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**The EU Divided: Effects of Dissimilar National
Foreign Policies on CSDP**

by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMM – EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh, Indonesia
ARTEMIS/DRC – EU Military Operation in DRC
AU – African Union
BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAR – (also seen as RCA) Central African Republic
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
CONCORDIA/fYROM – EU Military Operation in fYROM
CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDA – European Defense Agency
EEAS – European External Action Service
ESDI – European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy
ESS – European Security Strategy
EU – European Union
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine – EU Border Defense Mission to Republic of Moldova and Ukraine
EUBAM Rafah – EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah crossing point
EUFOR ALTHEA – EU Military Operation in BiH
EUFOR Libya – EU Military Operation in support of humanitarian assistance in Libya
EUFOR RD Congo – EU Military Operation in DRC to support MONUC
EUFOR Tchad/RCA – EU Military Bridging Operation in Chad and RCA
EUJUST LEX/Iraq – EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
EUJUST THEMIS/Georgia – EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia
EULEX Kosovo – European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMM Georgia – EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUNAVFOR ATALANTA – European Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta
EUPAT – EU Police Advisory Team in the fYROM
EUPM/BiH – European Union Police Mission in BiH
EUPOL Afghanistan – EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories – EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
EUPOL Kinshasa – EU Police Mission in Kinshasa, DRC
EUPOL PROXIMA/fYROM – EU Police Mission in the fYROM
EUPOL RD Congo – EU Police Mission in DRC
EUSEC RD Congo – EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for security reform in DRC
EU SSR Guinea/Bissau – EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea/Bissau
EUTM Somalia – EU Military Training Mission in Somalia
fYROM – former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HHG – Helsinki Headline Goal
ICC – International Criminal Court
ICG – International Crisis Group
MINURCAT – United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONUC – United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHQ – Operational Headquarters

PSC – Political and Security Committee
SHARE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TEU – Treaty on European Union (a.k.a Maastricht Treaty)
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
US – United States
WEU – Western European Union

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is the culmination of my semester-long research endeavor into the history of European security and defense policy, its impact on the global stage, and the future implications of such a policy. With no real background in the subject, my reading and research began at a very basic level. However, with the extremely valuable mentorship from Professor Jolyon Howorth as well as the wealth of books and literature I was able to digest throughout the semester, I quickly appreciated and became fascinated by the unique and subtle challenges facing CSDP as the EU attempts to grapple with shrinking defense budgets but an increasing desire to be an autonomous, unitary actor in dealing with its security interests. The following is the product of my research. I wish to thank all of my professors under which I have had the opportunity to study during my exploration of political science. I particularly want to thank my advisor and mentor Professor Howorth for his time and expertise; the guidance he provided has been invaluable throughout this process.

SECTION I: Introduction

Most scholars agree that the concept of sovereignty, and with it the sovereign state, was born out of the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648. These treaties were responsible for ending the Thirty Years' War, fought primarily in what is now Germany among multiple European countries, and the Eighty Years' War, fought primarily between Spain and the Dutch Republic. The result was a number of solidified territorial boundaries within which royals had sole control over their particular territory's religious worship – in effect stripping this power from the Holy Roman Empire.¹ This significant shift in how Europeans viewed their communities and even their identities eventually developed into the modern concept of *Westphalian sovereignty*. This idea has historically been defined as the exclusion of external actors from internal authorities with the king (or a particular “sovereign”) holding authority over all peoples within his territorial realm.² The concept of “the state” is so ingrained in our minds today – after surviving centuries in which the prominent actors in the global political system were states – that it is difficult to imagine another sort of viable actor. Recent human history is dominated by stories of wars fought among states, exchange between states, even the development of unique cultures within states. The evolution of nationalism and eventually “the nation-state” went even further by attaching an identity and sense of belonging to a state.³ Just when it seemed that these boundaries were becoming too strong to break, a modern age of globalization, increased communication, and technological advances in travel have begun to blur these lines. In a new world of international institutions and cooperation, some are questioning whether or not the “sovereign state” will fade as a thing of the past. Europe, out of which the revolutionary concept

¹ Peter Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 735-755.

² Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia,” *American Journal of International Law*, 41, no. 1 (1948): 20-41, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2193560?origin=crossref&> (accessed November 15, 2011).

³ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983), 3.

of “sovereignty” first developed, may also be the experiment out of which the next form of viable actor emerges.

What started as the European Coal and Steel Community consisting of six countries in 1951 has evolved into a political and economic union through a series of treaties that now includes twenty seven independent member states. This community, known as the European Union (EU), has developed a common legal system, created shared supranational institutions, integrated economic and monetary policy, opened member state borders to all “EU citizens,” and for the most part (within the “Eurozone” of seventeen EU countries) utilizes the same currency. This level of integration has never before been seen among fully developed nation-states, and many of its leaders claim that this is a move in the right direction. “Humanity and democracy – two principles essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order – can serve as guideposts in crafting a new international order...” Javier Solana, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from 1995-1999 and Secretary General of the Western European Union (WEU), Secretary General of the Council of the EU, and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) from 1999-2009, continued his speech by saying that “the Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration...In the end, it was a system that could not guarantee peace. Nor did it prevent war, as the history of the last three centuries has so tragically demonstrated.”⁴

Solana and a number of similarly-minded European leaders have made significant progress in ushering in this “new international order,” however despite the incredible progress of the EU in the last two decades, there remains one area of policy that has proven to be more

⁴ Javier Solana, speech, Symposium on the Political Relevance of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia in Mnster “Securing Peace in Europe,” Transcript, November 12, 1998.

difficult than trade or legal policy – this being the area of security and defense. Beginning around 1998, the EU began seriously investigating ways to integrate security and defense capabilities among EU member states. The monumental shift away from the sovereign state model by pooling and coordinating defense capabilities cannot be overstated. While alliances, arms trading deals, and coalitions have become fairly commonplace in the modern day, an autonomous “EU force” would be fundamentally different. The implications of integrating defense capabilities, after seemingly successful integration of most (if not all) other major policy arenas, would be profound. Jolyon Howorth, leading scholar in this area, describes the situation as follows: “The moves towards pooling that last bastion of ‘sovereignty’ – security and defence policy – with all their limitations and caveats, constitute a sea-change in the way the EU and its member states will henceforth relate to the outside world.”⁵

Having demonstrated the significance of these potential implications on the global political system as well as the future of Europe and its member states, it should be noted that European leaders have encountered a number of significant challenges. Recent fiscal and sovereign debt crises throughout the continent have diverted attention (and resources) away from defense. Global events such as 9/11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and unrest in the Middle East embodied most recently in the Arab Spring, have changed the security strategic environment in fundamental ways. In addition, crucial differences in foreign policy among EU member states have created barriers to what can and cannot be accomplished. Britain with its “special relationship” with the United States (US), Germany with its historically passive foreign policy since World War II, Poland with its fatigue from contributing to the wars in the Middle East, the historically neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland, and France with its more

⁵ Jolyon Howorth, “From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP,” *The International Relations of the European Union*, ed. C. Hill and M. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 182.

aggressive and proactive approach, are just a few examples of the vast differences in foreign policy that European leaders are dealing with.

Can the EU successfully coordinate defense resources and capabilities when its member states maintain foreign policies that will prevent them from agreeing on when and how to utilize these capabilities? Grevi et al. agree that “action through [European Security and Defense Policy] ESDP is predicated on the consensus of EU Member States on the need for and objectives of intervention. The relationship between CFSP and ESDP is the critical one here...The stronger the cohesion between EU Member States, the larger the potential for an ESDP mission to be effective in the field.”⁶ Howorth observes a similar connection in saying the following:

“Without clear guidelines as to its ultimate objectives and purpose, progress will be stalled...only two factors prevent the EU from developing genuinely autonomous and seriously credible military muscle: one, its ability to cooperate and to integrate, and two the political will to implement its decisions, by acting robustly in support of the values and interests outlined in its evolving Security Strategy.”⁷

Progress, according to some, may already be stalled. French Admiral Édouard Guillaud in a meeting on October 5, 2011 said that the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is “in hibernation” and is waiting for the “European springtime” so that it can come to life again.⁸

This paper argues that it will be extremely difficult if not impossible to have an effective CSDP without a cohesive collective foreign policy. The following arguments will be made: 1) incongruent foreign policies among EU member states prevent effective defense planning, specifically regarding investment in research and development (R&D) and defense material production, which renders poorly equipped fighting forces; 2) dissonant foreign policies create disagreement about when, where, and how to carry out missions, even if an effective and

⁶ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 404-405.

⁷ Jolyon Howorth, “From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP,” 202.

⁸ Édouard Guillaud, interviewed by Assemblée Nationale, Testimony before the Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées “Audition de l’amiral Édouard Guillaud, chef d’état-major des armées, dans le cadre du projet de loi de finances pour 2012 (n° 3775),” Transcript, October 05, 2011.

deployable force is available; and 3) conflicting foreign policies, particularly between Britain and Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain, have prevented the construction of an EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ) which has been shown empirically to be key for successful EU military operations.

The paper is structured in the following way: working definitions will be established in the next section, followed by a brief summary of the history of European defense policy. The three arguments above will then be fully presented in the same order. Finally, the military operations that the EU has already undertaken will be examined utilizing the frameworks outlined in Sections IV, V, and VI, followed by a conclusion.

SECTION II: Defining Security

In order to clearly address issues surrounding European security, it is important to first establish a working definition of “security,” as this definition has changed through time and varies even today from one state to another. One of the first academic publications on security was written by Arnold Wolfers who said “security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired.”⁹ The variability of the term “security” immediately becomes apparent from this definition when one considers the range of values that can be defended, how one state might prioritize certain values while other states prioritize different values, etc. Baldwin also makes this observation, and therefore fails to see the usefulness of Wolfers’ definition. Baldwin says that “Individuals, states, and other social actors have many values. These may include physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, psychological well-being, and so on...Failure to specify which values are included in a concept of national security often generates confusion.”¹⁰

⁹ Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an ambiguous symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 67, no. 4 (1952).

¹⁰ David A Baldwin, “The concept of security,” *Review of International Studies*, 23, no. 1 (1997): 13-14.

Perhaps this was Wolfers' point in the first place. Regardless, in order to accurately measure whether or not CSDP is effectively securing Europe, it must be determined what "values" this policy is meant to "defend."

At the request of the EU Secretary General Solana in 2004, a study group presented a new framework for European security. The report defined it as "human security" which means "individual freedom from basic insecurities." Many of these basic insecurities are violations of the laws of war enumerated by the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as "Genocide, wide-spread or systematic torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, disappearances, slavery, crimes against humanity... and massive violations of the right to food, health, and housing." The report continues by saying that "A human security approach for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not only on the defence of the Union's borders, as was the security approach of nation-states."¹¹ Solana already had this notion of security in mind as early as 2000 when, while discussing the budding foreign and security policy, he stated that "This new capability will help the EU to advance its core objectives: the alleviation of poverty, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. It will allow us to make a greater contribution to the development of international stability and the preservation of peace and security."¹²

This concept of security borrows from and overlaps with the better known concept of "cooperative security." Cooperative security, outlined nicely by Posen and Ross, differs from collective security in that it emphasizes working multilaterally through international institutions to deter aggression. Under a cooperative security framework, "peace is effectively indivisible...Wars in one place are likely to spread...The use of weapons of mass destruction

¹¹ Council of the European Union, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (Barcelona: 2004).

¹² Javier Solana, "Why Europe needs the military option" *Financial Times*, September 29, 2000.

will beget their use elsewhere; ethnic cleansing will beget more ethnic cleansing. Refugees fleeing the nationalist violence of one country will energize xenophobia in countries of refuge... Thus, these distant troubles cannot be ignored.”¹³ The cooperative security strategy is a fundamental break from other security strategies such as selective engagement, neo-isolationism, etc. because a state (or the EU) must now take other people’s security to be as important as its own. It requires the EU to protect collective goods or collective values rather than its own, narrower self-interests.

The shift to “human” or “cooperative” security indicates recognition among EU policy makers that the bright line between internal and external security is blurring if not disappearing completely. Cross describes internal security as priorities that include “counterterrorism, upholding fundamental rights, finding common approaches to legal and illegal immigration, harmonizing asylum procedures, protecting the EU’s external borders, sharing law enforcement information...and fighting cross-border crime, drugs, and illegal trafficking in humans.”¹⁴ These priorities are clearly threats that reside within EU borders and are typically dealt with utilizing civilian and law enforcement forces. External security, according to Cross, “refers to member states’ commitment to come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack, the sanctions or restrictive measures that the EU imposes in third countries in an effort to prevent human rights abuses and violations of democratic norms, and crisis management and conflict prevention operations under the...CSDP.”¹⁵ Responses to external threats typically require an operation that is at least partially military and involves states outside of the EU. The decision to embrace a human security strategy shows that EU policymakers believe that in an ever-shrinking world with globalization, increased trade, and increased communications, external security threats can

¹³ Barry Posen, and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, 21, no. 3 (1996/97): 22-24.

¹⁴ Mai’a K Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the European Union*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2011), 3-7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

ultimately impact or even create internal threats. This blurs the distinction between the two, and requires a policy response that can address both internal and external threats simultaneously. Take, for instance, counterterrorism. While law enforcement officials and intelligence agencies can track terrorist cells and prevent terrorist attacks within EU borders, the source of terrorist plots, recruiting, and extremist ideology oftentimes comes from overseas in countries like Pakistan in the Middle East. Monitoring these threats would traditionally fall into the realm of external security efforts. Gilles de Kerchove, the EU's Counterterrorism Coordinator, has stated that "It is impossible to separate the internal and external dimensions of counterterrorism. The most serious challenges we face outside the EU, all have complex connections inside the EU."¹⁶

Having established a working definition of security for the purposes of this paper, that being the human security definition outlined by EU policymakers themselves, it will also be valuable to define what an effective CSDP might look like in order to assess whether or not this can be achieved without a coherent foreign policy among EU member states. In order to achieve a holistic standard one must look at political goals, strategic goals, and specific capability milestones that have been outlined by four different documents in the history of the developing CSDP: the Petersberg Tasks, a joint declaration resulting from the summit in Saint Malo, the European Security Strategy, and the Headline Goal of 2010.

The Petersberg Tasks were developed at a WEU Summit in Bonn, Germany in 1992. They list the military and security priorities of Europe's security and defense policies. An important piece of this list is a description of the type of missions the EU will wish to carry out through CSDP. The Petersberg Tasks call for member states to have the capabilities to use force in "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis

¹⁶ Council of the European Union, *EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy – Discussion paper* (Brussels: 2005), 9. and Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (Brussels: 2005).

management, including peace-making.”¹⁷ Capabilities for our purposes can be defined as forces or resources giving a country or state the ability to undertake a particular kind of military action.¹⁸ The Tasks simply outline the types of missions an effective CSDP would carry out and specify that the EU will need capabilities to do so. A joint declaration at the summit between France and Britain at Saint Malo in 1998 added another dimension: “...the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”¹⁹ First, this statement marks a historic break by calling for autonomous European capability, whereas before Europe’s defense policy rested heavily on the resources of NATO and other allies. Second, this statement calls for institutions and processes by which member states can work together to build these capabilities as well as decide when to use them. An effective CSDP must therefore be able to operate independently from its allies and have the mechanisms and procedures to decide when and how to utilize its security and defense resources. The term “international crises” in the Saint Malo statement is fairly vague. The European Security Strategy (ESS), first introduced in 2003 and amended in years after, specified in 2010 what exactly these “crises” or threats are: “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism and organized crime; regional conflicts; state failure; maritime piracy; small arms and light weapons, cluster munitions and landmines; energy security; impact of climate change and natural disasters; cyber-security; poverty.”²⁰ It should be noted that this list of threats to security clearly reflect the concept of human security discussed previously. The final important document outlining the objectives of an effective CSDP is the Headline Goal of 2010. This is a collection of goals written in 2004 that were

¹⁷ Ministerial Council of the Western European Union, *Petersberg Declaration* (Petersberg: 1992).

¹⁸ *New Oxford Dictionary of English*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 269.

¹⁹ The British-French Summit, *Joint Declaration* (Saint Malo: 1998).

²⁰ The European Parliament, *European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and the Common Security and Defence Policy* (Strasbourg: 2010).

meant to be reached by 2010. The “driving factors” of this goal were “Interoperability but also deployability and sustainability” – interoperability broadly defined as “the ability of our armed forces to work together and to interact with other civilian tools.”²¹ In addition, the list of goals identified specific capability milestones. These included the creation of a European Defense Agency (EDA), the creation of EU Strategic lift joint coordination, the establishment of an efficient European Airlift command, the complete development of rapidly deployable battlegroups, the availability of an aircraft carrier, etc.²²

In order for CSDP to be effective, it must meet the goals and objectives outlined by the four documents cited above that have helped shape it. To summarize, an effective CSDP must achieve the following standards:

1. have the capabilities to use force in humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making
2. have the capacity for autonomous action
3. have institutions and processes by which member states can work together to build these capabilities as well as decide when to use them
4. have the proper capabilities to address the following specific threats: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism and organized crime; regional conflicts; state failure; maritime piracy; small arms and light weapons, cluster munitions and landmines; energy security; impact of climate change and natural disasters; cyber-security; poverty
5. achieve interoperability, deployability, and sustainability of security forces
6. reach the specific milestones outlined by the Headline Goal of 2010

This paper will demonstrate how the effective CSDP idealized above cannot be reached with the significant differences in foreign policy among EU member states. Armed with the necessary working definitions, a brief history of CFSP and CSDP can now be discussed.

²¹ General Affairs and External Relations Council, *Headline Goal 2010* (2004), 2.

²² *Ibid.*, 3.

SECTION III: Historical Overview of CFSP and CSDP

As was mentioned in the Introduction, the foundation of the modern European Union began as the European Coal and Steel Community which created a common market for coal and steel among six countries – Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The community and depth of integration continued to develop over the next few decades through the signing of additional treaties, the addition of more countries into these arrangements, and the creation of more supranational institutions. One of these was the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s that attempted to coordinate foreign policy among the participating nations.²³ However this effort was fairly ineffective at accomplishing anything significant and it seemed that most of the focus on integration remained on economic policy. In February of 1992 in Maastricht, Netherlands, the community of twelve member states that comprised the European Community signed the monumental Treaty on European Union (TEU – also known as the “Maastricht Treaty”). This treaty essentially created the European Union. This ultimately led to further monetary integration, the creation of the Eurozone, etc. In addition, it took the loosely defined goals of the EPC and transformed them into CFSP in Article 42 of the TEU. At this time, the nebulous Western European Union (WEU) that had been created in 1955 was informally enforcing the security and defense aspects of the CFSP by acting as a mediator between France and NATO as well as Britain and the EU.²⁴ Due to increased instability in Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the WEU adapted the Petersberg Tasks in 1992 (outlined in Section II above) in order to deal with any crises that might result from the situation. Because defense and security remained primarily within NATO throughout the 1990s even with the WEU and newly defined CFSP, the WEU Council and

²³ Jolyon Howorth, “From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP,” 180.

²⁴ Anne Deighton, *Western European Union, 1954-1997, Defence, Security, Integration*, (Oxford: European Interdependence Research Unit, 1997).

Secretariat moved to Brussels in 1992 to be closer to NATO.²⁵ This greatly strengthened WEU/NATO cooperation, resulting in the eventual creation of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in 1996. ESDI was Europe's first real attempt to coordinate its own security and defense strategies, but did so completely within the framework of NATO.

In 1998 there was a momentous shift in Europe's security and defense policy. Jacques Chirac, President of France, and Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), met in December at Saint Malo. Their intent was to find a way to develop autonomous military capabilities in the event that the US did not want to aid in any operations that Europe wished to pursue. They issued a joint statement from Saint Malo calling for "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces..."²⁶ After this declaration, from 1998 – 2004, there was a movement away from NATO and the more civilian-centered CFSP to more autonomous defense and military policymaking.²⁷ This movement was symbolized in a change of name from ESDI to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – from a "relatively fruitless quest from a European military *identity*...towards the delivery of a *policy*..." – in 1999.²⁸

ESDP underwent a developmental process of constant modification, clarification, and strengthening. The first of these was "Berlin Plus" – the first major formal agreement between NATO and the EU. The discussion surrounding Berlin Plus began as early as 1996, however the completion and formal announcement of these arrangements did not occur until 2002. The significance of Berlin Plus was that it gave the EU the ability to use NATO's defense assets and resources in Europe's own operations.²⁹ A second major addition to ESDP occurred with the

²⁵ Jolyon Howorth, "From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP," 180.

²⁶ The British-French Summit, *Joint Declaration* (Saint Malo: 1998).

²⁷ Jolyon Howorth, "From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP," 180.

²⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 103.

²⁹ NATO, "Berlin Plus agreement," Website.

Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (though it wasn't enacted until 1999). This treaty firstly absorbed the WEU, with its Petersberg Tasks, into ESDP. Second, it created the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which was the first formally institutionalized avenue to facilitate conversation between the broader, more civilian focused CFSP and the defense and military focused ESDP.³⁰ This link, and others like it, demonstrates the necessity for communication and coordination between Europe's foreign policy and its security and defense policy. That same year, the European Council developed the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) which was essentially a "Progress Catalogue" that designated specific military capability levels that the EU wanted to reach, based on the type of missions that it wanted to carry out (e.g. Petersberg Tasks), by 2003.³¹ The HHG has been updated several times in the last decade, most recently with the Headline Goal of 2010 which was discussed previously in Section II. The European Security Strategy, also discussed earlier, was published in 2003 with the intention of outlining a security strategy for Europe based on its common political objectives behind ESDP. This document could not have come any sooner since the EU launched its first operations in 2003. In accordance with the Headline Goal 2010, the European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency (commonly known as the European Defense Agency (EDA)) was created in 2004. It's mission was to "support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improved European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the [ESDP]..."³² It does this by acting "as a catalyst, promot[ing] collaborations, launch[ing] new initiatives and introduc[ing] solutions to improve defence capabilities."³³ The EDA has played an integral role in the development of European military capacity as well as the institutionalization of pooling

³⁰ *Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and Related Acts* (Amsterdam: 1997). and Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 122.

³¹ European Defence Agency, "Headline Goal," Website. and Jolyon Howorth, "From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP," 189-190.

³² European Defence Agency, "Missions and Functions," Website.

³³ *Ibid.*

and coordinating defense resources among member states. The final major chapter in the history of Europe's security and defense policy is the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. This treaty shifted away from ESDP and toward the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP – which the remainder of this paper will use to refer to Europe's collective security and defense policy). The Lisbon Treaty created the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (which superseded other security and external relations posts that already existed), the European External Action Service (EEAS) that is responsible for implementing the CFSP, and called for more permanent structures for defense cooperation.³⁴

Since 2003, CFSP has engaged in 25 different missions ranging from civilian missions to military missions to police missions. The EU has had varying degrees of success in these missions. It should be noted that this paper will deal primarily with the military and defense aspects of CSDP and its operations, as opposed to the civilian aspects. There are several reasons for this focus. First, the connection between foreign policy and CSDP will be most apparent in its military operations. The use of force in international politics is a means to some political end. The ability to effectively use force to achieve political ends is of utmost importance for the EU's plans to maintain security through CSDP. Additionally, as Engberg points out, there have been many studies focused on "security policy and political factors, while the 'D', as in defence, with its resource implications, is treated lightly...there are few comparative studies that offer more general observations."³⁵ It is hoped that this paper can help fill that void.

Despite all of the progress outlined in the summary above, the foreign policies of the individual member states (which now number at 27, although Denmark has formally abstained from any involvement with CSDP) remain disparate. Cross points out that "The UK and France,

³⁴ Council of the European Union. *Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007* (Lisbon: 2007). and Jolyon Howorth, "Libya, the EU, and NATO: A Paradigm Shift in European and Trans-Atlantic Security Arrangements?," Unpublished, Yale University (2011): 2.

³⁵ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, (Uppsala: Edita Vastra Aros, 2011), 12.

for example, have more political will and ability to get involved in third-country operations than do other countries.”³⁶ This should not come as a surprise given the events in Libya earlier in 2011 which will be discussed at length later in this paper. de Gouveia and Plumridge go into greater depth enumerating the differences in foreign policies and public diplomacy strategies among EU member states. The analysis shows how each member state still retains much of its own national identity, despite increasing EU integration, which greatly impacts its external public diplomacy strategies.³⁷ The updated 2010 ESS itself even identifies the urgency in resolving the differences of foreign policies. It “Takes the view that the Vice-President/High Representative should act very rapidly to make the Union’s various external policies more coherent, and that this coherence should be reflected on the ground...”³⁸ Is it necessary for these divergent foreign policies to be reconciled in order for CSDP to be effective? Sections IV, V, and VI identify three reasons why the answer to this question is *yes*.

SECTION IV: Defense Planning

The defense planning argument states simply that without a coherent EU foreign policy to direct defense planning, there will be a disconnect between the capabilities produced and the capabilities actually needed by the EU. This section will show that even with the HHG process, the ESS, and the EDA, there is not a direct link between these and defense planning documents. The true utility of the HHG process and the ESS will also be evaluated. Lastly, the mechanics through which strategy is translated into necessary operational capacities will also be explored.

Defense planning can be defined as follows:

³⁶ Mai’a K Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the European Union*, 63.

³⁷ Philip Gouveia, and Hester Plumridge, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy*, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005) <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/657.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2011), pp.

³⁸ The European Parliament, *European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and the Common Security and Defence Policy* (Strasbourg: 2010).

“...a technical instrument used for different purposes: 1) to undertake *force planning*, i.e. to translate scenarios into requirements in terms of necessary resources. Force planning will inform: 2) plans for the conduct of military operations, often called operational planning and 3) decisions on cost effective procurement of defence materiel.”³⁹

“Resources” in this context pertains mostly to expeditionary forces (which include personnel and material), command and control structures, and financial means. Defense planning is an exceedingly important process that requires long-term thinking, accurate assessment of the current and future strategic environment, and determination of efficient means by which defense capabilities can be created and deployed. There must be a strong connection between security strategy and defense planning. Without this connection, the defense planning process would be essentially uninformed of the types of capabilities to create, the range of missions and operations to prepare for, and the scale and level of technology in which to invest.

The EU historically has had difficulty with this process. Engberg goes so far as to say that the EU does not even “possess a full blown defence planning process that translates the general language of the [ESS] into political guidance for the purpose of defence planning.” She says this is due to a number of factors including “deliberate attempts in some [EU] capitals to limit the EU’s capability in this regard.”⁴⁰ These efforts to limit the EU’s capabilities reflect the political disagreements of member states over what EU defense capabilities should be and how they should be used. Despite these significant differences, EU member states have been able to find some semblance of common ground in the form of the ESS, Lisbon Treaty, Petersberg Tasks, and the HHG process. The problem is that these documents are unfortunately too vague, general, and/or arbitrary to be effectively translated into worthwhile defense planning. One can think about these documents as inputs. These inputs go through a defense planning process, which generates “outputs” of military capabilities, strategic planning, and usable technologies.

³⁹ Katarina Engberg, *The EU’s Collective Use of Force*, 50.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 52.

The problem is that if the inputs do not accurately reflect the modern (or future) security environment in which the EU will operate, the kinds of missions the EU will agree to carry out, or the political will of EU member states, the outputs from the defense planning process will not be useful.

For example, Engberg describes the ESS as “a cocktail of altruistic motives, or values, and more hardnosed interests.”⁴¹ Much of this “strategy” simply outlines political motives for moving from a traditional “territorial-borders” focused defense to the human defense concept outlined in Section II. This hardly translates into specific regions or types of conflict in which the EU could become involved. This is where the Petersberg Tasks and the Lisbon Treaty could come into play. The Petersberg Tasks, particularly after their update from 1992 in the Lisbon Treaty, speak directly to the post-9/11 era of security threats and outline scenarios in which the EU might take action. While this comes closer to usable inputs for the defense planning process than the ESS, it still falls short. Engberg notes that “The EU lacks a public and intermediate document...that clearly establishes the linkage between the tasks described in the Lisbon Treaty and the ESS with the defence planning documents.”⁴² To fill this void, the EDA was created to take the missions and goals outlined in the Lisbon Treaty and the ESS and translate them into force planning and cost effective defense material production. The EDA was designed to act as this key link between strategy formulation and procurement of defense capabilities. However the EDA is at the mercy of member states and their willingness offer up their resources and existing capabilities for pooling and cooperation. In a time when most EU states are strapped for funds to use on defense and in a climate where member states are unsure whether or not they will endorse the next EU operation, progress in this area has been slower than many had hoped.

⁴¹ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 53.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 55.

The final document that could be valuable in a defense planning process is the HHG process – most recently the Headline Goal 2010. The document identifies clear milestones in military capabilities that defense planners can mark, measure, and produce. The problem with this list is that it seems to be just that – a wish list. The goals described in the HHG are seemingly arbitrary, with little apparent roots in the strategy or broad goals of CSDP. To their credit, European policymakers have done an excellent job identifying capabilities that other military powers, namely the US, have successfully used in modern day operations that the EU currently does not have. However, it is not clear that the authors of the Headline Goal derived the need for these specific capabilities from the types of missions the EU plans to carry out or the specific threats the EU wishes to address. Howorth makes the same observation when he says that “The...potentially biggest...problem with the HHG process is the absence of clear debate about the nature of the military operations the EU intends to mount.”⁴³ A possible answer to this would be the Petersberg Tasks; however it has already been demonstrated how these also fall short of effective inputs for defense planning.

The underlying problem with all of these options is the same: they are simply too general to be useful in defense planning. Why hasn't EU strategic planning reached a level of specificity that it might actually be useful? Engberg says it well:

“The translation of generic planning, that does not mention specific countries or conflicts, into so-called advanced planning for specific, albeit potential contingencies, has been a hotly debated issue in the EU. The sensitivity of the matter stems from the *reluctance to name specific countries and places*, and the *weariness in some capitals to transfer authority* for the planning of sensitive issues to the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’” (italics added).⁴⁴

Member states' foreign policies differ greatly. States cannot even agree on what locations to have contingency plans for EU operations. This was most recently seen when Iran announced it

⁴³ Jolyon Howorth, “From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP,” 191.

⁴⁴ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 54-55.

might reassess its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in November 2011. Germany almost immediately issued a statement through Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle saying that it will not be a part of any discussions concerning military action against Iran. Germany feels that "...such discussions are counterproductive and even dangerous."⁴⁵ Bear in mind this statement narrowed Europe's available options while countries as different as the US, Israel, China, and Russia continue to discuss all options to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. If EU member states cannot agree to the point of even discussing potential military contingency plans, the EU will hardly be able to develop a specific enough security strategy for effective defense planning. This will result in waste and the development of defense capabilities that are unfit for the missions on which the EU can, in fact, agree.

The reason for this lies in the mechanism through which security policy is translated into operational capabilities. The Classic Linear Model of Innovation is mostly used in business spheres, however the principles illustrated in the model are useful in understanding the modern defense industry as well as the way government agencies, in this case the EDA under the CSDP, procure defense materials. The original source of the Classic Linear Model is unknown. Over the last half century as the model has been picked up in academic papers and business management courses, knowledge of the model was simply taken for granted.⁴⁶ Although the model has been modified in various ways through additional research that has increased its complexity (primarily due to the increasing trend of government outsourcing to defense contractors), the basic principles of the Classic Linear Model still hold true and will suit our needs. The model is depicted in Figure 1.

⁴⁵ "Iran may reconsider atomic watchdog cooperation" *CNN*, November 14, 2011.

⁴⁶ B Godin, "The Linear Model of Innovation: The Historical Construction of an Analytical Framework," *Science, Technology, and Human Values*, 31, no. 6 (2006): 4.




FIGURE 1: The Classic Linear Model of Innovation

The Classic Linear Model consists of five phases: research and development, prototyping, full scale production, deployment, and operations. This is a “value chain,” or a set of activities that link into each other and improve the value of an ultimate product or service. Scientific research and technological development results in new discoveries. This leads to the construction of prototypes that test whether or not the new technology can be harnessed and applied in a valuable way. If the prototype is deemed effective, then full-scale production begins where a large number of standardized products are manufactured. These products are then deployed, meaning they are transported and delivered into the field. Lastly, the products enter the “operations” phase when they are used in the field and are maintained to continue performing at a satisfactory level. Government budgeting determines how much money will be spent on a yearly basis on any of these five areas of defense capability development. Defense industries respond by choosing to specialize in one or several of these phases. Some firms specialize in research and prototyping, whereas other firms might build large manufacturing plants in order to handle large orders for full-scale production.

This model clearly demonstrates the importance in articulating a clear security strategy before attempting to procure the resources and defense capabilities necessary to successfully achieve that strategy. States in the 21st century are facing extremely strained budgets. Global economic problems ranging from the 2008 recession to the sovereign debt crises that continue to

plague the Eurozone have caused defense funding to experience serious cuts. If done incorrectly, these cuts could seriously undermine the effectiveness of a state's fighting force. This is one of the main impetuses behind pooling and coordinating defense resources, or Smart Defense, in the EU. Europe can no longer afford, for example, five individual ground-to-air missile programs or six individual attack submarine programs or three individual combat aircraft programs or twenty individual tank programs.⁴⁷ In order to maintain the ability to carry out high level military operations that the Lisbon Treaty and Petersberg tasks call for, the EU must find a more cost effective way to generate the right military assets. All of this is simply to say that Europe is operating on a limited budget. In order to make the most of its limited financial resources, EU leadership must invest in the right areas. For example, drawing on the Classic Linear Model, if the operations budget shoots up (as it would during any operation), then maintenance costs also rise. The rising costs on one end result in a decrease in the ability to invest in the other end, namely R&D. However, R&D is important for military innovation five or ten years down the road; if no money is invested in new technologies, then as the global threat environment changes, the EU could quickly find its fighting forces antiquated. The only way to know the "right" areas in which to invest is to have a clear and specific security strategy that enables defense planning to produce the correct means to reach the proper ends. The problem, then, is that the EU currently lacks the ability to effectively engage in worthwhile defense planning due to divergent foreign policies among member states, as was demonstrated previously.

Oftentimes the debate surrounding the effectiveness of Europe's ability to carry out security operations focus on questions of whether or not Europe has the technology to compete, if the EU has the organization to handle command and control of large-scale military operations,

⁴⁷ Claude-France Arnould, interview by The Brookings Institution, "Toward Stronger European Defense Capabilities: A Discussion with European Defence Agency Chief Claude-France Arnould," September 15, 2011, October 25, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2011/0915_europe_defense.aspx.

and if the CSFP and CSDP are enough to foster Europe's ability to secure itself. Howorth notes that "The problem is not one of science or technology. Despite collectively spending only one third of [what] the US spend[s] on Research and Development (R&D), the EU faces no purely technological or scientific impediment to the pursuit of such high technology programmes...But there must be a collective political agreement to drive the process forward to agreed targets."⁴⁸ Similarly, as the political history of the EU demonstrates, European institutions and their broad organization are just as much a product of the same "collective political agreement." Both technology and organization, which can be thought of as means to ends, are shaped by strategy.

Galbraith interestingly claims that it is impossible to prioritize the importance of technology, organization, and strategy. What matters is that these are aligned. The EU must identify the international security threat environment in which it exists, outline a specific strategic response to this threat environment, and align defense expenditures (such as in R&D), organization, and defense asset procurement with that strategic response. By setting arbitrary capability milestones, such as through the HHG process, capabilities and strategy are misaligned and therefore, according to Galbraith, are ineffective.⁴⁹ Without a defense planning process directly aligned with CSDP and CFSP's broad aims and strategies, the capabilities that the EDA does manage to yield will be ineffectual.

This is already being observed to an extent. As of 2009, member states all together spend almost €200 billion annually on defense. Member states also support roughly 1.7 million active service members.⁵⁰ According to Howorth,

"...about 10%...are adequately trained for serious peace-keeping operations, and of those probably a maximum of 50,000 could be used for the type of peace-making operations needed in a conflict such as that in Iraq. Factoring in the requirements of rotation, the number falls to a maximum of 20,000 who are genuinely usable in

⁴⁸ Jolyon Howorth, "From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP," 190.

⁴⁹ Jay Galbraith, *Strategy and Organization Consulting*, (Los Angeles: Center for Effective Organizations, 2003), 7.

⁵⁰ European Defence Agency, "Defence Data Portal," Website.

serious military missions.”⁵¹

He uses this as an example demonstrating that “Bottom-up methodology can produce raw numbers. But that does not equate to genuine military capacity.”⁵² This is precisely Galbraith’s argument: unless efforts to procure capabilities are aligned with the greater strategy, resources will be wasted and products (in this case, troops) will be rendered ineffective in accomplishing the broader strategy.

Unfortunately, it seems that the vital coherent strategy needed for the defense planning process cannot be developed. Conflicting foreign policies prevent constructive dialogue on the essential specifics needed to construct a utilizable security strategy. As a result, this factor strongly inhibits CSDP from meeting Standards 4, 5, and 6 identified in the metrics for an effective CSDP in Section II. These include the ability to reach the specific milestones outlined by the Headline Goal of 2010; the ability to achieve true interoperability, deployability, and sustainability of security forces; and the ability to procure the proper capabilities to deal with the EU’s identified list of threats. This is especially true of the threats that are always evolving and requiring new technological skills and capabilities, namely any threat requiring reliable and actionable intelligence (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, maritime piracy, and organized crime), new technology related to climate change, and the ever changing world of cyber-security.

Engberg also points out that regardless of what sort of defense planning does take place, “The adherence of member states to the requirements resulting from the process...is, by and large, voluntary.”⁵³ By comparison, NATO’s adherence measures are called “force-goals” and

⁵¹ Jolyon Howorth, “From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP,” 190.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Katarina Engberg, *The EU’s Collective Use of Force*, 52.

are more obligatory for countries that are part of NATO. This leads us to the next problem that arises due to a lack of coherent foreign policy.

SECTION V: Gaining Consensus on When to Engage

This section outlines another challenge that Europe faces in developing an effective CSDP due to incongruent foreign policies among member states. Even if the EU is able to overcome the defense planning hurdles described above to create military capabilities and some sort of fighting force, there is no guarantee that member states will elect to engage a conflict when one presents itself. Stated in a “means to ends” framework, this argument states simply that even if the EU is able to garner some collection of “means,” disagreement on foreign policy may never allow member states to determine what “ends” toward which to use them, rendering the capabilities essentially ineffective. If Europe is to cooperate on security and defense, it must not only learn to pool capabilities but also coordinate security decision-making. Analyzing this question will take a theoretical approach as well as examining historical examples including the Lebanon War in 2006 and the Libyan revolution in 2011.

Engberg identifies this problem and says that “In trying to understand the driving and inhibiting factors behind military operations undertaken by a regional organization such as the EU, it is important to examine the phenomenon of selective security. Which conflicts get selected and how is the decision being made and by whom?”⁵⁴ Moravcsik attempted to answer this question utilizing regime theory and asserted a two-step process. Domestic actors with varying interests come together and formulate a coherent national policy through whatever democratic institutions exist in that respective democratic government. The resulting national policy, reflecting the “national interest,” is then taken to the level of supranational institutions

⁵⁴ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 36.

(e.g. the EU), where other nation states have developed national policies of their own in similar fashions, and the national policies are bargained and traded in hopes of reaching some sort of consensus that is in the interest of all nation states involved.⁵⁵ According to Engberg, this idea has become “central to describing the EU’s development.”⁵⁶

An important factor to note is the significant role that domestic politics plays in this process. When discussing collective bargaining in the context of the EU, the emphasis is almost always on the difficulties that member states face when trying to work with each other to develop regional consensus. The domestic consensus-building in each of the individual member states to form national policies is many times almost taken for granted. While historically the primary difficulty has in fact rested with EU-wide consensus building, the ease of developing national policies within member states which are then used at the supranational level should not be taken for granted. One example is France, as Engberg points out:

“It is abundantly clear that the French at times were divided, had a hard time reconciling their diverging internal and external interests and that French positions developed over time. This represents a realistic portrait of a European nation of middle size (in an international context), but with a privileged position in the UNSC, a pivotal role in the EU and a central role in the Middle East, who is trying to ride the tiger of so many conflicting interests, including their own.”⁵⁷

One needs only to look at the news to see other examples of internal disagreement. In the last few months alone, after weeks of violent protests and in the midst of a complicated domestic political struggle sparked by Eurozone negotiations concerning Greece’s debt situation, Prime Minister Papandreou agreed to step down after negotiations on a transitional administration were completed.⁵⁸ Similarly in Italy, Prime Minister Berlusconi stepped down due to the adoption of austerity measures by the Italian parliament. Four days later the newly sworn in Prime Minister

⁵⁵ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (London: UCL Press, 1999).

⁵⁶ Katarina Engberg, *The EU’s Collective Use of Force*, 41.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁵⁸ “Greece” *The New York Times*, November 11, 2011.

Monti began work with the Italian senate to pursue ambitious financial and economic reforms in Italy.⁵⁹ All of these serve as examples of the ongoing difficulties in domestic politics that simply compound the consensus building process at the supranational level.

In addition, all of the above examples are domestic political challenges on issues that can be described as “low politics.” Low politics can include economic, monetary, and institutional areas of politics that are not necessarily regarded as essential to state survival. These areas have historically been where the EU has been able to make the most progress in integrating member states. By contrast, “high politics,” the policy area in which CSDP resides, deals with security, defense, and military policy that is traditionally seen as integral to state survival. Most agree that consensus on areas classified as high politics will be more difficult than gaining consensus on low politics.

Regardless of the policy area, many have wondered how EU member states have willingly come to agreement on so many things throughout the decades to a point where the EU was even possible. Cross argues that the mechanism through which this occurred relies heavily on “epistemic communities.” Epistemic communities can be defined as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.”⁶⁰ Cross claims that epistemic communities of diplomats, military officers, and academics have worked together in a unique way that has pushed policy collaboration forward, even in areas of security and defense, despite some pushback from other political leaders and even public opinion. With specific focus on defense policy, she says that “...the dynamics of decision making within [each] epistemic group have influenced and shaped security outcomes...”⁶¹ She provides a great deal of

⁵⁹ “Italy” *The New York Times*, November 18, 2011.

⁶⁰ Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” *International Organization*, 46, no. 1 (1992): 3.

⁶¹ Mai’a K Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the European Union*, 6.

analysis on specifically how each epistemic community has contributed to the evolving CSDP, and is notably optimistic about the entire process – possibly too optimistic. For example, although recognizing the big breakdowns in coming to a consensus on how CSDP should be involved in operations in Afghanistan in the early 2000s or Kosovo in the late 1990s, she brushes them off as rare occurrences that “are not really cause for concern.”⁶²

These situations should absolutely be cause for concern, particularly since the exact same breakdown occurred with Lebanon in 2006 and Libya in 2011. These “rare occurrences” seem to be recurring in a way that indicates that the challenges that exist in consensus building during these types of security scenarios have not been overcome in over a dozen years. Even if epistemic communities are able to push capability production, strategic planning, and strengthening of CSDP during times of relative stability when these types of decisions maintain a low profile, the minute a true security crisis arises, the restraints on the use of force inherent in democratic systems of government rear their head in a way that even the work of epistemic communities is unable to overcome. It is in the interest of diplomats and political leaders to work on CSDP together in a way that displays a willingness to cooperate among EU member states. However in a time of crisis such as the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Lebanon crisis in 2006, or the Libyan revolution in 2011, government leaders are in the spotlight making emergency decisions in a politically charged environment with potentially large numbers of resources and troops in the balance. In democratic systems, government leaders are held accountable to the people who elected them and will almost always make war decisions with these considerations first in their minds.

The accountability mechanisms that democratic leaders face have been studied extensively by democratic peace theorists. Democratic peace theory argues that democracies

⁶² Mai’a K Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the European Union*, 68.

will never fight each other but will fight non-democratic states, and empirically this is true. The parts of democratic peace theory relevant to this paper are the mechanisms that hold democratic leaders accountable. Most arguments made in democratic peace theory literature can be categorized into the six “causal logics” of democratic peace theory, which are outlined by Rosato. One of these follows a normative logic and the other five follow an institutional logic. The important part of these five is that they all rest “on the claim that democratic institutions make leaders accountable to various groups that may, for one reason or another, oppose the use of force.”⁶³ Rosato states that accountability in these cases “derives from the fact that political elites want to remain in office, that there are opposition parties ready to capitalize on unpopular policies, and that there are regular opportunities for democratic publics to remove elites who have not acted in their best interests.”⁶⁴ These logics include five sources of restraint on leaders: public opinion, interest groups that oppose engaging a conflict, the freedom of information flow that many times yields information that can avert war, the inability to launch truly surprise attacks, and the historically slow mobilization ability of democracies which prevents split-second decisions and generally provides time to find alternatives to war. It should be noted that the first three relating to public opinion, interest groups, and information flow are more relevant to the EU’s situation than the latter two. Although these five accounts are historically used to explain why democracies don’t fight each other, these same restraints (because they are institutional) exist whenever democracies engage in violent conflict. Many times, however, these restraints are weaker in situations where democracies are faced with non-democratic enemies. The point is that they do, nevertheless, still exist.

⁶³ Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” *The American Political Science Review*, 97, no. 4 (2003): 593, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593025> (accessed November 20, 2011).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 587.

It should also be recognized that these are all purely domestic factors that influence national security policy. This means that when the time comes for EU member states to make decisions about whether or not to enter emergency, politically-charged conflicts, each member state's leadership is thinking first and foremost about the potential domestic political backlash that might occur through the mechanisms described above and less about what may be the best decision for the collective good of the EU. This has been seen most recently in Greece's behavior during the Euro crisis and even in Germany's early declaration not even to engage in dialogue about a potential military option in Iran. Differences in foreign policy among member states become poignant in these situations because democratic leaders are rarely able to support what may be best for the EU (if this policy differs from the member state's national policy) because they will be held accountable for not pursuing the interests of that individual member state. These factors are oftentimes stronger in the decision-making processes of when and when not to pursue a CSDP operation than the forces of epistemic communities. This has been empirically shown in situations like Lebanon and Libya. The Lebanon War in 2006, fought between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, caused a divide among EU member states. Engberg argues that this situation was a perfect scenario for EU intervention under CSDP. She states that "...the necessary forces were at hand, including helicopters, provided that the political will was there."⁶⁵ As it turned out, the collective political will wasn't there. The primary obstacle to setting up a CSDP force was the "lack of a self-evident command and control structure."⁶⁶ A Berlin Plus arrangement was not a possibility due to weak foreign relations between Cyprus and Turkey as well as disagreement over the role of NATO in the operation (NATO/CSDP relations will be explored further in Section VI). Collective belief in this potential CSDP mission was

⁶⁵Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 79.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 80.

apparently not even strong enough for an EU member state to volunteer as a “framework nation” to host a headquarters for the mission. Lastly, division between the UK and France (stemming from their disagreement on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) of when to call for a cease-fire) was, according to Engberg, “...clearly an important inhibiting political factor.”⁶⁷ These three factors that blocked an opportunity to lead a CSDP operation in the 2006 Lebanon War are ultimately rooted in differing foreign policies among EU member states. As a result, a CSDP mission was never formulated, and the Lebanon War continued for roughly 34 days killing more than 1,200 people.

Libya is a more recent example where lack of member state consensus resulted in a missed opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its progress on CSDP. First, it should be noted that a Libyan mission would have been the quintessential mission for which CSDP was developed. The reasons for intervening and the capabilities necessary to have success were exactly the reasons and capabilities CSDP formulators had in mind when the concept of CSDP first arose. As it turned out, CSDP was not even considered as a leader in this situation. Germany and Poland explicitly opposed any EU action in Libya, and High Representative Catherine Ashton opposed involvement as well.⁶⁸ In total, nineteen EU member states opted out of the Libyan intervention leaving the UK and France to spearhead an operation that relied heavily on US resources. If consensus could not be gained on this seemingly ideal scenario for CSDP, one must wonder what sort of major military intervention EU member states could agree on. Other historical examples of military operations over which there was significant disagreement that ultimately impacted the efficacy (or even the existence) of an official CSDP operation include the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the two CSDP missions in the Palestinian

⁶⁷ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 104.

⁶⁸ Jolyon Howorth, “Libya, the EU, and NATO: A Paradigm Shift in European and Trans-Atlantic Security Arrangements?,” 3.

Territories, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), and the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan).⁶⁹ Libya and the other EU military operations will be discussed in more detail in Section VII.

Lastly, it should be noted that “gaining consensus” means more than a simple majority vote among EU member states. Cross herself points out that “...a single veto vote from one member state could prevent any CSDP operation from taking place, and a dissenting member state could control everyone’s fate.”⁷⁰ It appears that security really is the “ultimate bastion of sovereignty” that member states are extraordinarily reluctant to give up. Needless to say, it is extremely difficult to gain consensus on when to pursue a CSDP operation, and diverging foreign policies inhibit an effective CSDP in this important way. This obstacle prevents CSDP from accomplishing one of its extremely important goals, Standard 3, which called for institutions and processes by which member states can work together to build capabilities as well as decide when the use them. The process up to this point has been trying to gain enough volunteers on a case by case basis. This is will not be sustainable, falls short of one of CSDP’s express goals, and negatively impacts the effectiveness of CSDP and its missions.

SECTION VI: Development of an EU Operational Headquarters

One of the greatest difficulties that the EU has faced in mounting CSDP military missions has been the lack of reliable command and control structures, namely an operational headquarters (OHQ). CSDP operations have either utilized NATO or one of the EU member states has volunteered to be the “framework nation” meaning it offers its own command and control structures to be used as EU command and control for that particular mission. The lack of

⁶⁹ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, 405.

⁷⁰ Mai’a K Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the European Union*, 70.

an EU OHQ has made multiple military operations more difficult and has, in some cases, caused the EU to opt out of intervening in situations where it would have otherwise, namely Libya in 2011 and Lebanon in 2006. Disagreement on foreign policy, specifically on the role of NATO and the complicated relationship between NATO and CSDP, has prohibited the construction of an OHQ. This section argues that in order for CSDP missions to be effective, particularly external military interventions, an OHQ must be built. The reason that it hasn't yet been constructed, once again, can be traced back to conflicting foreign policies of member states.

Engberg concludes plainly that “The EU does not possess the proper command and control structures to assume responsibility for prolonged and potentially dangerous operations. This should not come as a surprise to any student of ESDP.”⁷¹ Her discussion of this comes in the context of the Lebanon War of 2006 which was arguably another perfect scenario, like Libya, for the EU to intervene, uphold its security values, and demonstrate its competency in peace-keeping and peace-making operations for which the Petersberg Tasks call. In addition to the inability to build consensus among member states as described in the previous section, the opportunity to intervene in the Lebanon War was also missed due to the fact that no EU country wanted to operate as the “framework nation” and host the headquarters for the mission.⁷² This issue would have been mitigated if the EU had a collective OHQ for exactly these types of situations.

Five years later in 2011 a similar situation arose where several prominent European countries, primarily the UK and France, wanted to intervene in Libya on the basis that under threats of revolution Muammar Qaddafi would commit heinous human rights violations through violence in Benghazi. Ultimately the revolution occurred, Qaddafi was blocked from causing

⁷¹ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 103.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 81, 93.

serious damage to Benghazi, and the UK and France were seen as leaders in helping facilitate this outcome. The way in which this was carried out, however, did not even include mention of CSDP. Of the 26 member states involved in the CSDP, 19 opted not to help in Libya (as was discussed in Section V). In addition, because Europe could not provide the capabilities and resources needed for an intervention in this situation, most of the muscle was provided by the US. But another key reason that CSDP was not considered for this operation was its deficiencies in command and control structure – an OHQ. Howorth concludes this same thing in his analysis of Libya when he says that “It was the lack of such a facility which, in part, made it impossible for CSDP to assume ownership of the Libyan mission.”⁷³

If European member states recognized that their inability to act in 2006 was due to such a deficiency, why was there no effort to correct it by 2011? The answer lies once again in contrasting national foreign policies, this time with specific focus on NATO. There have been consistent calls for the construction of an EU OHQ from many countries in the EU. However these have always been blocked for the same reason – the UK. This disagreement first reared its head at the Tervuren meeting outside Brussels in April 2003.⁷⁴ The most recent episode of this was during the summer of 2011. In July, High Representative Catherine Ashton presented proposals to build a permanent headquarters for EU operations.⁷⁵ However within hours the UK made a statement that it would block the proposals. William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary and First Secretary of State, outlined the UK’s staunch opposition in saying bluntly that “...the United Kingdom will not agree to a permanent operational HQ. We will not agree to it now and we will not agree to it in the future. That is a red line.” He explained this position saying “...we think it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning

⁷³ Jolyon Howorth, “Libya, the EU, and NATO: A Paradigm Shift in European and Trans-Atlantic Security Arrangements?,” 5.

⁷⁴ Katarina Engberg, *The EU’s Collective Use of Force*, 65.

⁷⁵ “EU to Build Military HQ?” *The Trumpet*, July 19, 2011.

from NATO planning.”⁷⁶ He proposed more cost effective solutions that involved improving on structures that already existed, such as strengthening links between national HQs. Europe responded two months later in September with a letter to Ashton cosigned by France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain calling for Ashton to use the “permanent structured cooperation” clause of the Lisbon Treaty to move forward with the project without Britain’s approval. The letter stated that this was “a matter of urgency” and that there was “strong political will to continue.”⁷⁷ The UK punched back stating that this was an “inappropriate” attempt to “use EU mechanisms to advance the political agendas of only a few member states.”⁷⁸

The back-and-forth summarized above demonstrates how even well thought out plans to further the goals of CSDP (Ashton’s detailed plans for the proposed OHQ even specified that there would be 250 people staffed within the facility) can be undermined by one state’s inconsistent foreign policy. At the time this paper was written, it remained unclear whether or not the EU would be able to bypass the UK in the construction of an OHQ or if the UK’s “red line” would hold. Regardless, even if an OHQ does get the green light, one can imagine that the UK will be uncooperative and could make the development of an OHQ a long and difficult process. Howorth claims that “The future of CSDP could hinge to some considerable extent on the outcome of this development.”⁷⁹

The fundamental disagreement on this issue involves the perception of NATO within the EU. There are three general schools of thought within Europe on what the role of NATO should be.⁸⁰ States that border Russia want the Alliance to revert back to its original mission of collective defense against Russia, as outlined in Article V of the treaty. A second group of

⁷⁶ Bruno Waterfield, “Britain blocks EU plans for ‘operational military headquarters’” *The Telegraph*, July 18, 2011.

⁷⁷ “EU to Create Military HQ Without Britain” *The Trumpet*, September 12, 2011.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Jolyon Howorth, “Libya, the EU, and NATO: A Paradigm Shift in European and Trans-Atlantic Security Arrangements?,” 5.

⁸⁰ Jolyon Howorth, and Teija Tiilikainen, *What do Europeans Want from NATO?*, ed. Alvaro de Vasconcelos (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2010) http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_8-What_do_Europeans_want_from_NATO.pdf (accessed November 20, 2011), 13-15, 19-22.

western EU states want a similar focus on Russia to ensure that Russia does not become an adversary due to its high levels of natural resources relative to European countries. The final group wants a more global focus in order to support the US in its international ventures. These three different NATO paradigms cause member states to see the role of the evolving CSDP differently. This is embodied most clearly in the OHQ example, which is, according to Howorth, Engberg, and others, crucial for CSDP to fully achieve its aims.

The varied responses to Libya demonstrate the differences of opinion on NATO as well, and also how these differences manifest in national defense policy stances. Howorth notes that the UK sees the “NATO operation” in Libya as a great success, showing that the UK is moving toward favoring a strong Atlantic Alliance over a strong CSDP (and Hague’s comments concerning an EU OHQ reducing the need for NATO structures reinforces this shift as well).⁸¹ On the other hand, countries that didn’t favor the Libya operation but still prefer CSDP to NATO – namely Germany and Poland – have eagerly attempted to rejuvenate CSDP since the middle part of 2011.⁸² These differences in foreign policy have strained CSDP in a significant way, and has prevented CSDP from fulfilling two of the goals outlined in Section II for an effective CSDP, Standards 2 and 5. The lack of an OHQ has in some cases (see Section VII below) prevented the EU’s ability to launch autonomous action and has also inhibited the interoperability, deployability, and most especially the sustainability of security forces. If the specific conflicting views involving NATO outlined above concerning the construction of an OHQ are not resolved, the efficacy of CSDP and its future missions will likely be sacrificed.

⁸¹ Jolyon Howorth, “Libya, the EU, and NATO: A Paradigm Shift in European and Trans-Atlantic Security Arrangements?,” 5.

⁸² *Ibid.*

SECTION VII: Discussion of Past EU Military Operations

The analysis above demonstrates three key weaknesses stemming from differences in foreign policy among EU member states that should theoretically limit the effectiveness of CSDP, but are these seen in practice? The EU has been launching collective operations since 2003, and there has been a great deal of analysis performed on these operations. Some are optimistic, yet others are more critical of the missions carried out under the EU flag. Grevi et al. states simply that “It has to be acknowledged that in some cases the gap between the discourse and practice of ESDP has been significant.”⁸³ He comments specifically about the effect of divergent foreign policies in saying that “In many cases...the link between CFSP and ESDP has been rather loose, which has entailed serious problems for relevant ESDP operations.”⁸⁴ This section takes a look at the CSDP operations to date, with particular emphasis on the military operations, to see if the weaknesses outlined in Sections VI, V, and VI have been problematic empirically.

The EU has launched 25 overseas operations since 2003; 14 are ongoing and 11 have concluded. The EU will be the first to tell you that its operations have spanned across three continents and have incorporated a broad range of civilian, policing, and military capabilities. The EU divides the missions simply by civilian missions and military missions. However in practice, the operations cannot be divided so cleanly. It is important to remember that an important aspect of CSDP is its supposed ability to combine both civilian and military capabilities into truly effective and adaptable security forces. Solana has “insisted repeatedly that all ESDP missions involved both elements and that the distinctiveness of ESDP derives

⁸³ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, 404.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 405.

precisely from its ‘civ-mil’ synergies.”⁸⁵ Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the 25 operations have been subdivided into the four-category framework outlined by Howorth.⁸⁶ Utilizing this standard, the EU has launched seven police missions; six border control and military/technical assistance missions; five peace monitoring and judicial training missions; and seven strictly military operations. See Table 1 on the next page for an overview of each mission as well as its size and scope. It is readily apparent that the size of the military operations is substantially larger than the average size of the other missions. Civilian operations (including policing operations) typically include anywhere from a dozen to several hundred international staff whereas military operations typically include well over one thousand troops. It should be noted that the number of military and civilian personnel that the EU is maintaining is in a downward trend since 2006.⁸⁷ In order to put the budget figures into perspective, according to the most recent data published by the EDA (2009), overall defense expenditures across the EU totaled at €194 billion compared to overall government expenditure which was €5,858 billion.⁸⁸ Total defense spending has decreased by €10 billion from €204 billion in just two years since 2007, compared to an increase of roughly €300 million in overall government spending in the same time frame. The amount spent by member states on their national militaries also greatly outpaces the expenditures of collaborative European defense. For example, in 2009 national defense equipment procurement EU-wide was €24.29 billion whereas the amount spent on European collaborative defense equipment procurement was just €7.14 billion (74.7% to 22.0% respectively).⁸⁹ These numbers simply demonstrate that the collective European defense expenditures are still much smaller than the amount of resources poured into national militaries

⁸⁵ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 212.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁸⁷ European Defence Agency, *Defence Data 2009* (Brussels: 2010), 11.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

25 EU Overseas Operations

<u>Police Missions</u>	<u>Border Control & Military/Technical Assistance Missions</u>	<u>Peace Monitoring & Judicial Training Missions</u>	<u>Military Missions</u>
EUPM/BIH <i>EU Police Mission in BiH</i> 01.01.2003 - (12.31.2011)* 134 intl. staff and 151 local staff €17.6 million for 2011	EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) <i>EU Support of AMIS - AU's enhanced mission to Sudan/Darfur</i> 05.01.2005 - 12.31.2007 20 advisors €1.9 million	EUJUST THEMIS/Georgia <i>EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia</i> 07.16.2004 - 07.14.2005 10 staff €4.65 million	CONCORDIA/TYROM <i>EU Military Operation in TYROM</i> 03.31.2003 - 12.15.2003 400 personnel €6.2 million
EUPOL PROXIMA/TYROM <i>EU Police Mission in TYROM</i> 12.15.2003 - 12.14.2005 200 intl. personnel €22 million	EUSEC RD Congo <i>EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for security reform in DRC</i> 06.08.2005 - (09.30.2012) 50 personnel €12.6 million from 2010-2011	EUJUST LEX/Iraq <i>EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission in Iraq</i> 07.01.2005 - (06.30.2012) 60 staff €22.3 million from 2010-2011	ARTEMIS/DRC <i>EU Military Operation in DRC</i> 05.06.2003 - 09.01.2003 1800 personnel €7 million
EUPOL Kinshasa DRC <i>EU Police Mission at Kinshasa, DRC</i> 05.12.2005 - 06.2007 29 personnel €9million (+ €400 million to MONUC)	EUBAM Rafah <i>EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah crossing point</i> 11.24.2005 - (12.31.2011) 13 EU staff and 9 local staff €1.4 million for 2011	Aceh Monitoring Mission - AMM <i>EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh, Indonesia</i> 09.15.2005 - 12.15.2006 80 minitors €15.3 million	EUROR ALTHEA <i>EU Military Operation in BiH</i> 12.02.04 - (Ongoing) 1400 troops €23 million per annum
EUPAT <i>EU Police Advisory Team in TYROM</i> 12.15.2005 - 06.15.2006 30 police advisors €1.5 million	EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine <i>EU Border Defense Mission to Republic of Moldova and Ukraine</i> 11.30.2005 - (11.30.2011) over 200 intl. staff €24 million per annum	EULEX Kosovo <i>EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</i> 02.2008 - (06.14.2012) 1550 intl. and 1176 local staff €165 million from 2011-2012	EUROR RD Congo <i>EU Military Operation to support MONUC in DRC</i> 06.2006 - 11.30.2006 2000 personnel €149 million
EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories <i>EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories</i> 01.01.2006 - (12.31.11) 53 EU staff and 36 local staff €8.25 million for 2011	EU SSR Guinea/Bissau <i>EU Mission in support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea/Bissau</i> 06.2008-09.30.2010 8 intl. staff and 16 local staff €7.81 million	EUMM Georgia <i>EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia</i> 10.01.2008 - (09.14.2012) 300 EU staff and 100 local staff €23.9 million	EUPOR Tchad/RCA <i>EU Military Bridging Operation in Chad and CAR</i> 01.28.2008 - 03.15.2009 3700 troops €119.6 million
EUPOL Afghanistan <i>EU Police Mission in Afghanistan</i> 06.15.2007 - (05.31.2013) 321 intl. staff and 197 local staff €60.5 million from 2011-2012	EUTM Somalia <i>EU Military Training Mission in Somalia</i> 04.07.2010 - (12.2012) 125 troops €4.8 million		EUNAVFOR - ATALANTA <i>EU Naval Force Somalia - Operation ATALANTA</i> 12.08.2008 - (Ongoing) 5-10 surface combat vessels, 1-2 auxiliary ships, 2-4 MPRAs €16.45 million from 2010-2011
EUPOL RD Congo <i>EU Police Mission in DRC</i> 07.01.2007 - 09.30.2011 38 intl. staff and 19 local staff €18.06 million			EUPOR Libya <i>EU Military Operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya</i> Announced 01.04.2011 Awaiting UN Approval

TABLE 1: 25 EU Overseas Missions

*Parentheses around end date denote ongoing mission

SOURCES: European Union External Action, "EU Operations," Website, and Job von Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 210-211.

annually. Even so, the amount spent on anything defense-related in the EU is small compared to other government expenditures (3.3% of total government budget committed to defense). With personnel and Euro figures in perspective, it was also observed that military operations typically demand more EU member states' approval than do the civilian missions. The smallest number contributing to a military mission was 17 countries with ARTEMIS/DRC, whereas with a civilian mission such as EU SSR Guinea/Bissau, only four member states contributed. Due to personnel requirements, cost, greater needs in EU member state consensus, and more political considerations and higher risk inherent in potentially violent military operations, military missions are more difficult to launch and successfully complete. With all of this in mind, the seven EU military operations undertaken to date will be briefly profiled with particular focus on how distinct national foreign policies affected the effectiveness of these missions.

CONCORDIA/FYROM

This was a peace-keeping mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) launched in March 2003. This was the first EU military operation launched, however it was not autonomous. The operation took over from a NATO force, used NATO assets, and was therefore the first mission to fully implement Berlin Plus procedures. There were contributions to this effort from 26 EU member states, however some member states contributed literally only one individual soldier as more of a symbolic contribution.⁹⁰ This may indicate the true resolve of many of the “contributing” member states. The broad objective of the mission was to maintain peace between small groups of rebels who had incited violence against the Macedonian army. It was quickly determined that the military solution to this problem, which had turned out to be more of a situation of high crime, was not the best solution. As a result,

⁹⁰ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 231.

CONCORDIA/fYROM officially ended nine months later in December 2003 to make room for EUPOL PROXIMA, a police mission established in fYROM to address the same problem.

EUPOL PROXIMA involved 28 separate programs that included all aspects of policing. However, it contained “many problems of implementation and operationality...” to the point that fYROM government officials essentially asked “for the mission to be terminated.”⁹¹ There were additional reports of inter-agency turf battles that also decreased the efficacy of EUPOL PROXIMA.⁹² Howorth reviews this mission saying that it “basically offered the EU ample opportunity to learn from their mistakes in the policing business.”⁹³

The effectiveness of the EU’s first military operation is still debated among scholars. Howorth describes it as “high in terms of political symbolism and modest in terms of military footprint.”⁹⁴ The fact that many contributing member states offered up only one individual suggests that there was consensus for the EU to display its military capabilities in the form of its first military operation, but not necessary for the mission in fYROM. Additionally, the procurement of defense capabilities cannot be attributed primarily to the EU. Although most of the troops were EU troops (numbering around 400), the EU relied heavily on NATO command and control structures. The EU utilized NATO operational planning at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), EU force headquarters were located at NATO HQ Skopje, and an additional EU command element was at NATO’s AFSouth HQ in Naples.⁹⁵ The reliance on NATO’s command and control structures was so extensive that France called the AFSouth command “superfluous,” demonstrating the political disagreement among member states concerning Berlin Plus and their relationship with NATO.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 228.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 231.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 232.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Overall, many conclude that this narrow mission was a tactical success. It was able to put troops on the ground and maintained relative peace in the operation's duration. Symbolically, it was a victory. However, one must consider that strategically this mission was far from successful. The only reason the mission formally ended was because EUPOL PROXIMA took its place, with embarrassing results. Although 26 member states formally contributed, the consensus to substantially contribute was much smaller. Lastly, were it not for the command and control structures that NATO provided, the mission would likely not have been as successful as it was. It must be remembered, however, that this was the EU's first military mission under CSDP (then ESDP) and one of its achievements was successful implementation of Berlin Plus. Even so, the "widely respected International Crisis Group" (ICG) said that there was "no room for complacency" on the part of the EU following this operation.

ARTEMIS/DRC

This was the first ever autonomous mission (civilian or military) launched in May 2003. Like CONCORDIA this was a peace-keeping mission with the general objective of securing a region in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where violence between Ugandan armed forces, Congolese forces, and tribal militias had been occurring since 1998. From the outset, this was "explicitly regarded as an interim mission to allow the UN to assemble a more permanent force by September" 2003.⁹⁷ The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) had been going on since 1999, but on May 30 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for help in the region while MONUC (which was growing ineffective) was rejuvenated. Within seven days the EU stepped up and volunteered to literally hold down the fort until the UN took back over.

⁹⁷ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 233.

France operated as the framework nation, offering 1,785 of the 2,200 troops. 16 other member states contributed assets ranging from strategic air-lift to engineers to helicopters and special forces. Operational planning was carried out at the French headquarters. There was a large consensus to carry out this mission politically in order to “heal wounds” inflicted earlier that year from disagreement over the Iraq invasion.⁹⁸ Eventually MONUC reassumed responsibility of the region in September 2003. The operation is ongoing (being renamed UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in 2010). An ICG report has reviewed the twelve-year UN mission saying that “There is nothing to suggest these military operations have improved the security of the population. On the contrary, UN specialists, NGOS and local civil society movements have reported a rise in human rights violations...”⁹⁹

Critics (primarily the ICG and NGOs) have similarly targeted ARTEMIS itself saying that it only drove militias out of the Bunia area (where they had been formerly concentrated) and dispersed them throughout the larger Ituri province. It should be remembered, however, that securing the entire province was beyond the scope of the original operation meant only to maintain relative stability around Bunia until MONUC was reactivated. Howorth argues that ARTEMIS demonstrated ability for “rapid deployment..., logistics, a single command structure, well and appropriately trained forces, clear rules of engagement..., good incorporation of multinational elements, excellent inter-service cooperation, and adequate communications.”¹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that many of these accomplishments stemmed from the fact that France, as the framework nation and provider of over 80% of the troops, utilized much of its national military and infrastructure. A truly multilateral, cooperative force would have operated very differently. Like CONCORDIA, ARTEMIS can be seen as a tactical victory

⁹⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 233.

⁹⁹ Thierry Vircoulon, “After MONUC, Should MONUSCO Continue to Support Congolese Military Campaigns?” *International Crisis Group*, July 19, 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 233-234.

for the EU in demonstrating its operational capabilities and progress under CSDP. That being said, there has been a debate ever since the conclusion of ARTEMIS on whether the operation can really be seen as a precedent for future missions. These arguments were purely speculative at first, but after a decade of decreasing military expenditures, a downward trend in the number of fully operational troops, and recent examples like Libya, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, and EUFOR RD Congo, it is increasingly evident that the EU is unlikely to be able to produce as effective a force so quickly should the occasion arise (as it did in Libya in March 2011).

EUFOR ALTHEA

At the end of 2004 NATO transferred responsibility of a stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to the EU. At the time of the transition in December 2004, there were 7,000 troops in the force, and that has since been reduced to approximately 1,400 troops in 2011. It should be noted that a very large portion of the original 7,000 were left from the NATO stabilization force (it included contributions from 22 member states and 11 non-EU countries). Like CONCORDIA, this mission operated under Berlin Plus procedures. The short term goal was to ensure a stable implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the medium term goal was to help BiH become part of the EU, and the long term goal was to make BiH a harmonious and stable country that has historically been plagued by deep divides between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims.¹⁰¹

Though this is listed as a military mission, EUFOR ALTHEA is “...far more of a civil-military mix than a purely military operation.”¹⁰² Its main tasks, stipulated by the EU at the outset of the operation, were to fight organized crime, help with economic reform, assist in the rule of law, and facilitate the implementation of police and defense reform. The challenge was to

¹⁰¹ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 235.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 236.

accomplish this with largely military instruments. It proved to be difficult from the start. In addition to adapting military forces for more civilian-military tasks, there were serious tensions and turf battles between EUFOR ALTHEA and EUPM/BiH which was already operating in the same area. Engberg states that this had a marked effect on the efficacy of the mission.¹⁰³

The evaluation on the success of this mission is difficult because the operation is still ongoing. Depending on how one defines “short term” and “medium term” goals (EUFOR ALTHEA commenced in 2004), the operation has, at least until now, maintained relative peace in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords, though BiH remains outside of the EU community. However Arbour and General Clark report the following:

“Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future looks more uncertain that it has at any time since the end of the war in 1995...Serbs are threatening to call a referendum on the Dayton Agreement that stopped the war; Croats are calling for the creation of an autonomous entity within the broader state; and Bosnian Muslims are demanding a new constitution giving them more powers...EU attempts to help Bosnia and Herzegovina by pushing for constitutional changes to make the government more functional have come to naught...”¹⁰⁴

It appears that once again, the EU can claim a sort of tactical success with troops on the ground preventing any major conflict (even though the majority of this “military” operation was carrying out largely civilian tasks), but the effectiveness of the mission in reaching the desired political goals remains unclear. After seven years, the situation has gotten no better and may be about to take a turn for the worse. It is simply too early to tell.

EUFOR RD Congo

For the second autonomous military operation, the EU once again sent troops (this time numbering around 2,000) to the DRC in order to support MONUC during the time of a potentially destabilizing presidential election in the second half of 2006. France was willing to

¹⁰³ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 132.

¹⁰⁴ Louise Arbour, “Why Bosnia Needs NATO (Again)” *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2010.

get involved, however it wanted Germany to also play a strong role in order to strengthen the Franco-German relationship as well as encourage Germany to become more comfortable in military operations (with the memories of World War II still fresh in its psyche). As a result, it worked for several months to convince Germany to take the lead on this operation as the framework nation. Germany was extremely reluctant, having almost ruled out any involvement at all, let alone as the framework nation. In the end France prevailed in its persuasion due to political reasons, and Germany volunteered to host the headquarters for the operation.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, the UK was extremely hesitant to get involved due to its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time.¹⁰⁶

Ultimately 18 member states contributed to the mission (though two thirds of the troops came from France and Germany alone). Engberg finds that the inability to establish an EU OHQ and Germany's reluctance to host one was a serious "inhibiting factor that delayed force generation..."¹⁰⁷ These factors were "real and palpable in their consequences. The postponement of the Congolese election schedule saved the EU from outright failure of being unable to mount the operation in time." The lack of an OHQ and the inability of EU member states to come to a consensus on whether or not to act seriously detracted from its ability to rapidly deploy any forces to the region. This is a significant shift from the ability demonstrated just three years earlier with ARTEMIS to rapidly deploy a fairly effective force. EUFOR RD Congo could have been a complete missed opportunity and total disaster were it not for an unbelievably lucky delay in the elections.

¹⁰⁵ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 115.

¹⁰⁶ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 238.

¹⁰⁷ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 129.

Similarly, Howorth states that the operation is “unlikely to go down in the annals as an ESDP success story.”¹⁰⁸ In addition to almost missing the opportunity outright, he states that it was a really a token force incapable of accomplishing much of anything in the area it had been assigned to cover, the military forces were scheduled to leave immediately after the elections were over and results were announced (which turned out to be the most tumultuous time with Kabila leading violence that cause hundreds of casualties¹⁰⁹), the troops were stationed in mainly peaceful areas to begin with, and there were some military accidents involving aircraft malfunctions that caused several civilian casualties.

Overall, EUFOR RD Congo demonstrated the EU’s inability to gain the consensus it needed to rapidly deploy troops (which almost caused the mission to fail completely), its inability to secure an OHQ which further delayed the launching of the mission, and the inability to procure functional capabilities which made the fighting force ineffective and also caused several accidents.

EUNAVFOR – ATALANTA

In December 2008 the EU turned its focus from the ground to the sea. EUNAVFOR – ATALANTA is the European Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta, and is the first maritime military mission of the EU. It was launched in support of UN Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1846 and 1897 to improve the maritime security off the coast of Somalia, primarily in the Gulf of Aden. Somali piracy has been an international concern, and it should be noted that EUNAVFOR – ATALANTA was launched following the start of a similar yet unrelated mission of NATO called Operation Ocean Shield in 2008. All 27 member states have contributed to this mission (even Denmark who has officially abstained from CSDP) through the Athena funding

¹⁰⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 239.

¹⁰⁹ Katarina Engberg, *The EU’s Collective Use of Force*, 122.

mechanism which was established in 2007 as a funding mechanism through which all EU member states contribute financial support, based on a gross national product scale, to common EU defense efforts.¹¹⁰ This is truly a global effort, because the EU is working with multiple other countries with extremely diverse international agendas such as the US, Russia, the African Union (AU), and China, to name a few.

OHQ for naval operations has been assigned to the UK headquarters at Northwood. Assigning this and all future naval operations to the UK headquarters is a significant shift in command and control policy. Typically headquarters for EU operations are volunteered by a framework nation or NATO structures are used through Berlin Plus. However, the potential significance of this shift should not be overstated. Engberg points out that “Maritime operations require lighter command and control arrangements than ground operations. It is an agile operation with no need for infrastructure and host national support arrangement.”¹¹¹ One of the reasons this operation is so “agile” is because European naval forces are significantly smaller than they should be to cover the designated area. Engberg found that the current force of 5-10 surface combat vessels, 1-2 auxiliary ships, and 2-4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (which were particularly difficult to procure) can really only cover between a third and a fourth of the area effectively. Another challenge this mission faces is more political. The EU has stated that “prosecution and detention of pirates are key components of counter-piracy.”¹¹² Yet even with this as a priority, one of the “major hurdles” in the operation was the “lack of interaction with the Kenyan justice system in the handing over of suspected pirates.”¹¹³

Despite the inability to procure appropriate materials in order to effectively accomplish the objectives of the operation, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA is having some effect – though it

¹¹⁰ European Union External Action, “EUNAVFOR Somalia,” Website.

¹¹¹ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 146.

¹¹² European Union External Action, “EUNAVFOR Somalia,” Website.

¹¹³ Katarina Engberg, *The EU's Collective Use of Force*, 146.

may be in the wrong direction. Some have found that “Piracy activities were forced...to re-deploy wider out, to the Indian Ocean...The number of incidents has diminished, but the sums obtained through piracy acts has increased.”¹¹⁴ It will be more difficult for the EU to patrol a wider area in the Indian Ocean with its already stretched force. In sum, it is simply too early to tell how effective this mission will be.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA

This autonomous mission took place where there was growing instability in eastern Chad and the northeastern region of the Central African Republic (CAR) that borders Sudan. This marks the first mission where the EU was the first entry into a conflict, meaning it wasn’t taking over from or adding to another organization’s efforts, therefore requiring the EU to design the operation from scratch.¹¹⁵ The objective of this operation was to act quickly in providing a stabilizing force for a short amount of time (one year) until UN forces in the form of MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) took over. France once again was a main driving force in lobbying other member states to act by providing this “bridging force” in the region. There was a very long internal discussion of whether or not to act (Germany was a particularly tough sell) despite a UN mandate calling for help.¹¹⁶ Ultimately 23 member states contributed in some way. The operation was launched in January of 2008 with the sole exit strategy being a takeover by the UN follow-on force in March 2009.

Despite the need to act quickly and EU’s supposed ability to deploy a rapid reaction force within days, the planning process for this operation took approximately four months. Seibert finds several reasons for this. There were significant hurdles in the force-generation process. He observes that “...it is in the force-generation process that member states demonstrate their true

¹¹⁴ Katarina Engberg, *The EU’s Collective Use of Force*, 146.

¹¹⁵ Bjeorn H Seibert, *Operation EURFOR Tchad/RCA and the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010) <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB1026.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2011), 9.

¹¹⁶ Katarina Engberg, *The EU’s Collective Use of Force*, 67.

political will...The first force-generation conference took place in early November 2007...As few countries were willing to contribute to the operation, considerable gaps remained, and four additional force-balancing conferences were necessary.”¹¹⁷ These problems were not solved internally. France was so frustrated with Germany and the UK’s unwillingness to help that, one, the process almost fell through completely, and two, France was forced to turn to “non-EU countries such as Ukraine and Russia to contribute personnel and equipment for the operation.”¹¹⁸ Despite these external contributions, France still had to lower the resource requirements for the mission and ultimately provided 55% of the troops. This is compared to the 40% level that it was originally willing to contribute.¹¹⁹

As if the challenges with operational planning and force procurement were not enough, more problems occurred in the field after the launch of the mission. Seibert says the outcome of the operation was “characterized by underachievement” for five main reasons.¹²⁰ First, the EU was unable to adapt to the evolving situation on the ground, particularly given how long it took for the mission to become fully operational (18 months). Second, there was an extremely light military footprint meaning there were not enough forces to effectively cover the area (roughly half the size of France with a little less than 4,000 troops). Third, there was a “rigid division” between the military tasks and law and order tasks. As the operation unfolded, it became evident that a major part of the problem was crime in the form of banditry as opposed to a strictly military problem. Partially due to the inability of EU planning to adapt to the changing situation on the ground, military forces were not allowed to partake in law enforcement tasks, making it very difficult for the force to deal with major aspects of the conflict. This also raises questions about the true synergy between civilian and military capabilities. Fourth, the mandate of the

¹¹⁷ Bjeorn H Seibert, *Operation EURFOR Tchad/RCA and the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy*, 16.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 17

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 38-40.

mission was limited to begin with. There was no real political strategy to accompany the military operations, so there was no long-term effect in the region. Lastly, the short duration of the mission meant that EU forces were not there long enough to really make a difference. The EU, wanting to stick to its deadline, handed control over to MINURCAT on March 15, 2009. This transition is largely seen as unsuccessful because UN forces were not fully prepared to take responsibility this early. It has called into question the true effectiveness of “bridging operations” in general.

This operation demonstrates several things. It reinforces what seems to be a growing trend in recent EU military operations including EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Libya (see below) that a lack of consensus among member states slows its ability to launch operations. This greatly undermines their effectiveness particularly when the point of these interventions is to contain a situation quickly. Additionally, lack of consensus and diverging policies towards the region caused the mandate and scope of the mission to be unfortunately narrow, again hampering the effectiveness of the mission. Lastly, procurement of the necessary resources to carry out the mission proved to be extremely difficult, to the point of needing to turn to countries such as Russia for assistance. This reflects both an unwillingness among many member states to become involved, as well as the results of decreasing defense budgets and little development of military resources in both troop capabilities and equipment. States will not be willing to offer precious resources if there is not strong political will to do so. This being the last CSDP military operation actually launched, it offers valuable insights into the true level of current EU military capabilities.

EUFOR Libya

EUFOR Libya is not yet a military operation (so technically there have only been six military operations actually executed in CSDP history). It was agreed to on April 1, 2011 and

calls for a military mission in the CSDP framework in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis in Libya. This decision only outlines the legal framework of the would-be operation. It is currently awaiting UN approval and no operation has been formally launched. This was a monumental missed opportunity. Policy-makers with any familiarity at all with CSDP and its history have been asking "...was this not precisely the type of scenario for which the EU's CSDP had been devised?"¹²¹ It was absolutely the quintessential scenario that for two decades CSDP officials have been preparing, yet CSDP was not even considered as an instrument to be utilized in this situation.

There are several key reasons for this. The first was discussed in Section V. In this almost stereotypical scenario of an intervention waiting to happen (a failing state with a cruel dictator inciting violence on his own people and threatening countless more deaths and human rights abuses), there was no consensus among EU member states to intervene including even High Representative Ashton (whose resistance strongly angered the UK and France). Nineteen member states opted out. The reason becomes clear when once quickly considers the extreme differences in foreign policy towards Libya. Italy had improved relations with Libya (particularly Qaddafi) since 2004 after dismantling his nuclear program, and even tried working with the AU to find a way for Qaddafi to leave Libya safely as late as March 28, 2011.¹²² Germany took more of a middle road by denouncing Qaddafi and calling for sanctions but initially wanted nothing to do with a military operation. At the other end of the spectrum, the UK and France were eager to take action and, though officially limiting their activities to upholding the UN Resolution to protect Libyan civilians, seemed intent on ousting Qaddafi. The second reason CSDP was not an option was the lack of a centralized command and control center

¹²¹ "War in Libya: Europe's confused response," *IISS Strategic Comments*, 17, no. 18 (2011): 3.

¹²² Julian Borger and Richard Norton-Taylor, "Diplomats discuss Libya's future as Italy plots Gaddafi's escape route" *The Guardian*, March 28, 2011.

(discussed in Section VI). There was little time for member states to debate who would serve as the framework nation; action was required immediately. As Howorth has pointed out (see Section VI), the lack of an EU OHQ made it an impossible candidate to lead this operation.

The last reason was Europe's inability to procure the resources and capabilities necessary for this type of operation. Had CSDP been the lead instrument, it would have been the most technologically demanding of any CSDP mission to date. The operation that did occur, however, yielded a number of insights into Europe's capabilities. The supposed "NATO coalition" (which was really France and the UK using US assets and leading around fifteen other countries ranging from Qatar to Belgium to Canada) provided enough of a demonstration to recognize that Europe is seriously lacking the technological capabilities to execute a no-fly zone. This comes as a bit of a surprise given that one of the primary impetuses for starting what evolved into CSDP, the Kosovo War in the late 1990s, involved an extensive air campaign that demonstrated Europe's reliance on the US.

The Libyan intervention began on March 19, 2011 after a no-fly zone was approved by the UNSC on March 17. Additionally, the League of Arab States had also given the green light to help protect Libyan citizens. To begin the campaign, it was necessary to eliminate any threats to the aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone. These included surface-to-air missile batteries, radar systems, and command and control structures of Qaddafi's regime. The US took the lead role in eliminating these targets by dropping approximately 110 Tomahawk missiles. Additionally, US Air Force B-2 bombers took out a Libyan air force base. The UK was the only other country to help in this effort by launching 12 Tomahawk missiles from one submarine off the Libyan coast as well as contributing one Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 aircraft to aid in the destruction of the

Libyan air force base.¹²³ After contributing less than 10% of the firepower to this operation, articles appeared in the British press stating that “up to 20 per cent” of the UK’s Tomahawks has been used in the “past four days” causing “fears that it is ‘burning through’ its armoury.”¹²⁴ Remember that the UK has one of the strongest militaries in Europe. This initial operation cleared the way for fifteen different countries to safely enforce the no-fly zone. The majority of these sorties were not used to commit strike missions. Only six countries did carry out strike missions,¹²⁵ one of which was France who very early in the intervention directly bombed Qaddafi forces believed to be advancing on Benghazi.¹²⁶

In addition to the no-fly zone, there were several other ways “NATO forces” aided the Libyan rebels. The UK, France, and Italy sent teams to counsel the rebels in Benghazi on how to improve their command and control, training, and communications. A need also arose for attack helicopters. An International Institute for Strategic Studies report stated the following:

“A longstanding NATO request for attack helicopters was not met by the US, although its Marine Corps Cobra helicopters are optimized for the role. Instead their capability has been recently provided by 16 British and French helicopters (4 British Apaches, 2 French Tigers and 10 French Gazelles) attacking from amphibious ships. This limited amphibious capability took almost two months to improvise as it was not routinely practiced by those nations.”¹²⁷

Despite the US stopping manned flights on April 4, taking a “backseat” in the intervention formally being led by the UK and France, European countries still relied heavily on US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, and tanker aircraft used for aerial refueling which is an integral part of a no-fly zone operation. Ultimately it was found that the US owes the UK \$222 million for the assets used in the Libyan intervention.¹²⁸

¹²³ “Libya: direct military hits, unclear political targets,” *IISS Strategic Comments*, 17, no. 12 (2011): 2.

¹²⁴ Thomas Harding, “Libya: Navy running short of Tomahawk missiles” *The Telegraph*, March 23, 2011.

¹²⁵ “Early military lessons from Libya,” *IISS Strategic Comments*, 17, no. 34 (2011): 2.

¹²⁶ “Libya: direct military hits, unclear political targets,” *IISS Strategic Comments*, 17, no. 12 (2011): 2.

¹²⁷ “NATO steps up the pace in Libya,” *IISS Strategic Comments*, 17, no. 23 (2011): 2.

¹²⁸ “Early military lessons from Libya,” *IISS Strategic Comments*, 17, no. 34 (2011): 2.

The Libyan crisis alone clearly demonstrates the ability of diverging foreign policies to undermine the effectiveness of a CSDP mission by preventing consensus among EU member states, by not being able to construct the much needed EU OHQ, and by inhibiting the ability to procure the necessary defense capabilities and assets for this level of intervention. The International Institute for Security Studies phrased it well:

“The fragmented European responses to the Libyan war show once again how difficult it is for Europe to forge a common foreign policy and to respond as one to crises through multinational frameworks. In particular, they have exposed the shortcomings of the defence structures that the...EU has been painstakingly crafting for two decades. They have shown the emptiness of claims that the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 would make the EU better fitted to take action than it was during the crises of the Balkans.”¹²⁹

In addition to exposing CSDP’s shortcomings, Libya has caused a “soul-searching” of sorts among CSDP circles. Howorth calls it “a decisive turning point” when the EU must think seriously about the future of CSDP and the EU’s future role as a global security actor. The Libyan intervention of 2011 has “once again opened wide the divisions on foreign policy” and “demonstrates that, 20 years after the Balkan conflicts broke out, the EU remains far from ready to assume a role as a regional power.”¹³⁰

Overall Analysis of CSDP Military Operations

From this survey of CSDP military operations, several trends become apparent and several conclusions can be made. The first trend is that it is exceedingly clear that the EU, through CSDP, intends to be a strong supporter of UN missions and mandates. Every military operation undertaken to date has either been with the grace of the UN or to directly support an existing UN mission. Another trend is the continued dependence on lead countries to front the majority of the resources with other countries playing small roles. This type of arrangement has

¹²⁹ “War in Libya: Europe’s confused response,” *IISS Strategic Comments*, 17, no. 18 (2011): 1.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

been seen in ARTEMIS/DRC, EUFOR RD Congo, and especially in EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Howorth wrote in 2007 that this arrangement “is unlikely to prove sustainable over time.”¹³¹ This arrangement, however, is inherent in the “framework nation” concept. Without a joint OHQ, a country volunteering its national structures as the command and control structures for a CSDP mission will naturally provide the majority of the resources. This again emphasizes the need for a central EU OHQ. In addition, the time it takes for a member state to step forward and volunteer as the framework nation has empirically been problematic, seen most obviously in EUFOR RD Congo. The delay for a member state to volunteer also stems from a weak political will on numerous occasions to embark on an intervention. There has been an increasing lack of consensus in recent operations after the initial enthusiasm on the part of EU member states to demonstrate its joint defense capabilities in operations like CONCORDIA/fYROM and ARTEMIS/DRC. EUFOR Tchad/RCA and above all Libya demonstrate that there is an increasing lack of consensus on when to intervene militarily. This is partially due to tensions from the Euro crisis and stretching already thin resources, but, as demonstrated in the cases above, conflicting foreign policies tied the EU’s hands. Lastly, the funding mechanisms for these operations are not sustainable. Although the Athena mechanism in 2007 provides one institutionalized mechanism for defense funding, its impact has been limited and used only for EUNAVFOR – ATALANTA. The majority of funds for all other military operations have been offered by member states on a case by case basis. With this system, it is extremely difficult to make the long term investments in defense technology, R&D, and planning necessary to procure the appropriate assets and capabilities when they are needed. The importance of this process was outlined in Section IV, and the breakdown of this process can be seen most readily in the Libya example. Without the US, European countries would not have been able to carry out the

¹³¹ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 240.

bombing operation needed to set the stage for a successful no-fly zone. Not only did they not have enough materials (i.e. Tomahawk missiles), they also would not have known what to bomb without US intelligence and US surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. The continued reliance on these, US tanker aircraft, and the inability to procure appropriate attack helicopters shows plainly that the EU's defense capabilities are below the standard needed for operations beyond deploying troops for the sake of keeping peace. In order to increase the level of capabilities, the EU under CSDP will have to make serious, coordinated, and long-term investments in military technology. This will prove exceedingly difficult not only due to the currently stretched European budgets, but also because EU member states are unlikely agree on what capabilities are worth the investment. 19 out of the 26 EU member states participating in CSDP did not support a Libya intervention in the form of a no-fly zone due to conflicting national foreign policies. Why would they agree on investing what little resources they have on capabilities to be used for operations in which they don't want to be involved?

The final trend apparent in these military operations is that there has yet to be a CSDP mission that has created the lasting political impact the EU originally set out to accomplish through these missions. CONCORDIA/fYROM gave way to the ineffective EUPOL PROXIMA, ARTEMIS/DRC was completed to make room for MONUC which boasts little success, EUFOR ALTHEA is ongoing but with an uncertain future, and EUFOR Tchad/RCA made little impact before handing control over to MINURCAT. While there are valid arguments that CSDP capabilities are growing and that these were early learning experiences, the mandates on these missions were narrow and therefore not intending to deliver the results critics expected, etc., the point remains that these operations were undertaken to accomplish real goals that would make significant contributions to the security of the European Union (using again the concept of

human security outlined in Section II). These political objectives that these operations were intended to meet in these regions have not been realized.

That being said, this is not meant to condemn all CSDP military efforts. There have indeed been tactical victories for the EU through these operations; and relatively speaking the timeframe within which the EU was able to deliver these operations is truly remarkable, particularly with regards to CONCORDIA/fYROM and ARTEMIS/DRC which were both launched as early as 2003 (even if more recent performances call into question whether these rapidly deployed missions could be replicated). This paper does not intend to show that all CSDP efforts have been for naught and are largely ineffective – empirically this is not the case. The aim of this paper is simply to show the ways in which the effectiveness of these military operations can (and in many cases have) been undermined by inconsistent national foreign policies.

SECTION VIII: Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated the great importance of a truly coherent foreign policy among EU member states in order to have an effective CSDP. The current existence of a CFSP is largely symbolic and it has been shown that the national foreign policies of EU member states play more of a role in CSDP decision making processes than does CFSP. After establishing working definitions of human security and metrics for what constitutes an “effective” CSDP, three specific mechanisms through which differing national foreign policies undermine the effectiveness of CSDP were presented.

The first showed how incongruent foreign policies prevent effective defense planning. Defense planning was proven to be an integral part of any type of defense policy that involves

military operations, both internally and externally. Without the ability to incorporate important strategy aspects that derive from foreign policy into the defense planning process, it will be nearly impossible to procure the right kinds of capabilities in the right amounts. This was demonstrated most clearly in Libya where there was complete dependence on the US for intelligence, reconnaissance platforms, Tomahawk missiles, and unmanned aerial aircraft. France and Britain, the two key military players in most CSDP military operations, were also unable to procure appropriate attack helicopters. These weaknesses were demonstrated after more than a decade of supposed resource pooling and capability development under the Headline Goal process. Other examples included EUNAVFOR – ATALANTA, where there is an inability to produce the correct number of ships to effectively cover the sea area as well as difficulty in finding aerial reconnaissance aircraft, and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, which procured troop levels that were too low to make a positive impact in the region. Ineffective defense planning was shown to prevent CSDP from effectively accomplishing three of its stated goals: to reach the specific milestones outline by the Headline Goal of 2010; to achieve interoperability, deployability, and sustainability of security forces; and to have the proper capabilities to address the aforementioned list of threats (particularly organized crime, regional conflicts, state failure, and maritime piracy).

The second illustrated how dissonant foreign policies create disagreements about when, where, and how to carry out CSDP operations. The inability to come to a fast consensus on whether or not to intervene prevented would-be missions from taking place – namely a timely Libya operation and an intervention in the Lebanon War of 2006. It seriously jeopardized the effectiveness of other operations, such as EUFOR Tchad/RCA. And lastly, slow consensus-building almost completely undermined other missions, particularly EUFOR RD Congo. A clear

goal at the outset of developing CSDP was to have institutions and processes by which member states can work together to build capabilities as well as decide when to use them. It has been empirically proven on multiple occasions that conflicting foreign policies have prevented a timely consensus which indicates that the above goal for the CSDP has not been met. This negatively impacts the efficacy of the CSDP.

The third and final challenge brought about by the lack of a coherent collective foreign policy is the inability to establish the much needed EU command and control structures in the form of a permanent OHQ. Multiple sources have identified this as a serious problem that blocked action in Libya and the Lebanon War of 2006 and hampered success in operations like EUFOR RD Congo. Multiple EU member states have also identified this as a serious deficiency in EU defense capabilities, but they have been unable to make progress on construction of an OHQ due to differing policies regarding NATO, particularly with the UK. This argument was most recently documented in the call to bypass the UK during the late summer of 2011. It was shown through historical examples that the lack of an OHQ prevented CSDP from meeting several of its goals: to have the capacity for autonomous action (this occurred only in a few cases when reliance on NATO's command and control structures during CONCORDIA/fYROM and during the Libyan intervention prevented autonomous action) and the EU's ability to achieve interoperability, deployability, and sustainability of security forces.

A brief survey was then taken to explore how these three factors impacted historical CSDP missions in practice. Despite some tactical successes, CSDP missions on the whole were seriously hampered by the factors that stem from the inability for EU member states to agree on key foreign policy issues relevant to the military operations.

The significance of the outcome of this revolutionary new form of policy, CSDP, cannot be understated. Its implications for future world order, global security, and frameworks through which we view collective security and defense policy would be vast. That said, the EU is currently on the brink in several different ways. The sovereign debt and monetary crisis in the Eurozone is causing EU leaders to reevaluate the entire economic system. Similarly, the recent experience in Libya is causing CSDP officials to revisit the drawing board to determine how CSDP can continue forward. In both cases, the ultimate decision is to either revert back to strengthening the sovereign state model by abandoning integrative policies, or to dive into unprecedented levels of integration. Will “the ultimate bastion of sovereignty” prove too much of a challenge for member states to release to a supranational entity? Can the EU really succeed in the concept of “Smart Defense” by pooling and coordinating security and defense policy?

This paper argues that unless the significant divides in national foreign policy are narrowed, the effectiveness of CSDP – particularly its military operations – will be undermined. How can these divides be fixed? One interesting idea is that continued progress on CSDP might actually shape a more coherent European foreign policy. Grevi et al. clue in to the same idea in noting that “Deploying an ESDP mission can also help to focus the minds of the Member States and provide an incentive to advance more common positions.”¹³² Perhaps this could work on a larger scale where CSDP itself could shape CFSP. If it could, it would take an extensive amount of time – time that CSDP may not have if officials’ reflections on Libya cause them to abandon hope.

Ideally, CSDP will continue to strengthen and learn from its mistakes. One key lesson in this learning process must be the importance of converging foreign policy. In debating the future of CSDP, Grevi et al. states that “Both political convergence and policy coherence remain

¹³² Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, 505.

inescapable conditions for generating effective action at the EU level.”¹³³ The EU has demonstrated its desire through CSDP to address the evolving global security challenges of the 21st century in order to be an international leader and legitimate force for good. It is hoped that CSDP can awaken from its “hiatus” post-Libya to address its internal disaccord concerning foreign policy so that it may truly be effective in the global arena.

¹³³ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, 20.

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