewhat tentatively.

Dessie pounced. “Some evidence of an earlier period supports that priority of security over wealth,” he said. “For example, a study (1976) of 600 young, employed, heads of households in Baltimore and Detroit found that blue collar workers were as satisfied with their standard of living as were white collar workers but ‘they were more worried, feared unemployment more, and very concerned about societal developments which threatened their standards of living. Their dominant concern was security.’<sup>368</sup> This is especially true of the children of parents who themselves sought job security.<sup>369</sup> But it is more general: a study assessing the contributions of 12 domains to life satisfaction in Northern Michigan of both urban and rural groups found that ‘of the 12 domains, satisfaction with *financial security* has the greatest relative impact on satisfaction with

life as a whole.’<sup>370</sup> An Imago that omits or slights the thing that has ‘the greatest impact on satisfaction with life’ is a poor guide in an age of insecure affluence.”

“That caricature that you call *economic man* does have risk preferences,” said Adam softly, knowing that he often gave “that caricature” only two properties, greed and a rationality with miserable capacities for risk assessment.

Hypatia was more in tune with the tone of the conversation. Turning to Dessie, she said, “You mean that because the prevailing imago or social norms do not license anxiety and insecurity, people don’t know what to make of their anxious feelings. Perhaps people think they are unique in that respect and are ashamed of it – anxious about being anxious. But I think you will find a stronger case for your theory of imago-institutional strain in the idea of responsibility for one’s own fate, or, as you might say, of locus of control.”<sup>371</sup> Hypatia smiled to herself at that bit of social sciencese sneaked into her vocabulary. “Taking responsibility for your own fate makes more sense in relatively isolated communities where, for example, you might open a drapery store. But once the big chains invade your small community, you lose some of that control over your own fate. Oscar Lewis reports that where poverty is thought to be the responsibility of the individual, as in the U.S., it is more demoralizing than where it is thought to be controlled by fate, as in India.<sup>372</sup> Some of that demoralization shows up as anxiety.” There! A philosopher had again shown that the wonderful gifts of that discipline could transcend its bounds of language and grapple with the monsters of the empirical world.

***Evolutionary and genetic roots of anxiety.*** Charles was wrestling with something else, his conscience. “One problem for the strain hypothesis,” he said, “is that anxiety has a modest genetic basis.<sup>373</sup> For example, Dr. Una D. McCann of the National Institute of Mental Health once said that the species needs a kind of ‘fretful wariness in conditions of threat. Anxiety is there,’ she added, ‘for a really good reason. It’s one of the things that is part of our genes because it’s protective. And while feeling tense and peevish may not be much fun, evolution cares nothing for our amusement, but only whether we survive long enough to breed.’<sup>374</sup> Others also find that ‘anxious people pay more attention to threatening situations or objects’<sup>375</sup> and so, although they may or may not live longer now,<sup>376</sup> they may have had survival advantages in hunter-gatherer times. In modern times Randolph Nesse notes that insufficient anxiety among young males increases their motor accident rates,<sup>377</sup> a statement made slightly more plausible by the finding that sociopaths also lack the normal capacity for anxiety.”<sup>378</sup>

“I have always thought of young male drivers as sociopaths,” interjected Adam.

“As I was saying,” continued Charles in his funereal tones, “Although one can defend anxiety on these classical evolutionary grounds, anxiety is really bad for people. It shares some of the bodily wear and tear of the fight-or-flight syndrome to which it is related. ‘Fear is our emergency reaction to threat and anxiety is the form of fear that persists when the threat is more remote’<sup>379</sup> or merely imagined by our fertile, symbol-using brain. Evolution prepared the body for sudden physiological responses to deal with episodic moments of real danger. That is not the way anxiety works today, for anxiety makes these responses frequently and often chronically.<sup>380</sup> There are psychological responses as well as these physiological responses. Psychologically, the link to the brain’s ‘behavioral inhibition system’ (BIS) tends to create inhibited, timid, even phobic personalities. For example, introverted personalities have been shown to be more anxious

than others and to have overactive BISs.<sup>381</sup> Furthermore, stress, the source of much anxiety, reduces cognitive ability,<sup>382</sup> impairs the performance of cells in the hippocampus, an organ that is the center of memory and cognition.<sup>383</sup> This impairment is associated with a tendency toward dogmatic thinking<sup>384</sup> and with authoritarianism, the belief that human relations are mostly power relations.<sup>385</sup> Adam, my friend, notice how this ‘propensity,’ not included in Adam Smith’s list, makes for an inefficient market and social system.” Although eager to relate what he knew about anxiety to Dessie’s concern for the failure of imagoes to match reality, Charles couldn’t quite make it. Hypatia, the errant philosopher, helped him out.

**Replacing material concerns.** “So the mismatch between our imagoes and the demands of our institutions and practices comes to this,” she said with executive dispatch. “The 18th and especially the 19th and 20th century imagoes portrayed rational, autonomous, self-interested materialists seeking happiness by making money. Although these imagoes may or may not have matched the characters of the people and their needs at the time [In the 1920s Frank Knight presented a picture of ‘sensitive and noble characters’ who did not fit the mold],<sup>386</sup> they no longer do so. Obviously, markets were designed for people pictured by the imagoes described, but democracy was, at least unconsciously, also designed to give people ways of improving their material conditions. In the political philosophy of the time, the language of *interests* reflects those material concerns.” Hypatia paused, suddenly realizing that she, the philosophical critic of Dessie’s and Charles’s position, was summarizing their case for them.

This attack on materialism was more than Adam could bear. “Your story is that markets took people’s natural materialism and distorted and exaggerated it, causing malaise and anxiety,” he said. “Well, let me tell you the other side of that story. “Marriage was once more of an economic contract than it is now; both among farm families where the spouses were joined more in an economic than a romantic union and among the gentry, who, as Jane Austen makes clear, saw marriage as a way of extending their properties. In other societies bride price and dowries reveal the economic nature of marriage. A self-interested economic imago was fairly descriptive, if not of the inner states of the newly espoused, at least of their public expectations.<sup>387</sup> What happens as the economic basis of marriage weakens? The ties weaken. Divorce!” Adam, whose marriage was rock-solid, showed signs of triumph. “Dear anti-materialists,” he said, “do wake up. Of all the sources of anxiety in this modern world, the insecurity of marriage and of human relations are fully as responsible for anxiety as is economic insecurity. And materialist ties bind people together and protect marriages. I don’t know what to do about it, but when husband and wife have independent sources of income, they are more likely to split up. When they have a joint source of income, as on a farm or a Mom and Pop store, they remain united. To coin a phrase, ‘love is not enough,’ especially in the United States which has divorce rates more than double the rates of France and Japan and five times the divorce rate of China.”<sup>388</sup>

“Sociologists” said Hypatia, “report both that the economic independence of women is the root source of current high divorce rates<sup>389</sup> and that higher economic aspirations in the West now require two incomes per family. These conflicting demands are an added source of anxiety. Ours is an *incoherent society*; contrast it to the relative coherence of *gemeinschaft* – but note that this coherence is also lost to the modernizing

collectivist societies of Asia.” She thought for a moment on the general point she was making, and continued. “Why does anxiety flourish now? First because of the way materialist institutions make an appeal to a form of gratification that is no longer satisfying, and second, in a kind of double bind, because of the breakup of the coherence of a totally materialist society.” Hypatia had left the certainties and clichéd responses of her field and broken new ground.

Admiring her temerity, Adam pursued his devotion to materialism across unfamiliar boundaries. He turned to Dessie: “Have you any idea of the huge implications of your proposed shift in pathologies from poverty to anxiety?” he asked in serious, almost alarmist tones. “Humans have been scratching for a living since Jericho and living from hand to mouth since Lucy. Our metabolism is built on that – hence modern obesity. The materialism that you deplore is not the moral defect you call greed or gluttony, nor an acquired response to advertising, but an expression of our prudential nature, providing for tomorrow’s dearth or famine. Anxiety may now be independent of poverty but it wasn’t that way throughout evolutionary history; it has a genetic base<sup>390</sup> for a good reason: it is the signal to watch out for future famines. Our institutions are built to help us take care of material interests for the same good reason, namely, to help us survive. If that costs us a little more anxiety, so be it.”

“Adam, my friend,” said Dessie, ominously, “you are a source of great comfort to me. When I doubt that new imagoes are needed to guide reform, you reinforce my belief that the need is almost desperate. You hold, with your disciplinary buddies, that concentration on economic gain has only one outcome, prosperity, although the facts suggest that such concentration, as indicated by measures of materialism, makes a person value possessions more than ‘warm relations with others’ or a sense of achievement; high materialists are less philanthropic and more envious than low materialists, and they tend to be unhappier. In these tests, say their authors: ‘Materialism was negatively related to satisfaction in all the aspects of life measured.’<sup>391</sup> The traditional imago that associates the profit motive mainly with a laudable ambition has much to learn from measures of materialism in Imago-21.”

But Charles was still thinking of what Adam had said about anxiety. “Anxiety is the brain’s solution to ambivalence where one of the evolutionarily programmed goals, materialism, no longer works,” he said to himself. “Thank heavens – I mean ‘thank Darwin’ – that we have each other.”

### **Imago-21 Implies Scaffolding for Choice Overload**

“The relief of want has another result,” said Adam harking back to the shift from dearth to anxiety, “one familiar to economists as *discretionary* income and to others as leisure or discretionary time. ‘Discretion’ is a polite word for wise choice; we now have more choices. And a lot of research shows that when people can choose among alternatives, they suffer less from any circumstances that cause them stress or pain. As you said last time, if people can control the pain, it hurts less. And they are less anxious when they feel in control of a threatening situation. So, by providing more discretion or choice, the increased abundance (what you call ‘relief of dearth’) offers its own solution to any

anxiety it may contribute to.” Adam was naturally pleased with this turning of the tables on his tormentors. And choice was his remedy for everything.

***Choice and scaffolding.*** “We live in a society that worships choice<sup>392</sup> but offers little guidance in choosing,” said Dessie, approaching the problem obliquely. “Choosing is thought to be the subjective experience of *freedom*, a glow word that stimulates the flow of dopamine in Western people the way bananas stimulate other primates. But – and here is the catch – choosing, itself, has a declining marginal utility: the more choices people have the less another choice, at least of the same kind, appeals to them. As alternatives to choice, *commitment* and *certainty* then become more attractive.<sup>393</sup> In market democracies this overabundance of choices overloads people’s vigilant mindfulness, and they become even more reliant on their adaptive unconscious. Guided more and more by their default mode of the adaptive unconscious, people will persist in a particular line of behavior beyond the point where it is self-defeating because the adaptive unconscious is responsive to the appeals of habit, routine, and least effort. In this situation, the proliferation of choices oddly demands some external guidance system created mindfully to guide people who must, perforce, use their adaptive unconscious as their dominant mode of guidance. Like, L. S. Vygotsky,<sup>394</sup> that smart Russian psychologist confronting similar problems before there was a name for the adaptive unconscious, I use the term *scaffolding* to mean such an external guidance system.” Dessie smiled benignly on his little captive audience.

“It sounds like a fancy way to justify the limiting of freedom by intervening in market and other choices,” said Adam with accustomed vigor. “Since we are naming things today, I will call this grave-digger’s spade by its right name: *paternalism*.”

“For example,” continued Dessie, ignoring the name-calling “because the choice of colleges for high school seniors is difficult, high schools provide counselors for this service. Government employment offices help some of the unemployed find jobs; *Consumer Reports* helps baffled consumers to negotiate the consumer market. Your market with ‘perfect knowledge’ is a myth, Adam, but both private and public agencies provide scaffolding to supplement the highly imperfect knowledge available in the market and in society, more generally. We’ll come back to this point when we talk about democracy.”

Hypatia was not satisfied. “That’s more like private counseling, tactical advice for individual decisions,” she said. “But your society guided by the adaptive unconscious needs mindful help for society-wide decisions: where to put resources to maximize welfare, or human development, or to prevent environmental degradation. High school counselors and *Consumer Reports* combined cannot do that.”

“Sounds like government planning to me,” said Adam, worried lest the market’s superior allocation of resources be overruled by some government agency on the grounds that the government was mindful and the market was not.

Charles looked at his watch. “Should a society concerned with human development put its resources in Headstart or in better high schools and job-training? Since the payoff is not measured in money terms, the market will not answer that question to our satisfaction. But a good econometric study of benefits measured in terms of delinquency, teen-age pregnancy, substance abuse, and going on to college, ‘shows dramatic cost benefit gains from early (Headstart-like) education compared to later

interventions in schooling and employment training.”<sup>395</sup> Almost smiling, Charles added: “Good research, even social science research, is the essence of mindful rationality.”

At this 58th minute of their spinach pie hour, Dessie was set to turn things upside down. “With scarcity essentially defeated, at least for now,” he said, “let me suggest an alternative set of priorities for government. The main job of government now is to contribute to more creative and less anxious minds in healthier and stronger bodies: *mens sana in corpore sano*. That is, the central departments of government are education and health. The rest, the transportation, agriculture, commerce, and state departments, and the treasury, are all peripheral to this purpose. Those departments create the scaffolding necessary to support the mental and physical development of the population. Isaiah Berlin talks about the ‘newness’ of the concept of liberty.<sup>396</sup> Lo! Health and education are two priorities for modern government that are even newer.”

Dessie’s 59th minute upset required a fitting finale. “See you next week,” he said.

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## PART FIVE: MARKETS AND POLITICS

### Chapter Nine

#### MARKETS WITHOUT ECONOMIC MAN

*Economic man was cited as an example of an imago in the second session but has appeared only in bits and pieces since then. Here he emerges whole and graced with his usual charm – only to die yet again and haunt his tormentors. Some gory details on his death by behavioral assassins and neurological destroyers are followed by one mourning eulogy and by some explorations of whom he has served and, as a spirit, continues to serve. As in the last chapter, the friends find that economic man is the servant of the system that created him.*

*Like economic man, himself, utility theory serves as a justification of market economics rather than as an empirical discovery or as an explanatory theory. Surprisingly, although utility theory is buried with economic man, economics survives and mounts a successful counterattack on an increasingly powerful evolutionary theory.*

*Naturally, the defenders of the market ask for an illustration of how an alternative theory, such as is offered by the adaptive unconscious, would do better than the standard bundle of propensities found in economic man. The heretics swallow the bait and offer advice, which probably would not surprise an advertising agent but does counter some assumptions in traditional economics. To support their advice, the heretics draw on some findings from “neuroeconomics,” such as the finding that in the prisoners dilemma game, dopamine flows when cooperation is offered and accepted rather than when a player competes and wins. Other evidence, this time showing that emotional maturity yields a higher salary than high IQ, supports their general assault on traditional economics.*

*At the end, things get a little sloppy when the New Humanists offer an example of how new findings from the microscope were gradually assimilated in biology without the ideological wars created by the new findings of the behavioral-neurological sciences when applied to economics.*

\* \* \* \* \*

“How are you feeling, Adam?” asked Dessie with malicious solicitude.

“My nerves are shot,” said Adam, in tones of deep despair.

“What a pity,” said Dessie in the same tone; “just when we were about to expose the nerves of your eponymous epigone, economic man.”

“Step over to the light,” said Charles standing under the bright fluorescence of Clark’s shadow-free illumination. “We need to get a better look at those frayed nerves of yours.” Pause. “Hmm, I see symptoms of this new autoimmune disease that has infected so many of your friends: excessive antibodies created to fight the *neuroeconomics* virus that’s been going the rounds. The virus is fatal to economic man but not to his host, the economists, who, in characteristic fashion, are not only developing immunity but have

mounted a counter-attack. Just the other day I saw a wonderful example of how some econometricians had applied their ‘net energy’ formula to animal foraging to give evolution an econometric base.<sup>397</sup> I couldn’t help but think how surprised Thorstein Veblen would be. As you know, Veblen wanted to make economics an evolutionary discipline,<sup>398</sup> but now he would find that evolution was being subsumed as an economic discipline.” Charles almost smiled in silent appreciation of this *bouleversement*. But this turnabout did not excuse his unkind behavior toward Adam.

“Dear friends,” said tough old Adam regaining his seat in the red booth, “people have killed economic man so often that I wonder there is any more pleasure in it. Economic man gave you the wealth that permits you to live your lives as you choose to live them. But his body lies riddled there before you.” Carried away, Adam played Mark Anthony rather well: “Look, in this place ran Sen’s dagger through; / See what a rent the envious Tversky made; / Through this the well-belovéd Kahneman stabbed.” But Adam’s revenge had run its course and he subsided, laughing into his bowl of soup.

“I had not heard that economic man, like Caesar, died of ingratitude,” said Hypatia not quite certain which side she was on. “Greed and rationality should be made of sterner stuff. I never liked economic man, but I am not at all sure that I will like any better the flaccid, automated version of humankind that this neuroeconomic virus leaves in his place.”

“The virus attacked a body greatly weakened by an earlier disease called science, in this case, behavioral science,” said Dessie, feeling he had been upstaged by his friend, Charles the biologist. “The story has been told many times, but it might be worthwhile putting this earlier morbidity in the story of the adaptive unconscious.”

### **How Behavioral Science Weakened Economic Man**

Dessie paused uncertainly as he confronted a proposed review of four decades of work exposing the illnesses of economic man. “Do you really want to hear the coroner’s report again?” he asked, morbidly torn between his necrophilia and his interest in the adaptive unconscious.

“Remind us,” said Adam who, like most people, best remembered ideas congenial to his ideology.

“It comes as a set of text messages,” said Dessie, showing off his thin knowledge of teen-age electronic culture. “I’ve written a gross summary of the Preliminary Coroner’s report to save you the pain of listening to me.” He tossed a more or less neatly written paper, labeled “Preliminary Coroner’s Report on Economic Man,” on the table.

#### **Preliminary Coroner’s Report on Economic Man**

1. *Money is not fungible # 1. By compartmentalizing their budgets, people prevent transfer of funds from one category to another. Mental bookkeeping allocates dollars to, say, theater, that are not then available for other purposes, say, dinner at Antoine’s.*<sup>399</sup>

2. *Money is not fungible # 2. Losses are more hurtful than gains of the same amount are beneficial (prospect theory).*<sup>400</sup> Note that these two principles tend to make an elastic yardstick of Pigou's 'measuring rod of money.'<sup>401</sup>
3. *Sunk costs are treated the same as current costs.* People will give themselves a miserable time playing tennis in the rain because they have paid for a court.<sup>402</sup>
4. *The strict self-interest model does not explain such behavior as tipping by travelers or returning lost wallets to their owners. Conscience and habit limit the role of self-interest.*<sup>403</sup>
5. *A reputation for honesty is enforced by self-interest but goes beyond what is required for that purpose as honesty becomes incorporated in a self-image.*<sup>404</sup>
6. *A sense of fairness dominates material self-interest when people believe they are being exploited (as in the ultimatum game).*<sup>405</sup>
7. *When acts are defined by an actor as altruistic or pro-social, offering money reduces the actor's willingness to perform those acts.*<sup>406</sup>
8. *Materialism (defined as valuing and pursuing monetary gain at the expense of such other values as friendship) is associated with unhappiness and envy.*<sup>407</sup>
9. *In prosperous, advanced countries, there is a declining marginal utility for income.*<sup>408</sup>
10. *In advanced, but not in developing countries, money yields less happiness than does friendship and social esteem.*<sup>409</sup>
11. *Commitment to a person or a cause or an identity erodes both economic rationality and greed.*<sup>410</sup>
12. *Utilities for current satisfaction, anticipated satisfaction, and remembered satisfaction are all different. Liking and wanting are different emotions.*<sup>411</sup>
13. *Although increased choice is generally associated with greater satisfaction, because human capacity to handle information is limited, there is a point where more choices yield less satisfaction.*<sup>412</sup>
14. *Rational behavior includes sacrificing income for other goods, such as the requital of love, honor (self- and social-esteem), professional achievement, etc. (By adding self-rewards, people reduce the play of contingent reinforcement.)*<sup>413</sup>

Adam looked at the Preliminary Coroner's Report with a wary eye and was actually relieved to find there were no surprises there. "I wonder," he said sweetly, "if there is a *higher, more refined* materialism motivating our humanist colleagues seeking offers from other universities, offers whose sole purpose is to increase their salaries at Yale." In this setting where evolution was a central theme, Adam knew the difference between *ad hominid* and *ad hominem*, but disregarded it.

Dessie sighed; they had been over this before.<sup>414</sup> "Wanting more money is a function of the discrepancy between actual income and aspirations," he said rather sharply. "Materialism, in the sense that we (and others) now employ it, is *valuing* money more than such other goods as love and achievement. It is based on a person's value of money relative to other goods. But Adam, that is not the point. The point is that the death

of the market's economic man implies a change of values and beliefs of titanic proportions: (1) It means finally recognizing that the desire for social esteem trumps the desire for materialist goals. (2) The undiluted priority of self-interest is replaced by a priority for some mix of collective and individual goals. (3) Instead of thinking of individuals as somehow autonomous, we now think of them as substantially guided by a combination of social induction and genetic instructions. (4) The dominance of mindful rationality is replaced by the recognition of the prevalence of the default condition, the adaptive unconscious. And (5) the implicit utilitarianism of economic man is modified by our knowledge that relying on dopamine flow (the physiology of happiness) is grossly misleading and that the most important good, human development, is not a necessary by-product of the pursuit of happiness. In the case of economic man: 'Do not send to know for whom the bell tolls: it tolls for Imago-18.'

***Fitting the imago to the needs of institutions.*** "If economic man is such a misfit in our modern society, how could he have persisted for so long and taken a thousand cuts and still smile and smile and be a villain?" asked Adam, with a little eclectic borrowing from Shakespeare.

"Ask yourself that useful question congenial to your discipline: *cui bono*? Who benefits?" said Dessie. "Is economic man the inevitable product of evolution, emerging as the 'fittest' over the years? Actually, your colleagues find: 'Evolution may just as readily weed out rational behavior as it does weed out quasi-rational behavior.'<sup>415</sup> So perhaps economic man is borrowed from the typologies of psychology? Yet Schumpeter reported that: 'economists have never allowed their analysis to be influenced by the professional psychologists of their times, but have always framed for themselves such assumptions about psychological processes as they thought it desirable to make.'<sup>416</sup> And sure enough, it is 'desirable to make' an imago of human nature that fits the institutions over which economics presides. Is there any resistance from these institutions? Well, given that the institutional interpreters created this imago to fit their theories, economists think not. Tailor-made for market theory, economic man fits the theory beautifully. Does he fit the institutions well? The Preliminary Coroner's Report said he died of malnutrition – there was simply not enough evidence to support belief in the poor anemic chap. The funny thing is that the advertisers (and marketing personnel) knew this long before the mainline economists."

"Adam, you have lived too long in a discipline whose solution to the absence of can-openers is 'assume a can-opener,'" said Charles. "Economic man was not created or discovered; he was assumed. Who mourns the demise of a false assumption?"

***The legacy of a false assumption.*** "'A spectre is haunting Europe' (and the world)" said Hypatia in hollow tones, "the spectre of economic man. In the nature of things, a Coroner's Report is not likely to deal with the survival of a spectre; that is a problem for social scientists and other theologians. But consider *cui bono* again, who and what benefits from such a living spectre? One has to strain to find in democracy a natural expression of economic man: as everyone knows, economic man would never make it to the polls, for the tiny chances of his vote making a deciding difference in the election are worth less to him than the value of almost any other use of his time. To their dismay, the rational choice people found that it was more a sense of duty than a hope for gain that

sent people to the polls.<sup>417</sup> In contrast to democracy, the market, as I said, is the more natural institutional expression of this economic creature; it was made for him, and, like the God whose place the market usurped, made in his image. *Cui bono?* Clearly, the market! Thus does the power of a spectral imago bias our choices among institutions.”

“Oh, well done, Hypatia!” exclaimed Charles whose gloomy soul found spectral images congenial. “‘The evil that economic men do lives after them.’ But what is the imagery for the creation by a ghost of its own reality?”

“Pygmalion comes closest,” said Hypatia, amused. “But Aphrodite, who is the ivory statue Pygmalion falls in love with, is not like any conception of economic man I have even seen.”<sup>418</sup> She smiled at the idea of Aphrodite, the goddess of love, as economic man.

“For once, social science is better at explaining mythology,” said Dessie, reluctantly. “A number of experiments have shown that ‘people overestimate the influence of self-interest,... [systematically] overestimating the impact that financial rewards exerted on their peers’ willingness to donate blood’ and related acts.”<sup>419</sup> Further, the lead author of these studies finds that the ‘theory of self-interest as the basic motivation’ not only leads people to misinterpret other’s behavior but also one’s own, finding it the cause of their own acts even when it is not. (Well, we already know that people have trouble explaining why they do things, so this use of a ‘common sense’ explanation by the general public should not surprise us.) What the authors of these studies of the power of the myth of economic man conclude is that the ‘norm of self-interest’ has become a collectively shared ideology so powerful that it makes people pretend to self-interest when they actually favor the interests of others. Consequently, even the extent to which people do behave self-interestedly proves nothing about a ‘natural tendency;’ rather it shows only how people tend to conform to social norms.”<sup>420</sup>

“An imago that leads people in their altruistic moments to pretend to be selfish is a pretty strong agent, no matter how many cuts he died from,” said Hypatia who was strangely pleased to have her 18<sup>th</sup> century imago finally cleansed of this incubus. “Dead by a thousand cuts of social science, this corpse or spectre is still powerful enough to influence society’s choice between markets and government. And the powerful spectre is sustained by those very same markets, as we saw last week, and cannot be dislodged by introspection which finds within what it is told by advertising and economics to look for. Do any of you know anything about exorcism?”

### **How Neuroeconomics<sup>421</sup> Adds to the Coroner’s Report**

“Of course there was a kind of autopsy after the alleged murder of economic man by those envious behavioral scientists,” said Charles, smiling through his funereal tones. “I happen to have seen an advanced copy. Shall I summarize it for you?”

“No, thanks,” said Adam.

“Yes, please,” said Hypatia in wavering tones. “But what do you mean by ‘a kind of autopsy’?” She asked in the belief that there either was or wasn’t an autopsy.

“Nowadays we don’t wait until after death for autopsies the way we used to,” said Charles, still smiling. “And we don’t have to carve up the cadavers any more. It’s so much neater. Instead, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging (or PET scans) on

living brains and watch them work. A conference at Princeton a few years ago reported some vivid findings on how the brain deals with such ‘economic’ problems as ‘the ultimatum game’ (Partner A divides the money and Partner B either accepts her allotment, whatever it is, or rejects it; if she rejects it both parties forfeit the money) and prisoners’ dilemma games – well, you know what they are. All players wear electric helmets scanning the blood flow to various parts of their brains. With or without conscious direction, the brain compares and evaluates ‘objects, people, events, memories, internal states, and the perceived needs of others so that it can make choice... Novelty, money, cocaine, a delicious meal and a beautiful face all activate dopamine circuits to varying degrees; exactly how much dopamine an individual generates in response to a particular reward is calibrated by past experience and by one’s biological makeup.’<sup>422</sup> Because these brain structures work *before* their host is conscious of having decided, one may say that your adaptive unconscious takes you to the point where you have a preference schedule reflecting your past experience.” Charles conveyed a kind of satisfaction as though he deserved credit for these unconscious preference schedules.

“Are they transitive, consistent, and coherent?” asked Adam, wondering whether Nature were a proponent of rational choice.

“Well, no,” said Charles. “Dopamine circuits are famously present-oriented. But there is a traffic controller called the *anterior cingulate*, the agency that directs you to enlist prefrontal cortical regions of the brain for mindful rationality. But don’t forget last week’s lesson: the higher regions of the brain often do worse than the adaptive unconscious.” Charles suddenly looked at his plate – his adaptive unconscious had forgotten all about his growling stomach.

Dessie ignored Charles’ stomach in favor of what he had said about the brain. “Even if you have a name for it, you should not count on any agency of the brain to serve your best interests. A Carnegie Mellon neuroscientist said at that Princeton conference: ‘Under the influence of powerful emotions or drives, people often end up doing the opposite of what they think is best for themselves, even at the moment of acting.’<sup>423</sup> That’s close to what those behavioral economists writing for the *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* meant by ‘bounded self-interest,’<sup>424</sup> although I think the Carnegie Mellon neuroscientist meant something a little less self-conscious. As I understand the brain, the problem is not so much rationality as coherence; it’s not all of a piece, now enlisting one agency, now another. Remember Churchland: ‘the self is something like a squadron of capacities flying in loose formation.’<sup>425</sup>

“It’s messy,” said Charles. “Have pity on the excellent new behavioral economist trying to survive among the Harvard neoclassicists. He (David Laibson) said: ‘It turns out that the brain has two key subsystems. One, the limbic and paralimbic system, rules the intuitive and affective parts of our psyches. It’s shared by all mammals and seems to do a lot of emotional cognition – how we feel emotionally, how we respond to other humans, or to being treated unfairly... Contrast that with the analytic system, centered in the frontal and parietal cortexes. It controls a lot of the thought processes we learn to do: calculated, conscious, future-oriented thinking. [It is] an interaction of the limbic and analytical systems that governs human decision-making.’<sup>426</sup> That idea of *interaction* is a little different from Wilson’s idea of a default adaptive unconscious calling in a backup rationality, but they are not so far apart.”

**Analyzing and justifying the market are two different processes.** “How do these economists, Laibson and his new peer at MIT, Sendhil Mullainathan, justify a market whose members do not maximize their utilities and who regularly disappoint their expected utilities?” asked Adam.

“Probably by some satisficing standard: the market works *well enough* to feed and clothe most of us and to make it possible to think of a world not dominated by the market,” said Dessie with a smile. “But, equally important, they must recognize that utility theory is good only for justification and has no analytical or predictive value at all. More than that, they must also see that the justifications offered by welfare economics are not independent justifications of the way *markets* work but of descriptive economic theory. These economists worship at an altar some miles from the shopping mall.”

### **How the Adaptive Unconscious Makes Market Choices**

Adam, who never liked shopping, let that oblique reference to his place of worship go by. “I am going shopping for a new television set tomorrow,” he said. “I want to prepare my adaptive unconscious, or her agent the anterior cingulate, for this excursion. What do I tell her?”

**Advice to the adaptive unconscious.** “How do you prepare yourself to shop for a consumer durable?” asked Charles, rephrasing the question and depersonifying the anterior cingulate. “Really, Adam, this is your department, but if you want a biologist’s opinion on shopping for a TV set, I will give you some borrowed hints from the neuroeconomists’ handbook. First, following Chorvat and McCabe’s opinion on the advantages of what they call *ecological rationality*,<sup>427</sup> include the cost of shopping in your account. Process benefits and costs are generally left out of accounts of economic rationality. Second, from the same source, employ both the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (emotion) and your dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (logic, calculation). That is, allow your gut feelings some say; they know more than you think they do.<sup>428</sup> But, third, keep your relations with the salesman impersonal, lest those parts of the brain involved in social-emotional processing distort your judgment.<sup>429</sup> Fourth, read *Consumers Reports*, if you must, but don’t read *Wired*. Too much information will not only confuse you but will distract you from the central features that make a difference to you and your wife.<sup>430</sup> Knowing too much is a genuine hazard. Fifth, when you’ve gathered as much information as you think you’ll need, go to the zoo or discuss the Red Sox’s prospects with your wife, allowing the wisdom of the unconscious to work.<sup>431</sup> Sixth, be aware that intuitive, ‘thin slice,’ off-the-cuff judgments are both informative *and* vulnerable to social pressure and suggestion.<sup>432</sup> The salesman will know this, even if you don’t. Seventh, because the brain looks for common patterns (if two heads in a row, expect a tails; *but* – if the stock market goes up for two quarters, expect a rise in the third quarter) beware of the ‘brain’s delusions of continuity.’<sup>433</sup> And eighth, *don’t* maximize your utilities; rather, satisfice them, pursue the ‘good enough’ criterion. Maximizers are usually less pleased with their purchases and more likely to regret the options not taken.”<sup>434</sup>

**Neuroeconomics in a social setting.** “I’m not sure that Adam will maximize his utilities with that advice,” said Dessie, “but I want to return to a point I made last week. In spite of early advice that you can control your moods by thinking happy thoughts,<sup>435</sup> your dopamine flow is no more autonomous of your setting than you are. It may be responsive to a ‘pretty face’ and a ‘good meal’, as the *Times* report on the 2003 Princeton conferees pointed out, but this is interactive. Montague Read, one of the participants in the conference said, ‘your dopamine plays off my dopamine’ in a chain reaction. Evolution made us especially responsive to approval by and support from our fellow conspecifics.<sup>436</sup> Charles’ sage advice to the adaptive unconscious won’t help very much if people don’t realize just what prompts dopamine flow. For example, the Princeton conference reported that when the helmeted participants in a prisoners’ dilemma game tried cooperation and were rewarded by reciprocal cooperation, the dopamine flowed more than when they defected and won points.<sup>437</sup> Reciprocal good feeling matters. Contrary to Vince Lombardi, it is not true that ‘winning is the only thing.’”

“If the adaptive unconscious is so sensitive to other people’s feelings, I doubt if it will survive a competitive market economy,” said Adam. “Even if you eliminate rivalry and treat others as ‘slot machines (which Frank Knight<sup>438</sup> said was appropriate in a market economy), you will not soothe your interpersonally sensitive AU.”

“On that score, the AU will be all right,” said Dessie. “People with good interpersonal relations do well in markets: People with high ‘emotional quotients’ (measuring sensitivity to other’s emotions) do better than people with equivalently high IQs;<sup>439</sup> some studies show that women make better business leaders because they listen better;<sup>440</sup> and if you distinguish between *sociability* (liking social activities) and *friendliness* (respect for others) you will find that the first is negatively related to earnings while the second is positively related.<sup>441</sup> The closest thing we have to a traffic controller for the adaptive unconscious, the cingulate cortex, tracks the parties to an exchange, keeping a record of how each is doing.<sup>442</sup> With that agent automatically monitoring your transactions, you can relax.”

**Neuroeconomics and the better chooser.** Hypatia was anything but relaxed. “Could I,” she said, pretending to ask a question, “surface to the level of the conscious mind from this underground unconscious cave where you are so much at home? A rather good British philosopher by the name of Derek Parfit recently suggested that instead of paying so much attention to the best outcomes we ‘should develop persons who have the aims and dispositions having which would make the outcomes best.’<sup>443</sup> In the terms we have been using, that means developing people whose anterior cingulate regularly switches them from their adaptive unconscious (with its access to the limbic system) to mindful rationality.” She paused, for suddenly she saw that neuroeconomics and neuropolitics were not in opposition to Parfit’s philosophical insight, but implementations of it. Perhaps that was true of the quarrel among the imagoes: Imago-21 could be seen as a way of selectively promoting the goals of Imago-18 – not the rational self-interest goal, which the 18<sup>th</sup> century mistook for human development, but other development goals.

Charles was increasingly disposed to favor Hypatia, not exclusively because she was on the threshold of conversion. “Dear Derek Parfit, whoever you are, welcome to the society of explorers,” he said portentously. “Our growing association of behavioral economists, neuroeconomists, evolutionary psychologists, and miscellaneous scientists

needs help: tell us what is a ‘good chooser’ and what are ‘good outcomes’ and we will tell you what the brain and learning have to offer.”

Unexpectedly, harmony threatened to break out. Except for Adam.

Hypatia looked sympathetically at her one-time ally. “Adam,” she said, laying her hand tenderly on his shoulder, “Your problem is not so much materialism or devotion to rational choice or to an underlying utilitarian philosophy; it is the Panglossian belief that free choice will solve (almost) all human problems. Supposing you (and I) were wrong about people’s capacities to choose wisely, not only in their own interests but also when they act for what they conceive to be the benefit of others? Markets would still work as they have always worked but their *justifications* would be weaker. I can say this to you, Adam, because I have been in the same boat, but you – we – have been defending an ideology – what is *said about* institutions, more than the institutions, themselves.”

“That’s a pretty lonely position,” said Adam, in defense. “Most of the world likes choices and, when you look at the alternatives, you can see why.”

“We are not against market or any other choices,” said Dessie, vigorously. “The behavioral and neurological sciences are all about choosing. Our position is simply that because choice itself has no intrinsic merit, we must assess the *outcomes* of choices and the effects of choosing *on the chooser*. You choose a spouse, a career, a bunch of fellows to hang out with. Maybe good, maybe bad! The assessment depends on how well you chose. And that, in turn, depends on how the environment helped to structure your choice (what we call ‘scaffolding’) and how well the brain was prepared for choosing well. Parfit would understand at least the second part of that argument.”

“The important lesson that I have learned about choice,” said Hypatia, again abandoning Adam, “is that it is no guarantor of either welfare or well-being for the choosers or anybody else. I know that Imago-18 thought it was a solution, but it isn’t and Parfit simply didn’t know how the brain is vulnerable to various nonrational pressures.”

Charles joined in. “When the Dutch spectacle-maker, Zacharias Janssen, discovered the principle of the compound microscope in 1590, and about 70 years later his fellow countryman, Anton van Leeuwenhoek, used his simple microscope to discover *animalcules* (bacteria and protozoa), no one said that their predecessors were morally or intellectually obtuse. Leeuwenhoek used his discovery to attack the prevailing belief in the spontaneous generation of life, but his heresy did not prevail until the mid-1800s. In the meantime both naturalists who believed and those who didn’t believe in spontaneous generation lived comfortably together until the new findings were familiar enough to fit into the prevailing cosmology. Similarly, gradually, evolution and Christianity made their peace in much of the advanced world. So, also will 18<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century concepts of human nature. The humanist vision of the 18<sup>th</sup> century will best survive by shucking off its ancient skin to emerge radiant in new garments. See you next week.”

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## Chapter Ten

### RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEMOCRACY'S FAILINGS

*At last, the New Humanists give to democracy the withering treatment that they have applied with such devastating effect to markets. If humans are such non-rational, largely unconscious, risk-blind deciders in markets, where the feedback is relatively prompt and transparent, how could they be good deciders in democratic elections where the choices are bundled together in ways not of any elector's choosing and the feedback is obscure, delayed, and uncertain?*

*The traditional and facile answer is that American democracy must be effective if it has endured with only one major breakdown in almost 225 years. Because many factors other than forms of government can contribute to duration, that answer is not persuasive. So, quite properly, the defenders of Imago-18 ask for more detailed criticisms. The answers are not encouraging: The cross-cultural evidence does not support the beliefs that compared to less democratic systems, more democratic systems give people a sense of effectiveness, or make people happier, or reduce economic inequality, or redistribute more income in welfare than other systems (although, where redistribution policies do occur, they seem to make people happier).*

*But what does this have to do with the misfit between the science-based concept of human nature and the assumptions of human nature embedded in the American Constitution? The hypothesis is that expected electoral behavior is not forthcoming and anticipated government support is not offered. One cause of this reciprocal misunderstanding is Imago-18's thesis that self-interest dominates political choices. In fact, the most careful study of self-interest in electoral decisions finds this to be rare. Similarly, the idea of legislators as predominantly self-interested also fails, largely because of legislators' assumption of roles that inhibit such behavior. The autonomy assumption is easily falsified in a field, which, by its very nature, is affiliative. The heretics argument is that where people do not behave as they are expected to, there is strain and disappointment.*

*But, say the Liberals, if the Enlightenment (at least the American version) was the source of democracy, how can supporters of democracy dismiss Enlightenment principles so easily, especially when the alternative seems to be some combination of science and evolution? You cannot get democracy from strictly scientific principles. And where are the nonhuman primate democracies or the hunter-gatherer democracies? Both, especially nonhuman primates, live in hierarchies guided by principles of dominance. The New Humanists answer that careful studies of chimp societies show both hierarchy and the need by the Alpha males (and females) for support from others. The evolutionary roots of empathy are strong, although such empathy tends to be limited to like others. These roots are embedded in the adaptive unconscious. What civilization did was to borrow from the Enlightenment the idea that all humans were sufficiently alike to be embraced in a common electorate. Here lies the birth of Rights. Mindful rationality is required for this last step, but once made, the step finds a comfortable home in the adaptive unconscious.*

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“What a surprise,” said Adam to Charles as they sat in the red booth waiting for the others to join them. “All along I thought that the basic fault of our democracy was that Republicans are allergic to taxation and Democrats are addicted to entitlement programs.” For him, saying this was like saying, “Have a nice day,” or “How do you do.” “Now,” he continued, “I learn that there is some underlying fault in the concepts of human nature which inspired democracy in the first place. And guess what that fault is? The structure and policies are not in line with our evolutionary heritage or natural predispositions. I know Hypatia’s friend David Hume said we should organize government so that knaves wouldn’t do much harm,<sup>444</sup> but I see we have to take the next step: organize government so that chimpanzees could govern us without similar damage.”

To Charles’ relief, Adam skipped over the opportunity for comments about chimps already in the White House or monkey-business in the House of Representatives. “You know” said Charles, “the term *devolution* means returning functions to lower levels of government rather than to a lower level of subspecies; that would be de-evolution, not devolution.” Only those who knew him well could see that Charles was smiling to himself.

“When Jane Goodall’s assistant saw one of her beloved chimps deliberately wound another, “said Dessie arriving on the scene, “the assistant wanted to keep it secret. But Jane reluctantly let the secret out. Still, most of the chest thumping and howling is all bluff and no one gets hurt. Just one small notch lower on the phylogenetic scale would not be such a bad idea. What do you know about de-evolution, Charles?”

“When the wicked primatologists sought to provoke a fight among bonobos by putting a bunch of bananas at the juncture where one troop would meet another,” said Hypatia following Dessie on the scene, “the dear bonobos first sat down and looked at each other across the bananas. Instead of fighting, one young bonobo girl ran over to an older female in the other set of bonobos and stimulated her sex organs.<sup>445</sup> I’m not sure that would work in Afghanistan, but it’s worth a try.”

Charles saw that de-evolution had much to be said for it, but decided he had not been chosen to be its spokesman. “There is nothing in Imago-21 about rule by lesbians of any particular species,” he said regretfully. “Like you, I doubt if it would work. But that imago does have a message about how democracies have failed and what lies behind this failure.” He paused as the Wednesday Spinach Pie Association came to order. “Some of that message is not good news. Are you ready?”

### **When Civilization Takes Over from Evolution**

“Two weeks ago you told us how the felicitous relationship between habitat change and adaptive capacity of organisms was destroyed when sapiens took over from evolution,” said Adam. “Anything else?”

Charles was glad to correct that impression. Like his namesake, he was more than a biologist. “It’s felicitous only if you don’t care about individuals,” he said. “Otherwise it makes progress dependent on random cruelty: ‘as flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods; They kill us for their sport.’” This poetic version of evolution seemed temporarily to exhaust Charles.

“Modernity doesn’t just leave you stranded,” said Dessie coming to the rescue of a civilization in trouble with the authorities. “In three ways it helps people cope with the increased complexity that confronts them. First, it gives a boost to the mindful rationality we talked about last week. It did this most recently by increasing their IQs, which have increased mightily since our departure from the state of nature, and especially since World War II.<sup>446</sup> The trouble is that the demands upon this intelligence have grown even faster so that for example, the demands for multi-tasking have overloaded our capacities.<sup>447</sup> As a consequence, more people break down: About half of your students this year will be sufficiently depressed to have trouble functioning.<sup>448</sup> And, as we said previously, general anxiety disorder has flourished where people have not. So civilization has had to take a second step: we rely on the division of labor and specialize, especially in fields related to modernity stress. For example, in 2003 there were more psychologists (185,000) in the labor force than there were biologists (112,000) or ‘medical scientists’ (101,000)<sup>449</sup> and slightly more degrees conferred (2002) in psychology than in the physical sciences.<sup>450</sup> Also, please notice that the division of labor in a stressful society embraces both the public (especially in paying the bills) and the private sector.”

“As Lane said long ago in his piece on ‘The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society:’<sup>451</sup> when knowledge expands, expertise also expands, quite regardless of what you call ‘modernity stress,’” said Adam, adding: “But you said modernity helped in *three* ways?”

Dessie seemed hesitant, not because he doubted the third point but because it was complex. “The third point has to do with the scaffolding and cues I have mentioned from time to time,” he said. “While modernity increases choices, making life more complex, it also sometimes provides aids or guides to that complexity, like handrails for a flight of stairs or diagnostic maps in the subways that tell you where you are and how to get from that position to where you want to go. Democracy has been faulted for failing to train citizens to cope with its complexity.<sup>452</sup> And the market? Well, the market is complicitous in systematically misleading consumers about the verifiable use values of market wares. Being ‘autocephalous’ (having its own head or mind), as Weber said, the market must rely on economists to interpret it, but Adam, you fellows really do little to prepare people for their market experiences. Instead, you rely on this misleading Imago-18 which is tolerant of quite false theories of rational choice.” He paused and looked at his blinking friends. “In my opinion, theories of both markets and democracies must include accounts of the *scaffolding* available to help people with their choices. But I think we need more time for that account and will return to it next week.”<sup>453</sup>

Hypatia was restless. “Very well,” she said. “You say Imago-18 was the inspiration for democracy, but now we must transcend that inspiration and employ a different version of human nature in analyzing the way democracy functions. To justify that you would have to show that democracy itself was somehow deficient and had failed to fulfill its promise. Moreover, I think you are saying that once launched by this extraordinary burst of mindful rationality in the constitutional convention of 1789, people and governments returned to the humdrum guidance of the adaptive unconscious. But first you have to show how democracy has failed us.” She rested on that very broad challenge, confident that these two skeptics could not meet it.

## Shortcomings of Democracy

“Good question,” said Adam. “After all, we have recently had a canonical declaration that market democracies represent ‘the end of history’<sup>454</sup> or the final paradigm of civilization. I know that Hegel said the same thing about the Prussian state. This time round maybe Dessie has evidence to support his high level *kvetching* about the failure of market democracies.”

Dessie sang a few bars of *The Internationale* in his off-key manner: “*It’s the final conflict./ Let each stand in his place.*’ Final paradigms and final conflicts tend to be forgotten rather quickly,” he said, smiling patronizingly at Adam. Then turning to Hypatia, he added, “Democracy, like the market and bureaucracy,<sup>455</sup> is a kind of triumph for modernity. It has the great virtue that it provides opportunities for feedback when things go wrong. But, again like the market, the internal feedback is imperfect and requires external correction. Believe it or not, in these spinach pie sessions *we* are contributing to that external correction and represent mindful rationality in all its glory.” A bit high flown, perhaps, but it was certainly true that these munching academics were working on how things might be otherwise. “After all,” he said, “if the physicists can entertain the possibility that the world we know is only one of many possible worlds, why can’t we?”

Adam was disturbed. “You said you would show us how democracy fails to provide the benefits it promised,” he said. “No generalities, please, but something that can be tested. Since a prime defense is that democracy empowers the public, please show how that is not true.”

**Empowering people.** “Fair enough,” responded Dessie with an exaggerated air of honesty and good will. “I hope you will agree that empowerment means making a person *feel* effective; to be told that you have 1/50,000 of the power to choose a mayor is pretty empty unless that knowledge endows you with a sense of effectiveness, which is doubtful in a country where fewer than 40 percent of the eligible population votes in local elections. There is an exception, however: enfranchising people who have not had the vote does seem to increase their sense of effectiveness.<sup>456</sup> But exercising the vote, especially for the umpteenth time, does not seem to do much for them.<sup>457</sup> More than half of the population agree that: ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on’ and although the National Election Studies’ political efficacy scales are clearly related to turnout, that is because the efficacious vote, and not because voting makes people feel more efficacious.<sup>458</sup> Granted that in local elections those who can actually make their voices heard by authorities feel and are effective, but that benefit is received by only a relatively small, elite proportion of the electorate.<sup>459</sup> The sources of political efficacy derive more from higher levels of income and education than from actual participation. More than Europeans, Americans tend to rate themselves as personally effective,<sup>460</sup> but fewer of them vote.”

“Let me say a word on behalf of the adaptive unconscious,” said Adam, assigning to it the primitive rationality of rational choice theory. “People don’t vote because the chances of making a difference in the outcome are infinitesimal whereas the costs of taking an hour out of the day are substantial. But I suppose you will say that is my untutored adaptive unconscious and that if I were to consult my mindful rationality,

taking system considerations into account, I would generalize my case to include my appreciation for democracy.”

“But more than half of the population, knowing what you know, *do* vote in national elections, mostly because they think of voting as a civic norm that they wish to honor – and be seen to honor (the force of shame). Your 18<sup>th</sup> century view of people as guided largely by material self-interest is disproved daily in politics, and your short-term rationality finds counter illustrations in the very philosophes from whom you claim to derive short-term rational choice,” said Dessie in a weary voice, tired of refuting this half true argument.

Adam had better arguments. “Compared to buying, where you put your money down and receive your goods almost immediately, voting certainly does not have that ‘contingent reinforcement’ that encourages people to believe that they are effective,” he said. He knew there were other considerations, like the illusion of control, that would feed people’s sense of effectiveness but he didn’t think that institutions should be defended by the illusions they created. He favored democracy, of course, and returned to something he thought he knew something about: utility, or satisfaction, or, if one had to be specific, happiness. “Look,” he said, “according to your plural principles, you don’t have to show that democracy makes people more effective, just that it contributes to their happiness. You’ve spent a lot of time investing in studies of subjective well-being, now is the time reap the income from those investments.” ‘Generous to a fault,’ he said of himself to himself – but rather mocking than praising.

***Does democracy make people happy?*** Dessie smiled at Adam and then frowned at the task before him. How to break it to Hypatia that the relationship between democracy and measures of average national happiness were discouraging? “You won’t like this,” he said to her sadly, “but cross-nationally there is very little evidence that democratic institutions make people happier, although there is some evidence that happier people sustain democracy better than unhappy people.<sup>461</sup> The strongest case for democracy making people happier is, as you would expect, the happiness lift that would come with the grant of a new franchise to previously disfranchised people. But even here, the evidence is not so strong: in South Africa, after a brief euphoria in 1994 after the first elections, the black population (but not the white population) returned to an earlier low ‘set-point’ of life satisfaction.<sup>462</sup> And the traumas of political changes themselves had damaging effects on the mental health of black adolescents.<sup>463</sup> More generally, a massive study of four samples of students and general publics in 55 nations with over 100,000 respondents found that, when the effect of income differences was eliminated the relationship between political rights and subjective well-being (SWB) shriveled to almost nothing (-.01).<sup>464</sup> Without democracy’s relationship to higher income, democracy itself seems to have no effect on subjective well-being. Finally, a recent study of the difference between anticipated misery if the opposition candidate won and the actual mood following that event, found that people rebounded to their previous level of happiness in a short time.”<sup>465</sup>

Adam was elated: “But of course it is income that makes people happy or sad; democracy’s good name rides piggy-back on the increased income it is associated with.”

“Sorry, said Dessie, “Cross-nationally there is *no* significant correlation between democracy and economic growth.”<sup>466</sup>

“Are you saying that political systems have *no* effect on people’s sense of well-being?” asked Hypatia harking back to Dessie’s earlier comment and seeing the significance of her own work in political philosophy shrink. “But you know the Swiss experiments showing that citizens in cantons with more referenda are happier than those with fewer?<sup>467</sup> That should tell us something about the relationship between voting and well-being.”

Dessie looked glum. “The Swiss findings should cheer an advocate of direct democracy: referenda, elected judges, recall – as in California. Ask the Californians if they are happy about the lower funding of education because of Proposition 13. In my opinion, the Swiss findings that direct democracy makes people happy represents the pleasure of a means (voting on issues) that incurs the concealed cost of poorer public services. It is a form of *myopia*. Participation itself also leads people to accept as fair outcomes that are quite unfair.<sup>468</sup> Now, going from the local to the cross-national, we find that across nations, although higher level of income makes people happier in poorer but not richer countries;<sup>469</sup> degrees of freedom show just the opposite pattern: more freedom makes people happier in richer but not in poorer countries.<sup>470</sup> In this respect, the world is not flat,<sup>471</sup> that is, different policies have different effects according to level of economic development.”

Whereas Dessie could search for consoling scraps in the data to cheer himself up, Hypatia had a different strategy: changing topics. “At least democracy must promote a more egalitarian society and help for the poor,” she said in a somewhat pleading tone. “The admission of the working people to political power would guarantee that.”

***Democracy, equality, and support for the poor.*** Dessie looked at the acoustic tile ceiling again but not with hope. Neither the ceiling nor the data would reassure Hypatia. “Democracies *can* redistribute income from rich to poor, of course, and when they do, they contribute to equality and security, the latter making people happier.<sup>472</sup> Recent analysis shows that, indeed, people are happier in social democratic regimes with more public services than in regimes of a more conservative nature.<sup>473</sup> Beyond that, without controlling for level of income, the more equal the income, the happier the people, but that is because equality increases with income level which is positively related to happiness. Controlling for income, the relationship again shrivels to insignificance.”<sup>474</sup>

Hypatia was distressed and sought relief in more logic. “But it doesn’t make sense to say that when the working classes are given the vote, the polity responds by ignoring that whole electoral segment, often a majority. The simplest analysis of politician’s self-interests would show that that can’t be true.” She sighed a great sigh in which there seemed to be mingled a great oath.

“I know,” said Dessie, sighing a rather artificial sigh to keep her company. “That was why Ian Shapiro convened a conference at Yale on “Why Democracies Don’t Redistribute.”<sup>475</sup> One paper at the conference argued that the empathy people might feel towards the poor was highly selective; that empathy was reserved for kin and other people like themselves. Both empathy and in-group loyalty are selected over the course of evolution<sup>476</sup> whereas pity for the poor is not. I hate to say so, but that is a facet of ‘human nature’ reflected in the lower ratio of the national budgets spent on welfare in countries that are ethnically heterogeneous.<sup>477</sup> So: ‘Is Democracy Good for the Poor?’

Answering his own question with improved data, Michael Ross finds ‘there is no evidence that poor people have benefited from living under democratic governments.’”<sup>478</sup>

“But that must be because the turnout is so biased against the poor,” said Hypatia in despair.

Dessie was also in despair as he reported cross-national research: “Sorry, my friend: it seems from some very careful research on eighteen OECD countries that ‘countries with higher turnout spend *less* on social insurance than countries with lower turnout.’”<sup>479</sup> In any event, welfare policies are generally responsive to public wishes,<sup>480</sup> a criterion that would gratify those still gripped by Imago-18, but not Imago-21 whose criterion is not whether a policy is chosen but whether it is good for people.

With her feelings under control, Hypatia summarized the loathsome claims. “Once established, democracy fails to increase working class feelings of empowerment; it doesn’t make people happier, at least not over the longer term; it does not seem to favor economic equality, has not been supportive of the poor, and the more people vote, the lower is the proportion of national product spent on social insurance.” She said this as though reading from the Egyptian book of the dead. “Imago-21 sounds like a fragment from Machiavelli’s essays, rather than what you make it out to be: the basis of a more humane and humanistic politics. Really Dessie, you have gone beyond playing the devil’s advocate and begin to smell of sulfur. On what possible grounds do you base your alleged support for democracy?”

“I don’t smell sulfur,” said Adam, blandly. “The remaining grounds are not trivial; they include democracy’s historical alliance with market economies.” He beamed with an irritating pleasure.

***Comparison of Indian democracy with the Chinese Authoritarian system.*** “Save me from my friends,” muttered Dessie before he turned to Hypatia. “As that former patron of spinach pies, C. E. Lindblom, said: ‘The egalitarian tradition in democracy has been subordinated to the libertarian.... [Democracies] are devised to serve liberty.’”<sup>481</sup> In the meantime, some insight into the basis of the findings on happiness is gained by comparing India, a democracy, and China, not a democracy. China enjoyed an economic growth rate over the past two decades much higher than India’s; the life expectancy in China of 70 years is 11 years longer than India’s; illiteracy rates are only half as high in China as in India, and for an infant born recently in China (1992) the chance of dying in the first year is only one third that of India.<sup>482</sup> Under these circumstances one would not expect that the right to vote in India would give ordinary people a higher sense of empowerment or a higher satisfaction with their lives than similar people in China. (‘Never mind about your dying son, you have the vote!’) Although the distribution of income is quite comparable in the two countries – a curve with a long, flat, low portion for the mass of the population in agriculture and a small, sharply accelerated, rising tail for the increasing urban middle class<sup>483</sup> – the urban groups in China seem to be more hopeful than those in India.<sup>484</sup> Did a discrepancy in mindful rationality make the difference? China was never a highly religious country; India was.”<sup>485</sup>

## Accounting for Democracy's Failures

Dessie, always ambivalent about individualism, was in a questioning mood. “Those reports on democracy were distressing,” he said, with genuine regret. “Hypatia put it succinctly: it seems that within a relatively short time of its inception, democracy fails to empower, to make citizens happier or more equal or to help the poor. Why these failures? Well, for many reasons, but could it be that the version of people as autonomous and rational and wholly self-interested, as reflected in Imago-18, is partially to blame?”

*How does Imago-18 frustrate democracy?* This was new to Charles. “How would that work?” he asked, his curiosity overcoming his skepticism.

“Sadly, there are many ways,” said Dessie without a trace of sadness. “Take the first thing we talked about, ‘empowering people.’ Imago-18 assumes that people’s self-interests will lead them to vote and instruct them whom to support. But a most careful comparison of how people with clear stakes in an electoral outcome vote compared to those without such stakes (e.g., parents of children in or vulnerable to a school busing program compared to those without such children) reveals only the most minimal differences in turnout and voting direction. Although in some large, visible tax and income cases there is evidence of voting by material self-interest, in general, symbols of race or left-right labels are more influential in determining the vote.<sup>486</sup> Further, somehow Imago-18 ignores the cost/benefit analysis of voting: clear, immediate cost in going to the polls versus distant, uncertain benefits if one’s preferred party wins. As we said earlier, the most important consideration is not direct self-interest but rather the force of community norms.<sup>487</sup> Enlightenment doctrines of self-interest and individualism are poor guides to democratic empowerment and lead to poor corrective prescriptions.”

“I read that not as an avoidance of self-interest, but as a shift from material to socially rewarded self-interest,” said Charles helping Dessie’s general agenda.

“Another way for Imago-18 to botch things up is for legislators and executives to accept Imago-18’s version of humans as self-interested and forget the idealism that originally informed the Enlightenment,” said Dessie. “The result is the theory of government derived from rational choice theory and anticipated by David Hume: ‘In contriving any system of government...every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all of his actions, than private interest.’”<sup>488</sup>

Like a well-trained chorus, Charles added: “That is pretty silly because people in public roles usually adopt the norms of the roles and derive their satisfaction from their reputations as, say, a sanitation inspector, public nurse, or whatever.”

Dessie was tenacious: “The beautiful Imago-18 works its subtle poison in many other ways: one is that the norm of self-interest metastasizes in the body politic, weakening concern for the collective commonwealth,<sup>489</sup> what others have called ‘the public interest.’ The assumption that every person is responsible for her own welfare (internal attribution)<sup>490</sup> mentioned in our first session implies that if she fails it is her own fault – blame the victim (*Belief in a Just World*).<sup>491</sup> And just recently it was discovered that individualism causes people to see risks in collective action that others don’t see.<sup>492</sup> If, compared to other systems, democracy doesn’t help the poor, don’t blame democracy, blame Imago-18.”

Charles found this line of argument congenial in a curious way. “Dessie, old boy, aren’t you saying that the mindful rationality of the Enlightenment actually produces a more self-interested creature than does the evolved adaptive unconscious we talked about last week? We have long known that chimpanzees help each other,<sup>493</sup> but as I understand it Imago-18 implies that each person is primarily self-interested.”

“If you are saying the root cause of these failures is the Enlightenment, you are not being fair,” said Hypatia whose support for Imago-18 rose in proportion to the attack upon it. “Adam Smith actually supported aid to the poor,<sup>494</sup> and you won’t find much support for equality before Rousseau and, perhaps, Condorcet. I know that Adam will disagree, but the fact is that the nineteenth and especially the twentieth centuries did terrible things to Imago-18. If you call Enlightenment doctrine *liberalism*, then please note how liberalism has changed over the years.”<sup>495</sup> Hypatia was right and Dessie knew it.

“Forgive me, Hypatia,” he said humbly, “but allow me to include the later 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century amendments in referring to the traditional imago employed to justify democracy over the past 200 years. After all, these amendments were themselves the flowers of the seeds planted (by Adam Smith among others)<sup>496</sup> in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. You will have noted, however, that Enlightenment doctrines of individual autonomy and thinking for oneself are in conflict with the way our adaptive unconscious relies on social norms for our opinions and our reliance on collective help in times of illness and just plain old age. Although there may be domains where autonomy and thinking-for-oneself are important, they are certainly not characteristic of democratic politics. Democracy is an affiliative, not a solitary, enterprise. As we have seen, Imago-18’s cherished autonomy and thinking-for-oneself are largely replaced in politics by groupthink. The best predictor of *whether* a person will vote is whether her neighbors vote and the best predictor of *how* she will vote is how her family votes. To be effective in politics, people must merge their self-interest with the interest of some group, such as working people, Hispanic-Americans, evangelical Christians. Beyond that, a lot of research shows that people are politically aroused less by the sense of *self*-deprivation than by ‘fraternal deprivation,’ deprivation of others like the themselves<sup>497</sup> (but the poor are not ‘people like themselves’). And in this age of identity politics, most identities are characterized by social attachments.”<sup>498</sup> Dessie paused for breath and Charles again intervened.

“But Dessie, it is the collectivists in all of us<sup>499</sup> whose attachments make democracy possible, whereas it is the cross-grained individualists who prevent democracy from empowering people and serving the poor and the weak and those who cannot, at least for the moment, take care of themselves. And I regret to say that the blessed Imago-18 that launched democracy also launched individualism.”<sup>500</sup>

***Democracy is not inspired by science or evolution.*** Naturally, Hypatia was bubbling with ire. “This is grotesque,” she said in high indignation. “You are saying that from that most civilized of centuries 300 years ago people may have learned the basic premises of democracy but at the same time they learned the principle of every man for himself. Now I suppose you will say that Imago-21 learned both how to share power and to feel compassion for the weak on the savanna a million years ago. You know as well as I do that evolution is hostile to democracy because among both nonhuman primates and early human primates *hierarchy* was the prevailing social system and *dominance* a strong,

genetically endowed motive. What released us from these anti-democratic instincts? Certainly not our inherited physiology. You can say it was the Greeks rather than the Enlightenment that initiated democracy but you can't say it was science."

Charles sighed. So much passion for the wrong cause! "First," he said, "we incorporate in Imago-21 our understanding of evolution because evolution is a source of information on inherent capacities and the activities that are biologically rewarded. Like evolution, Imago-21 tells us capacities, not what to do with them. It is not an ideology; it does not tell us what we *should* do, but only, so to speak, what runs with and against the grain of our biologically given dispositions. And what runs against the grain are presumptions that autonomous, rational, purely self-interested individuals make choices in democracies and markets that reflect those individuals' autonomous, transitive, enduring values. You cannot repeal the adaptive unconscious and substitute mindful rationality by willing the substitution." If Charles had a moustache, it would have drooped inconsolably at this point.

***Evolutionary support for democracy.*** "And where are the chimpanzee democracies?" asked Adam, as he thought, facetiously.

"Without speech, one can have hierarchy, community, and certain forms of equality, but not democracy," said Charles. "But the question is not yet of forms of government; rather it is of innate capacities for types of relationship. For example, Frans de Waal's account of chimpanzee behavior in the free-roaming Arnheim zoo reports not only that all greetings reflect the hierarchical principles of their species but *also* that the dominant male requires support from a coalition of other chimps to maintain his rank: 'Rank depends on friends',<sup>501</sup> and does not go unchallenged. Furthermore, males are not just individual competitors for deference and sex; rather 'males...do strongly depend on one another in the wild; cooperation is a matter of life and death during territorial encounters with neighboring groups.'<sup>502</sup> It is not true that the hierarchical interpersonal relations of nonhuman primate societies means that human societies have no genetic support for shared power.<sup>503</sup> Nor is it true that civilization, as reflected first in what Hobhouse calls the 'ethical religions',<sup>504</sup> is the original source of empathy, for that capacity is endowed by nature and found in nonhuman primate societies,<sup>505</sup> albeit almost exclusively for kin but sometimes more generally for the familiar and similar individuals of the troop. Civilization's contribution has been to seek to universalize that empathy to include the stranger and other persons unlike the self. And Democracy's contribution has been to prevent democracies from fighting each other.<sup>506</sup>

"But Charles," interrupted Dessie, "without some form of genetic support, there wouldn't be any human democracy; since there is, our task is not to prove that such support is there but to show how that genetic support works. A lot more research has to be done on this problem, but my hunch is that the support comes from those original biological affects supporting bonding and empathy."<sup>507</sup>

"What you two behavioral-evolutionists forget are the two great principles that kept these bonded groups from remaining forever warring tribes," said Hypatia. "The Greek principle found in Aristotelian logic says that like things should be treated alike. The Enlightenment principle says that, in spite of their superficial differences, all people are fundamentally Aristotle's 'like things'. These two principles combined to create the

conceptual basis of democracy. You won't find either of these principles in evolution or in your cherished Imago-21."

Dessie looked at Charles. "Fortunately, in addition to the Greek and Enlightenment concepts" said Dessie, "there is empirical research supporting our common humanity – in the sense that the same elements of personality, organized in the same way, prevail across the globe."<sup>508</sup>

Charles looked at Dessie. "Your comment was brilliant, my dear Hypatia," he said. "I have long suspected that the basis of democracy would turn out to be the neocortex.<sup>509</sup> And I also suspect that the improved diet (more proteins from more meat eating) that prompted the rapid growth of the brain about 150,000 years ago was necessary for such development." Charles was not really smiling but his eyes twinkled.

"That's not what I meant at all," said Hypatia.

"Evolution's contribution to compassionate democracy has other sources," continued Charles. "In addition to the reasoning capability of the neocortex and the biological affects there has to be some inhibiting system that turns off aggressive impulses and even the gonadatropin releasing hormone that makes for dominance. The Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) performs this function but there are other interference agencies mostly in various parts of the cortex.<sup>510</sup> The point is that the brain itself contains pro- and anti-democratic elements such that it may not be characterized as favoring a particular political system, but simply said to make many variants possible, although at any particular time one will be more congenial to a particular culture than another. I find it hopeful that increased education seems to support the work of the orbitofrontal cortex which plays an important part in self-regulation.<sup>511</sup> At the focus of these conflicting pressures, democracy will always be fragile, but our growing knowledge of the circumstances favorable to each pressure may, in the end, give stability." Charles' lucid head overcame his mournful spirit to permit a peek at the bright side.

"Wasn't it your friend Timothy Wilson who said of the human species 'we are masterly spin doctors'?"<sup>512</sup> asked Adam, with a wry smile. Then, in one of his fits of tidying up, Adam summarized: "Imago-18 launched democracy but, because of its emphasis on individualism (each person is responsible for her own fate), prevented democracy from empowering its citizens and from favoring equality and the poor. In spite of evolutionary tropisms toward hierarchy, evolutionary endowments gave humans the capacity to cooperate and share power, planting the seeds of empathy for the familiar and similar. Civilization, perhaps the force of logic in union with empathy, extended personhood to unlike others, universalized the concept of the human, extending the franchise by increments to unlike groups, and unevenly broadened human rights to include education and health and dignity. Oddly, because of our endowed affiliative tropisms, the adaptive unconscious is often more benign than mindful rationality." He smiled his blessed peacemaker smile, adding: "See you next week."

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## Chapter Eleven

### HOW GOVERNMENTS COPE WITH HUMAN WEAKNESS

*The heretical New Humanists were finally brought to face the dilemma they had created: If the governed were so poor at making choices and therefore needed a lot of government guidance, how could governors, drawn from the same pool of weak individuals, be reliably trusted to offer appropriate and disinterested guidance? The discussion starts with evidence on the weakness of the link between electoral policy preferences and voting decisions. To this are added some brain studies showing that the difference between voting novices and sophisticates is not an AU/MR difference but a difference in how the brain treats familiar and unfamiliar material.*

*Finding (once again) that the reasons people give for their electoral decisions cannot be the causes of the way they vote, the New Humanists properly ask whether what is called a “popular mandate” is a reliable guide to good policy or even popular policy preferences. Perhaps, they imply, one should rely more on legislators than publics?*

*Hypatia asks whether the so-called New Humanists are not supporting Edmund Burke’s theory of legislators as agents but not representatives of the public, acting on behalf of their publics’ interests but not guided by their preferences. The New Humanists tacitly agree, giving the following reasons why legislators are more trustworthy sources of policy than the general public: because they are more interested, they are more knowledgeable; because they are more educated, they are more likely to support the rule of law and wider and more open discussion of the issues; because they have better access to expert opinion, they are better informed; because of parliamentary rules, their discussion is more focused and relevant; because they have more experience in risk assessment, they protect their constituents better than the constituents can protect themselves.*

*The Liberals point out that the New Humanists have argued for a parliamentary system and the heretics agree, pointing to the success of the European governments in areas where the US presidential system has been more bound by conventional populist prejudices.*

*Further, the New Humanists point to the way European parliamentary systems have been able to adapt to the changes required by the shift from government as a protector of economic rights – what government must NOT do – to a promoter of human development – what governments CAN and SHOULD do. Whereas the Americans froze the structure and mission of their government in a written constitution embodying the prescriptions of Imago-18, the Europeans (probably because of their more frequent crises) were more able to adapt to changed missions and the structures they implied.*

\* \* \* \* \*

As Hypatia made herself comfortable in her regular niche in the booth by the window, she leaned across the table and whispered conspiratorially to Adam: “You see their dilemma, don’t you? They have this miserable creature they want to call ‘human nature,’ a creature who must serve them both as governors and as the governed. The weaker and more group-dependent the citizens are claimed to be, the more people need government

but the less the governors, also weak and miserable creatures, can help. Pretty soon, like Rousseau, they will summon superman, called ‘the Legislator,’ to help them out. Some democracy!” Hypatia was at her best in a conspiracy.

### **Human Nature and the Agencies of Government**

Charles, whose long face was bracketed by sharp ears, heard her and turned to Dessie entering just behind him. “She’s right, of course about our dilemma but not about Rousseau, who didn’t know beans about the natives of Bougainville on which he modeled his ‘state of nature.’ Shall I set them straight before they order?”

But he was diverted by Dessie who thought Bougainville was a flowering shrub. “Starting with a people-first approach,” he said briskly, “we ask two questions about the people concerned. First: What makes them happy and helps them develop, a set of policy questions? And second: What competences and limitations do they bring to government? The first is about government output, which, because it sets the agenda, helps determine government structure, that is, the agencies of government should be organized in such a way as to do most effectively what they will be called upon to do. The answer to the second question, people’s capabilities and limitations, is another question: ‘Who can and should do what in a government designed to make people happy and mature?’”

“The second sounds like an old fashioned question on the division of labor,” said Adam, sensing familiar turf.

“And so it is,” said Dessie. “That principle of division of labor should be applied in such a way that decision-makers in each level and agency of government be vested only with those kinds of decisions for which they have sufficient capacities and incentives to contribute to the missions of their agencies. Having stakes is not enough.”

“More checks and balances, more bicameralism, and more interventionist policies,” said Adam, supporting Hypatia’s perception of a dilemma. “The demand is for more sail and the supply is all anchor. What a mess.”

“May we elaborate on this ‘mess?’” asked Dessie, almost enjoying the paradox he and Charles seemed to propose. “Because democracy assumes that the members of the public have sufficiently clear perceptions of their own and others’ wants and needs to express these preferences in their votes, and further assumes that elected officials will seek to satisfy the expressed demands of their respective majorities, weighing them against each other and seeking expert advise on how to implement them – because of these assumptions, we can start with the fountain of inspiration, the public ‘demand.’”

“Hello adaptive unconscious. Good-bye rationality,” said Adam, sufficiently familiar with attitude studies to anticipate what was coming.

***Electoral decisions.*** Dessie continued: “Compare the interpretation of Imago-18 with what we now know about the way people decide how to vote. Imago-18 (or at least the Framer’s version) assumes that people match the policies proposed by each candidate or party (or faction) against the voters’ own preferences, look at the qualifications of the candidates who will carry out those policies, and vote accordingly. In fact, matching policies against preferences is a minor part of the process and the use of party identification is more important – and probably the most sensible part of that decision

process because it usually points to a general policy direction. But party identification is transmitted in early socialization and reflects family interests that may change as the circumstances of the individual change over a lifetime.

“Excuse me,” said Adam, “but I thought your Imago-21 had some special light to shine on electoral choices.”

“And so it does,” said Dessie, eager to shine that light on what that unfortunate voter was doing in her dark polling booth. “First, notice a neuropolitical revision of a 1964 simplified behavioral model of two kinds of voters, *novices*, whose votes followed random patterns of change suggesting that their policy attitudes were, in fact, ‘non-attitudes’ and *sophisticates*, whose patterns of change revealed continuity and understanding of the issues.<sup>513</sup> This 1964 version was already a major break with 18<sup>th</sup> century’s rational man. Some forty-five years later, brain research finds that the two types of electoral decision makers actually use different brain systems in their political thinking: in their attempt to make sense of unfamiliar issues, ‘novices engage a reflective brain system composed of their prefrontal lobes, anterior cingulate, and hippocampus.’ Sophisticates, for whom the issues are familiar, engage the ‘temporal lobes, amygdala, and basal ganglia.’<sup>514</sup> Does this mean that novices rely on their adaptive unconscious while sophisticates rely on mindful rationality? I think not. ‘Sophisticates are able to retrieve and form political attitudes nearly automatically using the *pattern recognition capabilities of their temporal lobes*, which accounts for their attitudinal stability and consistency as well as their faster response times.’<sup>515</sup> Remember that recognizing patterns and a faster response time are characteristic of the adaptive unconscious. To be colloquial, the difference between novices and sophisticates is not that one is more mindfully rational than the other, but rather that sophisticates are more familiar with the issues than are novices.”

“That disposes of one hypothesis,” said Adam, partly as goad and partly as an intellectual probe. “I mean the idea that the adaptive unconscious is conservative in that it follows norms and that mindful rationality at least offers grounds for radicalism in that it invites consideration of alternatives to the going order. Given the role of education in preparing people for mindful rationality, that would make the working class conservative and the professional class radical. On social, but not economic, issues there is something to that, but you are saying that familiarity with the issues cuts across this neat class system. So education triumphs if mindful rationality is dominant and also when familiarity with the issues is dominant.”

“Sometimes neurological research does illuminate behavioral research,” said Charles, changing the subject. “I think this evidence of the benefits of familiarity with the issues supports vesting more authority in legislators, who are inevitably more familiar with the issues than the electorates. But wasn’t there something in our earlier discussion of thinking for oneself that affect voting decisions?”

“Electoral decisions share most of the benefits and disadvantages of thinking about anything else, said Dessie. “For example, mood makes a difference that is hidden from the individual: ‘Being in a good (as opposed to neutral) mood speeds processing of material relevant to the decision, facilitates the flow of ideas, makes things come to mind effortlessly, and simplifies the perceived complexity of the decision.’<sup>516</sup> These political decisions are also guided by genetic instruction and especially by group induction, two themes quite alien to the 18<sup>th</sup> century view of human nature. They rely to an unusual

degree on the distinction between self and not-self which is a function of what are called 'mirror neurons,' located in the prefrontal cortex<sup>517</sup> and which are easily disturbed by mental disorders. Electoral decisions enlist our plural selves, which, as we said earlier, are actually mental representations in a person's brain derived from the original need to keep track of body movements. In politics, especially, there are many presenting selves,<sup>518</sup> a different one for such different groups as family, workplace, and with the guys at poker Thursday nights."

"When I play poker Thursday nights I seem to be same person who just left my wife going over the check book a few minutes previously," complained Adam. "But I can assure you that the self that enters the polling booth is a much better person than the one who drew to an inside straight and faked it last week."

"Thank you; bearing witness is helpful but not really necessary," said Dessie, smiling. "Some cases may help: Marilyn, an undecided voter, enters the polls and relies on her sense of trust in O'Flaherty, the former prosecutor. She thinks this trust is because of O'Flaherty's record but it also happens that she has just had intercourse and is filled with the hormone oxytocin, the hormone that increased subjects' trust in an investment agent when it was administered by those wily Swiss economists,<sup>519</sup> mentioned previously. Shall we trust Marilyn's sense of trust based on recent intercourse?"

Adam was heard to mutter, "To be fair, she should share the experience."

"Darlene" continued Dessie, "says she is voting for the candidate who supports higher social security payouts, but analysis of her vote shows that, like an increasing proportion of voters in European elections, she tends to vote for a candidate whose personality is like her own.<sup>520</sup> What is the relation between Darlene's preference for more social security and her vote?"

"You forgot about Tony," said Charles, correcting for the feminist bias in Dessie's account. "In considering gun control legislation, Tony weighs the risks of owning a gun and having his kids shot accidentally, against not having a gun and being powerless if a burglar enters his bedroom. According to recent research at the Yale Law School and Psychology Department, what will decide him has nothing to do with these actual risks, but rather the consensus on broader issues of hierarchy and individualism held by those with whom he talks in his everyday encounters.<sup>521</sup> Of course! How could Tony assess these risks on his own in any sensible or rational way?"

Dessie hadn't finished: 'Jennifer says she is voting her policy preferences, but because she has just been reading the obituary of her friend, the conductor of the Philharmonic, she has 'mortality salience.' This sad state has been shown to lead voters to prefer, compared to a strictly policy oriented candidate, a 'charismatic' candidate who 'proclaimed an overarching vision,' said he would 'take chances,' and suggested that the voters belonged to a 'special state and a special nation.' In an experiment, mortality salience influenced people to vote for a 'confident person [who] transcended mortality by participating in something larger than themselves.' It also increased ethnocentrism and hostility to outsiders.<sup>522</sup> Will Jennifer vote for the same candidate tomorrow? In short, Marilyn, Darlene, Tony, and Jennifer cannot explain why they voted the way they did. The experimental literature on introspection has shown time and time again that people confidently generate post-hoc narrative accounts of the thinking that supposedly went into a behavior, even when their behavior can be shown to be driven by factors outside

their conscious awareness.’<sup>523</sup> What, then, is the people’s ‘mandate’ or instruction to the legislature under these circumstances?’<sup>524</sup>

“Well, Edmund Burke, you have slyly sneaked into the teachings of your Imago-21 the doctrine of legislators as trustees *for* the people rather than representatives *of* the people,”<sup>525</sup> said Hypatia, too familiar with political theory to let that pass.

**Legislative decisions.** Dessie, of course, was not happy to be called ‘Edmund Burke,’ an MP from Old Sarum, one of the rottenest boroughs known to history. But he shouldered his burden and gave a fair account: “Burke’s argument was that he was elected by his constituents (such as they were) not to reflect their *views*, which were relatively uninformed, but to promote their *interests* as he understood them. He was hired, so to speak, as their agent and not as their representative.<sup>526</sup> It was a plausible position then and reflects actual practice even now, although, because it erodes accountability, it is more subject to abuse than would be an acceptance of the role of representative. But the gains from moving from making the agent’s mindful rationality available to his constituents are generally worth the risk.”

“From what you said earlier about group-embeddedness, I should have thought you would emphasize the clubbiness of a legislature,” said Hypatia, “the loyalties and reciprocal favors and mutual support for incumbents that group membership of that kind encourages. I do think you owe your own public some reason why these legislative individuals are better at framing public policy than any other group of citizens.”

“One,” said Dessie, holding up his thumb, “they are selected because they are *interested* in politics and policy, something that all studies show increases more complex reasoning.<sup>527</sup> Two (index finger), they get their jobs as lawmakers through career paths that require more than average *education*. In some ways this is the reverse of the intellectual snobbishness that you might think because here and in Europe and probably everywhere the university educated are less willing than others to ban discussion of defense plans, health plans, and to some extent, economic plans. That is, the educated favor public discussion more than the uneducated. Support for restricting the press is also greater among mass publics than among politicians in treatments of ‘dramatic crimes’ and ‘crimes among blacks’<sup>528</sup> The educated are also more tolerant of disliked out-groups, more likely to support due process for people accused of crimes<sup>529</sup> and, at least in France, less judgmental on questions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’<sup>530</sup> In short, to favor humanistic values implies tilting the balance from electoral decisions to legislative decisions.”

“Since you do not have much faith in ‘the people,’ you will, of course, eliminate all traces of populism in your new constitution,” said Hypatia with a wry smile. “Full circle back to the Framers. How ironic!”

**Framers’ fears and Imago-21’s prudence.** That was a direct hit and Dessie and Charles looked at each other with concern. Charles said, “Let me try,” and, to his own surprise, found a pretty good answer. “The metaphors of the time were nautical” he said: “‘sail’ for empowerment of government and ‘anchor’ for restraint. These were double metaphors, however, because empowerment was justified by the eighteenth century’s faith in people’s reason while restraint was required by that century’s fear of people’s ‘passions.’ The great leap forward that made a democratic (or republican) government possible was a mounting belief that reason could control passion, the same justification that Hirschman

shows was the licensing formula for the market.”<sup>531</sup> With that behind him, Charles moved onto more familiar turf. “As everybody knows by now, that vivid but inaccurate language, using ‘reason’ for cognition and ‘passion’ for affects and emotions, is rejected by Imago-21 as is the sharp division between cortex and limbic system. Cognition and affect, thinking and feeling are not two different and alternative poles of the same dimension; they are two different dimensions of brain behavior with many different kinds of relations among them.<sup>532</sup> What Laibson’s two-pronged version of neuroeconomics<sup>533</sup> fails to realize is that each of these systems uses the other to complete its own processes, that is, to define an emotionally loaded situation or to give meaning and direction to a new experience. Mindful rationality requires both processes.”

“I don’t get it,” said Adam. “Are you saying that compared to mass publics, legislators balance their affects and their cognitions in a more sane fashion? I had not thought of sanity as an appropriate criterion to apply to legislators” He thought of mentioning Huey Long and Joseph McCarthy, but knew that such outliers would not really help the general argument.

“Well,” said Dessie hesitantly, “the news stories, written with other purposes in mind, may not reflect legislative sanity, but on those few occasions when samples of legislators have been measured on such pathological traits as authoritarianism, legislators prove to be saner than average.”<sup>534</sup>

**Availability of experts.** Dessie was grateful for Charles’s relief pitching and went back to an earlier point. “Our distinction between the capacities of mass publics and of legislators is not based on the fear that emotional people will take over and do something dreadful,” he said. “Nor is it a rerun of *It Can’t Happen Here* (1935) where Sinclair Lewis tells the story of a demagogue who establishes fascism in the United States. But without a worst case scenario, in the ordinary business of governing, what kind of government would our analysis of human nature suggest? So far we have referred complex problems from mass publics to a more interested and better educated and less volatile agency, the legislature.”

Hypatia was waiting for just this move. “But legislators share the fallibility of human nature you picture so graphically in Imago-21. The fact that they are educated and interested in politics and even ‘more normal’ does not immunize them from gross errors, including favoring cronies, obfuscating science, and acting out the ideologies of their small town, sometimes evangelical, backgrounds. For example, required to shut down losing hospitals, if there is only one such hospital two-thirds will vote to shut it down; if there are two, only one quarter would shut even one down.”<sup>535</sup> Choosing is conflictful and legislators try to avoid conflict.”

She was right. “I know,” said Dessie, humbly, “that research on problem solving shows that as problems become more complex, group discussants increase the level of complexity of their own thinking up to a kind of breaking point where, according to individual capacities, one by one these individuals drop down to the level of the simplest heuristics and stereotypes.”<sup>536</sup> Parliaments can protect against this peril by both formal procedures (limiting the irrelevant) and especially by the use of experts from the civil service and outside.” Remembering that he had stopped his enumeration with his index finger, Dessie now discovered his middle finger: “Access to expertise is, then, the third way that, compared to general publics, parliaments are superior instruments for decision. The fallible rationality that leaders share with their publics leads them, as it cannot lead

their publics, to hire specialists in health, environmental protection, defense, finance, and so forth to assist them in their treatment of the complexity of these issues.”

“Naked meritocracies are repellent to people who ‘want more say in the government,’”<sup>537</sup> said Adam, quoting from a standard test of ‘postmaterialism.’ “You’ll have to do better than that to satisfy supporters of democracy.”

Charles took over, looking at Dessie to see how far he was straying from what he knew professionally. “In British and Continental systems citizens have as much final (but not chronic) ‘say’ as they do in the American system but both the prime minister and the MPs are served by members of the civil service. Both the British and Swedish systems have a pretty good record of civil servants devising health and pension plans before there was an articulated public demand for them.”<sup>538</sup> One might say the same thing of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Peace Corps in the United States. We think of bureaucracy as a stodgy method of implementing policy, but actually at its upper levels it is a source of innovation<sup>539</sup> and mindful rationality. We have only begun to tap expert knowledge in the BNR. For example, to relieve America’s chronic savings deficit, it has been suggested that proposals be framed so as to avoid the conflict between the instant gratification of the limbic system and the capacity to plan for future gratification of the cortex. Thus, instead of offering \$20 now or \$23 a month from now, the bank offers \$20 two weeks from now or \$23 in a month. Most people’s brains reject the first and accept the second.”<sup>540</sup>

“If banks can benefit people by manipulating their poor brains, they can also deceive them to enrich the banks,” noted Hypatia. “More generally, are you making the civil service a third or fourth branch of government? Or, like some lawyers who have just discovered the data on human irrationality in assessing risks, do you favor turning over to specialists a whole category of risk assessment assignments?”<sup>541</sup>

“Actually,” said Dessie, “Your enemy in this case of risk assessment is Cass Sunstein who is right about the public’s weak capacity to assess such risks as those involved in gun control, abortion, and environmental degradation. But as a Yale Law School group has discovered, these risk assessments are systematically rooted in such ideologies as individualism, community solidarity, and trust in hierarchy.”<sup>542</sup> Thus, to assign risk assessment to experts is also to assign decisions on public values, a profoundly undemocratic kind of devolution. But I think we can use expertise more adroitly in a democratic manner.”

Charles was torn on this issue, but had another related one. “I am thinking of how to serve the ‘knowledge function’ of society, where the return to invention and discovery is rarely commensurate with its contribution to marginal national product,”<sup>543</sup> he said. “Where Imago-18 focuses on representation, rights, channeling power – the fear of abuse and moral patrol model, Imago-21 focuses on how to promote human flourishing through knowledge and concern for the well-being and welfare of all citizens.”

***From what government must not do to what it can do.*** “You know,” said Hypatia tentatively, “in the psycho-political theory you are promoting I sense a shift from negative themes of protection against abuse of rights by government to positive themes of government’s role in human development, from what government *must not do* to what government *can do*. The funny thing is how closely this parallels the shift in psychology

from the medical model, useful in repairing defects, to the empowerment model, useful in strengthening capacities.”

“The difference,” said Adam, “is that while psychologists explore the various kinds of natures humans exhibit, Charles and Dessie keep talking about human nature in the singular. And today you seem to be trying to create jobs or roles or even government agencies that fit some standard version of humankind contained in Imago-21. Given the rich variety of human beings with which the world is endowed, I hope you do not destroy too many victims with your iron maiden.”

Dessie was alarmed by what Adam said and delighted by what Hypatia said just before that. “Adam,” he replied, “if you will remember, we have been exploring the *variety* of behaviors prompted by a variety of genetic configurations. Fitting government to human nature requires just as much attention to the variety of capabilities as to common limits to those capabilities. If there is an iron maiden in these schemas it is, *mutatis mutandis*, economic man.”

Feeling better, Dessie could now address Hypatia’s felicitous comments, and in his joy he probably went too far. “Positive government implies an enlarged civil service to carry out positive programs.” More bureaucracy? Did he mean that? Yes; that was implied by the new concept of government functions envisioned by Imago-21. He refused to think of it as the “cost” of the benefits to human well-being and welfare – unless people were to think of an ophthalmologist as the “cost” of better vision.

***Legislators and civil servants are constrained by their roles.*** “But,” said Hypatia, sticking to her point, “as I said last week, if the legislators and civil servants share this miserable semi-rational, group-dependent character that the people possess, why should they not rule so as to favor themselves?”

“Step outside...” began Charles as though inviting a bully to have it out in the alley. Then, in confusion he hurried to finish his sentence, “Step outside the cocoon of Imago-18 which says that rationality is inevitably self-interested and that good conduct depends on conscience, that is, guilt rather than shame. Actually, the group-dependent feature of humankind makes it congenial to act on behalf of others, e.g., one’s constituents. Thus, some experimental and brain research shows that ‘representatives are nearly as mindful of their constituents resources as they are of their own resources.’<sup>544</sup> And in the role of a legislator this mindfulness is enforced by shame with a force much more consistent than that of guilt.<sup>545</sup> As Dessie said last week, there is a term for the constraint in organizations that enforces behavior consistent with the mission of the organization; it is called *role*.” Charles reached over and gripped Dessie’s pudgy hand and extended the ring finger: “So, fourth,” he added, awkwardly waving Dessie’s ring finger over the table, “there is the legislators’ role that encourages behavior on behalf of constituents and even, sometimes, on behalf of the nation.”

“All as seen through self-favoring biases,” said Adam, still smarting from the translation of plain old ‘self-interest’ to this, as he thought, euphemism.

“Well,” said Dessie, not rising to the bait, “nothing escapes the self-favoring bias, but that very bias comes to the rescue of role prescriptions containing such magic symbols as ‘honor,’ and ‘trust,’ both powerfully reinforcing the trustee role. One enhances one’s self-esteem by seeing oneself as living up to the requirements of the role.” And in a slap at Imago-18 (and Mill and Mannheim)<sup>546</sup> Dessie went on: “We

certainly would not want autonomous people, insensitive to the opinions of others, in office.”

**Government Scaffolding Protects Against Human Weakness**

“To continue the metaphor of scaffolding,” said Dessie, rather proud of the term he had borrowed from the Russian psychologist, L. S. Vygotsky,<sup>547</sup> “notice that it serves both to protect the old building (protection against abuse by government) and as a platform for those building a renewed structure (the positive, human flourishing concept of government functions). To serve both functions a political system would have to take into account certain human frailties and capabilities, providing scaffolding that protects society against human weakness and facilitates the use of human capabilities. I think of it as both protection against the weaknesses of the adaptive unconscious and mindful rationality *and* a way to facilitate the strengths of each. In both senses it is benignly paternalistic – the good, but not overprotective, parent.” He handed them a piece of paper.

**Table 12.1 Government Scaffolding Protects Human Frailties**

<u>Human Frailties</u>	<u>Political and Cultural Scaffolding</u>
The limited cognitive & emotional capacities of individuals (low threshold for cognitive complexity; weak emotional resilience; etc.).	Government by discussion. Collective executives whose members check each other; division of labor in legislatures; multiple consultants.
Human vulnerabilities to overload (stereotypes & cognitive short-cuts under stress).	Division of labor to share burden of decision-making; adequate civil service staffing; culture of humane science.
Self-favoring biases (misperceiving own case <i>vis a vis</i> others’).	Rule of law, independent auditing, inspectors general, regular elections, free press.
Preference for the familiar and similar (ethnocentrism, nationalism).	Rule of law, impartial civil service, cross-cutting cleavages, coalition governments, culture of tolerance; international agencies.
Reliance on affectively loaded symbols (emotional appeals dominate cognitive appeals, scapegoating).	Free press in a cognitively and emotionally sophisticated culture. University education. Checks & balances; second opinions.
Behavioral tendencies of people in groups (we-they divide, groupthink, buck-passing).	Ethics of responsibility (Mannheim), <sup>548</sup> culture of cognitive complexity (as in courts). Role specification for independent thinking.

“I don’t see much system in your table,” said Hypatia, “but with further work, there may be something in the scaffolding idea that your imago-schema could use. [Faint praise, indeed!] It reminds me of earlier efforts to match situations to personalities and, for example, to describe universities in terms of their social as well as cognitive demands on students.<sup>549</sup> Universities do a lot of scaffolding for freshmen; less for upperclassmen until it is time for career or graduate school counseling.”

“I am reminded of two economic concepts,” said Adam: “the *hidden hand* effect where the competition of two individuals or firms benefits the third parties involved. In that sense, anti-trust regulation could be considered scaffolding for third parties. The second concept is the *variable sum game* where one player’s gain does not imply losses to another, as when pure food and drug legislation increases consumer trust and custom by protecting against dilution of medical ingredients. Can you write these into your constitution as the circumstances that will produce relational harmony and higher productivity?”

“That’s your department,” said Charles in his friendly, melancholy way. “The market is the domain of the hidden hand, although that hand also extends to high synergy schools (where teachers’ gains (e.g., higher pay) benefit children and children’s gains (e.g., better nutrition) benefit teachers. Economic growth is the paradigm case of a variable sum game, although the rule of law, where losing litigants benefit from living under that benign rule, is a kind of variable sum game. Thank you, Adam. When none of these incidental benefits to competition is consciously planned or mindfully organized, then, like persons, societies, too, enjoy the benefits of an adaptive unconscious.”

Adam smiled a restrained smile and continued his attack. “I smell parliamentarianism,” he said, a little more vulgar than usual. “The smell includes a bouquet of paternalism, but my olfactory tubercle, part of what is called the reptilian complex, tolerates that odor – up to a point. Could you engage your cortex on that issue? Don’t forget that the olfactory tubercle has ‘satellite aggregations of gray matter.’”<sup>550</sup> Adam had always liked science in school, but had never realized before how much fun the misapplication of its language could be.

### **Does the Parliamentary System Offer a Better Fit?**

“We think Imago-21 favors a parliamentary system,” said Charles, transcending his biological calling. “I know there are good political science reasons for that choice (of the many advanced countries who have created democratic governments since 1789, none has adopted the American presidential system), but it seems to offer less populism, better support for and protection of the civil service, and more stable government than do presidential systems.<sup>551</sup> Also parliamentary systems tend to have stronger, centrally financed political parties, whose individual MPs are bound together by more or less coherent ideologies as well as by party financial support at election time. The plural parliamentary executive, being less dependent on the erratic will of one man, is likely to produce more thoughtful and consistent policy. As a consequence, the dominant party or parties can (if they have genuine majorities) carry out coherent policies considered to be in the public interest. They are less vulnerable to highly particular interests and do not need to ‘bribe’ individual MPs with what the Americans call ‘pork.’”<sup>552</sup>

“I spent a sabbatical in Italy once,” said Hypatia. “I do not think you are describing the Italian parliamentary system which regularly bribes with offices and policies the members of minority parties in its shifting coalitions.”

***From economic rights to human flourishing: Will the old constitution serve?*** “My dear Hypatia,” said Dessie in that salutation that always meant trouble. “You are right about Italy and many other parliamentary systems. In trying to answer Adam, I was talking about general tendencies and modal politics. But the point we now want to emphasize and to engrave in our Imago-21 codicil on constitution making is this: *The most dangerous disease to which constitutions are vulnerable is sclerosis, the hardening of connective tissue in the spinal column and the brain.* The reason for this caution is that social purposes change. The U. S. constitution was designed mainly to protect individual rights, especially economic rights, and ‘to provide for the common defense.’ These purposes, embedded in Imago-18, were frozen by a written constitution protected by judicial review. For two hundred years it served its stated and implicit purposes well, but – and here is the contentious part of our codicil: *A constitution designed to promote human flourishing will have different provisions designed for this changed purpose, empowering and restraining government in a different fashion.* If we now wish an instrument to promote human flourishing, congress cannot do it without the Court’s permission. Unlike our distinguished predecessors, we are no longer innocents in a field with little historical evidence. That evidence suggests that our constitution does not serve this new purpose so well as a parliamentary system would – and does in European systems.”

“Perhaps parliamentary systems are better adapted to governing people with the characteristics that Imago-21 identifies,” said Hypatia, “but, compared to the American presidential system and setting aside our unfortunate post-war record, the longer term record does not indicate a stronger defense of freedom by parliamentary systems. Quite the opposite.”

Dessie drew a deep breath. “Once more dear friends, into the breach,” he said mostly to himself. Out loud, he said, “Dear Liberals, what you call *freedom* is not the ultimate good that Imago-18 says it is but rather has to be justified in terms of something else. You, Hypatia, justify it on the grounds that liberty permits future changes in priorities. Mill justifies liberty on the grounds that it permits the correction of error. Charles and I justify liberty on the grounds that choice facilitates a sense of competence and permits a greater variety of preferences to be satisfied, that is, freedom and choice can be good for human development.”

“And,” added Charles, sounding like the last notes of ‘Taps’ dying away in the distant hills, “when choices do not serve human development, they must be limited. See you next week.

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## PART SIX: TOWARDS THE HUMANE SOCIETY

### Chapter Twelve

#### THROUGH BIAS AND ILLUSION TO THE HUMANE SOCIETY

*In this chapter... The New Humanists summarize some further reasons why people's choices in markets and democracies (and elsewhere) are flawed and fail to do what Imago-18 promised they would do. The New Humanists claim that their version of human nature is more humanistic than that of the humanities, because it starts with a study of the character of human thinking and deciding and goes on to examine how creatures with those characteristics can achieve happiness and develop themselves. Without a way, other than introspection, of understanding human nature, the humanities' version of humanism must adopt a weaker foundation, assuming the characteristics of humans from the goals desired: inferring what is the case from what must be the case if certain desired outcomes are to be achieved.*

*Their critics insist that the New Humanists explain why a world with fewer choices would be better than a world with more choices. The New Humanists reply indirectly by listing the sources of error common in most choices. First they cite four kinds of biases that characterize human choices: (1) biases regarding one's own immunity to the perils of risky behavior, (2) biases favoring the present over the future, (3) biases flowing from people's inability to anticipate how they will feel when they have experienced, and then adapted to, changed circumstances; and, of course (4), all the self-favoring biases that give preference to the self over another. These latter, the New Humanists say, may, indeed, be sources of error, but they serve as a kind of psychological immune system something like the physiological immune system that protects the body against infection.*

*In answer to the Liberals' return to the gratifications of choice, the New Humanists point to the solution devised by Libertarian Paternalism, promoting better outcomes of choice by requiring the chooser to internalize the risks a risky policy would otherwise impose on others. From the point of view of the chooser, this internalization has the benefit of extending the illusion of control.*

*The New Humanists move on to explicate the illusions that govern the world of choice. First, the market promotes the illusion that in rich societies people will be made happier by material gain. Second, they repeat the point that people harbor the illusion that a democratic vote produces an electoral mandate for the policies of the victors. Third, returning to the self, the New Humanists point to people's illusion that they are the masters of their fates (the illusion of control) and the illusion of free will, i.e., that people's own thoughts are not substantially determined by their associates and the cultures they live in. Fourth, the by now familiar illusion of rationality, the idea that it is possible (and desirable) to calculate a course of action where the calculation escapes the influence of the limbic or emotional system.*

*For good evolutionary causes, people also harbor the illusion of a just world – lest their own efforts and sacrifices not be rewarded. With initial caution (soon*

*discarded) the Heretics then point to the belief in the causal force of supernatural beings. They accept that they cannot prove that there are no gods, but find explanations of outcomes based on divine intervention inconsistent with causal explanations based on a scientific method. The discoveries of a gene that predicts spirituality and of a form of brain stimulation that replicates religious experience give a new twist to accounts of religion – and to predictions of what Freud called “the future of an illusion” – but they do not alter the basic thrust of the New Humanists’ argument.*

\* \* \* \* \*

“I wish I were the person I used to be,” said Hypatia, seated in her usual corner in the red booth.

“But you are at the peak of your performance and profession,” said Dessie with only a trace of envy. “The paper you published last year on the Alexandrine philosophers was well received and led to your recent grant from the National Humanist Association.” He wondered if the ABH (Association of Behavioral Hybrids) would recognize his work in the same generous way.

“I don’t mean that,” said Hypatia, dismissively. “I mean, until I was taught otherwise by the powerful Wednesday Spinach Pie Association, I was a person with moral responsibility for my own thoughts and acts, free to think anything I thought true and good and even beautiful. Now I find I am only a pawn in a chess game that is not even God’s chess game but rather one where my Queen can morph or mutate over the centuries into some hybrid that is neither black nor white; not because she wants to but because she is less visible as the Mottled Queen.” Tossing her queenly, unmottled black hair, Hypatia was visibly distressed.

Whenever Hypatia was distressed, Charles was sympathetically distressed. “Dear Hypatia,” he began in his earnest fashion, “if evolution says mottled is more fit, then the court tells the Queen that mottled is beautiful and the knights will wear motley. Seriously, in a humane society, you do not lose your personhood because of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ genes. Nor do you gain freedom of thought by disclaiming genetic and social influences on thinking; you only lose your ability to account for those influences. If I may say so, I think you are still in the grip of an eighteenth century prophetic model of humankind. There are better uses for philosophy than prophesy and claims about human nature. Philosophy is at its best when it exposes the confusion buried in the kind of paradox you imply.”

***From a prophetic to a scientific model.*** “For the past few weeks I have been thinking about the underlying assumptions of our respective positions,” said Dessie, “and I think I know the answer. Charles is right, most of the thinkers of the Enlightenment were working with a *prophetic model* that *assumed* that people had the qualities needed for the kind of society desired. That model was a little like certain economic models: if you need something for a given outcome, *assume* it. Some Enlightenment thinkers wanted what we now call a *free society* and assumed that people would have the skills and judgments necessary to make their own choices in markets (Adam Smith) and democracies (Thomas Jefferson). Desiring to free people from the constraints of secular and religious authority, they assumed that people were autonomous, rational, and sufficiently aware of their true

interests to make the necessary decisions in these institutions, institutions whose benefits actually depend upon the kinds of choices people make.”

“Do you deny that you, too, are prophets?” asked Adam.

“The scientific model we are calling a *Humane Society* works differently,” said Dessie, not quite denying the prophetic nature of his proposals. “For one thing, we reverse the order so that the ‘free’ institutions are only instrumental to the things we care most about, the quality of the people and their lives. That’s why we claim to be more humanistic than the Enlightenment humanists: we put people, not their circumstances, first. Therefore, we do not have to assume that most people have the skills and judgment necessary for such free choice institutions as the market and democracy. Rather, that is a matter for investigation – the science part of our scientific model. We ask: “Under what *kinds of conditions* do what *kinds of people* with what *kinds of capacities* make what *kinds of decisions* to shape what *kinds of fates*? As I said, the much admired free society model simply assumes that most people can choose wisely to promote the values and preferences that their wisdom provides. So today, in our penultimate spinach pie session of the year, we will look once more at the biases and illusions that cloud that assumption of wisdom. In our last session we will compare this so-called Free Society to the Humane Society we propose.”

### **Human Flourishing and the Biases of Choice**

“I agree,” said Hypatia, now in her state of semi-conversion, “that the main alternative to the Dessie-Charles proposals has not been a humanistic society but rather what has been called a *free society*, a society endowed with many choices and governed by what Dessie calls ‘choice institutions.’ I also agree that these institutions were created under the impression that humans are autonomous and rational, and know their own interests and how to get them, an impression I have come reluctantly to revise. If people do not have these characteristics, then, obviously, the choice institutions devised for these characteristics are likely to be defective. Faith in *laissez faire* is simply an evasion of this problem. I realize that the last four spinach pie sessions have been devoted to these various defects, but I am curious about any solutions that this *Brave New (Humane) World* might provide for a society with fewer choices? Sprinkling the holy waters of science over the corpse of the world we have known and, I confess, loved, will not persuade skeptics like me or probably others.”

***The built-in biases.*** “Choices are good for people when the choices teach them that they are effective. Adam is right about that,” said Dessie glad to agree with his friend, for once.<sup>553</sup> But think of the case when neither the predicted nor its opposite consistently happens *whatever* a person chooses to do. Those choice conditions teach fatalism and helplessness. But there is another class of choices where people systematically choose wrong, leading them to failure and tragedy. Knowing this, shouldn’t a decent society protect people from predictably unhappy outcomes? These poor choice conditions are fairly well known:

Underestimating the risks to oneself is one such condition. In good moods, people tend to think that they will not incur the penalties of risks that they nevertheless believe

might well strike another. For example, the macho mentality of motorcycle riders feeds the natural human tendency to believe that what is likely to happen to others is unlikely to happen to themselves. Call this *the bias of risk immunity*.<sup>554</sup>

We also tend to discount the future, failing to assess correctly the rewards and pains of the future as contrasted to the present. The error has several sources: reluctance or inability to defer gratification, perhaps because of the dominance in the adaptive unconscious of the limbic system with its known tendency for instant gratification,<sup>555</sup> or perhaps because a person has learned that promises of goods in the future are unreliable.<sup>556</sup> Call this the *bias of temporal myopia*.

A third built-in bias is our inability to anticipate how we will feel *after adapting* to some unforeseen gain or loss.<sup>557</sup> This bias is best shown in the experiment reporting that after a brief euphoria lottery winners tend to return to their former (set-point) moods, and that victims of accidents involving loss of limbs also tended to return to their pre-accident moods after a brief period of depression.<sup>558</sup> Similarly, the moods of voters whose candidates lose an election in which the voters had invested money and energy suffer only a temporary decline of morale after the loss.<sup>559</sup> This bias may be called the *bias of persistence forecasting of current moods*.”

“I know the research that says that modestly inflated self-esteem is good<sup>560</sup> and that self-confidence is born of an exaggerated sense of one’s own competence, *the self-favoring bias*,”<sup>561</sup> said Adam. “In the spirit of Plato’s advice to ‘know thyself,’ will you erect scaffolding to demolish these self-protecting defenses?”

“This bit of classical advice might have been and might still be functional for a few select philosophers whose only method of knowing the human nature about which they wrote and write is introspection,” said Dessie calmly. “But, in an age when there are better ways of knowing human nature, knowing the self in that introspective way is not useful for self-knowledge. Indeed, Plato’s advice should be rephrased to address the variety of things a person ought to know about herself: She ought to know and take precautions against her *bias of risk immunity*, her *bias of temporal myopia*, and her *bias of persistence forecasting of current moods*. To the extent that she cannot correct them, the *Brave New (Humane) World* erects scaffolding to help her. As Timothy Wilson said: ‘Just as we possess a potent physical immune system that protects us from threats to our physical well-being, so do we possess a potent psychological immune system that protects us from threats to our psychological well-being.’<sup>562</sup> That system includes the *self-favoring bias*, an evolutionary scaffolding reducing need for artificial social scaffolding.” Dessie paused for a moment, and added: “But one might say the purpose of the Scientific Model is to help people know a more accurate version of themselves.”

Adam changed the subject. “After noting the benefits of learning from experience, you imply that the imaginary or real subjects of your experiments do not or could not learn from experience,” he said.

***Evolutionary and neural bases for biased self-perception.*** “And that’s for a very good reason,” said Charles, taking over his part in the duet. “These biases are built into the system. Risk assessments are chronically mistaken because evolution has generally favored risk-taking over caution as an assessment better adapted to survival. Introversion and anxiety lead to caution, but group survival seems better when these characteristics are in the minority. As for the human tendency to discount the future, when people are in the

default adaptive unconscious mode, they are vulnerable to prompts from the limbic system with its known demands for instant gratification. The roots of the third bias, persistence mood forecasting, are linked to the incapacity of the adaptive unconscious to engage in counterfactual thinking. T. Wilson characterizes this mode as ‘concerned with the here and now,’ ‘rigid,’ and ‘operating on-line’ rather than ‘after-the-fact,’ characteristics that seem to inhibit anticipating how one will feel ‘after-the-fact.’<sup>563</sup> More generally, failure to learn the lesson of the biases is rooted in the ‘easy-to-learn’ - ‘hard-to-learn’ distinction: one learns most easily those things programmed by evolution.”

“So you deprive humanity of the benefit of choices offering ‘hard-to-learn’ lessons because people would have to do the hard work of learning to overcome their biases,” said Adam. “I doubt if that kind of Nanny State will produce the tough-minded people needed to make the very difficult choices that the looming problems of overpopulation, resource-shortage, global warming and pollution will require.”

***Libertarian paternalism.*** “Not at all,” said Dessie, interrupting. “We simply alter the circumstances and risks involved in the choosing. Cass Sunstein, a lawyer, and Richard Thaler, an economist, have coined the term *libertarian paternalism* to describe a policy for a libertarian motorcycle rider who defies the order to wear a helmet. Instead of the standard proscription, the libertarian paternalistic law is framed so as to permit him to obtain (at a price and after education in the risks involved) a license NOT to wear a helmet. He would also have to show that he carried enough insurance so that the public would not be required to pay for any uninsured medical costs.”<sup>564</sup>

Hypatia was amused: “Any semi-smart libertarian would see through that,” she said. “As long as the state can alter taxes or fees, it can offer choices that actually control behavior. Your libertarian would likely quote Justice Marshall: ‘The power to tax is the power to destroy.’ The solution, says the libertarian, is to limit the taxing power. Thaler is an economist, of course, but I am surprised at Sunstein, a lawyer who would be more familiar with real world responses to constraints.”

“But the principle remains valid and offers opportunities for scaffolding that preserves some choice and protects people from some of their own biases,” answered Dessie. “By loading social costs on individuals or firms (I am thinking of the proposal to make Wal-Mart pay for the health costs it has typically loaded onto the public by way of Medicaid) we preserve employer and individual choices. The opposite is also true: by offering Medicaid to the medically indigent, the state shows that in addition to the insurance principle, it understands the human biases that we have called the *bias of risk immunity* and the *bias of temporal myopia*. Thus, the welfare state is one familiar form of scaffolding to protect people from their biases.”

“And,” said Adam, “President Clinton’s welfare reform was a further scaffolding to protect people against the *dependency entitlement bias* you have not mentioned. That bias follows from the logic of collective action where costs (working) and benefits (pay) are separated. It is a bias that says: ‘In this society I have a *right* to economic support without effort,’ and it is damaging to people’s morale and self-esteem in an industrial democracy – but apparently not in an aristocracy.” Adam paused for a moment and then, in a recognition of the implications of what he had just said, added: “The scaffolding required to protect people from the dependency entitlement bias is the provision of

adequate education and the assurance of jobs for all, that is, full employment. Looking for jobs that aren't there is not good for people."

"But sometimes illusions are good for people," said Hypatia, thinking of the benefits that flowed from the illusions of control and self-favoring illusions of how one is perceived. Contemplating this illusory world she could not help but think of the biblical phrase: "For now we see through a glass, darkly" (Cor. 13:11) as well as Plato's metaphor of our perceptions as shadows in a fire-lit cave, contrasted to what we might perceive in daylight.

### **Scaffolding for the Illusions of the Enlightenment**

"I find it hard to accept that there are circumstances when falsehood is better than truth," said Charles, "although I do recognize how self-favoring biases may be fruitful for the biased individual, as Dessie said earlier. The overly candid person risks losing her friends – for good reasons. But we have been trying to find ways whereby society could *correct* the effect of biases; I would be reluctant to look for ways that society can accept and use illusions."

"I have a list of seven common illusions in this world of imperfect minds and brains," said Dessie. "Each of the illusions has mixed outcomes. No surprises here, but collectively they do suggest how very fanciful is our interpretation of the world we have lived in for some time. Do you want to hear them?"

"I suppose we have to," said Hypatia, preferring seven truths to seven illusions.

***Illusions about markets and democracies.*** "Two of them apply respectively to markets and democracies. The illusion that applies most clearly to the market is what we have elsewhere called *the materialistic fallacy*,<sup>565</sup> the illusion holds that even beyond a fairly modest level of prosperity, more money will make people happier.<sup>566</sup> This illusion stems from a disregard of one of the basic laws of economics, that is, the declining marginal utility of any good that increases in abundance relative to other goods. This materialistic fallacy is an illusion for the simple reason that research shows it to be false."

"I doubt that it is always false," said Adam, "but the by-product of the illusion, prosperity, is worth a little individual disappointment along the way."

"And the illusion that applies mostly to democracy," continued Dessie, "is that an electoral victory implies a popular mandate regarding the issues discussed in the election. Because voters cast their ballots on the basis of a variety of considerations – the mood of the voter, the matching of candidate personality and voter personality, scandals diverting attention to mostly transient moral matters, inherited party loyalty, and so forth – for these reasons, reading mandates from electoral outcomes enlists the art of 'spin.'<sup>567</sup> As Adam said, one by-product of the market illusion may be a continuing increase in productivity. But others seem to include both a rising disappointment in the quality of life<sup>568</sup> and the increased anxiety mentioned earlier. The products of the democratic illusion are a continuing, though possibly declining,<sup>569</sup> incentive to vote and, I think, an inchoate disappointment with the way democracy works, at least in the United States although apparently not in Europe."<sup>570</sup>

“Your illusory world is off to a good start, undermining the justifications of the two institutions we have to foster and register choices in society,” said Adam sardonically.

***Illusions or biases about the self.*** “Thank you,” said Dessie, with sarcasm to match Adam’s sardonic tone. “The next set of illusions might just as well be called biases because they have to do with familiar illusions favoring the self. The first is the belief that one controls one’s own destiny, that one’s efforts are the cause of the outcomes affecting one’s life, *the illusion of control*. This illusion is associated with both occupational and marital success and has a felicitous self-confirming quality.<sup>571</sup> At the same time it leads people, especially in the United States where it is strong, to sacrifice real but diffuse control through collective means (such as unions and cooperatives), thus foregoing the kinds of scaffolding that might help them provide better for their health, their community amenities (none of the internationally ranked 20 most livable cities is American), and their economic or physical security.”

“Have you considered that this beneficial illusion of control is stronger in the US than elsewhere because the market, where contingent reinforcement is prompt and self-evident, is stronger, and the state, through which control is remote and dilute, is weaker than elsewhere?” asked Adam pursuing his own view of the world whether illusory or not.

“Why Americans reject collective self-help is a separate question,” said Dessie, eager to avoid that distracting argument. “Another personal illusion or bias,” he continued, “is the belief that we are autonomous and thinking for ourselves when most of the variance in our behavior and thought is explained by external circumstances and genetic endowments, neither of which is under our conscious control. The sense of freely choosing to do what we do, the belief that on any occasion we could just as well do otherwise, in short, the *illusion of free will* has the same benign consequences that follow from the illusion of control. I have no doubt that the illusion of free will, like the illusion of control, has evolutionary roots; it contributes to survival. This would follow from the fact that evolution has no independent sense of truth and falsehood and no machinery to weed out illusions that contribute to survival: what works to propagate the genes is ‘true’ *because* it works. Evolution is the supreme pragmatist.”

“The illusion of rationality is one of the more curious of these modern human misconceptions about themselves,” continued Charles. “Although it seems that we can detect illogicalities in our thinking – but only when we can set aside preferences urged upon us both by the cortex (as values) and the limbic system (as emotions). But these preferences are not easily set aside; they have automatic, unconscious ways of entering thought by means of secret portals that we do not consciously control.<sup>572</sup> As we said about political thinking last week, we do not know the processes by which we reach conclusions, assigning rational processes when other forces are at work. For example, we think that our basic political attitudes stem from our conscious values, when they are often prompted unconsciously by our genes;<sup>573</sup> we think we are impartially analyzing logical contradictions in the presentations of our preferred candidates and their opponents but partisanship biases our logical analysis.<sup>574</sup> In short when we think we are reasoning, careful investigation usually shows that we are rationalizing, that is, the reasons do not cause the decisions but rather justify decisions made on other grounds.”<sup>575</sup>

“Supposing that were true,” said Hypatia, “I dread the effect of removing that illusion. Such a removal would tell a person she is nothing but a gene-driven partisan, an unthinking, rationalizing entity – hardly a person at all. How could she ever say: ‘I have decided that I am opposed to prayer in the schools’ when she knows that the main cause for that belief is not her reasoning about the separation of church and state but rather some particular variant of her genetic makeup?”<sup>576</sup>

“Unless, of course, that knowledge of the sources of her attitude led her to inquire more deeply into the grounds for her belief,” said Charles who was not surprised at a belief source in the genetic code. He found that source more stimulating than frightening.

### **Illusions of Justice and the Supernatural**

For reasons beyond his own powers of apprehension, Dessie found exposing the illusory world of the human species a congenial undertaking. So he cheerfully asked a question that has troubled theologians for millennia

***Illusion of a Just World.*** “How can we account for the widespread *Belief in a Just World*,<sup>577</sup> tenaciously held in the face of the daily evidence that virtue is often not rewarded and harming others is often not punished?” he asked. Then, turning to Charles, he pursued this question in the usual way: “Perhaps there is an evolutionary answer to this question of attitudes toward what is labeled as ‘evil,’ an answer based in the felt need for sanctions against those who break community codes. I know that revenge has been shown to have such a basis both in groups<sup>578</sup> and individuals.<sup>579</sup> And one can understand why successful people would find congenial the belief that their successes were merited. But the belief in a just world is also held by those who are not very successful; indeed, it seems to be almost universal.”<sup>580</sup> He paused and then answered his own question: “One cause is the fact that anyone engaged in an enterprise has strong reasons to believe that, if she works hard and uses good sense, the enterprise will succeed.<sup>581</sup> Any alternative belief would abort the enterprise and, for example, lead our hunter-gatherer forebears to go hungry.”

“Because of delicacy regarding our feelings, are you deliberately avoiding mentioning the world’s main expression and source of the ‘belief in a just world’?” asked Hypatia provocatively.

***The illusion that supernatural beings have credible causal force.*** “All right,” said Dessie, this time reluctantly. “The originator of the concept and the principle investigator of the *Belief in a Just World*, Melvin Lerner, reports that “there seems to be a strong faith in the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent force, that sees to it that justice and goodness triumph, and that wickedness is punished.”<sup>582</sup>

Hypatia did not believe in supernatural beings but she knew the arguments against skepticism. “You cannot prove that there are no supernatural beings any more than you can prove that there are no black swans, Popper’s example of an unverifiable universal,”<sup>583</sup> she said in correct philosophy-of-science-speak.<sup>584</sup> “But do we want to get into this particular illusion at this time?”

“Of course, we don’t,” said Dessie, relieved. But in equally correct philosophy-of-science-speak, he added: “We can say that the attribution of causal force to supernatural beings is *inconsistent* with everything we *can* explain, including *The Descent of Man* and the functioning of the brain. But to persuade people that this inconsistency is worth taking seriously will be difficult. First, notice that the rewards to piety are actually substantial (in the United States people who go to church or temple are happier and more often report finding meaning in their lives).<sup>585</sup> Also, belief in the supernatural helps people believe that they will be rewarded in this world and the next for doing good and that they can find consolation in the future for their suffering. In imagination, the rewards are infinite: for Christians, escape from eternal torment is a supreme good. For all these reasons, beliefs in the supernatural are rational quite irrespective of the evidence available to support them, that is, regardless of their ‘truth value.’ Also, in every society, belief in the prevailing god(s) is normative and both avoids censure and facilitates acceptance. The rational person will, therefore, seek those benefits. Finally, the supernatural beings are thought to be responsive to prayer; consequently, it is rational for people to pray for the relief of grievances. But unlike other kinds of interventions, no study of the efficacy of prayer has shown that it is more effective than wishful thinking or private determination to help the self.” Then, under his breath, he said: “But perhaps, as Theodore Roosevelt said, this is because ‘God helps those who help themselves’ – confounding the results of any simple correlational study.”

***Is the illusion of supernatural forces congenial to the adaptive unconscious?*** “So, how does the adaptive unconscious dispel or undermine the illusion of supernatural beings?” asked Hypatia, seeking closure on this topic fraught with pain for believers.

“The adaptive unconscious, as the product of a long process of evolution, has been conditioned to support effective acts, like ‘fight or flight,’ or nurturance of the young,” said Dessie. “Because it works through such unconscious processes as those employed by the limbic system, the viscera,<sup>586</sup> and the brainstem,<sup>587</sup> the ‘rationality’ of belief in the supernatural is not so important. Nevertheless, I would expect the adaptive unconscious to employ methods with greater proven effectiveness than prayer.”

“Hold on, Dessie,” said Charles in alarm. “What could be seen as more effective than a belief that makes one happier, makes life more meaningful, justifies one’s successes, and increases social acceptance, the last, surely conditioned by experience among all kinds of primates as well as for human hunter gatherers. You have it backwards: only mindful rationality with its consciousness of alternatives, could free humankind from the illusion of the supernatural. The occasional advocacy of secularism was the failed lesson of the Age of Reason.”

“If illusions of the supernatural and the efficacy of prayer are so rewarding, any efforts to disillusion people would be hedonically counterproductive,” said Adam. “And many would say that, given supernatural injunctions to practice virtue, such efforts might be morally counterproductive, too. Nor can you show that piety inhibits productivity. Better erect your reconstructive scaffolding around other choices.”

Charles, who shared Darwin’s skepticism about the supernatural, looked at Dessie. “It is spirituality, not piety, that is prompted by gene VMAT2,”<sup>588</sup> he said, “and I think there is as much spirituality in the Unitarian Church and even in The American Humanist Association<sup>589</sup> as in the Christian churches or Jewish synagogues or Muslim

temples. Moreover, if transient changes in the temporal lobe, which may be induced by an electrical current applied to that area, can be responsible for 'religious sensations,'<sup>590</sup> denomination and doctrine are almost irrelevant. Also, genetic and neurological sources of spirituality and religious sensations suggest a powerful force that can be shaped by scaffolding. Further and in a different vein, some research suggests that the more one thinks of God as a controlling force in one's life, the more negative is one's mood.<sup>591</sup> Thus, although supernatural beings are famously Protean and subject to imaginative interpretation, they may, as in this research on the effect of a controlling image of God, conflict with a strong, endowed alternative illusion, *the illusion of control* that we talked about earlier." Charles paused to look ahead. "Can we restore people's sense that they influence their fates without the equivalent of prayer?" he asked. "We are not yet ready to build scaffolding for this area of misleading thought but may some day be able to use the spirituality behind these illusions about the supernatural for humanistic purposes."

"God be with you when you do," said Adam with a smile. "See you next week."

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## Chapter Thirteen

### THE FREE SOCIETY OR THE HUMANE SOCIETY?

*In this final session... The Liberals once again try to put the New Humanists on the spot: How would a society giving human development priority over freedom – what the New Humanists call “The Humane Society” – be different from or better than the one we have now? The argument is fought pretty much on the Liberals’ grounds with few references to evolution and the brain to support the defending Humanists.*

*Not being against human development, the Liberals make the first concession: “But course we favor human development,” they say. “So why not agree that a Liberal Society is simply the platform for, or condition of, a Humane Society?” The Humanist answer is not accommodating: because, they hold, not all choices promoted in the Liberal Society do foster human development. Since there is no intrinsic merit in the act of choice, only those choices should be encouraged that have beneficent effects on the choosing person and any others affected by the choice.*

*The Liberals have a strong counter-point: How can it be that telling people that they are the pawns of evolution and social norms contribute to their development if it makes them feel ineffective? To which the New Humanists reply: It is a gamble; although such candor may erode the illusion of control, arming people with better knowledge about themselves, gives them information that can, in fact, make them more effective.*

*The Liberals are drawn to one feature in the Humanist agenda, Libertarian Paternalism, and want to see that policy of internalizing costs carried further. The New Humanists see problems that the originators of this solution, limited by things measured by money, would not have seen. The illustrations suggest that the economists are wise to limit their paternalism to those things that can be more easily measured by money, even though the pain of hurtful experiences not measured by money are much greater.*

*The Liberals take up a long delayed criticism of the New Humanism: the New Humanists are confounding two levels of analysis, the human level and the molecular level. The Humanists counter that every discipline has a micro and a macro level and most find it fruitful to integrate the two. Then the contentious issue of free will returns to the conversation*

*To the Liberals’ repeated complaint that the New Humanists destroy moral responsibility in their deterministic account, the New Humanists reply that, in fact, it is morally irresponsible to argue for ignorance of the causes of social malfunctions. As for strict moral codes, empirical studies show that people who say that moral blame should “depend on the circumstances of an act” are also more compassionate and tolerant and seem to have a higher sense of moral responsibility than those with binding, absolute moral codes. A strict conscience does not always lead to more compassionate behavior.*

*In this final session comparing the two systems, the New Humanists return to the question of whether an individual is the best judge of her own welfare. They note that, although there is some truth to this claim when the stakes are simply material and thus more easily accounted for, when the stakes are mental health and psychological growth – the products of unconscious processes, whose causes are more obscure to the individual – that claim loses persuasive power. Against the Liberal contention that the New Humanists are traveling the road which socialists trod in their efforts to create a “New*

*Socialist Man,” the Humanists say, modestly, that they are trying to apply new knowledge of human well- and ill-being to the human predicament. The Liberals, they say, are arguing against the application of knowledge.*

*Science-based knowledge implies the familiar procedures of science, say the New Humanists: rehearse alternatives in free-ranging discussions, try small experiments before launching large reforms, and keep reforms focused on the objectives sought, in this case the development of what is most “sacred:” the flourishing human being.*

\* \* \* \* \*

Hypatia had reluctantly accepted the need to substitute Imago-21 for her beloved Imago-18, but when Dessie and Charles tried to substitute the implied *Humane Society* for the more familiar *Free Society*, she balked. If that was the transformation implied by the change in imagoes, she decided she would have to rethink her acceptance of Imago-21. But she did not see why a scientific understanding of human nature implied giving up the values and, she thought, the moral advantages of the free society. There was no historical machinery that seemed to force such a conclusion nor did the logic of the argument imply it. Rather, the proposed change of regime seemed to her, and to Adam, as well, to rest on a set of assumptions and inferences that were not persuasive.

### **Dignity and Empowerment in Free and Humane Societies**

Dessie came stumbling into Clark’s with the grace of a backhoe. Hypatia’s target had arrived. “Last week,” she said in something of a pounce, “you said you thought the free society was an *alternative* to the humane society that you favor. As a free thinker in a free society, why don’t you say a free society is simply a *condition* for your humane society, a condition showing humanity by encouraging choices<sup>592</sup> and free thought? Otherwise your arguments are paradoxical, as though freedom were in *opposition* to humane treatment.”

***Empowering people in free and humane societies.*** The backhoe rumbled a bit and hissed its hydraulic brakes. “People First!” it said in a mechanical voice. “What I mean by that,” said Dessie in his normal voice, “is that if one starts with an understanding of and concern for human nature, one does not ask “What do people want?” and then try to set up institutions that permit them to register what they want. That is important but not the first question. The first question is “What can society do to help people develop their best qualities and enjoy a higher quality of life?” That *may* be achieved by giving them more choices and asking them what they want, but also it *may not*. Do you see my point?”

“But the purposes of markets and democracies is not just to ask people survey questions; they are not just research engines. Rather, they are intended to, and actually do, *empower* people so that individuals can try to get what seems to each of them to be the elements of a higher quality of life,” said Adam with some heat. Then, smiling at his deliberate trespass on Dessie’s turf, he added, “powerless people do not develop their best qualities; indeed, they may quit on you as rats conditioned to believe they are powerless stop trying to escape electric shocks.”

“Empowerment?” queried Charles from half way down the aisle before he could

be heard. “Empowerment for what?” he added, sliding into his seat. “The condition of having power is not something we want to give to everybody on every occasion. Will the newly empowered use it to defile themselves or to develop themselves? That business about empowering people is part of the Eighteenth century package of clichés that still taints our democratic discussion. ‘The people,’ my friends, can be as corrupted by power as can a magistrate,<sup>593</sup> as any lynching mob will illustrate. The Humane Society, therefore, asks, ‘How can we create situations (scaffolding) where empowerment is used to help people help themselves?’ Empowerment is like freedom, as we explained several weeks ago: it has no intrinsic merit.”

“Or, to take the other side of the argument,” said Dessie, searching for a position that might be more persuasive to Hypatia, “since power is itself neither good nor bad, we would want to distribute it to prevent its monopoly. That is a kind of scaffolding that free societies acknowledge. For that reason, a widely shared knowledge of the popular biases and illusions represents just such a balance. Otherwise you encourage that asymmetric knowledge that economists say distort exchanges: the advertiser and politician know your biases and illusions, but you do not. As we learn more about human nature, we want that knowledge broadly distributed: ‘More Power to the People!’”

***How can telling people of their limitations empower people?*** Adam had not been heard from. “The free societies that I know anything about,” he said, “all assume that the people are sovereign, meaning that they are competent enough to be trusted. But your so-called humane society employs a concept of human nature with diminished capacities. In that society people can hardly take care of themselves, let alone deal effectively with large social problems. You weaken their confidence in themselves and thus disempower them. Surely it is paradoxical to try to empower people by teaching them that they are less competent than they thought they were and are themselves constrained by their genetic heritages and the group pressures they unconsciously accept.”

“To know the limits of one’s power is empowering,” said Charles. “This is obviously true of the sailing captain who knows that the source of certain changes in the wind is an enduring and uncontrollable warming in the Western Pacific (El Nino) – although he is powerless to change it. He is, for example, in better control of his situation than is some earlier navigator praying to Æolus (or sacrificing his daughter, Iphigenia, to Artemis).” Charles paused after this lyrical excursion into mythology, continuing more soberly. “So, too, is it empowering to understand why the presence of those cues that once prompted drinking or taking drugs should be avoided. (They stimulate the internal reward system prompted by previous substance abuse.) This understanding of behavioral/neurological processes empowers the former abuser to live a normal life. By telling people the truth about themselves, the Humane Society gives them weapons against such powerful interests as might seek to exploit them. Without that scaffolding, the Free Society leaves people to their unprotected fates, a policy called *laissez faire*, though I think *sauve qui peut* is a better epigram.”

Dessie joined in: “People with ‘Intermittent Explosive Disorder,’ have ‘abnormalities in ‘areas of the brain that are supposed to control anger’ – as in road rage. ‘Recognizing violence as a treatable problem should help individuals take more responsibility for violent actions, rather than less,’ says Michael Miller, the editor of the *Harvard Mental Health Letter*.<sup>594</sup> If this is so, the scaffolding provided by more adequate

mental health services in the Humane Society may increase, rather than decrease the moral responsibility that is said to be encouraged by the Free Society.”

***Reducing choices that make people feel effective.*** “Maybe,” said Adam, “but when in the name of a *Humane Society* you want to deprive people of choices that they enjoy and by means of which they actually learn that they are effective, you create a paradox. You know that depriving people of choices has the effect of increasing their wants for the forbidden items.<sup>595</sup> Be concrete: I think if you listed the choices that you would eliminate in your paternalistic reduction of choice, you would discover the pain and loss you would inflict on a rebellious population.” He didn’t actually say ‘gotcha’ but he might just as well have.

Dessie looked distraught. “Adam,” he said in an accusing tone, “you are asking for an inventory of all the choices with two kinds of costs: (1) *externalities*, that is, with costs imposed on people other than the decision makers, like the pollution costs which a manufacturer imposes on others in the manufacture of some good that profits him. And (2) costs that apply to an individual decision maker who suffers from the biases mentioned in the previous chapter: bias of risk immunity, bias of temporal myopia, bias of persistence forecasting of current mood, and various self-favoring biases, all of which distort judgment and suggest the need for social scaffolding to improve that judgment, perhaps of the libertarian paternalistic kind we mentioned last time. That paternalism would change the calculations of those responsible for these externalities and biased decisions and would be used to fix the price of a permit allowing a person to make any choice thus restricted. The example in our previous discussion of including in the cost of a permit to operate a motorcycle all the costs of health and accident insurance for the self and others was favorable to the idea of libertarian paternalism. But when the Humane Society follows the libertarian paternalism principle, problems emerge. For example, in the Humane Society:

“We allow firms to pollute up to a limited amount and permit them to sell their excess pollution rights to other firms (as in the Free Society). That works in the American Free Society where the level of pollution is now (but not for long) the world’s most voluminous. (*Rates of pollution decline with economic development.*) In the Humane World Society the cost of the pollution permits might include the cost of pollution beyond the nation’s boundaries, as in the Kyoto agreement.”

“Following libertarian paternalism, the Humane Society might allow handguns, but the cost of a permit would include the insured value of all human and property losses that exceed the same losses in a society that prohibits handguns.

“We would allow abortion, but charge for an abortion permit costing... what? The insured value of the estimated life of the destroyed fetus less the cost of its upbringing? The probable court and penal costs of delinquency of an unwanted child? But not all costs are dollar costs; should we add reimbursement for the psychic pain of bearing an unwanted child less the psychic costs of those who find abortion a violation of their religious tenets?

“If psychic costs are permitted and we allow atheism, must we reimburse those offended by sacrilege, perhaps funding the reimbursement fund by taxing those who go to church and thereby offend those who find the worship of the supernatural offensive? On the same principle, what should a gay marriage license cost?”

Hypatia was heard to mutter “‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ rides again.”

“Adam, my friend,” continued Dessie, “this is a morass, but it is not just the morass imposed by scaffolding in the Humane Society; it is the morass currently faced in the Free Society, as well. What is different is that the Free Society says voluntary decisions have value beyond their consequences. That is, quite irrespective of the consequences, something of value is added to a decision when it is voluntary. The decision is good *because* it is voluntary. Volition is a value in itself. By contrast, the Humane Society says that the consequences of choosing or deciding are its only sources of value. Volition is good because it *feels* good and because it *teaches* the decider something. If the voluntary decision doesn’t do these things, it is not good. And to go back to your premise: if the choosing increases the sense of effectiveness of the chooser, that increased effectiveness has a value that we both respect.”

“What difference does it make whether the value of volition lies in the fact that it is voluntary or in the good feelings that volition induces?” asked Adam, perplexed.

“A lot of difference,” said Dessie, emphatically. “The volition-is-good-in-itself position leads to a Free Society without much consideration of its consequences. *Laissez faire* must be good because of the voluntary nature of the choices it encourages. This is Milton Friedman’s argument.<sup>596</sup> But making each choice or decision valuable only if its outcomes are valuable leads to the Humane Society where outcomes of voluntary decisions must be weighed against other criteria of well-being and development. Drug addiction is only one of many possible Free Society harms, as we have seen in the cases of the biases of risk immunity, temporal myopia, and persistence forecasting of current mood. Imagining that one is effective when one is not (the illusion of control) may have other merits but it does not teach people how to be effective.”

“You might also mention,” said Charles, who was following the argument with care, “that only in the Humane Society is there any calculation of the cost of *adding* a new set of choices on an already full agenda of choices, of the burden of choice overload and the diminishing returns to choice.”

***Enhancing the dignity of personhood by reducing human potentialities.*** “I can’t help returning to Kant’s claim that what differentiates humans from all other entities is that humans have something more precious than exchange value; they have an intrinsic value which he called *dignity*,” said Hypatia. “I do not know how to describe that quality more precisely than to say that it is characterized by an internal quality, the ethical will, and an external quality, sharing in the general value assigned to personhood, a value diminished when any person is treated inhumanely. Both internal and external qualities are deserving of respect. In my opinion, the Humane Society you have described ignores that most precious quality of dignity.” It was almost Hypatia’s last cry from the depths of the 18<sup>th</sup> century that she was leaving with reluctance.

Adam’s phobic reaction to specious humanist reasoning was stimulated. “Humph,” he said in a snort. “We do not exchange dentures, but, although expensive, they have no dignity, quite the opposite. And the reason we value humans is because we *are* human. As William James noted a hundred years ago<sup>597</sup> and as now confirmed by the endowment effect (ownership endows any good or attribute with special value), whatever is *mine* is more highly valued than what is not mine.”<sup>598</sup>

Ignoring Adam, Charles returned to Hypatia's question. "Can it be that the more we know about the sources of human behavior, the less dignity, we assign to our species?" he asked. "Can knowledge of what we care most about diminish our sense of personhood? How can it be that you have less, rather than more, dignity when you know better *why* you feel and think and act as you do? I understand what prompts your distress and the value you place on what you call *autonomy*, but think of the paradox you are illustrating: 'The less I know about myself, the more autonomous and free do I become.'"

***Can you have a free and humane society without free will?*** This crucible of alleged paradoxes did not frighten Hypatia. "I find something else even more paradoxical," she said with her brow looking like a worried washboard. "You claim to be concerned with the inner, dispositional, volitional nature of humans and show that concern, paradoxically, by explaining thought and behavior through the workings of the non-volitional brain machinery operating outside consciousness. You honor the subjective side of human nature by making it passive while giving causal force to hormones, electric circuitry, and genes, none of which can be said to be subjective or volitional. By descending to the molecular level and beyond, you sacrifice all that we have ever thought was human, especially the human ability freely to choose one's course according to one's values. When you confabulate analysis appropriate to the human level with analysis appropriate to the molecular level, you lose the person and her willed choices. The Free Society that we have known does not suffer from this paradox because it acknowledges free will; indeed, it justifies its choice institutions, especially markets and democracies, on the grounds that these institutions permit people to sum their preferences and express them freely. The question is fundamental: Can you have a free society, with or without scaffolding, without free will?"

"We have been over that in an earlier session when we discussed thinking for oneself," said Dessie in a tired voice. "Like others,<sup>599</sup> I have explained free will as the subjective experience one has in consciously deciding an issue. Objectively, it is the name given to the unexplained variance in behavior after exhaustive examination of other causal factors. Free will is 'real,' whatever that means, because people act on the assumption that they have free will, just as they act on the assumption that supernatural beings influence their lives. But let us suppose that your Free Society assigns, on average, forty percent of the variance to 'free will' and the Humane Society assigns eight percent.<sup>600</sup> Does that difference of thirty-two percent make the two kinds of societies incompatible? The real difference is that the Humane Society is serious about searching for *all* causal factors (including factors in genes and the brain), while the Free Society is not." Dessie thought that would close the issue, but Charles had something further to say.

"Every field I know anything about has macro and micro levels of analysis that supplement each other," he said, "including [with a glance at Adam] economics. For example, in my field we understand plant life both by botany, say, by the ecology of ferns, *and* by microbiology, such as the synthesis of proteins from amino acids. For the life of me, I cannot see why the way the neurons in the hippocampus affect memory is not as much a part of the study of humankind as are the memories thus generated." Charles smiled to himself and continued with a kind of gentle malice: "If there were a subject labeled neurohistory to go along with neuropolitics and neuroeconomics, you

would have a literature as well as a label to bridge this problem of levels of analysis that seems to trouble you.”

### **Blame in a Free and a Humane Society**

How could humanism be so easily diverted from its proper course? Hypatia tried again.

***Does the neural and evolutionary grounding of ethics strip ethics of moral responsibility?*** “Well, at least we can agree that ethics is not reducible to empirical analysis,”<sup>601</sup> she said; “we don’t have to argue about whether one can go from is to ought. The fact that a society engages in cannibalism or capital punishment has no effect on the ethical standing of those practices. So at least in that area your reductionist program is a violation of humanism, indeed, the most important part of humanism.”

“High-minded principles are dangerous if ruthlessly applied,” said Dessie in one of his iconoclastic moods. “There is some evidence that ‘it depends on the circumstances’ is the best answer to questions on the application of principles of right and wrong.”<sup>602</sup> He paused to navigate around the looming Charybdis, saying: “provided that you avoid such relativism as ‘Liberalism for Liberals, Cannibalism for Cannibals.’<sup>603</sup> Categorical imperatives have a ringing resonance that appeals to people looking for certainty, but as it happens, the educated Swedes and Dutch are much less likely to believe categorically in their cultural principles of right and wrong than are the Nigerians and the people who live in India.<sup>604</sup> Education everywhere has the effect of teaching people that even their own moral culture, as Ruth Benedict said, is only one variant of a rainbow of possibilities.”<sup>605</sup>

“Aside from the fact that you have distorted Kant’s idea of a categorical imperative,<sup>606</sup> you should know that moral questions cannot be decided by referring to their distribution around the world,” said Hypatia, sticking to her philosophical arguments. But Hypatia was not finished.

### **Scientific Understanding in Free and Humane Societies**

“In the name of humanism,” she continued, as though invoking Minerva to bless her thoughts, “you put scientific understanding in the place of humanistic understanding. That is certainly paradoxical. It is as though I were to ask you to believe in the power of close textual analysis to relieve the symptoms of hypertension.”

***Free thinking in a Free Society; disciplined thinking in a Humane Society.*** “There is wisdom in the Cartesian dualist conception of reality,” continued Hypatia with a smile. “So I will not try to substitute my method for yours and, dear Charles and Dessie, you should not try to substitute your method for mine.” Surely, she thought, tolerance for honest differences was a moral attribute.

Dessie laughed and said, “Could we agree on a dualist approach this once: textual analysis for literary critics and causal analysis for students of human behavior?”

Charles was less permissive: “Hypatia,” he said, “You will think me narrow and dangerously dedicated to my own version of truth, but I want to try out a distinction

between thinking in a Free Society and thinking in a Humane Society. The virtue of the Free Society is that it has *no* agenda so it needs no criteria for the way it thinks. The truths of faith, fantasy, and science all have standing in the Free Society. On the other hand, the virtue of the Humane Society is that it *does have* an agenda, the happiness and development of its people. And this agenda will give advantages to one way of thinking over another. Whenever the Free Society serves the purposes of the Humane Society, epistemological laissez faire is licensed and we may think any way we please. Whenever the Free Society does not serve those purposes, as where it fails to help correct the biases and illusions mentioned last week, we are obliged to think in the ways that are most effective in relieving those defects. Speech with a purpose is constrained in a way that speech without a purpose is not. And, of course, that principle of matching type of thinking to the requirements of what one is trying to do applies to speech in the Free Society as well as in the Humane Society. The difference is that in a Free Society people are free to choose malevolent purposes supported by any way of thinking congenial to them.”<sup>607</sup> Charles was teetering on the edge of professional bias and he knew it.

Dessie had a proposal: “Since we are all agreed that the well-being and development of human beings are the criteria for successful social policy, why not compare the contributions of science and the humanities to these two goals? For example, three hundred and fifty years ago ‘Descartes separated mind from matter more sharply than had ever been done before... The attributes of matter... [could] be handled mathematically’ and measured. But at that time, the attributes of mind and experience could not be measured and, says an intellectual historian, were ‘declared to be essentially “subjective,” and in some way “unreal.”’<sup>608</sup> As a consequence, while the study of mind floundered, science flourished and we developed a great material civilization. Benefiting from science, people lived longer, healthier lives. But were they in any way ‘better people?’ *Things* have flourished, even some of the circumstances of life have flourished, but have people, in the important respects that we care about, really flourished?”

“Thinking about things and thinking about people use different parts of the brain,”<sup>609</sup> said Hypatia, smiling as she used their argument against them. “What you need is a comparison between the value of products of the mind, say intellectual history, and products of the brain, say, RNA.”

“Without the brain, there would be no intellect, let alone intellectual history, and without RNA there would be no DNA or human carriers of either RNA or DNA. It is a silly argument,” said Dessie. “But one might compare our understanding of mind, a partially humanistic undertaking, with our understanding of the brain, a largely scientific one. The last, best humanistic effort to understand minds were those of Sigmund Freud: ideographic in application, reliant on Greek myths for evidence of universality, and consistently resistant to the usual scientific controls. What is the outcome? Some studies find that the outcome of psychoanalysis has been about the same as the natural rate of remission without any treatment.<sup>610</sup> For depression, the breakthrough came with the discovery of the role of serotonin in influencing mood; selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors relieved depression more effectively than searching childhood experiences for the genesis of depression.<sup>611</sup>

***Pain and illness in the Free Society and the Humane Society.*** “In the Free Society,” continued Dessie, “the same reliance on individual wants applies to the relief of pain and

illness as to the relief of demand for commodities. That is, each rational, autonomous, self-interested and informed individual makes, within her budget, the choices that she thinks will offer the greatest relief. The Humane Society does more than pool resources in a national health insurance plan, like Medicare, to relieve strains on smaller budgets; it recognizes that people are not always the best judges of their own health needs (universal vaccinations, quarantine in the case of certain communicable diseases, education about and screening for early symptoms of breast cancer, colon cancer, cardiovascular diseases, etc.). Public health is more effective than private medicine in improving the health of a nation. One way to show the difference between the health benefits of a Free Society (such as the United States) and more Humane Societies (such as those in Europe) is to compare the disability rates in the two societies: on average, Americans enjoy fewer disability-free years than do Europeans.”<sup>612</sup>

“But we have been talking about mental illnesses where self-diagnosis is least reliable,” said Dessie going back to the problem of mind and body. “Whereas the Free Society waits to hear from victims to discover the ‘demand’ for treatment, the Humane Society takes active steps to locate pain and disability in a population. Because the symptoms are easier to diagnose, people are more likely to seek help for tuberculosis or cancer than for depression and general anxiety. Thus, a summary of cross-cultural studies a few years ago, found that mental illnesses world-wide ‘produce a greater burden based on a “disability-adjusted life years” ... than that from tuberculosis, cancer, or heart disease.’<sup>613</sup> And of those mental diseases, the most costly in disability was depression, especially for women. Furthermore, a World Health Survey report in 2004 found that a major reason for the high incidence of disability from mental illness was its lack of treatment,<sup>614</sup> even in the United States, the nation with the highest rates in the world of mental illnesses of almost all kinds.”<sup>615</sup>

“Perhaps one reason why the Free Society has been slow to recognize mental illness is because of the Enlightenment assumption that people are rational, autonomous, and informed on how to get what they want and need. If one were all those things, one would not be mentally ill,” said Hypatia alert to the irony of her former position. “This population that escapes the Enlightenment criteria is not trivial: in 2005 almost ten percent of the U.S. population suffered from mood disorders (mainly depression) and another 18 percent suffered from clinical anxiety of some kind.”<sup>616</sup>

***“Better people” or less impaired people?*** “There is a difference between improving the existing model of mankind we have and trying to create a new one,” said Hypatia. “I was thinking more of previous ‘scientific’ efforts to shape the human species closer to the heart’s desire. I mean Auguste Comte’s attempt to enlist the ‘laws of progress’ to move from the stage of philosophical reasoning to the stage of ‘observation and experimentation.’<sup>617</sup> But there were no such laws of progress. The recent effort to create a model of ‘socialist man’ in Communist countries was not a success.”

“That is our point,” said Dessie, continuing with his defense of the science of human nature. “Without a science of behavior and a science of the brain, efforts to improve human development will fail, as did the more recent effort to give economics a solid base in psychology before there was a decent psychology to base it on.”<sup>618</sup> Comte’s error was similar: he looked for regularities in the wrong place. Marxism and

Freudianism, as we now know, were brave humanistic – not scientific – efforts to master micro problems with macro theories. They did not follow the scientific paradigm.”

“And which science will define the ‘better person’ and prescribe the course of medication to achieve that happy state?” asked Adam.

With furrowed brow, Charles looked at Dessie. Treacherous territory. “Well,” he said, “the ordinary citizen taking several psychotropic pills a day is also beginning to wonder whether she has not forever lost the natural person born to her mother these many years ago. But I think the answer is that just as ‘medieval man’ changed his concept of honor, adapting to different codes of principled behavior prescribed by modern industrial man, so ‘post-industrial man’ will adapt to the scaffolding of the Humane Society. To repeat, in the Humane Society people are free to choose their goals when the goals are within the broad boundaries of the Humane Society’s concepts of well-being and human development (and justice).”

“Remember Hypatia’s complaint that science descended to the level of hormones, circuitry, genes, and even molecules to analyze what was basically human and even humane? That is not a complaint; it is a specification of what is necessary for effective treatment: when the source of the problem is disturbance of serotonin flow, treat the problem at the level of neurotransmitters;<sup>619</sup> when the problem is emotional disturbance, examine the functioning of the amygdala *and* the way emotional control was learned in socialization;<sup>620</sup> when the problem is abuse of children, examine the history of the abuser for evidence of his own victimization in childhood *and* the presence of a certain gene that predicts antisocial behavior, or that inclines the individual to pedophilia.<sup>621</sup> The ‘better person’ is one whose mood, emotional self-regulation, antisocial behavior and so forth are identified and treated at whatever biological or behavioral level promises to be most effective.” Dessie paused, and added: “And the Humane Society is one where the individuals are not simply given more choices but are offered scaffolding to guide them and to treat the infirmities which they do not yet recognize.”

“You think we are ready now, with a more mature behavioral science and a blossoming neuropsychology to acknowledge the grand purpose of what we have been doing peace-meal anyway?” asked Charles, frightened at the public statement of a mission he had long unconsciously pursued.

“We’ll never know until we try it out – in small ways,” said Dessie with a wave of his fork: “Spinach pie sessions are only vicarious rehearsals of these next early trials. See you next... oh... next year.”

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## Chapter Fourteen

### ENVOI

The next year Dessie had a sabbatical on Osney Island (Oxford); Hypatia was sent on a secret mission to tutor the *former* President of Harvard, and Charles returned to the lab to continue his work interbreeding flatworms and roundworms. *Lyttae*, the main journal on worms, named the resulting elliptical worm, *D. elegans*<sub>2</sub>. It was several years before members of the Wednesday Spinach Pie Association saw each other again.

As it happened, it was a Wednesday when Dessie bumped into Adam on Whitney Avenue.

“I’ve got something for you,” said Adam and thrust a reprint into Dessie’s hands.

Dessie looked at the title of Adam’s new article in *Journal of Behavioral Economics*, “The Marginal Return to Investments in Human Development Among Economists.”

“What happened?” Dessie asked his old adversary.

“Oh, didn’t I tell you? I had a Fulbright to Zurich. They send you their regards.” He looked embarrassed. “Sorry, I have to rush. We, my graduate students and I, are in the midst of an experiment testing whether faint praise is as damning as penny tipping. I’ll send you a reprint.” And he was off.

In one of those strange coincidences that sometimes happen on Whitney Avenue, in the next half block Dessie met Hypatia and Charles, arm in arm. Dessie tried not to look at Hypatia’s extended stomach.

“You look wonderful,” he said obliquely.

“We’re going to call her ‘Dessie,’ said Hypatia, smiling broadly. “Names aren’t sexist anymore.”

“They thought it was crazy, but *D. elegans*<sub>2</sub> has been fed on spinach leaves and is also thriving,” said Charles in tones that suggested deep tragedy. Then, smiling his rare, shy smile at Hypatia, he added, “We’re off to buy a layette. Have you any advice?”

“How did it happen?” Dessie asked again.

Hypatia blushed and Charles said, “The usual way.”

Dessie said, “No, I mean the rapprochement.”

Our joint course on neurophilosophy<sup>622</sup> was such a success we decided to continue it by other means,” said Hypatia in happy tones.

Dessie stepped into Clark’s and headed for the old familiar booth looking out on the familiar array of randomly parked cars on Whitney Avenue.

“Are you waiting for anyone?” asked the brisk new waitress as she set down the water glass and silverware with the familiar clatter.

Softly, so softly that the waitress could barely hear him, he murmured, “Spinach pie and coffee, black... for one.”

\* See [endnotes for this chapter](#) below.

## ENDNOTES

### PART ONE: IMAGOS OF HUMAN NATURE

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### ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 1 THE TRIUMPH OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

<sup>1</sup> See Patricia Smith Churchland, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

<sup>2</sup> Robert E. Lane, *After the End of History: The Curious Fate of American Materialism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

<sup>3</sup> Kevin N. Ochsner and Matthew D. Lieberman, "The Emergence of Social Cognitive Neuroscience," *American Psychologist*, 56 (2001): 717-734.

<sup>4</sup> Timothy D. Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). The quotation that follows is on p. 161.

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<sup>5</sup> Terrence Chorvat and Kevin McCabe, “Neuroeconomics and Rationality,” *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, vol. 80 (2005): 101-121 (Internet reproduction Social Sciences Research Network: [http://ssrn.com/abstract\\_id=748264](http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=748264)).

<sup>6</sup> R. E. Nisbett and N. Bellows, “Verbal Reports about Causal Influences on Social Judgments: Private Access versus Public Theories,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35 (1977): 613-624. My account is taken from an annotated analysis of this study in Robert P. Abelson, Kurt P. Frey, and Aiden P. Gregg, “Strangers to Ourselves: The Shortcomings of Introspection,” in their *Experiments with People: Revelations from Social Psychology* (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2004), 1-13. In addition to this kind of behavioral experiment, direct physiological experiments using pharmacological and electrical treatments, functional magnetic resonance imaging of the brain, and controlled observations of genetic differences all yield insight into the grounds of decisions of which the decision makers are unconscious.

<sup>7</sup> The reference is to J. Weiss and P. Brown, *Self-Insight Error in Explanation of Mood*, Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 1977, cited in Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall (1980), p. 221.

<sup>8</sup> Nisbett and Ross, *ibid.*, 221-222.

<sup>9</sup> Dan Kahan and Donald Braman, “Cultural Cognition and Public Policy,” 24 *Yale Law & Policy Review*. 149 (2006). ([http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/dmk\\_articles/culturalcognition.pdf](http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/dmk_articles/culturalcognition.pdf))

<sup>10</sup> Benedict Carey, “The Unconscious Mind: A great Decision Maker,” *New York Times, Science Times*, February 21, 2006, F6, reporting research published in *Science* by Ap Dijksterhuis et al. (University of Amsterdam).

<sup>11</sup> Among the authors contributing to the tidal wave, those crossing the borders of biology comprise an important part. These include: Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); and *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998); Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. New York: Avon, 1995); Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (New York: Viking, 2002), and *How the Mind Works* (New York: Norton, 1997); Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves*; Churchland, *Brain-Wise*; Daniel M. Wegner, *The Illusion of Conscious Will* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking* (Boston: Little Brown, 2005).

<sup>12</sup> Timothy Wilson, *ibid.*, p. 23. Wilson’s term “adaptive unconscious” is becoming generic; cf. Gladwell, *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> “Sleep is regulated by the activity of histamine cells concentrated in the posterior hypothalamus, just above the pituitary.” Anahad O’Connor, “Teasing Apart Chemicals, Scientists Unlock One more of Sleep’s Mysteries,” *New York Times* (June 15, 2004), F5, reporting research by Jerome M. Siegel.

<sup>14</sup> Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves*, 23.

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<sup>15</sup> J. E. LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996).

[http://www.cns.nyu.edu/home/ledoux/the\\_emotional\\_brain/](http://www.cns.nyu.edu/home/ledoux/the_emotional_brain/)

<sup>16</sup> Churchland, *Brain-Wise*, 105. J. A. Gray has developed a different way of classifying the functions of the unconscious. See, e.g., Gray, "Brain Systems that Mediate Both Emotion and Cognition," *Cognition and Emotion*, 4 (1990): 269-288.

<sup>17</sup> Andreas K. Engel, Stefan Debener, and Cornelia Kranczioch, "Coming to Attention" *Scientific American Mind*, 17 (August/September, 2006): 46-53. Conscious attention requires teams of neurons that cooperate with enough strength to reach consciousness, 50, 53.

<sup>18</sup> Marcello Spinella and William M. Miley, "Orbitofrontal Function and Educational Attainment," *College Student Journal* (Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, NJ), 38 (2004): 333-338.

<sup>19</sup> John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand, "The Unbearable Automaticity of Being," *American Psychologist*, 54 (1999): 462-479.

<sup>20</sup> Hugh McIntosh, "New Technologies Advance Study of Autism," *APA Monitor*, 29 (November 1998): 14.

<sup>21</sup> "What is Social Support?" *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, vol. 14 (June 1998), 6-7.

<sup>22</sup> "The areas more likely to be active in personal moral dilemmas were areas of the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the bilateral superior temporal sulcus (STS). These areas are normally involved in social-emotional processing." Chorvat and McCabe, "Neuroeconomics and Rationality," 117. See also Marc D. Hauser, *Moral Minds: How Nature Designed our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong* (New York: Ecco, 2006).

<sup>23</sup> Joseph P. Forgan, "Asking Nicely? The Effects of Mood on Responding to More or Less Polite Requests," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24 (1998): 173-185 at p. 173.

<sup>24</sup> Ed Diener, Ed Sandvik, and William Pavot, "Happiness is the Frequency, not the Intensity, of Positive versus Negative Affect." In Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle, and Norbert Schwarz, eds., *Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1991), 119-140.

<sup>25</sup> Sandra Blakeslee, "How Does the Brain Work?" *New York Times (Science Times)*, November 11, 2003, F4.

<sup>26</sup> Ellen J. Langer, *Mindfulness* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1990). The Internet version of the *Harvard Health Letter* <Healthbeat@obs.com> gives the following definition of mindfulness: "The ability to pay attention to what you're experiencing from moment to moment – without drifting into thoughts of the past or concerns about the future, or getting caught up in opinions about what is going on – is called mindfulness." According to this source mindfulness not only increases effectiveness but also enjoyment of life and good health.

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<sup>27</sup> Alvin Roth, "Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field." In *The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior*, Kenneth Arrow et al., eds. (1996), p. 9 as reported in Chorvat and McCabe, "Neuroeconomics and Rationality," 105.

<sup>28</sup> The five senses are taking in more than 11,000,000 pieces of information at any given moment. The eyes alone receive and send over 10,000,000 signals to the brain every second. But the brain can process only about 40,000 bits of information per second. Thus, the unconscious must process the remaining 10,999,960. Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves*, 24.

<sup>29</sup> Chorvat and McCabe, "Neuroeconomics and Rationality," 114.

<sup>30</sup> Chorvat and McCabe (ibid., 114-115) employ the term *ecological rationality* to cover much of what Wilson means by adaptive unconscious. They contrast this type of rationality (which includes the costs of decision making) with *constructivist rationality* by which they mean economic rational choice theory. Ecological rationality is located mostly in the ventrodmedial prefrontal cortex, with links to the limbic system, while the processes of constructivist rationality take place in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Note that Herbert Simon's earlier concept of *bounded* rationality focused entirely on what took place within the bounds whereas Wilson's idea of adaptive unconscious focuses on what is outside the bounds. See Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

<sup>31</sup> The prefrontal cortex is the site of the higher cognitive capacities, and the dorsolateral portion of that cortex is actively engaged in resolving conflicts and solving problems. The fMRI studies show much overlap among the anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, insula, and posterior parietal cortex. John Jonides and Derek Evan Nee, "Resolving Conflict in Mind and Brain," *Psychological Science Agenda*. 18 (May 2004).

<sup>32</sup> 'Mindfulness' is a state of alertness and lively awareness, at both cognitive and emotional levels, that is expressed in active information processing characterized by cognitive differentiation... It is a flexible, deliberate, conscious move from the unknown to the known and gives rise to feelings of control. [In contrast] Mindlessness is inflexibility by default rather than by design." Bonnie R. Strickland, "Internal-External Control Expectancies: From Contingency to Creativity," *American Psychologist*, 44:1 (1989), 6.

<sup>33</sup> Langer, *Mindfulness*, 63. The illustrations are Dessie's although he borrowed the last one from an earlier study where it was called the "Einstellung" effect.

<sup>34</sup> Robert J. Sternberg, Richard K. Wagner, Wendy M. Williams, and Joseph A. Horvath, "Testing Common Sense," *American Psychologist*, 50 (November 1995): 912-925.

<sup>35</sup> Chorvat and McCabe, "Neuroeconomics and Rationality," 115.

<sup>36</sup> Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves*, 49.

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## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 REVOLUTION IN IMAGOS

<sup>37</sup> Daniel C. Molden and Carol S. Dweck, "Finding 'Meaning' in Psychology: A Lay Theory Approach to Self-Regulation, Social Perception, and Social Development," *American Psychologist*, 61 (April 2006), 192-203; Bertram Malle, *How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).

<sup>38</sup> *Imago* is Freud's word for the infant's conception of the parent as it has been retained in adulthood, but Freud may have borrowed the term from zoology where it means, perversely, the sexually mature state of an insect. Dessie is using it to mean the usually unconscious image people have of human nature and applying it to both the images employed by the 18th century philosophers (and their successors) and the images emerging in this century from the behavioral-neurological sciences. Bertram Malle's prosaic *folk explanation* [*How the Mind Explains Behavior* ] does not deal with more sophisticated imagoes.

<sup>39</sup> "Everything empirical is not only quite unsuitable as a contribution to the principle of morality, but is even highly detrimental to the purity of morals. For the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists precisely in the fact that the principle of action is free of all influences from contingent grounds, which only experience can furnish." Immanuel Kant, *Grounding the Metaphysics of Morals*. In Kant, *Ethical Philosophy*, trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983 [Ger 1785], p. 34. Quotation from Russell Hardin, *Morality Within Limits of Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.), p. 170, fn. 4.

<sup>40</sup> "The task... can be compared to the revolution of mind called the Enlightenment. One of the great difficulties is that the framework of values of which we now need to let go has in fact served us so well for so long. It is rather as if we embarked on a journey by train and made excellent progress – this of course being an entirely metaphorical occurrence – for the first half of the journey. To continue towards our destination, the place in which we will live 'agreeable and wisely and well' it is necessary to change trains. My fear is that we are in danger of missing our connection, and remaining aboard a train that is now hurtling us in the wrong direction." Richard Reeves, "The Politics of Happiness," London: New Economics Foundation, 2003.

<sup>41</sup> Tori DeAngelis, "The 'Who am I?' Question Wears a Cloak of Culture," *APA Monitor*, 23 (October 1992): 22.

<sup>42</sup> Samuel P. Oliner, and Pearl M. Oliner, *The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe* (New York: Free Press, 1988).

<sup>43</sup> Ellen J. Langer, *Mindfulness* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1990).

<sup>44</sup> Robert P. Abelson, Kurt P. Frey, and Aiden P. Gregg, "Strangers to Ourselves: The Shortcomings of Introspection." In their *Experiments with People: Revelations from Social Psychology*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2004), 1-13.

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- <sup>45</sup> Barry Schwartz, *The Battle for Human Nature* (New York: Norton, 1986).
- <sup>46</sup> Robert W. White, "Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence," *Psychological Review*, 66 (1959): 297-333; Martin E. P. Seligman, *Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973).
- <sup>47</sup> Ellen J. Langer, *The Psychology of Control* (Beverly Hill, CA: Sage, 1983).
- <sup>48</sup> S. T. Allison, D. M. Messick, and G. R. Goepthals, "On Being Better but not Smarter than Others: The Muhammad Ali Effect," *Social Cognition*, 7 (1989): 275-293; Shelley E. Taylor, *Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
- <sup>49</sup> John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
- <sup>50</sup> "The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion draws all things else to support and agree with it." Francis Bacon, *Advancement of Learning* (1605) and *Novum Organum* (1620), ed. James Edward Creighton (New York: Willey Book Co. 1944), Bk. V, Ch. III. Later psychologists would elaborate Bacon's observation with "balance theory:" the tendency to link liked objects positively with liked attributes. See Robert P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. Rosenberg, and P. H. Tannenbaum, eds., *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1968).
- <sup>51</sup> Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves*, p. 39.
- <sup>52</sup> There is also an evolutionary basis for some of the values inherent in every imago. See Chapter 4.
- <sup>53</sup> Oliver W. Holmes, *The Common Law* (Boston: Little Brown, 1881), 1.
- <sup>54</sup> B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1953).
- <sup>55</sup> Karl Polanyi, "Our Obsolete Market Mentality," in his *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies* (Boston: Beacon, 1971), p. 68.
- <sup>56</sup> Dale T. Miller and Rebecca K. Rattner, "The Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed Power of Self-Interest," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 74 (1998): 53-62 at 53.
- <sup>57</sup> Leo Lowenthal, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society* (Palo Alto, CA, Pacific Books, 1968).
- <sup>58</sup> Ed Diener, Ed Sandvik, and William Pavot, "Happiness is the Frequency, not the Intensity, of Positive versus Negative Affect." In *Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1991), 119-140.
- <sup>59</sup> Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself* (New York: Rinehart, 1947).
- <sup>60</sup> See, for example, Robert E. Lane, *The Market Experience* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); *The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Peter C. Whybrow, *American Mania: When More is Not Enough* (New York: Norton, 2005).

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- <sup>61</sup> Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, *Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1983).
- <sup>62</sup> Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
- <sup>63</sup> See, for example, Robert H. Frank, "Rethinking Rational Choice." In Roger Friedland and A. F. Robertson, eds., *Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 53-87; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science*, 211 (30 January 1981): 453-458; Amos Tversky, "Intransitivity of Preferences," *Psychological Review*, 76 (1969): 31-48.
- <sup>64</sup> See Chapter One.
- <sup>65</sup> Peter Gay, "Introduction." In Peter Gay, ed., *The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 23.
- <sup>66</sup> Herbert M. Lefcourt. 1976. *Locus of Control: Current Trends in Theory and Research* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum/Wiley, 1976; Lefcourt, ed., *Research with the Locus of Control Construct: Extensions and Limitations*, vol. 3 (Orlando, FL: Academic, 1984).
- <sup>67</sup> Albert O. Hirschman. *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- <sup>68</sup> Steven Pinker. *How the Mind Works*. New York: Norton, 1997, 371-374.
- <sup>69</sup> Patricia Smith Churchland. 2002. *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 105.
- <sup>70</sup> Desiderius Erasmus, *In Praise of Folly* (1509-1511) and *Letter to Martin Dorp* (1515). Transl. Betty Radice (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1971), 106.

### ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 FAILED SELF-KNOWLEDGE

- <sup>71</sup> Patricia Smith Churchland, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 64.
- <sup>72</sup> See Ross Buck. 1999. "The Biological Affects: A Typology," *Psychological Review*, 106: 301-336, especially pp. 311-12.
- <sup>73</sup> J. E. LeDoux, *Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are* (New York, Viking, 2002).
- <sup>74</sup> Churchland, *Brain-Wise*, 63.
- <sup>75</sup> Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2002., 220-221+ 294 and passim.
- <sup>76</sup> William James, *Psychology* (1892) quoted in Robert E. Ornstein, "Introduction" to *The Nature of Human Consciousness*, ed. Ornstein (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973), xiii.

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- <sup>77</sup> Robert A. Wicklund, "Objective Self-Awareness." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. L. Berkowitz, Vol. 8 (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 235.
- <sup>78</sup> Debra G. Hutton and Roy F. Baumeister, "Self-Awareness and Attitude Change: Seeing Oneself on the Central Route to Persuasion," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 18 (1992): 69-75; Igor Gavanski and Curt Hoffman, "Awareness of Influences on One's Own Judgments: Covariation Detection and Attention to the Judgment Process," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52 (1987): 453-463.
- <sup>79</sup> Robert P. Abelson, "The Psychological Status of the Script Concept," *American Psychologist*, 36 (1981): 722. Ivana Markova suggests a variety of benefits for what she calls 'reflexive awareness:' "The ability to recognize one's own existence and experience, and the existence and experience of others; knowledge of one's own agency and of that of others; the ability to monitor and evaluate events, to solve problems in one's own life, and to make decisions about one's own future on the basis of that knowledge; and the ability to communicate one's awareness of oneself and of others to other human beings." Ivana Markova, "Medical Ethics: A Branch of Societal Psychology," in *Societal Psychology*, Hilda T. Himmelweit and George Gaskell, eds. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 125-126. See also I. Markova, *Human Awareness* (London: Hutchinson Education, 1987).
- <sup>80</sup> C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (1930, London: Kegan, Paul, 1944), 141.
- <sup>81</sup> William K. Frankena, *Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963). Nevertheless, Kant's idea that *benevolence* is the only intrinsically good thing in this world seems to include unconscious benevolence.
- <sup>82</sup> John H. Flugel, *Man, Morals and Society, A Psychoanalytic Study* (New York: International Universities Press, 1945), 245.
- <sup>83</sup> Richard DeCharms, *Personal Causation: The Internal Affective Determinants of Behavior* (New York: Academic, 1968), 269.
- <sup>84</sup> Herbert M. Lefcourt, *Locus of Control: Current Trends in Theory and Research* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum/Wiley, 1976); Lefcourt, ed., *Research with the Locus of Control Construct. Extensions and Limitations*, vol. 3. Orlando, FL: Academic, 1984).
- <sup>85</sup> George E. Vaillant. 1977. "The 'Normal Boy' in Later Life: How Adaptation Fosters Growth," *Harvard Magazine*, 80 (1977): 51. Based on Vaillant, *Adaptation to Life* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977).
- <sup>86</sup> Bertrand Russell, *The Conquest of Happiness* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1930), 242.
- <sup>87</sup> George Katona, Burkhard Strumpel, and Ernest Zahn, *Aspirations and Affluence: Comparative Studies in the United States and Western Europe* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971).
- <sup>88</sup> Oscar Lewis, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in The Culture of Poverty - San Juan and New York*. New York: Random House/Vintage, 1966), xlvii-xlviii.

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- <sup>89</sup> Gerald Gurin and Patricia Gurin, "Personal Efficacy and the Ideology of Individual Responsibility." In Burkhard Strumpel, ed., *Economic Means for Human Needs* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1976), 137.
- <sup>90</sup> "Narcissism and Self-Esteem: Therapists try to Discourage One, Encourage the Other, and Understand How the Two are Related," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 20 (February 2004): 1-5
- <sup>91</sup> Shelley E. Taylor, *Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
- <sup>92</sup> Because of different influences on different segments of the population it is possible for the prevalence of clinical depression to be high in a fairly happy population. Rick E. Ingram, Timothy W. Smith, and Sharon S. Brehm, "Depression and Information Processing: Self-Schemata and the Encoding of Self-Referent Information," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45 (1983): 412-420. But "self-focused" people were "more vulnerable to distress." See Ingram, Brenda R. Johnson, Christine Z. Bernet, Mark Dombeck, et al., "Vulnerability to Distress: Cognitive and Emotional Reactivity in Chronically Self-Focused Individuals," Special Issue: Cognitive Vulnerability to Psychological Dysfunction," *Cognitive Therapy & Research*, 6 (1992): 451-472.
- <sup>93</sup> Steven Prentice-Dunn and Ronald W. Rogers, "Effect of Public and Private Self-Awareness on Deindividuation and Aggression," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 43 (1982): 503-513.
- <sup>94</sup> Patricia W. Linville, "Self-Complexity as a Cognitive Buffer against Stress-Related Illness and Depression," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52 (1987): 663-676.
- <sup>95</sup> Idem.
- <sup>96</sup> Thomas M. Dixon and Roy F. Baumeister, "Escaping the Self: The Moderating Effect of Self-Complexity," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 17 (1991): 363-368.
- <sup>97</sup> Hutton and Baumeister, "Self-Awareness and Attitude Change."
- <sup>98</sup> Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, "Effect of Public and Private Self Awareness on Deindividuation and Aggression," *passim*.
- <sup>99</sup> Jonathan D. Brown and Keith A. Dutton, "Truth and Consequences: The Costs and Benefits of Accurate Self-Knowledge," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21 (1995): 1294-95.
- <sup>100</sup> "Beyond Shyness and Stage Fright: Social Anxiety Disorder," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, Vol. 20 (October 2003), 1-4.
- <sup>101</sup> Roy F. Baumeister, "Choking Under Pressure: Self-Consciousness and Paradoxical Effects of Incentives on Skillful Performance," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 46 (1984), 610-620.
- <sup>102</sup> Among other differences, self-consciousness as "self-focus" is associated with depression while genuine self-understanding is associated with mental health. Rick E.

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Ingram, Brenda R. Johnson, Christine Z. Bernet, Mark Dombeck, et al., "Vulnerability to Distress: Cognitive and Emotional Reactivity in Chronically Self-focused Individuals. Special Issue: Cognitive Vulnerability to Psychological Dysfunction," *Cognitive Therapy & Research*, 6 (Aug. 1992): 451-472.

<sup>103</sup> Linville, "Self-Complexity as a Cognitive Buffer."

<sup>104</sup> Jeremy Bentham (1830), "On Self-Interest." In W. Stark, ed., *Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings* (London: Royal Economic Society by George Allen & Unwin, 1954). vol. III, 425-426.

<sup>105</sup> Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and T. J. Figurski, "Self-Awareness and Aversive Experience in Everyday Life," *Journal of Personality*, 50 (1982):15-24.

<sup>106</sup> Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology* (1956). Transl. H. E. Barnes (New York: Pocket Books, 1966).

<sup>107</sup> In addition to such summary data on the demography of subjective well-being as Ed Diener and Marissa Diener, "Cross-Cultural Correlates of Life Satisfaction and Self-Esteem," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68 (1995): 653-663, see "Death and the Candidates," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, vol. 22 (Dec. 2005): 7, research based on E. Cohen et al. "Fatal Attraction: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Evaluation of Charismatic, Task-Oriented, and Relationship Oriented Leaders," *Psychological Science* 15 (Sept. 2005): 846-51.

<sup>108</sup> For Harry Frankfurt it is our ability to change our values by a conscious act of will that defines our humanity. Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *Journal of Philosophy*, LXVIII ( 1971): 5-20.

<sup>109</sup> Churchland. *Brain-Wise*, 127-199.

<sup>110</sup> One such area is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, activated, for example, when a person is considering an offer regarded as unfair. "Emotion in Economic Decisions," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 21 (July 2004): 6-7. Summary of A. G. Stanley, et al. "The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game," *Science*. vol 300, No. 5626, pp. 1755-58. The modern study of the physiology of emotions begins with W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1929).

<sup>111</sup> Howard Berenbaum, Chitra Raghavan, Huynh-Nhu Le, Laura Vernon, and Jose Gomez, "Disturbances in Emotion, Mood, and Affect." In Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds., *Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology* (New York: Russell Sage, 1999), 267-286.

<sup>112</sup> B. Libet, "Do we Have Free Will?" *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 6 (1999): 47-57. In 1983 Libet and colleagues published research showing that emotions registered in the brain before they registered in the organs of consciousness. This seemed to establish a causal order which advocates of free will have since opposed. See, e.g., Jing Zhu, "Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet's Experiment," *Journal of Consciousness Studies*. 10 (2003): 61-77.

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- <sup>113</sup> Klaus R. Scherer, "Emotion Experiences Across European Cultures: A Summary Statement" (173-189). In Scherer, Harold L. Wallbott, and Angela B. Summerfield, eds., *Experiencing Emotion: A Cross-Cultural Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Self-reports on emotions are subject to the very error we are considering: they are often wrong. See J.W. Pennebaker, *The Psychology of Physiological Symptoms* (New York: Springer, 1982)
- <sup>114</sup> Eunkook Suh, Ed Diener, Shifehiro Oishi, and Harry C. Triandis, "The Shifting Basis of Life Satisfaction Judgments Across Cultures: Emotions Versus Norms," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74 (1998): 482-493.
- <sup>115</sup> The Minangkabau of West Sumatra and an American group were asked to adopt poses of smiling and frowning without experiencing the situations that produce those actual feelings. The American sample could report their actual feelings, but not the Minangkabau. Why? 'For the Minangkabau participants to confine and localize the source of emotional experience solely within the boundary of private feelings was unnatural. The relational and interpersonal factors, the key elements of the Minangkabau's emotional scripts, were not present' R. W. Levenson, P. Ekman, K. Heider, and W. V. Friesen, "Emotion and Autonomic Nervous System Activity In the Minangkabau of West Sumatra," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 62 (1992): 977.
- <sup>116</sup> J.D. Campbell, P. D. Trapness, S. J. Heine, J. M. Katz, L. E. Lavalee, and D. R. Lehman, "Self-Concept Clarity: Measurement, Personality Correlates, and Cultural Boundaries," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70 (1996): 141-156.
- <sup>117</sup> E. Suh. 1994. *Emotion, Norms, Values, Familiarity, and Subjective Well-Being: A Cross-Cultural Examination*. Unpublished master's thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, reported in Suh, Diener, Oishi, and Triandis, "The Shifting Basis of Life Satisfaction Judgments Across Cultures: Emotions Versus Norms."
- <sup>118</sup> Benedict Carey, "Living on Impulse," *New York Times (Science Times)*, 4-4-06, FL, F6. Carey's account reports on the work of Drs. Charles Carver, Janine D. Flory, Robert Cloninger, and Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg.
- <sup>119</sup> Nancy Eisenberg, "Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development," *Annual Review of Psychology*. 51 (2000): 665-697 at pp. 665, 684.
- <sup>120</sup> Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg in Carey, "Living on Impulse," F6.
- <sup>121</sup> Sandra Blakeslee, "How Does the Brain Work?" *New York Times, (Science Times)*, November 11, 2003, F4.
- <sup>122</sup> Buck, "The Biological Affects: A Typology," 301-336.
- <sup>123</sup> Markova, "Medical Ethics: A Branch of Societal Psychology," 117.
- <sup>124</sup> "Antisocial personality – Part II," *The Harvard Mental Health Letter*, vol. 17 (January 2001), 1-4.
- <sup>125</sup> Eisenberg, "Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development," 665-697.

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<sup>126</sup> Nicholas Bakalar, "Men are Better Than Women at Ferreting Out That Angry Face in a Crowd," *Science Times, New York Times*, June 13, 2006, F5. Bakalar is reporting research by Mark A. Williams (MIT) and Jason B. Mattingly (University of Melbourne) published in the June 2006 issue of *Current Biology*.

#### ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4 STRANGERS TO OURSELVES

<sup>127</sup> With apologies to Timothy D. Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) and to Robert P. Abelson, Kurt P. Frey, and Aiden P. Gregg, *Experiments with People: Revelations from Social Psychology* (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2004) for their chapter entitled "Strangers to Ourselves: The Shortcomings of Introspection," 1-13.

<sup>128</sup> Wilson (*ibid.*), like Churchland, finds that our autonomic nervous system does a pretty good job of adapting to unfamiliar situations. See Patricia Smith Churchland, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

<sup>129</sup> R. E. Nisbett and N. Bellows, "Verbal Reports about Causal Influences on Social Judgments: Private Access versus Public Theories," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35 (1977): 613-624. My account is taken from an annotated analysis of this study in Abelson, et al., "Strangers to Ourselves: The Shortcomings of Introspection."

<sup>130</sup> Abelson et al., *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 6. Compare Daryl Bem: "An individual's attitudes and the attitudes that an outsider would attribute to him are functionally similar in that both are partial 'inferences' from the same evidence: the public behavior and accompanying cues upon which the socializing community has relied in training him to make such self-descriptive statements in the first place." Daryl J. Bem, "Attitudes as Self-Descriptions: Another Look at the Attitude-Behavior Link." In A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock, and T. M. Ostlund, eds., *Psychological Foundations of Attitudes* (New York: Academic, 1968), 201-202.

<sup>133</sup> Abelson et al., *ibid.*, 3-4, emphasis added.

<sup>134</sup> Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 4.

<sup>135</sup> James G. March, "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice," *The Bell Journal of Economics*, 9 (1978): 578-608; Daniel Kahneman, P. Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds. *Judgment Under Uncertainty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

<sup>136</sup> Benjamin N. Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); Roscoe Pound, *The Spirit of the Common Law* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921).

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- <sup>137</sup> Keith B. J. Franklin, "The Neural Basis of Pleasure and Pain." In *The Origin of Values*, Michael Hechter, Lynn Nadel, and Richard E. Michod, eds. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), 273-284.
- <sup>138</sup> Ralph Barton Perry, *General Theory of Value* (New York: Longman's Green, 1926).
- <sup>139</sup> Richard E. Michod, "Biology and the Origin of Values." In *The Origin of Values*, Hechter et al., eds., 264.
- <sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 265.
- <sup>141</sup> Ross Buck, "The Biological Affects: A Typology," *Psychological Review*, 106 (1999): 301-336.
- <sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 325.
- <sup>143</sup> Lionel Tiger, "Morality Recapitulates Phylogeny," in *The Origin of Values*, Michael Hechter et al., eds., 219.
- <sup>144</sup> A. Tesser, "The Importance of Heritability in Psychological Research: The Case of Attitudes," *Psychological Review*, 100 (January, 1993): 129-42; John R. Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing, "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?" *American Political Science Review*, 99 (2005): 153-167.
- <sup>145</sup> Dean H. Hamer, *The God Gene: How Faith is Hardwired Into Our Genes* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).
- <sup>146</sup> Kenneth S. Kendler, Charles O. Gardner, and Carol A. Prescott, "Religion, Psychopathology, and Substance Abuse: A Multimeasure, Genetic-epidemiology Study," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 154 (1997): 322-329. Reported in *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 14 (November 1997), 7.
- <sup>147</sup> Hamer, *The God Gene*.
- <sup>148</sup> Arnold H. Buss, *Personality: Evolutionary Heritage and Human Distinctiveness* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1988). But see, Nicholas Wade, "Selection Spurred Recent Evolution, Researchers Say," *Science Times, New York Times*, 12/11/07, p F2
- <sup>149</sup> Buck, "The Biological Affects," p. 328.
- <sup>150</sup> Gregory R. Maio and James M. Olson, "Values as Truisms: Evidence and Implications," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74 (1998): 294.
- <sup>151</sup> Jon A. Krosnick, Lee J. Jussim, and Ann R. Lynn, "Subliminal Conditioning of Attitudes," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 18 (1992): 152-162.
- <sup>152</sup> Bobbie J. Calder and Michael Ross, *Attitudes and Behavior* (Morristown NJ: General Learning Press, 1973).
- <sup>153</sup> Hypatia wanted to contest the idea that philosophy and public opinion had anything in common but recalled Aristotle's reference to opinions of 'the majority of mankind' and decided to wait for a more vulnerable target.
- <sup>154</sup> Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

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- <sup>155</sup> Peter Randall, *Adult Bullying: Perpetrators and Victims* (New York: Routledge, 1997).
- <sup>156</sup> Milton Rokeach and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, "Stability and Change in American Value Priorities, 1968-1981," *American Psychologist*, 44 (1989): 775-784.
- <sup>157</sup> *Idem.*
- <sup>158</sup> Robert E. Lane, *After the End of History: The Curious Fate of American Materialism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005).
- <sup>159</sup> Because values make assumptions that are subject to empirical tests, they may be right or wrong. Nicholas Rescher, *Introduction to Value Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 9.
- <sup>160</sup> Marsha L. Richins and Scott Dawson, "A Consumer Values Orientation for Materialism and its Measurement: Scale Development and Validation," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 19 (1992): 303-316; Tim Kasser, *The High Price of Materialism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
- <sup>161</sup> Maio and Olson, "Values as Truisms," 294.
- <sup>162</sup> "Property is the foundation of happiness." Mercier de la Riviere, *L'ordre Naturel et Essential des Sociétés Politiques* (1767) quoted in John Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (1920; New York: Dover, 1955), 174.
- <sup>163</sup> Rescher, *Introduction to Value Theory*, 9.
- <sup>164</sup> See Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology* (New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- <sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 3, 6.
- <sup>166</sup> Robert P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. Rosenberg, and P. H. Tannenbaum, eds. *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1968).
- <sup>167</sup> Jane Loevinger, *Ego Development* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1976), 20.
- <sup>168</sup> When Adam met Charles in the washroom, he questioned that idea of a 'dimension.' "What goes on here," he said. "These 'consciousnesses' are not measurable dimensions, nor are they syndromes, and we don't know what relationship they have to each other." Charles looked at him quizzically. "If they are more interesting than frustrating, take it from here. If more frustrating than interesting, we'll try again."
- <sup>169</sup> Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values*, 25.

**ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 5  
INDIVIDUALISM & COLLECTIVISM**

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<sup>170</sup> Of course, she knew Durkheim's solution, expressed in his defense of the Dreyfusards: "Individualism thus understood has 'the glorification, not of the self, but of the individual in general' And its native force was: 'not egoism but sympathy for all that is human, a wider pity for all suffering, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire to combat and alleviate them, a greater thirst for justice.'" Steven Lukes, *Émile Durkheim: His Life and Work*. London: Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1973), 346.

<sup>171</sup> Muzafer Sherif, *Robber's Cave*. See account in M. Sherif, W. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, *Attitude and Attitude Change*. Philadelphia: Saunders, 1965.

<sup>172</sup> Herbert Hoover, *American Individualism* (1922). Reported in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt*, Vol. 1, *The Crisis of the Old Order: 1919-1933* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 83. Hoover was probably unfamiliar with Tönnies' belief that individualist *gesellschaft* represented "a war of all against all." Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 1887)*. Transl. C. P. Loomis. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1957), 77.

<sup>173</sup> Harry C. Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 2.

<sup>174</sup> The definition goes on to "emphasize the connectedness to members of these collectives," *ibid*, 2.

<sup>175</sup> Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 51. Lukes' treatment, of course, is much more complex. It also includes: *individuality*, meaning individual differences, *privacy*, a private space for each individual, and *human development*, that is, the value assigned to individuals implies that whatever talent and emotional maturity may be given by a person's genes should be encouraged and brought to fruition as much as possible. Presiding over all this is a concept of the *dignity of the human personality*.

<sup>176</sup> National Election Studies items copied from Joseph A. Vandello and Dov Cohen, "Patterns of Individualism and Collectivism Across the United States." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77 (1999): 279-292 at 285.

<sup>177</sup> David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and D. Ravel, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). Riesman later makes a contribution to *individualism* in his essays: *Individualism Reconsidered*. (Glencoe, Ill: Free press, 1954).

<sup>178</sup> T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford. *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

<sup>179</sup> Julian B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement," *Psychological Monographs*. # 609, vol. 80, 1966.

<sup>180</sup> For example: (1) Durkheim's "'the glorification, not of the self, but of the individual in general,' (Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work*. London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1973, 341). (2) Berlin's concept of *self-control*, self-mastery which 'enters the tradition of liberal individualism at least as deeply as the "negative" concept of freedom.' (Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Freedom." In *Four Essays on Liberty*. London: Oxford University Press, 139.); (3) Lane's distinction between *functional* individualism, a focus on the way individuals function without necessarily valuing them, as in market economics, and *evaluational* individualism, as in Lukes' axiom that the

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individual was the only thing of value in society. Robert E. Lane, "Individualism and the Market Society," in *Liberal Democracy*, NOMOS XXXV, Roland Pennock and John Chapman, eds. (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), 374-407.

<sup>181</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), 41. This theme is given extensive coverage in Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom* (New York: Rinehart, 1941).

<sup>182</sup> Benito Mussolini, *La Dottrina del Fascismo* (1932). Reprinted in *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe*, Michael Oakeshott, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 166.

<sup>183</sup> R. Wolin, "Fascism and Hermeneutics: Gadamer and the Ambiguities of the 'Inner Emigration.'" Paper delivered to the Yale Political Theory Workshop, September, 2000, p. 13. The reference to Jaeger is to Werner Jaeger, "Die Erziehung des politischen Mensch in der Antike," *Volk im Werden* I (3) (1933), p. 43.

<sup>184</sup> See Chapter Two where Dessie gives imagoes *social roots*.

<sup>185</sup> Ross Buck, "The Biological Affects: A Typology," *Psychological Review*, 106 (1999): 301.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 326.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 302, 309. The location of these feelings of attachment and lust is the hypothalamus.

<sup>188</sup> Lionel Tiger, "Morality Recapitulates Phylogeny," in *The Origin of Values*, ed. Michael Hechter, Lynn Nadel, and Richard E. Michod (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), 329.

<sup>189</sup> Buck, "The Biological Affects," 325.

<sup>190</sup> Jessica C. Flack and Frans B. M. de Waal, "'Any Animal Whatever': Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes," *Journal of Consciousness Studies*. 7 (2000): 1-29.

<sup>191</sup> Buck, "The Biological Affects," 316.

<sup>192</sup> W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

<sup>193</sup> Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2002), 220-221 and *passim*.

<sup>194</sup> (Sir) Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (1861; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931).

<sup>195</sup> Li-Jun Ji, Kaiping Peng, and Richard E. Nisbett, "Culture, Control, and Perceptions of Relationships in the Environment," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78 (2000): 943-955 at 943; Robert Nisbett and Hannah Faye Chua found that in examining pictures of a tiger in a jungle, a locomotive, and an airplane among mountains American Caucasians focused on the foreground objects 118 milliseconds longer than Chinese

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participants. See Leon Winerman, "The Culture-Cognition Connection" *Monitor on Psychology*, vol. 37 (February 2006), 64.

<sup>196</sup> Winerman, "The Culture-Cognition Connection" 65, reporting research by Kaiping Peng.

<sup>197</sup> Lee Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and his Shortcomings." In *Advances in Experimental Psychology*, L. Berkowitz, ed., vol. 10 (New York: Academic, 1977), 174-220.

<sup>198</sup> Herman A. Witkin, "Psychological Differentiation and Forms of Pathology," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 70 (1965), 317-36; reprinted in Peter B. Warr, ed., *Thought and Personality* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 201-2. To make the terminology consistent with that of Li-Jun Ji et al., I have translated Witkin's concept of "field-independent" as "thing-in-itself" and his concept of "field-dependent" as "thing-in-context."

<sup>199</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>200</sup> Witkin, "Psychological Differentiation and Forms of Pathology," *passim.*

<sup>201</sup> Witkin, et al., *Psychological Differentiation*. For criticism of Witkin's measures, see Richard Nisbett and Linda Temoshook, "Is there an 'External Cognitive Style?'" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 33 (1976): 36-47.

<sup>202</sup> Given that the West tends to prefer abstractions up to the point where they can no longer be concretely pictured, what would a transformation from Western to Eastern epistemology mean in terms of use of concrete and abstract terms? Or active and passive verbs? Or use of pronouns (when *I* and when *we* )? Or person perception? In terms of *attribution*, some evidence suggests that modern mainland Chinese are very like Americans. See Deborah Stipek, Bernard Weiner, and Kexing Li, "Testing some Attribution-Emotion Relations in the People's Republic of China" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 56 (1989): 109-116.

<sup>203</sup> Li-Jun Ji et al., "Culture, Control, and Perceptions of Relationships in the Environment," 953. Western influences encourage personal control, *primary control*, whereas Asian cultures encourage conformity to norms as *secondary control*. p. 953. See also Walter Goldschmidt, "Ethology, Ecology, and Ethnological Realities," in *Coping and Adaptation*, ed. George V. Coelho, David A. Hamburg, and John E. Adams (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 24; Roger G. Tweed and Darrin R. Lehman, "Learning Considered Within a Cultural Context: Confucian and Socratic Approaches," *American Psychologist*, 57 (2002): 89-99. In the United States, plantation economies are associated with collectivist values and beliefs. (Joseph A. Vandello and Dov Cohen, "Patterns of Individualism and Collectivism Across the United States," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77 (1999): 279-292.) But family structure may have come first. Peter Laslett finds that before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the demarcation between economic collectivism and market economies coincided with the demarcation between extended and nuclear families. Peter Laslett, "Size and Structure of the Household in England Over Three Centuries." *Population Studies*, XXIII (July 1969): 199-223.

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<sup>204</sup> Philip E. Tetlock, Orié V. Kristel, S. Beth Elson, Melanie C. Green, and Jennifer S. Lerner, "The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78 (2000): 853-870.

<sup>205</sup> Winerman, "The Culture-Cognition Connection," reporting work by Shinobu Kitayama, 65.

<sup>206</sup> Byron Kolb and Ian Q. Whishaw, "Brain Plasticity and Behavior," in *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49 (1998): 55.

<sup>207</sup> Marco Orrù, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary G. Hamilton, "Organizational Isomorphism in East Asia." In *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 361-389.

<sup>208</sup> Yun-shik Chang, "The Personalist Ethic and the Market in Korea," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 33 (1991): 106-129 at 120.

<sup>209</sup> David Kelly and Anthony Reid, eds., *Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast Asia* (New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>210</sup> Surveys show that when asked to choose between the two statements: "Individuals should take more responsibility for themselves," and "The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for," 50 percent of the Americans choose the first, whereas only five percent of the Japanese do so. *The Public Perspective: A Roper Center Review of Public Opinion and Polling*, June/July 1996 6: 28. Source: World Values Surveys 1990-1993.

<sup>211</sup> David I. Hitchcock, *Factors Affecting East Asian View of the United States: The Search for Common Ground*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1997), 17. "A father in Japan spends on average 36 minutes a day with his children compared with 56 minutes in the United States" (p. 20). And a recent Youth Study Institute poll reported that, when asked, 'Will you take care of old parents by all means?' respondents in three countries replied 'yes' as follows: the United States, 46 percent; China, 66 percent, and Japan, 16 percent." Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>212</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1993).

<sup>213</sup> Chang, "The Personalist Ethic and the Market in Korea," p. 125 footnote 5.

<sup>214</sup> See websites for The International Society of Quality of Life Studies ([www.isqols.org](http://www.isqols.org)) and New Economic Foundation ([www.neweconomics.org](http://www.neweconomics.org)).

<sup>215</sup> Jüri Allik and Anu Realo (Estonia), "Individualism-Collectivism and Social Capital," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35 (2004): 29-49.

<sup>216</sup> Ed Diener and Eunkook Suh, "National Differences in Subjective Well-Being," In *Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology*, Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 434-450.

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- <sup>217</sup> Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
- <sup>218</sup> Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981).
- <sup>219</sup> Valerie Stander and Larry Jensen, "The Relationship of Value Orientation to Moral Cognition: Gender and Cultural Differences in the United States Explored," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 24 (1993): 42-52. Comparison of the Individualism-Collectivism scale with S. H. Schwartz's cross-cultural Value Survey reveals high correspondence and correlations. See Shigehiro Oishi, Ulrich Schimmack, Ed Diener, and Eunkook M. Suh, "The Measurement of Values and Individualism-Collectivism." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. 24 (1998): 1177-1189.
- <sup>220</sup> Monika Keller, Wolfgang Edelstein, Christine Schmid, Fu-xi Fang, and Ge Fang, "Reasoning about Responsibilities and Obligations in Close Relationships: A Comparison Across Two Cultures." *Developmental Psychology*. 34 (1998): 731. But age interacted with culture such that "In adolescence, close friendship became an equally important value in both cultures," p. 731.
- <sup>221</sup> Jonathan Baron and Joan G. Miller, "Limiting the Scope of Moral Obligations to Help: A Cross-Cultural Investigation," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 31 (2000): 703-725.
- <sup>222</sup> Dong Yul Lee, Sung Hee Park, Max R. Uhlemann, and Philip Patsula, "What Makes You Happy? A Comparison of Self-Reported Criteria of Happiness Between Two Cultures," *Social Indicators Research*, 50 (1999): 351-362; Luo Lu and Jian Bin Shih, "Sources of Happiness: A Qualitative Approach," *Journal of Social Psychology*. 137 (1997): 181-188.
- <sup>223</sup> Maine, *Ancient Law*, 140.
- <sup>224</sup> Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics; or, the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness* (New York: Appleton, 1878). 480.
- <sup>225</sup> "Mill's harm principle, Berlin's defense of 'negative' over 'positive' freedom ... Rawls' bid for the 'priority of liberty,' and Nozick's rejection of 'patterned' theories of distributive justice all embrace the thesis that individual autonomy is the primary political end, that other ends can be justified only to the extent that they are consistent with it." Ian Shapiro, "Gross Concepts in Political Argument," *Political Theory*, 17 (1989): 51-52.
- <sup>226</sup> See Alan Gilbert, *Democratic Individuality: A Theory of Moral Progress* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- <sup>227</sup> David M. Buss, "The Evolution of Happiness," *American Psychologist*, 55 (2000):15-23.
- <sup>228</sup> See Chapter Two, "The Revolution in Imagoes."
- <sup>229</sup> Ed Diener and Marissa Diener, "Cross-Cultural Correlates of Life Satisfaction and Self-Esteem," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68 (1995): 653-663. Based

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on a sample of 13,118 students in 31 countries; Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 108.

<sup>230</sup> Diener and Diener, "Cross-Cultural Correlates," 657, 663.

<sup>231</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Preface to the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, ed. and transl. by T. K. Abbott and published as *Kant's Theory of Ethics*. London: Longmans, Green, 6th ed. Reprinted in T. M. Greene, ed., *Kant: Selections* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1920).

<sup>232</sup> Howard L. Fromkin, "Effects of Experimentally Aroused Feelings of Undistinctiveness Upon Valuation of Scarce Novel Experience," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 16 (1970): 521-529.

<sup>233</sup> Frank M. Andrews and Stephen B. Withey, *Social Indicators of Well-Being: Americans' Perceptions of Life Quality* (New York: Plenum, 1976), 244-245.

<sup>234</sup> Douglas P. Crowne and David Marlowe, *The Approval Motive* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

<sup>235</sup> Ed Diener, Ed Sandvik, and William Pavot, "Happiness is the Frequency, not the Intensity, of Positive versus Negative Affect." In *Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1991), 123.

<sup>236</sup> George Katona, Burkhard Strumpel, and Ernest Zahn, *Aspirations and Affluence: Comparative Studies in the United States and Western Europe* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971).

<sup>237</sup> The general point is made in Jack W. Brehm, *Responses to the Loss of Freedom: A Theory of Psychological Reactance* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972).

<sup>238</sup> David Trafimow, Harry D. Triandis, & Sharon G. Goto, "Some Tests of the Distinction Between the Private Self and the Collective Self," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60:5 (1991), 649-655; Jüri Allik and Anu Realo (Estonia), "Individualism-Collectivism and Social Capital," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35 (2004): 29-49.

<sup>239</sup> Ruut Veenhoven, letter to Robert E. Lane, Dec. 6, 1994.

<sup>240</sup> For obvious reasons Adam did not go on to say that being poor in an individualist country where poverty was thought to be self-imposed was much more hurtful than being poor in a collectivist county that had no such belief in individual responsibility for one's own fate. See Oscar Lewis, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in The Culture of Poverty - San Juan and New York* (New York: Random House/Vintage, 1966).

<sup>241</sup> Daryl J. Bem and David C. Funder, "Predicting More of the People More of the Time: Assessing the Personality of Situations," *Psychological Review*, 85 (1978): 485-501.

<sup>242</sup> Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (1948): 280-315.

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<sup>243</sup> R. D. Caplan, "Person-Environment Fit: Past, Present, and Future," in *Stress Research*, C. L. Cooper, ed. (New York: Wiley, 1983); Elchanan I. Meir and Samuel Melamed, "The Accumulation of Person-Environment Congruences and Well-Being," *Journal of Occupational Behavior*, 7 (1986): 315-323.

<sup>244</sup> Martin Hollis, "Is Universalism Ethnocentric?" In *Multicultural Questions*, C. Joppke and S. Lukes, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 36. I am indebted to Steven Lukes for this citation.

<sup>245</sup> Reported in John B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (1920) (New York: Dover, 1955), 255. Dessie turned to Hypatia and said gently "sorry about that sexist language; that's Hegel speaking, not me."

<sup>246</sup> Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Rinehart, 1944).

<sup>247</sup> Peter Gay, "Introduction" to *The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology*, in Peter Gay, ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 23.

<sup>248</sup> Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach* [1845]. First published by Friedrich Engels as an appendix to his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* (1888, xi; New York: International Publishers, 1934).

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 THINKING FOR ONESELF

<sup>249</sup> Robert B. Zajonc, "Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences," *American Psychologist*, 35 (1980): 151-175.

<sup>250</sup> Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Avon, 1995).

<sup>251</sup> Benedict Carey, "The Unconscious Mind: A great Decision Maker," *New York Times*, *Science Times*, February 21, 2006, F6, reporting research published in *Science* by Ap Dijksterhuis et al. (University of Amsterdam).

<sup>252</sup> Timothy Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 23. Wilson's term "adaptive unconscious" is becoming generic; cf. Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking* (Boston, Little, Brown, 2005).

<sup>253</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Grounding the Metaphysics of Morals*. In Kant, *Ethical Philosophy*, trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983 [Ger 1785], p. 34. Quotation from Russell Hardin, *Morality Within Limits of Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 170, fn. 4.

<sup>254</sup> She looked at Dessie closely: "Don't squirm. Whenever you distinguish between those elements of a definition that cannot be left out without changing the meaning of the defined word and those that can, you employ essentialist reasoning. To be human implies certain properties, authentic thinking is one of them." But Adam wanted to explain the

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circularity of essentialist thinking: “you define something as essential to some process or entity and then you discover that if that something is missing the defined entity is not a member of that class of things. How could it be?”

<sup>255</sup> David Hitchcock, *Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict?* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 73.

<sup>256</sup> David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and D. Ravel, *The Lonely Crowd*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

<sup>257</sup> Otis Dudley Duncan, Howard Schuman, and Beverly Duncan, *Social Change in a Metropolitan Community* (New York: Russell Sage, 1973).

<sup>258</sup> Philip E. Tetlock, Ori V. Kristel, S. Beth Elson, Melanie C. Green, and Jennifer S. Lerner, “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78 (2000): 853-870.

<sup>259</sup> G. Lowenstein, “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 65 (1996): 272-291 at 272.

<sup>260</sup> B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Bantam/Vintage, 1972).

<sup>261</sup> Robert W. White, “Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence,” *Psychological Review*, 66 (1959): 297-333.

<sup>262</sup> Harold H. Kelley, “The Processes of Causal Attribution,” *American Psychologist*, 28 (1973): 107-128; Julian B. Rotter, “Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement,” *Psychological Monographs*. # 609, vol. 80 (1966).

<sup>263</sup> Jerry Wind and Paul Green give the characteristics of “heavy beer drinkers” as young, blue collar workers with only high school education who are male oriented and risk-takers. The beer company these market researchers served then built an advertising campaign “around the imagery of the sea to dramatize the adventure of the last frontier ... Men who lived with gusto and who enjoyed a gusto brew.’ It was felt that the target consumer, regardless of his everyday life, could identify with these men, their life styles and the beer... The campaign was an effective one.” William D. Wells, ed., *Life Style and Psychographics* ((Chicago: American Marketing Association, 1974), 165,

<sup>264</sup> Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

<sup>265</sup> Walter Mischel, *Personality Assessment* (New York: Wiley, 1968).

<sup>266</sup> Robert E. Lane, *After The End of History: The Curious Fate of American Materialism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005, chapter 4.

<sup>267</sup> Herbert M. Lefcourt, *Locus of Control: Current Trends in Theory and Research* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum/Wiley, 1976), 97-104.

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<sup>268</sup> Patricia Smith Churchman, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Daniel M. Wegner, *The Illusion of Conscious Will* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

<sup>269</sup> Abraham S. Goldstein, *The Insanity Defense* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980).

<sup>270</sup> Something called “agency theory” deals systematically with this agent-principal problem. See: Roger Friedland and A. F. Robertson, “Beyond the Marketplace” 3-49. In Friedland and Robertson, eds. *Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 19.

<sup>271</sup> See Daniel C. Dennett, *Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984).

<sup>272</sup> Whether or not the justice of equality requires acknowledgement of individual persons is not clear. In some ways not, but if the equality is “bloc-regarding,” members of the bloc must be identified. Douglas Rae, *Equalities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

<sup>273</sup> William Damon, “The Development of Justice and Self-Interest During Childhood,” 57-72. In Melvin J. Lerner and Sally C. Lerner, eds. *The Justice Motive in Social Behavior: Adapting to Times of Scarcity and Change* (New York: Plenum, 1981).

<sup>274</sup> Francis Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development*, (London: Dent, 1883).

<sup>275</sup> Ellen J. Langer, *Mindfulness* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1990).

<sup>276</sup> Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

<sup>277</sup> For example, Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, transl. L. Wirth and E. Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949).

<sup>278</sup> Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People’s Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *Voting*.

<sup>279</sup> Robert E. Lane, “Autonomy, Felicity, Futility: The Effects of the Market Economy on Political Personality,” *Journal of Politics*, 40 (1978): 2-24.

<sup>280</sup> Hypatia knew Habermas’ work on the ideal speech situation and found Cooke’s commentary on that especially helpful. See M. Cooke, *Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1994). She also knew that if speech and thought were as closely linked as she thought they were, the costs of forbidding deviant speech was a major consideration.

<sup>281</sup> T. N. Srinivasan, “Democracy, Markets, and Development,” September 1995, Yale University, Processed.

<sup>282</sup> For example, Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980); Robert P. Abelson, “Whatever Became of Consistency Theory?” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 9 (1983): 37-54.

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<sup>283</sup> Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991); Paul Ekman, *Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life* (New York: Henry Holt, 2003); Steven Pinker, *How the Mind Works* (New York: Norton, 1997); Steven R. Quartz and Terrence J. Sejnowski, *Liars, Lovers, and Heroes: What the New Brain Science Reveals about How We Become Who We Are* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Daniel M. Wegner, *The Illusion of Conscious Will* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

<sup>284</sup> See Chapter One.

<sup>285</sup> Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Autonomy." In, *Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will*, Timothy O'Connor, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 33-42.

<sup>286</sup> "The Addicted Brain," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 21 (July 2004): 3. <sup>286</sup> Daniel Wegner, holds that although the act of willing *feels* like a cause, it is actually only epiphenomenal in the causal sequence. See his *The Illusion of Conscious Will*.

<sup>287</sup> "The temperament characteristics found to be significantly influenced by genes were shyness and anything unfamiliar, and activity levels." Robert Emde, M.D., University of Colorado Health Center, quoted in Tina Adler, "Shy, Bold Temperament? It's Mostly in the Genes," *APA Monitor*, 24 (1993): 7-8.

<sup>288</sup> Ernst Fehr (with Michael Kosfeld, Markus Heinrichs, Paul Zak and Urs Fischbacher), "Oxytocin increases Trust in Humans," *Nature*, 435 (2 June 2005): 673-676.

<sup>289</sup> Natalie Angier, "What Makes a Parent Put up with it All?" *New York Times*, November 2, 1993, C1, C14.

<sup>290</sup> "Fearing More than Fear Itself," *New York Times*, July 30, 2002 (*Science Times*, p. 5) reporting work by Dr. Ahmad R. Hartri and Dr. Daniel R. Weinberger (National Institute of Mental Health).

<sup>291</sup> "A Gene for Neophilia?" *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, Vol. 14 (No. 9, March 1998), 7.

<sup>292</sup> Gina Kolata, "Studies on a Mouse Hormone Bear on Fatness in Humans," *New York Times*, April 2, 2004, A14. In that report, Dr. Jeffrey Flier of Beth Israel-Deaconess Hospital (Boston) says: "It all comes back to the same issues – the whole issue of appetite regulations in humans ... It is at the interface of free will and determinism. There is certainly a strong biological underpinning to our drive to eat and maintain certain weights ... But now there is another layer of mechanisms by which things like hormones that not only can affect the neurochemistry that affects how hungry you are but also can affect the wiring of your brain."

<sup>293</sup> Konrad Z. Lorenz, *On Aggression* (London: Methuen, 1966).

<sup>294</sup> Natalie Angier, "Genetic Influence on Social Status," *New York Times*, November 12, 1991, C1.

<sup>295</sup> *Idem*.

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<sup>296</sup> Hugh McIntosh, "New Technologies Advance Study of Autism," *APA Monitor*, 29 (November 1998): 14.

<sup>297</sup> Jean Piaget and Barbara Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child*, transl. H. Weaver (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

<sup>298</sup> Lucy L. Brown, Helen Fisher, Arthur Aron, Debra J. Mashek, Greg Strong, and Haifang Li, "Reward, Motivation, and Emotion Systems Associated With Early-Stage Intense Romantic Love," *Journal of Neurophysiology* 94 (2005): 327-337.

<sup>299</sup> B. Libet, C. A. Gleason, E. W. Wright, & D. K. Pearl, "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (readiness-potential): the Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act," *Brain; a Journal of Neurology*, 106 (1983): 623-42. But see also, Jing Zhu, "Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet's Experiment," *Journal of Consciousness Studies*. 10 (2003): 61-77.

<sup>300</sup> Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 7-58.

#### **ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 7 THE FUNDAMENTAL LIBERAL ERROR?**

<sup>301</sup> Byron Kolb and Ian Q. Whishaw, "Brain Plasticity and Behavior," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49 (1998): 43-64. Also wild born chimpanzees "with rich past experience" perform lab tests with fewer errors than those laboratory reared. J. McVicker Hunt, "Psychological Development," *Annual Review of Psychology*, vol. 30 (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 1979), 132.

<sup>302</sup> "It is now clear that experience produces multiple, dissociable changes in the brain including increases in dendritic length, increases (or decreases) in spine density, synapse formation, increased glial activity, and altered metabolic activity." Kolb and Whishaw, "Brain Plasticity and Behavior," 43.

<sup>303</sup> Daniel Kahneman and Carol Varey. 1991. "Notes on the Psychology of Utility." In Jon Elster and John H. Roemer, eds., *Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 127-163.

<sup>304</sup> Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, Rakesh Sarin. 1997. "Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (2): 375-405.

<sup>305</sup> Patricia Smith Churchland, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

<sup>306</sup> Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty." In *Four Essays on Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 129.

<sup>307</sup> Paul Lewis, "New U.N. Index Measures Wealth as Quality of Life," *New York Times*, May 23, 1993, 14.

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- <sup>308</sup> “The man of knowledge and the productive laborer can be widely divided against each other.” Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, transl. Eden and Cedar Paul (1867/1887, New York: Dutton, Everyman, 1972), 382.
- <sup>309</sup> Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Rinehart, 1944), 46.
- <sup>310</sup> (Sir) Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1861] 1931), 140.
- <sup>311</sup> Harrison Wein, “Stress and Disease: New Perspectives,” National Institutes of Health October, 2000. <[weinh@od.nih.gov](mailto:weinh@od.nih.gov)>
- <sup>312</sup> Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less*, 201. Schwartz goes on to say “It may be that we are biologically unprepared for the number of choices we face in the modern world.” 142-143.
- <sup>313</sup> Kolb and Wishaw, “Brain Plasticity and Behavior,” 47.
- <sup>314</sup> Ian Shapiro, “Gross Concepts in Political Argument,” *Political Theory*, 17 (1989): 51-76.
- <sup>315</sup> Jacob Jacoby, “Perspectives on a Consumer Information Program.” In Michael L. Ray and Scott Ward, eds., *Communicating with Consumers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976), 12-20.
- <sup>316</sup> *Idem.*
- <sup>317</sup> Jacob Jacoby, Donald E. Speller, and Carol K. Berning, “Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension,” *Journal of Consumer Research*, vol. 1 (1974): 33-42 at 33.
- <sup>318</sup> Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R. Lepper, “When Choice is Demotivating” Can One Desire too Much of a Good Thing?” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79 (2000): 995-1006.
- <sup>319</sup> Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less*, 134, 136.
- <sup>320</sup> N. J. Roese, “Counterfactual Thinking,” *Psychological Bulletin*, 21 (1997): 133-148.
- <sup>321</sup> Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 157.
- <sup>322</sup> Barry Schwartz, “Self-Determination: The Tyranny of Freedom.” *American Psychologist*. 55 (2000): 79-88.
- <sup>323</sup> Ellen J. Langer and Judith Rodin, “The Effects of Choice and Enhanced Personal Responsibility for the Aged: A Field Experiment in an Institutional Setting,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34 (1976): 191-198; Judith Rodin and Ellen J. Langer, “Long-Term Effects of a Control-Relevant Intervention with the Institutionalized Aged,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35 (1977): 807-902.
- <sup>324</sup> Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 101.
- <sup>325</sup> “The Sadness and Pain of Rejection,” *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, Vol. 20 (June 2004): 6-7. Sources: N. L. Eisenberg, et al., “Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion,” *Science*, vol. 302 (Oct. 10, 2003). No 5643, pp. 290-292; J. Panksepp.

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“Feeling the Pain of Social Loss,” *ibid.*, 237-239.

<sup>326</sup> Martin L. Hoffman, “Is Altruism Part of Human Nature?” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 40 (1981): 121-137.

<sup>327</sup> “If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster / And treat those two imposters just the same:” Rudyard Kipling, *If*. Reprinted around the globe; here taken from Roy J. Cook, ed., *One Hundred and One Famous Poems* (Chicago: Reilly & Lee, 1958).

<sup>328</sup> Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1999).

<sup>329</sup> “The ability to pay attention to what you’re experiencing from moment to moment – without drifting into thoughts of the past or concerns about the future, or getting caught up in opinions about what is going on – is called mindfulness.” “Mindfulness” <Healthbeat@obs.com> *Harvard Health Letter*.

<sup>330</sup> Barry Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 77-78.

<sup>331</sup> Joseph Luft, “Monetary Value and the Perception of Persons,” *Journal of Social Psychology*, 46 (1957), 245-251.

<sup>332</sup> Chapter One and Two. As Barry Schwartz said ‘This may be the most important choice we have to make. B. Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 104.

<sup>333</sup> Timothy D. Wilson and Jonathan W. Schooler, “Thinking Too Much: Introspection can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60 (1991): 181-192. For those especially interested in choices among jams, see also Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R. Lepper, “When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire too Much of a Good Thing,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79 (2000): 995-1006.

<sup>334</sup> George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker, “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,” *American Economic Review*, 67 (1977): 76-90.

<sup>335</sup> Wilson and Schooler, “Thinking Too Much: Introspection can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions,” 181.

<sup>336</sup> Benedict Carey, “The Unconscious Mind: A great Decision Maker,” *New York Times, Science Times*, February 21, 2006, F6, reporting research by Ap Dijksterhuis et al., University of Amsterdam.

<sup>337</sup> T. D. Wilson, D. J. Lisle, J. S. Schooler, S. D. Hodges, K. J. Klaren, and S. J. LaFleur, “Introspection about Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice Satisfaction,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19 (1993): 331-339.

<sup>338</sup> T. D. Wilson and D. Kraft, “Why Do I Love Thee? Effects of Repeated Introspections about a Dating Relationship upon Attitudes toward the Relationship,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19 (1993): 409-418.

<sup>339</sup> “Is it love - or Just Stress Hormones?” *Harvard Health Letter*, vol. 30 (February 2005): 7. Reporting on work by Donatella Marazziti and Domenico Canale (University of

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Pisa) in the August 2004 volume of *Psychoneuroendocrinology*. ‘Phenylethylamine is a signaling molecule in the brain with a chemical structure similar to amphetamines’

<sup>340</sup> Alex C. Michalos, “Job Satisfaction, Marital Satisfaction, and the Quality of Life: A Review and a Preview.” In Frank M. Andrews, ed. *Research on the Quality of Life*. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, 1986), 62.

<sup>341</sup> B. Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 146.

<sup>342</sup> Norbert Schwarz and Fritz Strack, “Evaluating One’s Life: A Judgment Model of Subjective Well-Being.” In Strack, Michael Argyle, and Schwarz, eds., *Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1991), 27-48,

<sup>343</sup> Robert A. Wicklund, “Objective Self-Awareness.” In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, L. Berkowitz, ed., vol. 8 (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 233-275.

<sup>344</sup> S. Lyubomirsky and H. S. Lepper, “Hedonic Consequences of Social Comparison: A Contrast of Happy and Unhappy People,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73 (1997): 1141-1157.

<sup>345</sup> Langer, *Mindfulness*, 202

<sup>346</sup> Darlene E. Goodhart, “Some Psychological Effects Associated with Positive and Negative Thinking about Stressful Outcomes: Was Pollyanna Right?” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48 (1985): 216-232.

<sup>347</sup> Alice M. Isen, “Feeling Happy, Thinking Clearly,” *APA Monitor*, 19 (1988): 6-7. See also, Alice M. Isen, “Positive Affect, Cognitive Processes, and Social Behavior.” In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, L. Berkowitz, ed., vol. 20 (New York: Academic Press, 1987), 203-253.

## **ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 8 FROM DEARTH TO ANXIETY**

<sup>348</sup> Dante Cicchetti and Sheree L. Toth, “The Development of Depression in Children and Adolescents,” *American Psychologist*, 53 (1998): 221-241. But it is not clear that primitive societies are not riven by anxiety. See Irving A. Hallowell, “Fear and Anxiety as Cultural and Individual Variables in a Primitive Society. In Hallowell, *Culture and Experience* (New York: Schocken, 1967).

<sup>349</sup> Robert E. Lane, *After the End of History: The Curious Fate of American Materialism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

<sup>350</sup> Robert E. Lane, *The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

<sup>351</sup> J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor. 1982. *The Greeks on Pleasure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 99, 105.

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<sup>352</sup> Poverty is changing. In 1973 42 percent of the bottom fifth had cars; in 2003 over 70 percent of the poverty households had cars. In 1970 26 percent of the poverty households lived in ‘crowded’ homes (more than one persons per room); in 2001 only 6 percent did; From 1974 to 2004 the rate of infant mortality shrank from 16.7 per 1000 live births to 6.7. Nicholas Eberstadt, “Broken Yardstick,” *The New York Times*, September 9, 2005, A25.

<sup>353</sup> Burkhard Strumpel (with the assistance of Richard T. Curtin and M. Susan Schwartz), “Economic Life-Styles, Values, and Subjective Welfare.” In Strumpel, ed., *Economic Means for Human Needs* (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, 1976), 56.

<sup>354</sup> Adam might have found a matching, if less poetic and less informed, diagnosis in Michael Sandel’s recent work. Sandel says “two fears – for the loss of self-government and the erosion of community – together define the anxiety of the age.” Michael Sandel, “The Public Perspective of Contemporary Liberalism,” Paper presented to the Yale Political Theory Workshop September 12, 1996.

<sup>355</sup> National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), “Largest Ever Comorbidity Study Reports Prevalence and Co-Occurrence of Alcohol, Drug, Mood and Anxiety Disorders,” Press release, Aug. 2, 2004.

<sup>356</sup> Jean M. Twenge, “The Age of Anxiety? Birth Cohort Change in Anxiety and Neuroticism, 1952-1993,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79 (2000): 1007-1021.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*, 1007.

<sup>358</sup> “Hearts and Minds – Part II,” *The Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 14 (Aug. 1997): 1.

<sup>359</sup> The WHO World Mental Health Survey Consortium, “Prevalence, Severity, and Unmet Need for Treatment of Mental Disorders in the World Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys,” *JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association)* vol. 291 (No. 21, June 2, 2004): 2581-2590. Note that these figures are not based on visits to doctors but rather on national (or in China, city) surveys of individuals given standard diagnostic tests taken from American Psychiatric Association’s *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-IV).

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, 2584.

<sup>361</sup> Harry C. Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

<sup>362</sup> The WHO World Mental Health Survey Consortium, “Prevalence, Severity, and Unmet Need for Treatment of Mental Disorders,” 2584.

<sup>363</sup> Dessie “forgot” to say that many of the European countries had lower rates of problems with impulse control and substance abuse than did the two collectivist cultures. For the summary “Any [Mental Disorder]” category, only Italy ranked lower than Japan (8.2 to 8.8)

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, 2584.

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<sup>365</sup> Dessie was prepared for Adam to question how a society could be both fairly high on a happiness scale and still rank the very highest on a measure of anxiety. Although Dessie might have pointed out that the anxiety measure was a much more solid instrument, he was also prepared to cite German evidence showing that where the measure dealt with satisfaction with life, “of the completely satisfied, 37% have “frequent spells of complete exhaustion or fatigue; 9% recurring frightening thoughts; 10% constantly keyed up and jittery; 6% usually unhappy or depressed; 8% often shake and tremble.” Wolfgang Glatzer, “Quality of Life in Advanced Industrialized Countries: The Case of West Germany.” In *Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1991), 265.

<sup>366</sup> Thorstein Veblen, “Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?” In *The Portable Veblen*, ed. Max Lerner (New York: Viking, 1948). But see Richard R. Nelson and Sidney Winter, *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1982); Arthur E. Gandolfi, Anna S. Gandolfi, and David P. Barash, *Economics as an Evolutionary Science: From Utility to Fitness* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002).

<sup>367</sup> Mercier de la Riviere, *L'ordre Naturel et Essential des Sociétés Politiques* (1767) quoted in John B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (1920, New York: Dover, 1955), 174.

<sup>368</sup> Burkhard Strumpel (with the assistance of Richard T. Curtin and M. Susan Schwartz), “Economic Life-Styles, Values, and Subjective Welfare.” In Strumpel, ed., *Economic Means for Human Needs* (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, 1976), 56.

<sup>369</sup> Michael Hout. 1984. “Status, Autonomy, and Training in Occupational Mobility,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 89 (1984), 1379-1409,

<sup>370</sup> Alex C. Michalos, “Job Satisfaction, Marital Satisfaction, and the Quality of Life: A Review and a Preview.” In *Research on the Quality of Life*, Frank M. Andrews, ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, 1986).

<sup>371</sup> Herbert M. Lefcourt, *Locus of Control: Current Trends in Theory and Research* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum/Wiley, 1976).

<sup>372</sup> Oscar Lewis, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in The Culture of Poverty - San Juan and New York* (New York: Random House/Vintage, 1966).

<sup>373</sup> “There is strong evidence that anxiety conditions run in families ... And recent findings suggest a genetic predisposition to anxiety.” “Chronic Anxiety: How to Stop Living on the Edge,” *Harvard Health Letter*, 23 (July 1998): 1. See also Kent C. Berridge, “Pleasure, Pain, Desire, and Dread: Hidden Core Processes of Emotion.” In *Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology*, Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 525-557, quotation at p. 545.

<sup>374</sup> Natalie Angier, “Grumpy, Fearful Neurotics Appear to be Short on a Gene.” *New York Times*, Nov. 26, 1996, A1, B17. Research by Dr. Dennis L. Murphy of the National Institute of Mental Health, Dr. Dean H. Hamer of National Institute of Cancer Research;

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Dr. Klaus-Peter Lesch of the University of Würzburg in Germany. Published in *Science*, November 29, 1996.

<sup>375</sup> Dr. Susan Mineka, reported in Carol Turkington, "Evolutionary Memories May Have Phobia Role," *APA Monitor*, 22:(no. 11, 1991): 14.

<sup>376</sup> Daniel Goleman, "The Secret of Long Life? Be Dour and Dependable," *New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1993, C3. Based on Terman longitudinal study of California boys and girls age about 11 in the 1920s. See also Becca R. Levy, "Mind Matters: Cognitive and Physical Effects of Aging Self-Stereotypes," *Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences*. 58 (2003): 203-211.

<sup>377</sup> Randolph Nesse, "Evolutionary Functions of Enjoyment and Suffering." Paper presented to the Conference on Enjoyment and Suffering, Princeton October 31-November 2, 1996, pp. 12, 17, citing M. Daly and M. Wilson, "The Young Male Syndrome," *Ethology and Sociobiology* [no pages given],

<sup>378</sup> "Antisocial personality--Part II," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, vol. 17, (no. 7, Jan. 2001) 1-4.

<sup>379</sup> "Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Toxic Worry." January 2003. *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, vol. 19: 2.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>381</sup> Ross Buck, "The Biological Affects: A Typology," *Psychological Review*, 106 (1999): 314-315.

<sup>382</sup> "Stress Takes the Edge Off," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*. 21 (May 2005): 7.

<sup>383</sup> Philip J. Hilts, "Studies suggest Estrogen Lowers Alzheimer's Risk," *New York Times*, Nov. 10, 1993. A23, reporting work by Dr. Michael Meaney of McGill University.

<sup>384</sup> R. B. Vachiano, P. S. Strauss, and L. Hochman, "The Open and Closed Mind: A Review of Dogmatism," *Psychological Bulletin*, 71 (1969): 261-273.

<sup>385</sup> John Mirowski and Catherine E. Ross, *Social Causes of Psychological Distress* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989).

<sup>386</sup> "In a social order where all values are reduced to the money measure, in the degree that this is true of modern industrial nations, a considerable fraction of the most noble and sensitive characters will lead unhappy and futile lives." Frank Knight. *The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays* (1923) (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1935), 66

<sup>387</sup> Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1975). Also: "Assuming ... that love is used as a functional substitute for other bonds, we may guess about American society that the average level of love is high in part because for most Americans there is little economic reason for marrying." Paul C. Rosenblatt, "Cross-Cultural Perspective on Attraction," in *Foundations of Interpersonal Attraction*, ed. Ted Huston (New York: Academic, 1974), 82. See, for example, the defense of paternalism in the Indian family by Richard A. Schweder, Manamohan Mahapatra, and Joan G. Miller, "Culture and Moral Development." In *Cultural Psychology: Essays on*

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*Comparative Human Development*, James W. Stigler, Richard A. Schweder, and Gilbert Herdt, eds. (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 130-204.

<sup>388</sup> *United Nations Demographic Yearbook. 2002*. New York: United Nations Publication (Internet). Table 25. Divorces and Crude Divorce Rates. pp. 639-42. Getting married has been shown to reduce the level of depression of depressed people. Given the high comorbidity rates of depression and anxiety, one might expect the same therapeutic effect for anxiety. See “Depressed? Marriage May Help, Study Says,” *Medline Plus*, August 14, 2006. Research by Kristi Williams (University of Ohio, Department of Sociology).

<sup>389</sup> William J. Goode, Elizabeth Hopkins, and Helen M. McClure, *Social Systems and Family Patterns: A Propositional Inventory* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).

<sup>390</sup> “Chronic Anxiety,” *Harvard Health Letter*, 1.

<sup>391</sup> Marsha L. Richins and Scott Dawson, “A Consumer Values Orientation for Materialism and its Measurement: Scale Development and Validation,” *Journal of Consumer Research*, 19 (1992): 303-316 at 313. Other studies with other measures of materialism similarly find that when materialist values are central to a person’s world outlook, ‘values and expectancies for wealth and money are negatively associated with adjustment and well-being.’ Tim Kasser and Richard M. Ryan, “A Dark Side of the American Dream: Correlates of Financial Success as a Central Life Aspiration,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65 (1993): 410-422 at 410.

<sup>392</sup> Dessie recalled Hypatia’s brilliant comparison in Chapter Two of liberalism’s blaming voters and customers for the failures of democracies and markets with Christianity’s blaming evil on human free will.

<sup>393</sup> Barry Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less* (New York: Harper/Collins, 2004).

<sup>394</sup> L. S. Vygotski, *Thought and Speech* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962 [1956]).

<sup>395</sup> “Inequality in America: What Hope for Human Capital Policies?” *Focus*, vol. 23, Number 3, Spring 2005, pp. 1-10, reporting research in: James Heckman, “Policies to Foster Human Capital,” *Research in Economics* 54: no. 1 (2000): 3-56.

<sup>396</sup> Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in his *Four Essays on Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 129.

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 9 MARKETS WITHOUT ECONOMIC MAN

<sup>397</sup> Paul W. Glimcher, *Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 205-223.

<sup>398</sup> Thorstein Veblen, “Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?” (1932) In *The Portable Veblen*, Max Lerner, ed. (New York: Viking, 1948).

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- <sup>399</sup> Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science*, 211 (1981), 453-458
- <sup>400</sup> Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," *Science*, 185 (1974), 1124-1131.
- <sup>401</sup> Pigou defined the boundaries of economics as that which could be measured by money. Arthur C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare*, 4th ed. ([1952] London: Macmillan, 1948), ix.
- <sup>402</sup> Robert H. Frank. "Rethinking Rational Choice." In *Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society*, Roger Friedland and A. F. Robertson, eds. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 53-54.
- <sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.
- <sup>404</sup> Robert E. Lane, *The Market Experience* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 98. See also Sendhil Mullainathan and Richard H. Thaler, "Behavioral Economics," *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (2006).
- <sup>405</sup> Frank, "Rethinking Rational Choice," 62-63; Daniel Kahneman, "Perceptions of Unfairness: Constraints on Wealth Seeking," *American Economic Review*, 76 (1986), 728-741.
- <sup>406</sup> Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
- <sup>407</sup> Marsha L. Richins and Scott Dawson, "A Consumer Values Orientation for Materialism and its Measurement: Scale Development and Validation," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 19 (1992): 303-316; Tim Kasser, *The High Price of Materialism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
- <sup>408</sup> Ed Diener and Robert Biswas-Diener, "Will Money Increase Subjective Well-Being? A Literature Review and Guide to Needed Research," *Social Indicators Research*, 57 (2002): 119-169; Robert E. Lane, *The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
- <sup>409</sup> Lane, *Loss of Happiness*, 77-98; Ed Diener and Martin E. P. Seligman, "Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being," *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 5 (July 2004), 1-31.
- <sup>410</sup> Frank, "Rethinking Rational Choice," 61
- <sup>411</sup> Daniel Kahneman, "Objective Happiness," *Foundations of Hedonic Psychology: Scientific Perspectives on Enjoyment and Suffering*, Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 3-25.
- <sup>412</sup> Barry Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).
- <sup>413</sup> Bruno S. Frey, *Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation* (Cheltenham [UK] & Brookfield [US]: Elgar, 1997).

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<sup>414</sup> Robert E. Lane, *After the End of History: The Curious Fate of American Materialism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

<sup>415</sup> Mullainathan and Thaler, "Behavioral Economics."

<sup>416</sup> Joseph A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*. Edited from manuscript by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 28.

<sup>417</sup> William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973). Going beyond their rational choice perspective, Riker and Ordshook might have supported their case for self-interested behavior by enlisting the *illusion of control* whereby people perceive themselves to be in control of events which are actually out-of-control, a perception prompted by their desire to believe they are effective.

<sup>418</sup> Hypatia would have gone on to suggest a version that would offer a more wholesome lesson to economic man. That version was W. S. Gilbert's *Pygmalion and Galatea* (1873) where, when the beautiful, beloved statue (Galatea) finds she has caused trouble in Pygmalion's marriage, she voluntarily returns to her original marble state. But Hypatia recalled that economic "man" was not likely to make such self-sacrificing gestures.

<sup>419</sup> Dale T. Miller and Rebecca K. Rattner, "The Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed Power of Self-Interest," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 74 (1998): 53-62 at 53.

<sup>420</sup> Dale T. Miller, "The Norm of Self-Interest," *American Psychologist*, 54 (1999): 1053-1060.

<sup>421</sup> "Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary research program with the goal of building a biological model of decision making in economic environments. Neuroeconomists ask, how does the embodied brain enable the mind (or groups of minds) to make economic decisions?" Kevin McCabe, "Neuroeconomics Explained," September 15, 2003. <http://neuroeconomics.typepad.com/neuroeconomics/2003/09/n>

<sup>422</sup> Sandra Blakeslee, "Brain Experts Now Follow the Money," *New York Times*, June 17, 2003, F1.

<sup>423</sup> "In making short-term predictions, neural systems tap into gut feelings and emotions, comparing what we know from the past with that is happening right now." Ibid. F4.

<sup>424</sup> Mullainathan and Thaler, "Behavioral Economics."

<sup>425</sup> Patricia Smith Churchland, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 63. For a somewhat different but compatible view of the self, see J. E. LeDoux, *The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are* (New York: Viking, 2002).

<sup>426</sup> David Laibson, quoted in "Neuroeconomics," *Harvard Magazine*, March-April 2006. Vol. 108, No. 5. [www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/0706000.html](http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/0706000.html).

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<sup>427</sup> Terrence Chorvat and Kevin McCabe, "Neuroeconomics and Rationality," *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, vol. 80 (2005): 101-121 (Internet reproduction Social Sciences Research Network: [http://ssm.com/abstract\\_id=748264](http://ssm.com/abstract_id=748264)), 110.

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

<sup>429</sup> Those areas of the brain 'normally involved in social-emotional processing' are the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the bilateral superior temporal sulcus. *Ibid.*, 117.

<sup>430</sup> Gladwell gives an example from Daniel Goldstein showing why German students, knowing less than American students about American cities, give better estimates of the relative sizes of San Antonio and San Diego. "The point is that knowledge and the ability to make a good decision correlate only sporadically, and there are plenty of times when knowledge gets in the way of judgment." *Decision Science News*, June 24, 2006. <http://www.dangoldstein.com/dsn/>

<sup>431</sup> Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking* (Boston: Little Brown, 2005).

<sup>432</sup> *Idem.* See also Nalini Ambady and Robert Rosenthal, "Half a Minute: Predicting Teacher Evaluations from Thin Slices of Nonverbal Behavior and Physical Attractiveness," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64 (1993): 431-441.

<sup>433</sup> Dr. P. Read Montague, reported by Sandra Blakeslee, "Brain Experts Now Follow the Money," *New York Times*, June 17, 2003, F1.

<sup>434</sup> Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*.

<sup>435</sup> M. W. Fordyce, "Development of a Program to Increase Personal Happiness," *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 24 (1977): 511-521.

<sup>436</sup> David M. Buss. 2000. "The Evolution of Happiness," *American Psychologist*, 55 (2000): 15-23.

<sup>437</sup> Blakeslee, "Brain Experts Now Follow the Money," F1.

<sup>438</sup> Frank H. Knight, *Freedom and Reform: Essays in Economics and Social Philosophy* (New York: Harper, 1947), 66.

<sup>439</sup> Daniel Goleman, *Working with Emotional Intelligence* (New York: Bantam, 1998), 7-9.

<sup>440</sup> "Do Women Make Better Leaders?" *Harvard Mental; Health Letter*, 21 (July 2004), 7.

<sup>441</sup> Randal Filer, "The Influence of Affective Human Capital on the Wage Equation." In *Research in Labor Economics*, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, ed., vol. 3 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1981).

<sup>442</sup> Damon Tomlin, M. Amin Kayali, Brooks King-Casas, Cedric Anen, Colin F. Camerer, Steven R. Quartz, P. Read Montague, "Agent-Specific Responses in the Cingulate Cortex During Economic Exchanges," *Science*, Vol. 312 (19 May 2006) no. 5776, 1047-1050.

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<sup>443</sup> Derek Parfit, "Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma," *Proceedings of the British Academy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 554, quoted in Jon Elster, *Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 93.

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 10 RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEMOCRACY'S FAILINGS

<sup>444</sup> David Hume [1742], "Of Independence of Parliament," *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary*. vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 117-118.

<sup>445</sup> Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996).

<sup>446</sup> James R. Flynn, "Massive IQ Gains in 14 Nations: What IQ Tests Really Measure," *Psychological Bulletin*, 101 (1987): 171-191.

<sup>447</sup> "Our brains aren't wired to multitask, the way our computers are ... We're taxing the limits of our human abilities." Bridget Murray, "Data Smog: Newest Culprit in Brain Drain," *APA Monitor*, 29 (March 1998): 1, 42.

<sup>448</sup> "Nearly half of all college students report feeling so depressed at some point in time that they have trouble functioning." *College Mental Health Statistics*, 2001 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. [www.HealthyMinds.org](http://www.HealthyMinds.org).

<sup>449</sup> *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 597, p. 385.

<sup>450</sup> *Ibid.*, Table 775, p. 515.

<sup>451</sup> Robert. E. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," *American Sociological Review*, 31 (1966): 649-662.

<sup>452</sup> Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 42.

<sup>453</sup> From time to time it has been suggested that culture is the scaffolding for choice institutions. In this connection it is useful to observe Karl Polanyi's analysis of markets as disembedded from their cultures. See: Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Rinehart, 1944).

<sup>454</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1993).

<sup>455</sup> Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (1964), 339-57.

<sup>456</sup> Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

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<sup>457</sup> The National Election Studies codebooks break down the sense of effectiveness into *internal efficacy*, (e.g., “When you make plans ahead, do you usually get to carry out things the way you expected, or do things come up to make you change your plans?”) and *external efficacy* (e.g., “Do public officials care much what people like R think?”) There has been no substantial increase in either measure of efficacy since the first of these questions were asked in 1952 and external efficacy has tended to decline since 1960.

<sup>458</sup> National Election Studies; University of Michigan, online. For earlier periods see Philip E. Converse, Jean D. Dotson, Wendy J Hoag, and William H. McGee III, *American Social Attitudes Data Sourcebook, 1947-1978* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).

<sup>459</sup> Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political, Democratic, and Social Equality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 333.

<sup>460</sup> George Katona, Burkhard Strumpel, and Ernest Zahn, *Aspirations and Affluence: Comparative Studies in the United States and Western Europe* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 54.

<sup>461</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 33.

<sup>462</sup> Valerie Moller, “Happiness Trends Under Democracy: Where Will the New South African Set-Level Come to Rest?” *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 2 (2001): 33-53.

<sup>463</sup> Michelle Stone, Debra Kaminer, and Kevin Durrheim, “The Contribution of Political Life Events to Psychological Distress Among South African Adolescents,” *Political Psychology*, 21 (2000): 465-487.

<sup>464</sup> Ed Diener, Marissa Diener, and Carol Diener, “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of Nations,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69 (1995): 861. Political rights include, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, multiparty systems, elections by secret ballots, and the presence of independent trade unions (p. 855). An earlier income-controlled correlation of level of democracy with happiness also found a nonsignificant negative relationship (-.02). Ruut Veenhoven, *Happiness in Nations: Subjective Appreciation of Life in 56 Nations 1946-1992* (Rotterdam: Erasmus University, RISBO Press, 1993). p. 50. But note that a Swiss study found that “the more developed the institutions of *direct* democracy, the happier the individuals are.” Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, “Happiness, Economics and Institutions,” *The Economic Journal*, 110 (2000): 918-938.

<sup>465</sup> William J. Cromie, Harvard News Office, “Scientists Pursue Happiness: Results not Too Cheerful,” *Harvard Gazette Archives*, 2000. Research by Daniel Gilbert.

<sup>466</sup> Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 7 (1993): 51-70.

<sup>467</sup> Frey and Stutzer, “Happiness, Economics and Institutions,” 918-938.

<sup>468</sup> “Research on procedural and interactional justice suggests that perceived injustice is reduced where those affected by a decision have an opportunity to offer an opinion

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(voice) prior to the decision, and where the decision maker offers a justifying account for the decision.” Ronald L. Cohen, “Fabrications of Justice,” *Social Justice Research*, 3: (1989), 31.

<sup>469</sup> Ed Diener and Robert Biswas-Diener, “Will Money Increase Subjective Well-Being? A Literature Review and Guide to Needed Research,” *Social Indicators Research*, 57 (2002): 119-169.

<sup>470</sup> Jan Ott. 2000. “Freedom and the Achievement of Happiness,” in *Challenges to Democracy: Ideas, Involvements, and Institutions: The PSA Yearbook, 2000*, Keith Dowding, James Hughes, and Helen Margetts, eds. (London: Palgrave, 2000), 46-58.

<sup>471</sup> Robert E. Lane, *After the End of History: The Curious Fate of American Materialism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 144-147. Lane argues that because economic growth, government deficits, and provisions for free speech all have different effects in advanced countries and LDCs we need two systems of analysis, one for rich countries and a different one for poor countries.

<sup>472</sup> Robert W. Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1975).

<sup>473</sup> Benjamin Radcliff, “Politics, Markets, and Life Satisfaction: The Political Economy of Human Happiness,” *American Political Science Review*, 95 (2001): 939-952.

<sup>474</sup> Diener et al., “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of Nations,” 861; with income controlled (.04, NS) and without controlling income (- 0.46,  $p > .05$  where the lower the score the higher the relationship). Whether income equality is related to level of democracy is another matter. Miles Simpson reports data to the effect that the effect of democracy on income equality is curvilinear, first increasing equality and then decreasing it. Miles Simpson, “Political Rights and Income Inequality: A Cross-National Test,” *American Sociological Review*, 55 (1990): 682-693.

<sup>475</sup> Ian Shapiro. “Why Democracies Don’t Redistribute,” *Daedalus* 131 (Winter 2002), 118.

<sup>476</sup> Robert E. Lane, “Self-Reliance and Empathy: The Enemies of Poverty – and of the Poor,” *Political Psychology*, 22 (2001): 473-492.

<sup>477</sup> Martin Gilens, “Racial Attitudes and Opposition to the American Welfare State.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1992.

<sup>478</sup> Michael Ross, “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” UCLA Department of Political Science, 2004. <mailto:mlross@polisci.ucla.edu>

<sup>479</sup> Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, “Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution.” Paper presented to the Conference on Democracy and Distribution,” Yale University, November 12-14, 1999, ms. p. 24, fn. 19.

<sup>480</sup> Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, “Social Policy Responsiveness in Developed Democracies,” *American Sociological Review*, 71 (2006): 474-494.

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<sup>481</sup> C. Edward Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 163.

<sup>482</sup> “Indian Democracy vs. Chinese Communist Command Economy,” *New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1992, E4. In a more complex analysis of the effects of democracy on infant mortality, it was found that: “Transnational economic linkages associated with multinational corporations adversely effect child mortality more strongly at lower levels of democracy – that is intranational, political factors interact with the international economic forces to affect child mortality.” John M. Shandra, Jenna E. Nobles, Bruce London, and John B. Williamson, “Multinational Corporations, Democracy, and Child Mortality: A Quantitative, Cross-National Analysis of Developing Countries,” *Social Indicators Research*, 73(2005): 267-293 at p. 267.

<sup>483</sup> India’s gini index was .40 in the early 1990s. Diener et al., “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of Nations,” 856.

<sup>484</sup> Dessie should not have made these last comparisons. They were based on an impressionistic reading of the news and his own visits to the two countries over twenty years ago.

<sup>485</sup> “Two things ... characterize any modern industrial system: rationality, which is the spirit of the institution, and change, which is rationality’s logical corollary.” David S. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1770 to Today* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). Reprinted in *Industrial Man*, Tom Burns, ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 78.

<sup>486</sup> David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk, “The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes,” *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 24 (New York: Academic Press, 1991), 1-91.

<sup>487</sup> Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley, 1960); William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

<sup>488</sup> David Hume, “Of Independence of Parliament” (1742), *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary*, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 117-118. I am indebted to Bruno Frey for this quotation.

<sup>489</sup> Dale T. Miller, “The Norm of Self-Interest,” *American Psychologist*, 54 (1999): 1053-1060.

<sup>490</sup> Julian B. Rotter, “Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement,” *Psychological Monographs*. # 609, vol. 80, 1966.

<sup>491</sup> Melvin J. Lerner, *The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion* (New York: Plenum, 1980).

<sup>492</sup> For example, people with “individualistic orientations worry more about the risk of being rendered defenseless in a world with too much gun control ... [and] are more concerned about the damage that excessive environmental regulation can cause the

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economy.” Dan Kahan and others, National Risk and Culture Survey, Yale Law School. <http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/45/89/>

<sup>493</sup> Frans B. M. de Waal, “Sex Differences in Chimpanzee (and Human) Behavior: A Matter of Social Values.” In *The Origin of Values*, Michael Hechter, Lynn Nadel, and Richard E. Michod, eds. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), 283-303 at 293.

<sup>494</sup> Amartya Sen, *On Ethics and Economics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 25-26.

<sup>495</sup> Harry K. Girvetz, *The Evolution of Liberalism* (New York: Collier Books, 1963).

<sup>496</sup> “Humanly speaking, the greatest happiness possible for us consists in the greatest possible abundance of objects suitable to our enjoyment and in the greatest liberty to profit by them.” Mercier de la Riviere, *L’ordre Naturel et Essential des Sociétés Politiques* (1767) quoted in John Bury, *The Idea of Progress* ([1920]. New York: Dover, 1955), 173.

<sup>497</sup> W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); F. J. Crosby, *Relative Deprivation and Working Women* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

<sup>498</sup> R. A. Wicklund and P. M. Gollwitzer, *Symbolic Self-Completion* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1982).

<sup>499</sup> Chapter Five.

<sup>500</sup> Tracing the sources of individualism is an industry: Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973) reports origins in the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and, of course, in the growth of capitalism and democracy. For most of these accounts individualism was considered evil. p. 14. In his *The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property, and Social Transition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978) Alan Macfarlane finds its origins in the twelfth century.

<sup>501</sup> de Waal, “Sex Differences in Chimpanzee (and Human) Behavior,” 291.

<sup>502</sup> Ibid., p. 301. See also J. van der Dennen and V. Falger, *Sociobiology and Conflict: Evolutionary Perspectives on Competition, Cooperation, Violence, and Warfare* (London & New York: Chapman & Hall, 1990).

<sup>503</sup> Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, “From Human Nature to Public Policy: Evolutionary Theory Challenges the ‘Standard Model’” in *Human Nature and Public Policy: An Evolutionary Approach*, Somit and Peterson, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 1-26; Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, “Darwinism, Dominance, and Democracy,” *Research in Biopolitics*, 3 (1995): 19-34.

<sup>504</sup> Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution: A Study in Comparative Ethics* (1906; New York: Henry Holt, 1924).

<sup>505</sup> Martin L. Hoffman, “Is Altruism Part of Human Nature?” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 40 (1981): 121-137.

<sup>506</sup> Lester R. Brown, Michael Renner, Brian Halweil, & Linda Starke, *Vital Signs 2000: The Environmental Trends that are Shaping our Future* (New York: Norton, 2000). It

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was Bruce Russett who first discovered that democracies do not make war on each other. But a conflicting interpretation says that where a minority ethnic group owns a visibly disproportionate share of the wealth, democracy encourages civil conflict. See Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).

<sup>507</sup> Ross Buck, "The Biological Affects: A Typology," *Psychological Review*, 106 (1999): 301-336.

<sup>508</sup> "Common Humanity: Universals of Personality," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 22 (October 2005), 7. Reporting research by R. R. McRae et al., "Universal Features of Personality Traits from the Observer's Perspective: Data from 50 Cultures," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88 (March 2005): 547-561.

<sup>509</sup> Cognition accounts for more than Charles has time here to explain. Dan Kahan and associates at Yale Law School show that the individualist and collectivist worldviews so color risk perception that these two ideologies account for much of the public debate on such topics as gun control, abortion, global warming and so forth. See <http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/blog/>

<sup>510</sup> John Jonides and Derek Evan Nee, "Resolving Conflict in Mind and Brain," *Psychological Science Agenda*. vol. 18 (May 2004): Figures 1a, 1b.

<sup>511</sup> Marcello Spinella and William M. Miley, "Orbitofrontal Function and Educational Attainment," *College Student Journal* (Richard Stockton College of New Jersey), 38 (2004): 333-338.

<sup>512</sup> Timothy Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 39.

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 11 HOW GOVERNMENTS COPE WITH HUMAN WEAKNESS

<sup>513</sup> Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, David Apter, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206-261.

<sup>514</sup> Darren Schreiber. "A Hybrid Model of Political Cognition" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, 2004-04-15 Online <PDF>. 2004-11-04

<sup>515</sup> Darren Schreiber, "Looking into Their Minds: Latency in Survey Response as Determined by Political Sophistication, Issue Publics, and Cognitive Conflict." Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2000.

<sup>516</sup> Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, *Social Cognition* (New York: Random House, 1984), 328-29. See also Wendy M. Rahn, "Mood as Information: The Role of Public Mood in Political Reasoning." In *Elements of Reason*, Arthur Lupin, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 130-150.

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<sup>517</sup> Patricia Smith Churchland, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 91-117. Keeping track of who is winning is probably the function of the cingulate cortex. See Damon Tomlin, M. Amin Kayali, Brooks King-Casas, Cedric Anen, Colin F. Camerer, Steven R. Quartz, P. Read Montague, "Agent-Specific Responses in the Cingulate Cortex During Economic Exchanges," *Science*, 19 May 2006: Vol. 312. No. 5776, pp. 1047–1050.

<sup>518</sup> Marilynn B. Brewer, "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 17 (1991): 475-482.

<sup>519</sup> Ernst Fehr (with Michael Kosfeld, Markus Heinrichs, Paul Zak and Urs Fischbacher), "Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans," *Nature*, 435 (2 June 2005): 673-676

<sup>520</sup> Gian Vittorio Caprara and Philip G. Zimbardo, "Personalizing Politics: A Congruency Model of Political Preference," *American Psychologist*, 59 (2004): 581-594.

<sup>521</sup> Cass R. Sunstein, *Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment* (Cambridge, U.K. & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman, and John Gastil, "Fear and Democracy or Fear of Democracy?: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk," *Harvard Law Review*, vol. 119, 2006. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=801964>

<sup>522</sup> "Death and the Candidates," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, Vol. 22 (Dec. 2005): 7. Based on E. Cohen et al. "Fatal Attraction: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Evaluation of Charismatic, Task-Oriented, and Relationship Oriented Leaders," *Psychological Science* 15 (Sept. 2005): 846-51.

<sup>523</sup> M. S. Gazzaniga, "Consciousness and the Cerebral Hemispheres." In *The Cognitive Neurosciences* Gazzaniga, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 1391-1400. Quoted in Matthew D. Lieberman, Kevin N. Ochsner, and Darren Schreiber, "Is Political Cognition Like Riding a Bicycle? How Cognitive Neuroscience Can Inform Research on Political Thinking." *Political Psychology*, 24 (2005): 681-682. Even if the National Election Studies show that there is considerable correspondence between policy preference and vote, that correspondence does not indicate that members of the electorate voted *for* the policies of the candidates whom they supported.

<sup>524</sup> This is the question that Converse implied but did not answer in his famous "nonattitudes" article. See Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 206-261.

<sup>525</sup> For a discussion of Burke's advocacy of the trustee role of legislators, see Robert E. Lane, "'Losing Touch' in a Democracy: Demands vs. Needs" in *Élitism, Populism, and European Politics*, Jack Hayward, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 33-66.

<sup>526</sup> Edmund Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" included in: Burke, *Speech on Conciliation*. Howard Bement, ed. (New York: Ambrose, 1922).

<sup>527</sup> M. Margaret Conway, *Political Participation in the United States*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991).

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- <sup>528</sup> W. L. Miller, A. M. Timpson, and M. Lessnoff, “Freedom from the Press.” Paper presented to the Europeum Conference, University of Oxford, 15-19 September 1993.
- <sup>529</sup> Lane, “‘Losing Touch’ in a Democracy, 33-66.
- <sup>530</sup> Jean Stoetzel, *Les valeurs du temps présent: une enquête européenne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), 209.
- <sup>531</sup> Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- <sup>532</sup> William J. McGuire, “Psychological Factors Influencing Consumer Choice,” in *Selected Aspects of Consumer Behavior*, ed., R. Ferber (Washington, DC: NSF-RANN--Government Printing Office, 1977), 351.
- <sup>533</sup> David Laibson, Harvard economist, quoted in “Neuroeconomics” *Harvard Magazine*, March-April 2006, 54 ([www.harvardmagazine.com](http://www.harvardmagazine.com))
- <sup>534</sup> J. B. McConaughy, “Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina,” *American Political Science Review*, 44 (1950), 879-903.
- <sup>535</sup> Barry Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 128.
- <sup>536</sup> Harold M. Schroder, Michael J. Driver, and Siegfried Streufert, *Human Information Processing* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967). One of the findings of the experiments reported in Schroeder et al. is that in small groups the members are retarded in their group functioning by the least complex thinker in the group. Parliaments are not limited in the same way to the same extent.
- <sup>537</sup> This is one of the questions that distinguishes ‘postmaterialists’ from materialists in Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 108.
- <sup>538</sup> Hugh Hecllo, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
- <sup>539</sup> Charles forgot to note the extensive use of experts, including civil servants, by Congressional Committees.
- <sup>540</sup> “Neuroeconomics,” sidebar in Craig Lambert, “The Marketplace of Perceptions,” *Harvard Magazine*, 108 (March-April, 2006), 50-57 at 54. ([www.harvardmagazine.com](http://www.harvardmagazine.com))
- <sup>541</sup> Cass R. Sunstein, *Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- <sup>542</sup> Kahan et al., “Fear and Democracy or Fear of Democracy?” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=801964>. The Yale group suggests that by using market means to achieve public goods, we can co-opt the individualistic values that inhibit action on genuine environmental risks.
- <sup>543</sup> Martin Neil Baily and Alok K. Chakrabarti, *Innovation and the Productivity Crisis* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988).

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<sup>544</sup> John R. Alford and John R. Hibbing, “The Neural Basis of Representative Democracy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 30-September 3, 2006. The authors argue that: “Evolution has likely selected for people who care about what others think of them and who take pleasure when they have been the cause of someone else’s good fortune.” (From the paper Abstract.)

<sup>545</sup> June Price Tangney, “Moral Affect: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61 (1991): 598-607.

<sup>546</sup> See Hans Bloklund *Freedom and Culture in Western Society*, (1991). Transl. M. O’Loughlin (New York and London: Routledge, 1997).

<sup>547</sup> L. S. Vygotsky, *The Essential Vygotsky* [English Selections], Robert W. Rieber, David K. Robinson, in collaboration with Jerome Bruner. eds. (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2004). See also discussion of Vygotsky (1978) in Kurt W. Fischer and Louise Silvern, “Stages and Individual Differences in Cognitive Development,” *Annual Review of Psychology*, vol. 36 (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, 1985), 613-648.

<sup>548</sup> Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949), 171.

<sup>549</sup> Daryl J. Bem and A. Allen, “On Predicting Some of the People Some of the Time: The Search for Cross-Situational Consistencies in Behavior,” *Psychological Review*, 81 (1974): 506-520; Daryl J. Bem and David C. Funder, “Predicting More of the People More of the Time: Assessing the Personality of Situations,” *Psychological Review*, 85 (1978): 485-501; Daryl J. Bem, “Putting Persons Back into the Context.” In *Persons in Context: Developmental Processes*, Niall Bolger, Avshalom Caspi, Geraldine Downey, and Martha Moorehouse, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 203-216.

<sup>550</sup> Ross Buck, “The Biological Affects: A Typology,” *Psychological Review*, 106 (1999): 312.

<sup>551</sup> “The probability that a parliamentary democracy would die at any time during the 1946-2002 period was 0.0171, against 0.0416 for a presidential one.” José Antonio Cheibub, “Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems,” *American Political Science Review*, 100 (August 2006), 353-368 at p. 353.

<sup>552</sup> Humphrey Taylor, “The American Angst of 1992,” *The Public Perspective*, vol. 3, July/August 1992, 3.

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 12 THROUGH BIAS AND ILLUSION TO THE HUMANE SOCIETY

<sup>553</sup> That was the valid lesson from Skinner’s operational conditioning, but the valid lesson may have a less felicitous outcome when nothing happens whatever a person chooses to do. Those choice conditions teach fatalism. B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

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- <sup>554</sup> See Cass R. Sunstein, *Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- <sup>555</sup> Craig Lambert, "The Marketplace of Perceptions," reporting on research by David Laibson, *Harvard Magazine*, 108 (March-April, 2006), 50-57 at 54 ([www.harvardmagazine.com](http://www.harvardmagazine.com))
- <sup>556</sup> Shlomo Maitel, *Minds, Markets, and Money* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 64.
- <sup>557</sup> Daniel Kahneman and Carol Varey, "Notes on the Psychology of Utility." In Jon Elster and John H. Roemer, eds., *Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 127-163.
- <sup>558</sup> Philip Brickman, D. Coates, and R. Janoff-Bulman, "Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 36 (1978): 917-927.
- <sup>559</sup> William J. Cromie, Harvard News Office, "Scientists Pursue Happiness: Results not Too Cheerful," *Harvard Gazette Archives*, 2000. Research by Daniel Gilbert.
- <sup>560</sup> "Narcissism and Self-Esteem: Therapists try to Discourage One, Encourage the Other, and Understand How the Two are Related," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 20 (February 2004): 1-5.
- <sup>561</sup> Shelley E. Taylor, *Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
- <sup>562</sup> Timothy Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 38.
- <sup>563</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.
- <sup>564</sup> Cass R. Sunstein, *Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle* (New York & Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); John Tierney, "Free and Easy Riders," *New York Times*, June 17, 2006, A-13. See Dru Stevenson, "Libertarian Paternalism; the Cocaine Vaccine as a Test Case for the Sunstein/Thaler Model," *Rutgers University Journal of Law and Urban Policy*, 3 (November 2005), 4-62.
- <sup>565</sup> Robert E. Lane, *The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
- <sup>566</sup> *Idem.*
- <sup>567</sup> Chapter Eleven.
- <sup>568</sup> Joseph M. Sirgy, ed., *Handbook of Quality-of-Life Research* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001).
- <sup>569</sup> From 1960 to 1985 (and possibly beyond) there has been a declining turnout in presidential elections. Donald R. Kinder and David O. Sears, "Political Opinion and Political Action," Chapter 25 of *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1985), 659-741 at 704.

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<sup>570</sup> Dieter Fuchs and Hans Dieter Klingeman, "Citizens and the State: A Relationship Transformed." In Hans-Dieter Klingman and Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the State: Beliefs in Government*, vol. One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 419-443; cf. Table 14.1, p. 430.

<sup>571</sup> Herbert M. Lefcourt, *Locus of Control: Current Trends in Theory and Research* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum/Wiley, 1976), pp. 97-104.

<sup>572</sup> Michael Craig Miller, "What is the Amygdala and What are its Functions?" *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 21 (May 2005), 8.

<sup>573</sup> John R. Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?" *American Political Science Review*, 99 (2005): 153-167.

<sup>574</sup> Benedict Carey, "A Shocker: Partisan Thought is Unconscious," *New York Times*, January 24, 2006, F1, reporting on research by Drew Westin (Emory University) paper presented to Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Palm Springs, FL 28 Jan. 2006.

<sup>575</sup> Don Locke and Donald Pennington, "Reasons and Other Causes: Their Role in Attribution Processes," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 42 (1982): 212-223. "This is merely a further refutation of the Cartesian model of the mind, outdated at least since Freud and rejected as early as Leibnitz, that what is mental must be conscious." When one has causes rather than reasons, "intuitive theory may be all one has to go on," 220.

<sup>576</sup> Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?" Of 28 measured attitudes, those toward prayer in the schools and toward the property tax are the two most "heritable" items (index = 0.41), 159. Charles wanted to go on to question the effect of genetic sources of moral beliefs on Piagetian theory but was interrupted.

<sup>577</sup> Melvin J. Lerner, *The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion* (New York: Plenum, 1980).

<sup>578</sup> Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, and Simon Gächter, "Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and the Enforcement of Social Norms," *Human Nature*, 13 (2002): 1-25.

<sup>579</sup> Ernest Fehr and Simon Gächter, "Altruistic Punishment in Humans," *Nature*, January 10, 2002, 137-40. Using positron emission tomography, these authors found that the same part of the brain, the *striatum*, that lights up when a lover sees a picture of his loved one, lighted up when a player punished his partner for failing to abide by their common understanding of fair play.

<sup>580</sup> Lerner, *The Belief in a Just World*, 138.

<sup>581</sup> *Ibid.*, passim.

<sup>582</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>583</sup> Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).

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<sup>584</sup> Carl G. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science." In *Foundations of the Unity of Science*, vols. I-II of *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

<sup>585</sup> David G. Myers and Ed Diener, "The New Scientific Pursuit of Happiness," *The Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 14 (August 1997): 4-7.

<sup>586</sup> G. Loewenstein, "Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 65 (March 1996): 272-292.

<http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/ob;jsessionid=3f0rtt8dqta8c.alice>

<sup>587</sup> Bjorn Merker, "Consciousness Without a Cerebral Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and Medicine," accepted for publication in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*; forthcoming.

<sup>588</sup> Dean Hamer, *The God Gene* (New York: 2004).

<sup>589</sup> See *American Humanist Manifesto III* (2003), American Humanist Association, 1777 T Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009-7125.

<sup>590</sup> Charles Brack and W. Zhang, "The Darwin Code," *Neuropolitics.orgEzine*, June 2006.

<sup>591</sup> Katherine E. Wiegand and Howard M. Weiss, "Affective Reactions to the Thought of 'God': Moderating Effects of Image of God," *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 17 (March 2006): 23-40.

### **ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 13 THE FREE SOCIETY OR THE HUMANE SOCIETY?**

<sup>592</sup> Eduardo Porter, "Choice is Good. Yes, No, or Maybe?" *New York Times* (March 27, 2005), 12.

<sup>593</sup> "Power corrupts..." Lord Acton, (J. Emmerich), Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, 1 April 1887. Reported in *Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton* (London & New York: Longmans, Green, 1904), vol. I, 172.

<sup>594</sup> Vol. 23 (October 2006), p. 8.

<sup>595</sup> Jack W. Brehm, *Responses to the Loss of Freedom: A Theory of Psychological Reactance* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972).

<sup>596</sup> Milton Friedman. *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

<sup>597</sup> William James, *Psychology: The Briefer Course* [1892], quoted in Robert E. Ornstein. "Introduction," Ornstein, ed. *The Nature of Human Consciousness* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973), p. xiii.

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- <sup>598</sup> D. Kahneman, J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias." In D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, eds., *Choices, Values, and Frames* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- <sup>599</sup> Daniel M. Webner and Thalia Wheatley, "Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will." *American Psychologist*, 54 (1999): 480-492; Jeffrey M. Schwartz and Sharon Begley, *The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), 24-25.
- <sup>600</sup> The amount of the variance unaccounted for in an Australian election was eight percent. Bruce Headey and Alexander Wearing, "Subjective Well-Being: A Stocks and Flows Framework." In Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle, and Norbert Schwarz, eds., *Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1991), 49-73.
- <sup>601</sup> See Immanuel Kant, *Grounding the Metaphysics of Morals*. In Kant, *Ethical Philosophy*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983 [Ger. 1785], p. 34.
- <sup>602</sup> Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, (1932), transl. M. Gabin (New York: Free Press, 1965).
- <sup>603</sup> M. Hollis, 'Is Universalism Ethnocentric?' In C. Joppke and S. Lukes (eds), *Multicultural Questions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 36.
- <sup>604</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 93.
- <sup>605</sup> Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1959).
- <sup>606</sup> "There is therefore but one categorical imperative." Immanuel Kant. *Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785). Transl. T. K. Abbott (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949), 38.
- <sup>607</sup> For a different view, see Arthur Melzer, "On the Inherent Tension Between Reason and Society." Paper delivered to the Yale Political Theory Workshop, January 2007.
- <sup>608</sup> Lynn White, Jr., *Dynamo and Virgin Reconsidered: Essays in the Dynamism of Western Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).
- <sup>609</sup> Hugh McIntosh, "New Technologies Advance Study of Autism," *APA Monitor*, 29 (November 1998): 14.
- <sup>610</sup> H. J. Eysenck, *The Biological Basis of Personality* (Springfield, IL: C. C. Thomas, 1967). But see, a modification of that view in "Psychodynamic Therapy Passes a Test," *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 22 (April 2006), 5.
- <sup>611</sup> "Chronic Anxiety: How to Stop Living on the Edge." *Harvard Health Letter*, 23 (July 1998): 3; "SSRIs and Hostility" *Harvard Mental Health Letter*, 15 (September 1998), 7.

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<sup>612</sup> Barbara Crosette “Americans Enjoy 70 Healthy Years, Behind Europe, U.N. Says,” *The New York Times*, June 5, 2000, A10. But within the United States there is a group of white and Asian middle class Americans who live longer than European or Japanese averages. Research by Mazid Ezzati and Christopher Murray reported in William J. Cromie, “Research Shows Who Dies When and Where,” *Harvard University Gazette*, September 11, 2006.

<sup>613</sup> Steven Regeser Lopez and Peter J. J. Guarnaccia. “Cultural Psychopathology: Uncovering the Social World of Mental Illness,” *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51 (2000): 571-598 at p. 577.

<sup>614</sup> The World Mental Health (WHO) Survey Consortium, “Prevalence, Severity, and Unmet Need for Treatment of Mental Disorders in the World Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys,” *JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association)* vol. 291 (June 2, 2004): 2581-2590.

<sup>615</sup> See Chapter Seven. The National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) reported in 2005 that in recent years 19 million American adults suffer from some form of depression. ([www.health.harvard.edu/hhp/publication/view.do?name=UD](http://www.health.harvard.edu/hhp/publication/view.do?name=UD)).

<sup>616</sup> Benedict Carey. June 14, 2005. “Snake Phobias, Moodiness, and a Battle in Psychiatry” *New York Times: Science Times*. pp F1, F-6; original source, American Psychiatric Association.

<sup>617</sup> Auguste Comte, *Cours de Philosophie Positive* ([1830], transl. J. H. Bridges as *Introduction to Positive Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

<sup>618</sup> A. W. Coats, “Economics and Psychology: The Death and Resurrection of a Research Programme.” In S. J. Latsis, ed. *Method and Appraisal in Economics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 43-64.

<sup>619</sup> Serotonin works in part by increasing the growth of new brain cells, so work at the cellular level is also required. See the work of Grirori Enikolopov, Cold Springs Harbor Laboratory, reported in online edition of the *proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. May 16 2006.

<sup>620</sup> Nancy Eisenberg, “Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development,” *Annual Review of Psychology*. 51 (2000): 665–697.

<sup>621</sup> “Bad Behavior Linked to Gene,” *BBC News World Edition*. Online edition, 2 August, 2002. Strong evidence has come out recently that homosexuality is gene-linked; our society has, for the most part, accepted that this is “different” (from the majority) but not “bad” behavior. The possibility that pedophilia is also gene-linked may bring into society a greater degree of sympathy towards those with this proclivity, but it cannot become tolerated. This, and other genetically-supported antisocial behaviors, present severe moral quandaries for modern societies. To the extent that we accept the evidence for genetic impulse, the blame on the individual is lessened, yet it is still necessary to prevent the harms that such people may do. This line of reasoning could lead to major rethinking of the American penal system, tilting it more toward *restraint*, and away from *punishment*.

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**ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 14**  
**ENVOI**

<sup>622</sup> The text, of course, was Patricia Smith Churchland, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).