Nationalism in the Arab Spring

Expression, Effects on Transitions, and Implications for the Middle East State

A Comparative Analysis of Egypt and Libya

By Danielle Bella Ellison

Yale University
Department of Political Science

Senior Essay | PLSC 419: Arab Revolts, Revolution, and Reform
Advisor: Professor Ellen Lust
April 20, 2015
Introduction

Since the Arab Spring uprisings began in late 2010, scholars, politicians, and citizens have endeavored to understand which factors, or which qualities of states or of peoples, played important roles in affecting the trajectory of transition in countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This paper considers a factor heretofore not prominently focused on: nationalism. How does whether or not a state is a nation-state affect the trajectory and viability of the country after a period of political upheaval and regime rupture? This paper delves into how nationalism in the MENA state has affected transitions in the course of events during the Arab Spring. It considers the comparative case studies of Egypt and Libya, two states possessing vastly different levels of nationalism. In 2011 and continuing through this writing in 2015, Egypt and Libya have both experienced the ruptures of decades-long regimes and ensuing upheaval as each citizenry vies to set a new political course.

In Egypt, the January 25th 2011 “Day of Rage” set off eighteen days of mass public protest, centered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square but extending across the country, ultimately forcing the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak who had ruled Egypt for almost three decades. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power (amid continuing protests) until elections were held in June 2012, which brought in Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood as President. As Morsi issued decrees and altered the government structure to expand and consolidate his power and pass an Islamist-leaning constitution in November 2012, public protests resumed in a June 30th 2013 movement pushing once again for regime change. The military acted to stabilize the situation and it removed Morsi from the government, calling once again for parliamentary and presidential elections and for the drafting of a new constitution. In the May 2014 elections, former general Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi won the presidency and Egypt moved again in the direction of a secular military-dominated government.

Meanwhile, in Libya, a popular uprising against four-decade ruler Colonel Muammar Gaddafi began on February 15th 2011 in Benghazi, and violent clashes escalated in Benghazi and then in Tripoli and elsewhere between those rebelling against the regime and Gaddafi’s loyalists – both sides flanked by a military force that split. Alarmed by Gaddafi’s explicit threats to massacre his own people, in March 2011 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized an international intervention to protect Libyan civilians. Aided by air strikes on government targets and a no-fly zone maintained by NATO and several Arab allies, anti-regime
forces took control of the capital, capturing and killing Gaddafi in October 2011. The Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) proclaimed its governance over a freed Libya, and organized elections. Nonetheless, after the regime’s fall numerous competing militias – some nationalist, some Islamist, some tribal, some jihadi – have plagued Libya with continued fragmentation and instability. After Libya’s June 2014 parliamentary elections, several Islamist parties and their allies formed the Libya Dawn coalition to overthrow the newly elected government, which fled to Tobruk in the east of the country. Since July/August 2014 Libya has descended into civil war as numerous groups fight for control over different regions of the state.

This paper illustrates how nationalism played a role in affecting the trajectories in these two countries after the Arab Spring uprisings began. In Egypt, a long-standing nation-state with strong nationalistic sentiment among its citizenry, the Arab Spring and subsequent protests and rounds of government transitions exhibited political ideological cleavages of secularist nationalists and Islamic nationalists, all engaged in the effort to produce a regime that would be accountable to the people and that would produce prosperity for Egypt – albeit in line with their vision. In Libya, a relatively recently-constructed state with intense inter-tribal and inter-regional tensions and a lack of nationalistic sentiment among the citizenry, the rupture of the Gaddafi dictatorial regime as Libya was “freed” led to the rupture of the state as well, as tribal and regional sub-national cleavages produced competing political authorities and militias that vied for control of all or parts of the country. As this paper will examine, the contrasting levels of nationalism in Egypt and Libya manifested itself in: the discourse of the uprisings; the cleavages that formed and have been exhibited over the course of the transition period; and the demands expressed by key actors. Nationalism has affected the levels and types of violence that ensue and even implications for the viability of the country overall.

Expanded beyond these cases, consideration of the role of nationalism in the Arab Spring posits a prediction that, even if troubling, is worth reflecting upon: when there is political upheaval and regime rupture, if a country is a nation-state then there can be repeated regime change and transition but nonetheless the country stays together, even through cycles of disillusionment and more protest; if regime rupture and overthrow is of a dictator who presided over a state without a strong national identity existing before or above the ruler’s reign, then the transition phase can suffer from ongoing violent conflict among disparate groups and perhaps even a breakup of the country.
[2] Theoretical perspectives in political science on factors affecting the Arab Spring: Mechanisms and Hypotheses for Nationalism

Literature on the Arab Spring uprisings, as well as that on nationalism, revolutions, and transitions broadly, indicates that while there has not yet been a central focus on nationalism as a variable affecting countries’ trajectories in the Arab Spring, this is potentially a crucial and fruitful linkage to explore.

The factors that political scientists have identified as relevant in significantly affecting the political uprisings and transitions of the Arab Spring are analyzed in literature from recent years. Some scholars have focused on the power relationships and structures among rulers and different elements of the citizenry. In “Missing the Third Wave” Ellen Lust focuses on the relationships between the incumbent regimes in MENA countries and the Islamists in the countries, arguing that political realities stem from whether or not Islamists had been included or excluded from the government (prior to the Arab Spring uprisings), and whether or not “the regime based its legitimacy on Islam.”\(^1\) Steven Heydemann posits that not only formal relationships between power-seeking actors but also “informal modes of governance and resource allocation” are relevant to the political trajectories of MENA countries.\(^2\) Meanwhile Vickie Langohr examines the role and indeed failures of civil society to transition and shape MENA states.\(^3\) Other political scientists have studied the role of particular elements of society such as Adria Lawrence’s emphasis on the leadership of the “first movers” galvanized to push for regime overthrow and transition, and Mervat Hatam’s examination of the part played by the youth of different genders and classes.\(^4\),\(^5\) In addition, some researchers have explicitly focused on economic variables: Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siournounis find that economic development and education are the most important variables in order for democratic transition to be successful; Mehdi Shadmehr shows that the relationship between magnitude of income

---

\(^1\)Ellen Lust, “Missing the Third Wave,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46(2) (June 2011): 163.
\(^3\)Vickie Langohr, “Too much civil society, too little politics: Egypt and liberalizing Arab regimes,” *Comparative Politics* 36(2) (2004): 181-204.
\(^4\)Adria Lawrence, “Repression and Activism among the Arab Spring’s First Movers,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, 2013.
\(^5\)Hatem Mervat, “The Intellectual Debate on Youth and its Role in the Arab Uprisings (part I),” Center for Mellemoststudier, April 2014.
inequality and repression by a regime is an interaction which may predict whether protests and attempted regime overthrow will occur or succeed.\(^6\)\(^7\)

Other Arab Spring literature emphasizes particular structural and institutional features of MENA countries such as: oil endowments and foreign patronage, different characteristics of the security forces in a country, or the type of regime of a pre-Arab Spring state, as being pivotal in determining the trajectory of transition after uprisings have begun. Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds focus on whether or not a state’s military remained loyal to the regime or sided with the protestors; and they identify the variables of oil wealth and hereditary succession precedent as propelling this response.\(^8\)

Eva Bellin explains that whether a MENA state’s coercive apparatus has the capacity as well as the will to crush an uprising is predictive of its outcome, and that the robustness of the coercive apparatus is in turn derived from: “maintenance of fiscal health”; “successful maintenance of international support networks”; the level of institutionalization of the security establishment; and the degree of popular mobilization.\(^9\) Gregory Gause III and Sean Yom argue that Arab monarchies have been able to stave off regime rupture due to their utilization of: oil/hydrocarbon rents; cross-cutting coalitions; and foreign patronage.\(^10\)

Meanwhile other scholars have presented arguments debating the merits of monarchy itself as providing particular religious or tribal legitimacy, loyalty, stability, or ability to respond credibly with sufficient reform as to diffuse popular protests and prevent regime rupture.\(^11\)

Finally, some scholars have considered more dynamic factors in affecting the transition trajectories of countries experiencing the Arab Spring. David Patel, Valerie Bunce, and Sharon Wolchik emphasize the role of the dynamics of communication, “deliberate diffusion”, as well as “demonstration effects.”\(^12\)

---

adaptable and ultimately resist such movements. These analyses though are more about timing and proximate impetuses for cascades of events – rather than considerations of which factors make a specific country susceptible to events proceeding in one way or another.

The literature on nationalism, political revolutions, and transitions overall reveals that the intersection of these forces may be another important factor to consider in the trajectory after regime ruptures precipitated by the Arab Spring. John L. Comaroff shows that national (as well as other) identities become particularly relevant in times of transition because of their inherent connection to material, political, and symbolic power. Dankwart A. Rustow, specifically focusing on transitions from oligarchies to democracies, reviews that “it is now widely accepted that democracy is indeed a process of ‘accommodation’ involving a combination of ‘division and cohesion’ and of ‘conflict and consent.’” In his landmark piece, he then argues that national unity is the key background condition for democratic transition since, tersely put, “the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.” Once national unity is established, it is then dynamic political struggle that over time produces democracy. Moreover, Rustow concludes that democracy exists in “the tenuous middle ground between imposed uniformity (such as would lead to some sort of tyranny) and implacable hostility (of a kind that would disrupt the community in civil war or secession).”

Considering nationalism and its role in revolution and transition, the literature also makes clear that it is important to theoretically distinguish between the development and presence of strong nationalism, and the development and presence of a strong state. In political science, the distinction between a “strong state” and a “weak state” can be made based on a state’s “degree of effective autonomy from societal demands” in all spheres including the economic, the military, and the socio-cultural. Strong states have “the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors.” Strong nationalism often is present in strong states, but strong nationalism can also be prevalent in situations of weak states.

---

16 Ibid., 350-351.
17 Ibid., 352.
18 Ibid., 363.
or of national communities that seek statehood or a change in government. Indeed while states often try to bolster nationalism in the lead up to an attempt at consolidating power or at the onset of a new regime, this is different from nationalism that exists at a level deeper than any particular government and that is part of the foundational sentiment in the country. In *Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism*, Adria Lawrence puts forth a detailed study of what propelled nationalist mobilization against the French Empire in the mid-20th century, examining North African countries such as Morocco and Algeria. Lawrence explains that nationalist identity and nationalist mobilization are also two separate concepts that can though influence each other and intersect, particularly in circumstances of political contention.21

Scholars focusing on significant waves of political transitions in various regions outside of the Middle East have reflected on nationalism as a variable relevant in these trajectories. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan in *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* discuss paths of transition from different types of non-democratic regimes to consolidated democratic governance, and they investigate how the concepts of “nation-state” and “democracy” can come into conflict but also can be reconciled.22 In *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* Jack L. Snyder looks at how in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia the installation of electoral democracies in the late 20th century did not alleviate conflict as different nationalist groups continued to vie for power within established borders.23 Considering countries in Africa (Kenya), Europe (Spain and Czechoslovakia), Asia (China and Taiwan), and the Middle East (Turkey and the Kurds), Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai illustrate that breakups based on ethnic or other minority identities are likely.24 More specifically, David Brown shows how newly industrialized Southeast Asian countries are experiencing “a politics of nationalist contestation…which increasingly focuses on tensions between civic, ethnocultural, and multiculturalist constructions of national identity” that are intertwined with the strength or weakness of the state itself.25

Regarding transitions in Eastern European countries after the fall of the Soviet Union, Philip G.

---

Roeder argues that national self-determination is required for peaceful democracy.\(^{26}\) Additionally, Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul discuss how nationalism was manipulated by the ruling classes in Sub-Saharan African states in order to try to suppress different ideologically-motivated or economically-motivated groups of the citizenry, but that nationalism was also really a “response to the fragility of political structures and identifications which results from the legacy of ethnic and cultural diversity in the states of Sub-Saharan Africa.”\(^{27}\) They argue that in Africa, an “achieved nationalism” of the people would be better in terms of fostering stability and prosperity, as opposed to nationalism constructed by the ruling classes and to a degree the international community.\(^{28}\)

The concepts of nationalism and of the nation-state in political science are themselves relatively modern ideas as well as truly useful ones in understanding the dynamics of contemporary polities. At its core, nationalism requires national unity and identity, although, as Rustow explains, it does not matter when or by what means this sentiment has developed: “National unity may have been achieved in prehistoric times, such as in Japan or Sweden; or it may have preceded the other phases [of political transition] by centuries, as in France, or by decades, as in Turkey”; meanwhile national unity may have arisen from geographic conditions such as in Japan or more by administrative institution such as in France.\(^{29}\) Nationalism is itself then the popular, and often political, sentiment of patriotism and loyalty that is expressed especially through advocacy for or support of a nation-state.\(^{30,31}\) The nation-state is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “an independent political state formed from a people who share a common national identity (historically, culturally, or ethnically)”; the Merriam Webster Dictionary defines the nation-state as “a form of political organization in which a group of people who share the same history, traditions, or language live in a particular area under one government, or a form of political organization under which a relatively homogenous people inhabits a sovereign state.”\(^{32,33}\) Nation-states evolved in Europe through centuries of war-making among feudal lords and ultimately higher-level rulers; the nation-state system itself became


\(^{28}\)Ibid., 171.

\(^{29}\)Rustow, 351.


codified in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed the nation-state order is considered generally by the West to be a natural and secure model of political organization that will provide stability and reliable public services to the citizenry.

Nonetheless, the historical process in the Middle East was different from that in Europe. The nation-state was not a naturally developed concept throughout the region, and despite entering into the international state system since World War I (WWI), countries in the MENA are nation-states only to varying degrees. Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia have had strong national identities for centuries if not millennia. In the 1920s Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon had their modern borders carved by Great Britain and France after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the Italians compiled Libya from Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. From the construction of modern states in the region in the twentieth century, some of which had the characteristics of nation-states and others of which did not, different political implications arise. The failure of nationalism in a country can be seen in the politicization of tribalism or in the persistence of ethnic, religious, or sectarian cleavages – especially in the political or military arenas – at the expense of a cohesive national identity. Such fissures have harmed attempts at peaceful transition in numerous countries across the Middle East since the Arab Spring began. As Lust and Waldner emphasize, “Both Iraq and Libya, more so than Egypt and Tunisia, were relatively recent creations in which regional, tribal, and sectarian differences remained strong.”\textsuperscript{35}

Upon the beginning of the Arab Spring uprisings in late 2010, MENA countries had different starting points in terms of characterization as nation-states and presence of nationalist sentiment. Therefore, nationalism is an interesting and worthwhile factor to consider in assessing the trajectories of transition in different countries.

Some scholars have in fact alluded to nationalism as relevant in the transition trajectories of states that have experienced Arab Spring uprisings, but they have not considered it directly. Political scientists have implied – while assessing other factors – that nationalism may be a key underlying force, including in the specific cases of Egypt and Libya that are the central subjects of this paper. In “The Arab Uprisings and the Prospects for Building Shared Societies,” Dina Shehata identifies that in Egypt:


where the population is largely homogeneous, state and civil society institutions are fairly developed, and the levels of national integration are high, the uprisings [ ] assumed a political and class-based character with various political and civil society groups and social movements playing a leading role.  

Meanwhile in Libya, 

where the population is more heterogeneous, primary loyalties are strong, and state and civil society institutions are weak, the uprisings have assumed a regional and sectarian nature…the persistence of strong tribal and regional loyalties, and the weakness of state institutions gave the uprising a decidedly tribal and regional character…

Shehata also mentions the potential importance of nationalism in the trajectory of Arab Spring uprisings in that a “reason for the declining legitimacy of Arab republics has been their failure to achieve national integration, especially vis-à-vis religious, racial and ethnic minorities (and sometimes majorities).” Many MENA governments have failed to use “national institutions, such as the media and the educational system,” to build a strong national consensus and identity. Ellen Lust and David Waldner’s piece “Parties, Polarization and Transition in the Arab World” posits the significance of the types of cleavage structures in MENA states’ political parties in affecting the subsequent success or failure of democratic consolidation. They explain:

In the contemporary Middle East, two main cleavages emerge: first, universalistic-transformative cleavages, in which parties have programs that affect the entire political community and aim to revise substantially a large subset of political, economic, or sociocultural norms and institutions; and second, particularistic-redistributive cleavages, in which parties make more highly targeted claims to specific sub-communities and seek intra-communal redistribution of resources without necessarily reshaping norms and institutions. Universalist-transformative cleavages became the dominant motives for political mobilization and party politics in Egypt and Tunisia, while the political dynamics of particularistic-redistributive cleavages predominate in Iraq and Libya.

While these scholars focus on political parties, the connection to nationalism is quite apparent: universalistic-transformative cleavages will most likely occur when the citizenry has a strong nation-state identity, as these divides express debates in vision for the future of the nation; particularist-redistributive cleavages will most likely occur in countries where the citizenry does not have a strong nation-state identity and the political demands are sub-national. Additionally, Lust and Waldner note that in the Middle East, “it is not the case that local politics were

---

37 Ibid., 89.
38 Ibid., 87.
39 Ibid., 87.
40 Lust and Waldner, 4.
gradually absorbed into a national political system.”

Rather, “political parties originated in the political center and gradually but incompletely extended their reach to the territorial periphery, or parties representing regionally specific constituencies migrated to the capital to defend or advance sub-national interests.”

These patterns of association certainly are relevant in understanding the efforts at political transitions in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

As it has not thus far been the focus of political scientists to study the ways in which the Arab Spring Uprisings in the MENA since late 2010 have been affected in their progression and intermediate outcomes by nationalism, this paper aims to do so. Overall, the underlying hypothesis of this paper is that the independent variable of the presence or absence of nationalism in a country will, through intermediate mechanisms (that proceed largely chronologically and stem from one another), affect the ultimate dependent variable of whether or not the state experiences severe conflict and the propensity to break apart as a country.

There are three specific mechanisms through which the relationship between nationalism and Arab Spring transition trajectories transpires. These mechanisms are informed by the literature so far on the Arab Spring as well as that more generally on the role of nationalism in political transitions. In this paper, Mechanism I: Discourse of the Uprisings stems from the literature that considers how mobilization occurs and where identity becomes apparent and then significant in the process of political mobilization. Mechanism II: Cleavages and Demands engages with the literature that studies the intermediate steps of transition – once an old regime has fallen, how do political, social, and military groups unite or divide themselves to address the power vacuum and respond to the needs of building a new government. Mechanism III: Violence and the Future of the State relates to literature that considers the long-term viability of a post-revolution state under various circumstances, whether or not consolidation of a new political order is likely, and whether the violence that has emerged in the transition process is likely to subside or to intensify and possibly jeopardize country’s future.

**Mechanism I: Discourse of the Uprisings:** The first mechanism by which nationalism begins to affect the transition trajectory in a country experiencing regime rupture is in terms of the discourse of the uprisings. Words propel actions, and words reflect actions. The discourse during the period of time (in this analysis, 2011-2015) in which political uprisings and transition are

---

41Ibid., 11.
42Ibid.
occurring can reveal how nationalist sentiment, or the absence thereof, drives the way citizens think about and express the revolt or revolution, and also the way that the military or the regime view and react to such unrest.

**Hypothesis I:** Nationalism propels the uprisings to exhibit discourse expressing unity and a desire for transition to a better government; lack of nationalism propels discourse about liberation from an oppressive regime, but without a consideration of the whole citizenry moving forward.

**Mechanism II: Cleavages and Demands:** Following from the discourse that framed the uprisings, the second mechanism through which nationalism continues to affect the transition trajectory is through the types of cleavages that emerge during the period of transition, and the agendas or demands made by different groups. The types of cleavages and the demands they make indicate whether key actors’ aims are to build the nation-state according to a particular political ideological vision, or to create a new governmental structure that enables favoritism towards, or autonomy of, certain sub-national regions or other sub-national groups.

**Hypothesis II:** The existence of nationalism in a country will lead to cleavages and demands calling for different political ideological visions for the post-transition government; the lack of nationalism in a state will lead to cleavages and demands calling for favoritism of sub-national groups, or for regional federalism or autonomy in the post-transition government.

**Mechanism III: Violence and the Future of the State:** The types of cleavages and the demands that groups make then lead into the third mechanism of how nationalism affects the trajectory of countries that have experienced the Arab Spring. In the aftermath of regime rupture, violence is likely as struggles for power occur among competing groups. But whether the competition is among essentially nationally cohesive but ideologically divided groups, or among different types of sub-national groups, will impact the types and extent of the violence that ensues. Nationalism thus leads to the result of whether or not the country will continue to be racked by large-scale conflict and contribute to what the political future of the state will be.

**Hypothesis III:** A state with a strong sense of nationalism will experience smaller-scale political violence that will not endanger the viability of the country as a single cohesive geopolitical unit; a state with no nationalism or a weak sense of nationalism may experience large-scale violence
between sub-national groups, particularly in the form of territorial competition or even civil war that may precipitate the breakup of the country.

These three mechanisms reveal the impact of nationalism or the lack thereof in a state, affecting the transition trajectory and the future of the country after its experience in the Arab Spring. The fundamental independent variable is nationalism which, through the discourse of the uprisings, and then through the cleavages that form and groups’ demands, and finally through the ensuing violence, produces the end dependent variable result of whether or not a state is likely to show a high propensity to fall apart from conflict after experiencing a regime rupture. After describing the case selections of Egypt and of Libya, this paper will examine in detail each of these mechanisms and hypotheses for the two illustrative cases.

[3] Case Selection: Egypt and Libya

Egypt and Libya are ideal comparative cases for studying the role of nationalism in the Arab Spring because these two countries show similarities on numerous metrics that political scientists have considered important in assessing Arab Spring trajectories; nonetheless, Egypt and Libya also have disparate nationalistic histories – one is almost fully a nation-state and one is almost fully constructed. Both states experienced very clear and full regime ruptures in 2011 with the overthrows of authoritarian rulers presiding over “republics,” and yet the countries have had extremely different transition trajectories and outcomes by 2015.

Scholars have pointed out numerous metrics (other than nationalism) as likely important in affecting transition trajectories. These include variables such as: type of regime political structure pre-Arab Spring; degree of domestic ethnic or religious diversity; extent of human development (i.e. quality of life); unemployment rate; oil or natural resource endowments; and international intervention during the Arab Spring.
Factors Affecting Arab Spring Transitions: Comparison across Egypt and Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EGYPT</th>
<th>LIBYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Regime Political Structure pre-Arab Spring</strong></td>
<td>Republic with authoritarian ruler holding a military pedigree</td>
<td>Republic with authoritarian ruler holding a military pedigree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Ethnic Diversity</strong></td>
<td>Relatively homogeneous – majority Arab [98% Arab]43</td>
<td>Relatively homogeneous – majority Arab [97% Arab-Berber]44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Religious Diversity</strong></td>
<td>Relatively homogeneous – majority Sunni [85% Muslim (mostly Sunni); 10% Coptic Christian; 5% other Christian]45</td>
<td>Relatively homogeneous – majority Sunni [97% Sunni Muslim; 3% other e.g. Ibadism, Sufism]46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extent of human development (i.e. quality of life)</strong></td>
<td>Human Development Index: 0.784 Rank 5547</td>
<td>Human Development Index: 0.682 Rank 11048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment Rate</strong></td>
<td>13%49</td>
<td>21%50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil or Natural Resource Endowments</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Intervention during the Arab Spring?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – NATO and Arab allies: air strikes and no-fly zone to stop Gaddafi massacring citizens, enabled his defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low/none pre- or above Gaddafi rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In many but not all of these potentially relevant categories, Egypt and Libya share common features. Among other factors that have been analyzed in the past, nationalism is a significant difference between these two countries. Therefore Egypt and Libya, possessing many similarities but this key difference, are excellent cases to use for an assessment of what ways

---

43Ibid., 28.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.
46Ibid.
49Lust and Waldner, 28.
50Ibid.
transition processes are affected meaningfully by the nationalism in a country experiencing political upheaval and regime rupture.

The histories of Egypt and Libya reveal how these two countries are indeed arguably the clearest and most extreme examples of fully nationalistic and fully constructed MENA states. Egyptians have been a nation for millennia, and it has a strong national identity. Since ancient times, there has been a state in Egypt consisting of the peoples of the cities along the Nile and the lands of its fertile valleys. The Egyptian civilization, people and culture are ancient, although the language and religion shifted after Arab conquests in the 600s C.E. The modern borders of Egypt (in particular its western and southern borders in the desert) were formally drawn by Great Britain when it occupied Egypt as a protectorate from 1882 until Egypt’s independence in 1922. Egypt’s essential geography and its conception as a nation-state are extremely long-standing. Thus logically, “with its geographical unity created by the Nile River, its lengthy and world renowned historical heritage, and its relative internal homogeneity, the bases for a distinctive national identity are unusually well defined in Egypt.” A sense of Egyptian national autonomy and pride is evident in literature from the time of the ancient civilization, through Egypt’s period as part of larger Arab and Muslim empires, and prominently in the 19th century. Juan Cole points to a first national revolution in modern Egypt in the Urabi revolt of 1881-1882, in which there was an attempt to establish an Egyptian parliamentary government of military and civilian officials in order to produce increased autonomy under Ottoman rule. The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 led to the Egyptian national focus on actual independence – including what Cole explains was the second mass Egyptian uprising in 1919-1922, which pervaded even after British post-WWI withdrawal and the founding of the modern Egyptian nation-state in the form of a constitutional monarchy that ruled from 1922-1952. The Egyptian revolution in 1952 Cole...

51It is notable, but explainable, that the recent World Values Surveys from Egypt and from Libya do not however actually show clearly the difference in nationalist sentiment. The 2012 Egypt World Values Survey and the 2013 Libya World Values Survey both for example have similar results as to: what percentage of the population see themselves strongly as part of the Egyptian nation or the Libyan nation (70.0% and 77.3%); what percentage of the population see themselves as a world citizen (22.7% and 29.2%); or how trustworthy people are from other religions or nationalities. These results nonetheless can likely be explained by: (a) the sentiments expressed in broad-based population surveys reflecting perhaps the sentiment of people generally but not those of people in power such as political activists or military personnel or other elites, whose views are ultimately the most relevant in cleavage formation and policymaking; (b) there is very likely a bias towards answering surveys the “right” way when surveyed by an international association, but then in fact in times of conflict when key difficult decisions must be made, people likely may not just act in the “right” way and instead may be concerned with more basic interests – for themselves and their sub-national or national group. (WV6_Results_Egypt_2012_v_2014_11_07.pdf. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid. ; WV6_Results_Libya_2013_v_2014_11_07.pdf. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.)


deems the third.\textsuperscript{54} With this came the onset of “Nasserism,” as Gamal Abdel Nasser led a new brand of Egyptian nationalism in which Egypt was considered the leader, but also crucially part of, the larger Arab nation. However Nasser’s successors, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, emphasized Egyptian uniqueness and specifically Egyptian nationalism rather than Arab nationalism more broadly.\textsuperscript{55} They key takeaway from this history of Egyptian nationalism, especially in recent decades, is that while its precise focus and objectives may have shifted, the cleavages of contention are among those who have different visions for Egypt. Importantly, as Cole characterizes the 2011 Arab Spring uprising as the fourth Egyptian revolution, he makes the key point that it is a national revolution similar to those in the past in which another new form of government and vision of political order is asserted. Indeed, he analyzes the ways in which these different national revolutions can be compared and contrasted.\textsuperscript{56} As Lust and Waldner point out regarding this contemporary revolution’s time period, the political divisions in Egypt, principally those between secularists and Islamists, are of the “universalistic-transformative” variety – they are seeking to foster different models for how the nation-state Egypt should be and should act.\textsuperscript{57}

In contrast, Libya is a recently assembled state, without a pervasive nationalistic sentiment and lacking a longstanding united people or civilization. Traditionally, the land that is present-day Libya consisted of three regions – Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica – and had no one center of power or unified citizenry. In fact in Libya’s early history, Tripolitania had greater links with Tunisia and Cyrenaica had closer links with Egypt than these lands had with each other; similarly during the Ottoman Era, they were separate political units – “one linked to Tripoli in the west and the other to Benghazi in the east.”\textsuperscript{58} Libya was a reluctant jigsaw puzzle, compiled from Egypt-looking Cyrenaica, Tunisia-looking Tripolitania, and the province of Fezzan with a Berber population that is essentially part of the Sahara desert.\textsuperscript{59} Completing the “Scramble for Africa” with colonization of these three provinces that were not yet claimed, Italy in 1911 put Libya together as a political unit that would last through the end of World War II (WWII), although post-WWII Libya was still “divided into regions – Tripolitania, Cyrenacia,

\textsuperscript{55}“Egyptian Nationalism,” in Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Leaders, Movements, and Concepts.
\textsuperscript{56}Juan Cole, 61.
\textsuperscript{57}Lust and Waldner, 21.
and Fezzan – of differing political, economic, and religious traditions.”

Libya became an independent state in 1952 as a result of a United Nations Resolution, but only after much debate of different political arrangements for that region. The monarchy during Libya’s early years “did little to foster national unity,” and the discovery of oil and the ensuing revenues largely kept this first Libyan regime together. In 1969, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi led a coup and proclaimed a republic with him as its leader. Gaddafi’s authoritarian rule held Libya together, and additionally through numerous initiatives he tried to involve Libya in broader pan-Arab or Maghreb nationalist movements. Indeed “with its emphasis on transnational values such as Arab-nationalism and anti-colonialism, [Gaddafi’s rule] further weakened the fragile sense of Libyan identity.”

The paramount nature of tribal interests persisted and Libyan nationalism was not a strong force before or above the dictator’s regime. As Lust and Waldner articulate, in Libya “political cleavages…are linked to (relatively) fixed [non-national] identity…political competition is centered on multiple divisions: ethnic identity, tribalism, and regionalism, with regionalism arguably the most salient.”

Recognizing the very different histories and levels of nationalistic identity in Egypt and in Libya, two states that are similar on many other metrics and that both experienced intense regime ruptures in 2011, this paper will use these two cases to consider how nationalism impacted the divergent trajectories the states experienced during the 2011-2015 period.

The Arab Spring protests in Egypt began as a non-ideological, broad-based movement among youths and others disaffected with the regime. On January 25, 2011 – National Police Day – a “Day of Rage” was organized to protest police brutality and by extension (such as through the “We are all Khaled Said” movement) other quality of life issues. As Rabab El-Mahdi points out, those pushing for the end of Mubarak’s regime included Nasserists, Leftists, and Islamists – all engaging in increasing political activism trying to improve the justness and accountability of the Egyptian government, as well as to refine it according to their ideological

---

60Ibid.
61Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Libya.”
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
66Ibid.
68Lust and Waldner, 24-25.
69Shehata, 88.
By Friday, significant protests were occurring in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez, and the number of protestors as well as the diversity of their backgrounds and political focuses grew.70

Once revolutionary upheaval shook Egypt in early 2011, the trajectory of regime rupture and transition over the next several years would reveal that Egyptian nationalism impacted the cycles of repeated protest and government change, but nonetheless it also contributed to the maintenance of stability and unity of the country overall. This relationship is revealed by: the discourse of national unity exhibited by the citizenry; the fact that cleavages throughout the years of transition were over ideological matters; and the evidence that demands of the different sides were both in essence to build a better post-Mubarak Egypt along their vision. The existence of nationalism in Egypt thus contributed to low levels of violence that were predominantly of a broad-based public against smaller numbers of regime cronies, and moreover it bolstered the high likelihood of the continuation of the Egyptian state.

The Libyan Arab Spring uprisings started in Benghazi, the largest city in the eastern region, on February 15, 2011 – two days before the February 17 “Day of Wrath” scheduled gatherings to commemorate the 1996 Abu Salim Prison massacre in which 1,200-1,700 political prisoners were killed.71,72 Although such demonstrations had become routine since the 2008 revelation of the prison massacre, the 2011 protest “resulted in the imprisonment of Fathi Terbil, the lawyer representing the Abu Salim families. What was unusual, however, was that the demonstrators did not disperse after the arrest but rather continued to demand his release in front of the police station.”73 Although Terbil was released, the anti-Gaddafi protestors, likely inspired by the regime ruptures that had occurred in recent weeks in Tunisia and Egypt, persisted and swelled: “Instead of dispersing, the protestors continued demonstrating in the streets of Benghazi, [now] specifically calling for the end to [G]addafi’s rule.”74 In response, Gaddafi sent his armed forces to violently suppress the uprising, but these forces split in loyalty – largely due to the fact that the strong tribal affiliations in Libya had led Gaddafi to give “key military and security commands to [his] own tribesmen and close relatives,” such that numerous paramilitary and

70 Shehata, 88.
73 Rajabany and Ben Shitrit, 87.
74 Ibid.
security forces were quite loyal to Gaddafi and other army units had loyalties towards different segments of the population.\textsuperscript{75} Soon armed rebels had control over Benghazi and were pressing west to “liberate” the rest of the country. Then, the UNSC Resolution of March 17, 2011 provided a no-fly zone and airstrikes by NATO and its Arab allies which enabled Libyan rebel forces to continue capturing more land and cities from Gaddafi, moving towards the capital Tripoli in the western part of the country. As Shehata explains: “Every city that was liberated proceeded to form its own rebel militia. The rebels predominantly consisted of bands of young men who had the support of important tribal groups and large families who were isolated by Gaddafi’s regime.”\textsuperscript{76} The focus was on freeing Libya and controlling one’s part of it – not at all a nationalistic endeavor.

The 2011 uprisings in Libya, a country devoid of strong nationalism surmounting the previous regime, resulted in continuing instability and division after the regime rupture, ultimately devolving into civil war. The impact of the lack of nationalism is demonstrated in: the discourse focusing only on “freeing” Libya; the fact that cleavages were present predominantly along tribal and regional lines; and the evidence that demands of different actors emphasized control through armed force of different cities or areas, causing chaos once Gaddafi’s regime was gone. The lack of strong nationalism in Libya thus contributed to high levels of inter-militia violence and ultimately civil war that may threaten the continuance of a unified Libyan country.

[4] Comparative Analysis on Hypothesis I: Discourse of the Uprisings

The discourse of the citizenry at the time of the uprisings provides key insight into the ways in which people envisioned their goals and the meaning of the anti-regime protests. Discourse illustrates emotions such as frustration, anger, and jubilation, and it also reveals how people were thinking of events as they progressed. Before conducting an in-depth examination of the discourse by Egyptians and Libyans participating in and observing the revolts in their countries, it is key to establish an understanding of the basic patterns of discourse and how they can be assessed.

To do so, this paper considered the cases of Egypt and Libya sampled at three key points in the trajectories of the Arab Spring: (a) when anti-regime uprisings began; (b) when the long-

\textsuperscript{75} Zolton Barany, “The Role of the Military,” in \textit{Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab World}, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 167-168.\textsuperscript{.}

\textsuperscript{76} Shehata, 88.
standing ruler fell; and (c) one year after such government overthrow. There are four types of words or phrases in discourse that this paper considers important to indicating the level of nationalism in a country. The first is referencing the state itself – Egypt or Libya respectively – which would indicate nationalism. The second is mentioning different sub-national identities – including city, region, tribe, or ethnicity. The third is saying “people” or “country” – which would indicate nationalism. The fourth is using the term “free” or “liberate” which would reveal a desire to break the lid of the state and potentially let loose numerous identities. A sampling shows the distinction broadly between Egypt and Libya on these discourse metrics.

---

Samples will be taken from the article(s) posted on Global Voices on the day under consideration, or from days as close to that as available. As an explanatory note about the subsequent citations from Global Voices: Global Voices includes pieces by over “1200 writers, analysts, online media experts and translators. Global Voices has been leading the conversation on citizen media reporting since 2005. [It endeavors to] curate, verify, and translate trending news and stories [] on the Internet, from blogs, independent press and social media in 167 countries.” As it explains, “many of the world’s most interesting and important stories aren’t in just one place. Sometimes they’re scattered in bits and pieces across the Internet, in blog posts and tweets, and in multiple languages. These are the stores we accurately report on Global Voices – and translate.” http://globalvoicesonline.org/about/. Therefore, citations in this paper will be of the Global Voices article and author, but much of the content in any given article is from a variety of sources that are noted, quoted, and referenced within the article itself.

Each numerical figure represents the number of mentions of such a word divided by the total number of tweets included in the Global Voices article(s) at that key moment in the transition trajectory, and this scaled number then converted into a percentage.


(b) When the long-standing dictator fell: February 11, 2011 “Egypt: The World Rejoices as Mubarak Resigns” – 11 total tweets; relevant words = country, Egypt, Egypt Egypt, Egypt, country, Cairo, Egypt. “Egypt: Mubarak’s Resignation Celebrations Continue” – 17 total tweets; relevant words = Egypt, people, Egypt, people, Nasr City, Egypt, Egyptian, Egypt, Egyptian, people, Egyptian, Egypt, Egypt, Egyptians, peoples.

(c) One year after such government overthrow: February 11, 2012. “Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood versus SCAF – the Fall of the Masks?” – 6 total tweets; relevant words = people, people.
This sampling indicates that during three key stages of transition – when the uprisings began, when the ruler fell, and one year after the regime rupture – the discourse in Egypt was more nationalistic and in Libya it was less nationalistic. While both Egyptians and Libyans mentioned their state during the protests, this element of nationalistic discourse increased in Egypt when the ruler fell, but in Libya it dropped off significantly after the start of the uprising. Libyans also made significant references to sub-national labels (such as cities or regions) whereas Egyptians did not. Egyptians meanwhile showed more nationalistic references to their people and their country, more so even after the ruler fell and a year after the overthrow of the government. Finally, Libyans mentioned freeing or liberating the country, but Egyptians did not.

---

80(a) Anti-regime uprisings began: February 15, 2011
“Libya: Protests Begin in Benghazi Ahead of February 17 Day of Wrath.”

(b) The long-standing dictator fell: October 20, 2011
“Libya: Unconfirmed News of Gaddafi’s Capture” – 7 total tweets; relevant words = Libyan, Libya, Libyan, Libya, Libyans, Benghazi.
“Libya: Celebrations as Gaddafi Confirmed Dead” – 8 total tweets; relevant words = Libyan, Tripoli, Libya, Tripoli, Sirte,
“Libya: The Truth About Gaddafi’s Death” – 9 total tweets; relevant words = free, Misrata, Libya, Libya, people,

(c) One year after such government overthrow: October 20, 2012
“Arab World: Outrage Over Killing of US Ambassador in Benghazi” – 10 total tweets; relevant words = Libya, Libya, Benghazii, Libyan, Libyan, Misrata, Benghazii, Libya, Benghazii, people, Libya, Libya,
“Libya: Sorry Chris, Benghazi Couldn’t Protect You” – 5 total tweets; relevant words = Benghazii, Libya, Libyans, Benghazii, Libya, Benghazii, Benghazii, Benghazii.
A more in-depth analysis of the discourse in both countries even better illustrates the nuances of how nationalist or non-nationalist discourse impacted the trajectory of Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and in Libya.

IA: Discourse of the Uprisings in Egypt

The discourse in Egypt from the beginning of the regime rupture and throughout the ensuing years of repeated regime change and transition reflected national unity. Citizens spoke about “The Egyptian people’s intifada (uprising),” and choosing the date January 25th was both due to the significant grievances against the regime’s police brutality and also because this National Police Day originated to commemorate that the Egyptian police stood by the Egyptian people resisting the British in 1952. The Egyptian Arab Spring was a national uprising against the regime. On January 27th when the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest organized opposition group, announced it would join the protest after Friday prayers, other activists welcomed increased participation but also warned that this must be a unified national protest for regime change, not one that would become divided by religious slogans. The Friday protest would be the people’s “Day of Rage.” On that Friday when riot police and some of Mubarak’s forces engaged in a crackdown and some violent clashes ensued, the vast majority of protestors continued focusing on the unified slogan “The People Will Bring the Regime Down.” As one activist made sure to explain on Twitter, “Egypt uprising is a popular uprising – not religious, not political, not ideological – plain vanilla ‘popular.’” Another remarked that inside Tahrir Square there was no sectarianism or division: “inside the field no one asked about religion, no one cared. All Egyptians…all protesting, all united.”

“The Egyptians have united for the first time – Islamist, Salafis, Muslim Brotherhood, the Left / Christians and Muslims / Young and old / Rich and poor / Graduates of the American and German universities, and the uneducated / Residents of fancy neighbourhoods and slum-dwellers / United by injustice, oppression, corruption, and torture.”

---

Public discourse also expressed appreciation as numerous journalists from regime-backed newspapers including *Al-Ahram* were switching sides to support the people.  

Additionally, a very significant indicator of the extent to which Egypt’s was a national uprising was the army’s ultimate decision to protect the protestors and not exert repressive violence on them as the regime ordered. As Eva Bellin argues, the response of a state’s coercive apparatus to an uprising plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of that uprising, and whether coercive forces have the will to repress is in turn heavily impacted by the size and composition of the protesting crowds. She explains: “Using lethal force against civilians threatens to undermine the image of the military as defender of the nation, especially if the crowds are representative of the ‘nation’ and cannot be dismissed as distinctly ‘other’ along class, sectarian, or ethnic lines.”

There was overwhelming support in Egyptian citizen discourse once it became clear that the military would stand by the people.

After speeches by Mubarak conceding that he would change his cabinet and then that he would not run in the scheduled fall 2011 presidential elections, speeches that only contributed to fueling the protests, on February 11, 2011 Mubarak finally resigned as president of Egypt and the military’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over in the interim. Public complaints and protests nonetheless persisted until elections for a new civilian government began in November 2011. Notably, the discourse among the citizenry continued to emphasize that the national protests were to achieve an Egyptian government that was credible and accountable to the people.

The November 28-29, 2011 Egyptian parliamentary elections saw gains for Islamist parties; the May 23-24, 2012 presidential election and June 2012 runoff between Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsy and Ahmed Shafik, an Independent who was Mubarak’s last Prime Minister, led to the victory of Morsy as the new ruler of Egypt. By November 2012 though, Egyptian people were again in the streets to protest Morsy’s extensions and abuses of power: much of the public saw him as a new “Middle East tyrant” in the making. Significantly, this round of protests also exhibited discourse of an Egyptian nation seeking another chance at building a government that was credible and accountable to the people. The ruler being protested

---


against was very different – Mubarak had been a secular, socialist, military pedigree authoritarian ruler, whereas Morsi was a religious, Islamist, civilian authoritarian ruler – but the method, technique, and discourse surrounding the efforts to overthrow the regime were much the same. The June 2013 protests also began in Tahrir Square, expanded across the country and accelerated until July 3, 2013, when the military forced Morsi’s resignation and again took control in the interim to restore public stability. Head of the armed forces General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi announced that there would be a temporary technocratic national government that would prepare for a new constitution to be written and for the holding of new presidential and parliamentary elections. In May 2014 Al-Sisi, now a civilian, won the presidential election against Hamdeen Sabahi.

**IB: Discourse of the Uprisings in Libya**

The discourse in Libya was not one of national unity but rather was one emphasizing “liberating” or “freeing” Libya from Gaddafi. When anti-regime protests erupted a before the February 17, 2011 planned “Day of Wrath,” Benghazi, the site of the uprising, was quickly attacked by pro-regime forces ordered by Gaddafi to use full-scale lethal violence to suppress the protests. Amidst outcries of horrific violence, the military forces split. As one observer remarked, “Fighting with anything from heavy weapons to clubs and sticks has broken out throughout certain cities between defecting members of the military who have joined civilians against the remaining factions of Muammar Al Gaddafi's government.” This split of the armed forces in Libya, which occurred at the very beginning of the regime rupture, was instrumental in the outcome seen in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime as well as in the events of subsequent years. This split also revealed the crucial point that absent a strong nationalism among the people in Libya, the uprisings led to divisions and armed conflict among different groups. Bellin explains: “In Libya, the military’s structure mirrored (and built upon) the country’s tribal profile. And so, not surprisingly, when one ‘tribe’ (citizens of Benghazi) rose in protest against Gaddafi’s regime, the military fractured along tribal lines, with Benghazi units refusing to fire on their compatriots and other units remaining loyal to Gaddafi.”

---


93 Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” 134.
As violence escalated, citizen as well as in fact regime discourse revealed the extent to which a lack of nationalism in Libya was creating a problem in the trajectory of these uprisings. One observer remarked: “Blood bath in #Libya by #Gaddafī killing his own people. This is a genocide, this is ethnic cleansing, this is State Terrorism!!!” likely referencing that different tribes – now different sides in the battle for power in parts of the state – were massacring each other.\(^9^4\) On February 22, 2011, Gaddafī gave an alarming speech in which he issued frightening threats of death to people who opposed him. He “likened protestors to ‘rats’ and pledged to ‘cleanse’ the country ‘house by house and alley by alley.’”\(^9^5\) In this speech, Gaddafī also rhetorically equated himself with the state of Libya itself, claiming that he was “the national leader” and that those revolting who did not want him also did not want Libya.\(^9^6\) The dictator was asserting that a unified Libyan nation-state had existed only under his auspices, and so his enemies were enemies of such a nation-state as well. Historically, there is indeed an argument for this view, as a unified Libya had been a construct maintained in Gaddafī’s 42 years of rule. The fall of Gaddafī thus would leave a vacuum in which Libyan nationalism was not a meaningful force since it did not really exist above his reign nor before the dictator took power.

Violent clashes between various anti-Gaddafī and pro-Gaddafī militias continued, gradually “liberating” the rest of the country, and citizen discourse continued reflecting this sentiment desiring freedom from the regime but devoid of constructive nationalism. March 4, 2011 was deemed the “Friday of Liberation” – indicating the feeling among Libyans that the objective of the uprisings was to liberate the country from Gaddafī’s regime (not a project of proactive nationalistic building in a new direction).\(^9^7\) The battle continued from East to West and reached Misrata, and some citizens started to comment that the division of Libya was imminent: “@Almisryyy: Libya is a Prey from everyone, The Dirty Deal is to divide #Libya East & West & #Misrata is preventing it from happening…”\(^9^8\) Tripoli, depicted by the regime as Gaddafī’s final loyal stronghold, was finally seized by Libyan rebels in August 2011, and on October 20 Gaddafī was captured and killed.\(^9^9\) The discourse upon the taking of Tripoli was that “Tripoli is liberated”
and “Libya is liberated.” This declaration was formalized by the National Transitional Council (NTC) that had formed in the East and become internationally recognized by this time.

[5] **Comparative Analysis on Hypothesis II: Cleavages and Demands**

The cleavages that form during the process of transition after regime rupture, as well as the demands that different groups make, are affected significantly by how strong nationalism is in a country and by the discourse that has colored and guided the early stages of the transition period. Cleavages are, broadly, “collective political identifications,” and they often shift or become more apparent during periods of large-scale transition. A cleavage has three key elements: “(1) A *social-structural* element, such as class, religious denomination, status, or education, (2) an element of *collective identity* of this social group, and (3) an *organizational manifestation* in the form of collective action or a durable organization.” Cleavages can form along different types of lines or along multiple cross-cutting lines. Different types of cleavages though reveal varying levels of nationalist sentiment existing in a country – as exhibited in the divergent situations in Egypt and in Libya. Cleavages along lines of political ideology are more likely to emerge where there is strong nationalist sentiment but citizens nonetheless disagree on the policies that should govern the state. Cleavages along (sub-national) identity lines – including regional, tribal, ethnic, or religious lines – are more likely to emerge where citizens lack a strong sense of nationalism.

**IIA: Cleavages and Demands in Egypt**

The cleavages in Egypt reveal strong nationalistic sentiment: cleavages over the period of regime rupture and transition have been predominantly along political ideological lines between secularists and Islamists, with both demanding in essence a better government for Egypt in line with their vision. Sadik Al-Azm points out that the cleavages in Egypt were not of the formerly familiar Islamist nationalist or Arab nationalist types. He notes that absent from the Egyptian uprisings were banners saying, “‘Islam is the solution’” or “‘Arab unity is the solution.’”

---


101 Rajabany and Ben Shitrit, 76.


103 Ibid.

Neither universalistic Islamism nor universalistic pan-Arab nationalism pervaded the demands of the Egyptian people – the focus rather was on the future character and government of the Egyptian nation-state itself.

Egyptian nationalist sentiment is strong and this understanding shaped the cleavages the country experienced. “Unusual for countries in the MENA, Egypt had well-defined state borders, a strong national identity, and ethnically and religiously, a relatively homogeneous population.”

Thus as the rounds of protests continued in Egypt, spread across the country, and then also repeatedly rekindled themselves due to displeasure with successive governments, the actors involved did not lose a sense of nationalism but rather split along political ideological lines. As Rabab El-Mahdi explains, in the transition period since 2011 the political cleavage structure has essentially retained and followed the political cleavage structure of pre-2011: that of “Islamist vs. non-Islamist (or secular).” The debate in Egypt occurred as people demanded different policy visions for the nation of Egypt. Elisabeth Ozdalga argues that within Egypt, secularist nationalism and Islamist nationalism are actually sister ideologies. Ahmed al-Rahim acknowledges as well that the Islamic side of the ideological debate in Egypt is indeed truly nationalist in its realistic political objectives. Lust and Waldner frame Egypt’s political cleavages as “universalistic-transformative,” “with Islamists facing off against liberal-secularists.” In this scenario, the challenge in a political transition period is competing demands potentially carried out in a resurgent authoritarian manner, and indeed perhaps cycles of authoritarianism between the political ideologies, rather than democratic transitions of power.

Evidence of the types of ideological cleavages in Egypt, and of how nationalism pervades and shapes the trajectory of political transition in the country, is revealed in polls conducted during this period. While 24% of Egyptians are strongly Islamist and 20% are strongly secularist, the vast majority of citizens are in the center; 70% of Egyptians actually identify economic betterment of the nation as the key factor on which they should vote. While Ellen Lust, Gamal Soltan, and Jakob Wichmann point out that “the broad national coalition that brought down the

---

105 David Patel, Valerie Bunce, and Sharon Wolchik, “Diccussion and Demonstration,” in The Arab Uprisings Explained, edited by Marc Lynch, 64.

106 El-Mahdi, 67.


109 Lust and Waldner, 20.

Mubarak regime began to disintegrate immediately after his ouster,” they attribute this to the fact that “the ideological conflict between Islamists and secularists re-emerged, each seeking to institute their own encompassing vision for the nation through legitimate channels of power.”

This observation is precisely in line with the assessment that Egypt’s deep nationalism meant that cleavages following the regime rupture would be about political ideology – two competing visions for the Egyptian nation.

This reality of cleavages along political ideologies, with both sides exhibiting different nationalisms and demands articulating divergent visions for the nation-state, can be seen in the series of transition stages in 2011-2015. The trajectory in Egypt has turned on the changing capacities and successes of political organization – as opposed to ethnic, regional, or tribal identity clashes within the country. As Lust, Soltan, and Wichmann explain:

At first, Islamists carried the day because they had organisational unity and the ability to mobilise vast swathes of the population. They contrasted sharply with fragmented secularist parties which held small political bases based in urban areas, primarily in Cairo… But the tables turned. The alliance between the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and Nour Party began falling apart, just as the secularists were regrouping. The formation of the National Salvation Front (NSF) in response to President Morsi’s extra-constitutional declaration of November 2012 was a turning point of the balance of power between the two blocks, and it ultimately led to mass protest of June 30 that granted the military the opportunity to ouster then President Mohamed Morsi.\textsuperscript{112}

Importantly, just as the round of protests in January to February 2011 against Mubarak was broadly a national movement of the Egyptian people against an authoritarian ruler with extensive and unjust powers being exercised oppressively, the round of protests against Morsi in June 2013 was broad-based and against authoritarian extension of power by the new president. “A great many Egyptians…were driven by anger over Morsi’s failure to deliver on his promises and the continued economic stagnation, deteriorating security, and ever-narrowing political coalition.”\textsuperscript{113}

\textbf{II.B: Cleavages and Demands in Libya}

In Libya, a state with little nationalistic sentiment or consensus, the cleavages persisting before and after the regime rupture and throughout the transition period were predominantly regional and tribal; this resulted in continued instability as once Libya was “freed” then various

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{112}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{113}\textit{Ibid.}
groups’ demands focused on controlling – through force if necessary – different cities or areas, causing chaos as the post-Gaddafì government lacked control over the entire country.

Notably, regional and tribal cleavages and competition were abused under Gaddafì’s regime and would persist after its fall. As Intissar K. Rajabany and Lihi Ben Shitrit explain, Gaddafì exploited tensions between the western and eastern regions and fostered tribal conflict. “For example, while Qaddafì developed his native town of Sirte, staple food was not consistently available in Benghazi. Another example was the installation of the headquarters of international oil companies in Tripoli, even though most of the drilling took place in the eastern part of the country.”114 Additionally in the realm of fueling tribal division and competition, “Qaddafì also tried to win the support of the largest tribe in Libya, the Warfalla tribe, by bestowing favor on its members, a practice that caused resentment among other tribes.”115

These regional and tribal cleavages had significant impacts on the early trajectory of the Libyan revolution, in particular on the break up of the armed forces along regional and tribal lines, and on the formation of a rebel government in the East as Gaddafì continued to maintain power by force in the West. Rajabany and Ben Shitrit point out that soldiers in eastern cities were the first ones to defect from the military, which was absolutely key in enabling the city of Benghazi to be liberated. In particular they emphasize the key defection of interior minister and second-in-command in the Libyan regime, Major General Abdul Fatah Younis, who was followed by his Special Forces. Since Younis hailed from the important Al Obeidi tribe of eastern Libya, he was assured that many would follow his lead. Significantly, once the East was liberated from Gaddafì, leaders that had defected from the regime, including Libya’s permanent representative to the UN among others, formed the National Transitional Council (NTC), headquartered in Benghazi, which was in effect the rebel capital. Indeed this provided the revolt with an appearance of some cohesive leadership, which was key in bringing in UNSC support and the international military intervention that would be crucial in defeating Gaddafì.116

After Gaddafì’s fall, tribal and local loyalties continued to be paramount for many armed groups, which perpetuated and escalated divisions. For example, tensions continued among the Warfalla (the largest tribe in Libya) and Qadhadhfa (the tribe of the former dictator) tribes and Misrata groups. As rivalries over influence and retribution as well as land and resources persisted,

114 Rajabany and Ben Shitrit., 80.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., 90.
the Libyan national army that was formed after Gaddafi’s fall failed to diffuse these tensions by its “attempt to integrate whole rebel groups into the army. Many of those groups prioritize[d] the interests and commands from their tribes over the national good.”\textsuperscript{117} Additionally, racism towards tribes in the southern and southeastern parts of the country (Fezzan) such as the Toubou and the Tuareg increasingly propelled these groups to seek political and military autonomy. As one Berber activist explained, “No one in Tripoli cares for the rest of the country.”\textsuperscript{118}

The potential for Libya to move forward towards a unified national government was hindered by disparate cleavages and loyalties in this non-nationalistic country. In August 2011, the NTC put forth a ‘constitutional declaration’ providing a schedule for elections and writing a new constitution.\textsuperscript{119} But as future Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril explained, the interim governing body could not find national unity beyond the previous goal of its members to free Libya from Gaddafi. Jibril articulated:

“When the NTC was composed there were no criteria, people didn’t know each other, everyone came from a different city…They just met and agreed on one objective, ‘getting rid of Gaddafi.’ Other than that there was no common purpose whatsoever. Our differences came out clearly when Gaddafi was gone. We discovered we don’t talk the same language. We have different perceptions of different things…”\textsuperscript{120}

Rajabany and Shitrit also note that although Libyan activists showed impressive coordination in 2011 to oust Gaddafi, during the transition period “mistakes by the transitional government, the resurfacing of regional and tribal divisions, and difficult security conditions contributed to waning enthusiasm.”\textsuperscript{121} Continued cooperation to build a legitimate government that is accountable to the people faltered at least in part due to Libya’s “atomised tribal structure that makes cooperation hard and magnifies distrust.”\textsuperscript{122} In July 2012 Libyans elected representatives to the General National Congress (GNC), replacing the provisional NTC. The GNC was then responsible for overseeing the drafting of a constitution; in March 2013 it provided for election of a Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA).\textsuperscript{123}

\begin{flushleft}
118 Ibid.
120 Mahmoud Jibril in Danahar, 331.
121 Rajabany and Shitrit, 97.
\end{flushleft}
Recent surveys reveal that while most Libyans want the legislative body to succeed and democratic government to prevail, they are disappointed at its failures and are particularly concerned that ethnic and tribal divisions will continue to compromise the political cohesion of the country. Surveys by the Transitional Governance Project, JMW Consulting, and the National Democratic Institute in late 2013 found that 68% of Libyans see the GNC’s performance as poor, especially in that the GNC “has not taken appropriate steps to ensure national reconciliation, improve security, [or] combat corruption…”\textsuperscript{124,125} The surveys, conducted through face-to-face interviews with 1,200 randomly selected respondents from Libya’s 13 governorates, reveal: that Libyans have increasingly negative views towards political parties; that citizens disapprove of tribal leaders in the assembly; and that the majority of Libyans would like to see reductions in the quotas in the CDA for the Amazigh, Toubou, and Tuareg minority communities.\textsuperscript{126,127} These views reflect the Libyan citizenry’s fear that enabling formal tribal and ethnic cleavages to present themselves officially in political bodies is harmful to such institutions’ ability to fairly pass laws and govern. Unfortunately though, in practical reality there is apparently a gap between what the majority of the public want and what those with military and political power desire; so even if the public believes inclusive democracy to be the ideal, elites leading sub-national groups with particular interests can be the ones who truly determine outcomes in the transition period.

The ways in which non-nationalistic cleavages interact with each other and with the public’s desire to form a unified Libyan democracy will continue to be crucial for the country’s future. If there is hope for “successful political transition, pluralist transformation and consolidation in Libya,” then reconciliation between these values and long-standing loyalties to sub-national groups is needed.\textsuperscript{128} As Karim Mezran describes:

Many local counterweights to central authority emerged during and after the war [overthrowing Gaddafi] in the form of local councils and militias whose membership was based on cities, families and tribes. Indeed, the first important effect of the revolution on the country is the rediscovery of local ties at the subregional level (local and tribal). In addition to that, new values, based on pluralism and participation in the political life of the country, have emerged. Whether the older allegiances will merge with the new values

\textsuperscript{124}Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{129}Mezran, 309.
and produce a vibrant and democratic public or will clash and return to a dictatorship is the point of the struggle ahead.129

As Mezran explains, the cleavages in Libya persist in causing difficulties in the areas of: ensuring the legitimacy of transitional ruling institutions; reconstructing government organizations and the economy while also building a consolidated police and military out of local armed groups; and holding violators of human rights accountable without creating additional strain and retaliation among the citizenry. The legitimacy of the NTC was questioned as its membership arose ad hoc from local councils, tribal elders, and militias, and even after Gaddafi’s fall in the western region local groups were more successful than the national government in determining and fulfilling the needs of their cities and towns. Rebuilding state institutions would be closely connected with having physical authority in an area, which in turn was related to the severe problem of integrating militias into a national police force and army because each militia had its own chain of command and internal interests. Additionally, persistent vigilante justice in different parts of the country, as well as score-settling among groups – all of which had basically committed human rights abuses – made just trials and punishment very challenging.130 The lack of nationalism in Libya led to intense sub-national cleavages – political, economic, social, and military – that continue to pose a major threat to the prospect of a successful unified state. Mezran concludes:

The question of unity in Libya is pivotal. From the provinces of the east to the many local councils in the west and the south, centrifugal forces are pushing for the establishment of a political system that would give significant powers to local entities. These forces pay only lip service to the Libyan state; most of their claims in support of national unity hide separatist tendencies…[I]f the current and future Libyan governments do not embark on serious nation-building activities, Libya could split up. The way the revolution was conducted, fragmented, and decentralized reflected the lack of national institutions and cohesive national identity.131

The cleavages and lack of national institutions and strong national identity that persist in the Libyan transition period pose problems for those trying to build a unified credible government establishment and for those who simultaneously seek to have their particular interests recognized as they fear renewed oppression.

In 2013, by the second anniversary of the February 17th Libyan uprising against Gaddafi, there had been three governments in less than two years, demonstrating that the effort to

129Ibid.
130Ibid., 323-327.
131Ibid., 328.
establish democratic institutions had been very challenging. Citizens recognized that the country continued to be divided and was not progressing as a nation-state:

The Libyan government...has failed to secure the borders and arms stockpiles, making the country the largest smuggling place on earth and Libyans the biggest arms dealers. Mishandled priorities, the continued shunning of justice and reconciliation and evident gross corruption has put a damper on the euphoria, exacerbating the grievances from various groups and regions.\(^{132}\)

Displeased with the internationally-recognized national government, different groups in Libya remained divided and sought various avenues – not national reconciliation – to assert their demands and advance their interests. One activist stated:

The growing take over of the Islamists in public spheres and their pandering to militias allowed them to pontificate more and more culminating in the assassination of the US Ambassador to Libya in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. This marked a turning point with increased political kidnappings and killings in Libya, anchoring firmly the view that the elected government was impotent, slow and disconnected from the real Libyan problems. The voices calling for federalism were now stronger till they reached their crescendo a couple of months ago with a planned second revolution on February 15 in Benghazi with the logic that they started it and so could do it again to correct the wrong. The list of demands ranged from the resignation of political figures to installing a federalist system.\(^{133}\)

The problem in Libya has been that, as Lust and Waldner explain, “the major line of cleavage separates particularistic-redistributive parties representing distinct ethno-linguistic communities.”\(^{134}\) Therefore the danger during the post-regime rupture period of transition in Libya has been the failure of a national reconciliation cohesive government.


Finally, cleavages and demands of the groups that form in turn affect transition trajectories in states post-regime rupture as civil, political, and even violent struggles ensue among them to determine how the country will be governed. The nature and extent of such conflicts, and the impact of the level of nationalism, led to the outcome of the propensity for a country to stay together or fall apart as a geopolitical unit.

\[\text{III A: Violence and the Future of the State in Egypt}\]


\(^{133}\)Ibid.

\(^{134}\)Lust and Waldner, 20.
The violence during the Egyptian regime ruptures and political transitions has been predominantly between masses of protestors and paramilitary police or security forces sent by the regime (whether Mubarak’s, Tantawi’s in the interim, or Morsi’s). In addition, violent clashes occurred between Muslim Brotherhood members who had supported Morsi and protestors who had pushed for his overthrow. Nonetheless, many Egyptians saw this political violence as “expected” and not particularly destabilizing.135

Importantly, the Egyptian army’s strength and long-standing prevalence as a nationalist symbol enabled a quelling of the violence during the cycles of regime rupture and transition that Egypt experienced. “Historically, the military has been the bastion of Egyptian nationalism… And, of course, it abhors widespread unrest and political instability that threaten the state and their economic interests.”136 So when the military stepped in to govern in the interim after popular protests pushed both Mubarak and then Morsi from power, it was really a nationalist victory: “Together, the military and the people removed Morsi from power, just as they had Mubarak before him, because he failed to deliver. Most supporting these ousters yearn for economic and political stability, state integrity, and a decent life.”137

This pattern produces an optimistic prediction for the nation-state of Egypt: it has remained together and viable, and it is likely to have a stable and secure future (albeit not necessarily a democratic one). The Arab Spring has brought to Egypt a now understood process of widespread public protest, and with the assistance of the military to quell any potentially serious civil violence, of the removal of a ruler who has unjustly and excessively utilized his powers to the point of authoritarianism. The people continue to push for “reform that provides a genuine constitutional president of the republic and a prime minister not appointed by presidential fiat, but actually produced by the democratic political arena of the country.”138

Although it is not yet clear whether now-civilian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will stand the test of the Egyptian people’s demands for government accountability and quality-of-life improvements for citizens, it is evident that the country has the propensity to stay together. Interestingly, Lust, Soltan, and Wichmann explain that any group or individual’s attempt to become complete victors will just “cause economic deterioration and instability that causes

136Ibid.
137Ibid.
138Al-Azm, 276.
Egyptians to turn on them.”139 Hopefully, the rounds of regime change will eventually result in compromise between Egypt’s principal ideological political sides and a building of democratic government and prosperity for the people.

III B: Violence and the Future of the State in Libya

Since the 2011 regime rupture, Libya has continued to experience high levels of widespread inter-militia violence, and ultimately civil war; by 2015 it continues to seem that the viability of a unified Libyan state is in jeopardy. Even months after Gaddafi had been killed and his regime fell, carrying weapons and disorganized violence persisted. Protests continued in Tripoli urging for the cessation of such practices and pushing for “reconciliation, disarmament, and a national army.”140 Citizens realized that the struggle for power was far from over – Gaddafi’s overthrow left a vacuum in the national “republic” of Libya that he had constructed and oppressively held together for 42 years. Once he fell, Libyan identity groups fragmented.141 The problem escalated in particular when sub-national groups mobilized and persisted not just in a political manner (as in local transitional councils) but also in a military manner (as in revolutionary brigades).142

As Shehata explains, the regional and tribal character of the conflict during the Libyan Arab Spring uprisings led to immense violence and a possibility that the unified Libyan state itself may not survive. When Gaddafi and his family were gone, the power of allegiances to regions and tribes combined with the fragility of national institutions resulted in a failure of national governance. In various areas, regional militias created during the revolt assumed power and refused to disband. Since governance by elected bodies such as the Libyan Congress is “tenuous at best,” their relevance is highly questionable. The ultimate result of current efforts to unite regions of Libya under the power of a national military that has a monopoly on force is uncertain.143 As Danahar explains in “Libya: Year Zero,” Gaddafi’s death did not end the serious violence in Libya because the death of the 42-year dictator “didn’t end Libya’s war with itself.”144 The lack of nationalism in Libya meant that this revolution was not just going to cause

139Ibid.
142Mezran, 329.
143Shehata, 92-93.
144Danahar, 326.
regime change but perhaps could cause the break up of the Libyan country. The combatants were not fighting “a war in Libya, they were fighting a war against Libya…” The young men knew what they were fighting against, but not what they were fighting for.”  

As the conflict continued, the allegiances of the fighters “drifted away from the already fragile idea of ‘Libya’ and settled instead with men fighting alongside them and the town or city they were trying to defend.”

The fact that pre-Arab Spring Libya was lacking in nationalism meant that after Gaddafi fell, his concept of Libya fell too. In this void, militias’ loyalties were with their city, region, or tribe, and this multi-directional chaotic violence enabled civil war to take hold in the country. During the revolution against Gaddafi, the fact that every town and city basically freed itself had created very localized forces: different militias therefore felt a connection and loyalty specifically to defending and controlling their turf, but not to land beyond and certainly not to stabilizing, unifying, and securing a state of Libya. Danahar reflects that the transition trajectory in Libya may continue to be unsettled and bloody, as Gaddafi’s constructed Libya had left an immense power vacuum and many “small Gaddafis” now competing for power in different cities and regions, “a product of the forced union between disparate peoples.” Despite Libyan public opinion that largely is opposed to regional breakaways and declarations of autonomy, the reality does not bode well for a unified Libya going forward.

In late 2013 several kidnappings, assassinations, and incidents of clashes between militias escalated tensions in the country that had never fully stabilized since the Gaddafi regime rupture. Both Tripoli in the West and Benghazi in the East experienced such unrest, including the kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in October and bloody clashes between a Misrata-affiliated militia and demonstrating citizens in Tripoli in November. Additionally, public pressure mounted against Zeidan as he failed to implement the GNC’s law requiring “the government to remove all militias from Tripoli and state institutions, and to disband all non-state armed groups.” In November 2013, there was also an explicit effort at establishing regionalism in Libya’s East as “The federalist Cyrenaican Political Bureau led by Ibrahim Jadhran continued to demand autonomy for the region—including the creation of a regional

---

145 Ibid., 326-327.
146 Ibid, 327.
147 Ibid., 328.
148 Ibid., 329.
147 Ibid., 4.
government, regional oil company, and seizure of oil production facilities.”  

Civil war broke out in 2014. Displeased with the June 2014 election results, militias from Misrata and some other Islamist militias from the West formed Libyan Dawn, which battled militias in Tripoli and some scant government armed forces and by August took control of the capital. Libyan Dawn formed a parliament, and the previous Tripoli government fled East to Tobruk, so that “Libya now has two governments, one in Tripoli and one in the east of the country, both battling for the hearts and minds of the myriad militias.”\(^1\) The lack of a strong Libyan national army being built after Gaddafi’s fall has meant that in each city and area of Libya the fighting is between different militias with shifting alliances. By the end of 2014, the country continued to be de facto divided into: Eastern Libya (i.e. Cyrenaica) controlled by the internationally recognized Libyan government and loyal militias; northwestern Libya (i.e. Tripolitania) controlled by the Libyan Dawn government and militias; and southwestern Libya (i.e. Fezzan) controlled by Toubou and Tuareg tribes. As Zack Beauchamp comments, “Libya is divided into two main chunks, but there are many smaller tribal, Islamist, and militia players that complicate the war even further.”\(^2\) The actual breakup of the country may result as a negotiated peace or simply as an armistice. Recent surveys conducted by the Transitional Governance Project, JMW Consulting, and the National Democratic Institute find that “the vast majority of Libyans continue to view disarmament of militias, political stability, and personal security as the most important issues to be addressed.”\(^3\)

**[7] Summary: Egypt versus Libya**

The above investigation of how nationalism affects the transition trajectories of countries that have experienced Arab Spring regime ruptures supports the proposition that the fundamental underlying independent variable of the presence or absence of nationalism in a country, will, through three intermediate mechanisms, affect the dependent variable of whether or not the country experiences severe conflict and the propensity to break apart. This relationship has been

---

\(^1\)Ibid.  
\(^3\)Transitional Governance Project, JMW Consulting, and National Democratic Institute, “Committed to Democracy and Unity: Public Opinion Survey in Libya,” 2.
demonstrated by an analysis through the progression of hypotheses regarding: I: *Discourse of the Uprisings*; II: *Cleavages and Demands*; and III: *Violence and the Future of the State*.

First, the comparison of discourses in Egypt and in Libya is consistent with hypothesis I. In Egypt, citizen discourse was exemplified by the phrase: “The people want the overthrow of the regime.” Egypt, a country possessing strong nationalist sentiment, exhibited discourse during the overthrow of Mubarak, subsequent protests, and the overthrow of Morsi that expressed an aspiration for a more accountable and just government. Egyptians’ discourse conveyed national unity and a desire for change that would replace allegedly illegitimate and oppressive rulers with ones who would be credible and benefit the people. This discourse propelled the result of several successive changes in government in Egypt. Contrastingly, “#freeLibya” reveals the train of discourse in Libya. A country with weak if any nationalistic sentiment, Libya had discourse calling for freedom or liberation from the oppressive Gaddafi regime, but it lacked expression of a goal to construct a post-regime-rupture alternative for the country as a whole. Meanwhile, Gaddafi claimed that he himself was the Libyan state, and the fall of his regime coincided with the downfall of this purported Libyan national identity. Failed governance of the country and chaos would ensue.

Next, the comparison of the cleavages that emerged during the regime rupture and transition periods in Egypt and Libya, and the demands expressed by different groups across these cleavages, is consistent with hypothesis II. In Egypt, where nationalism is strong, cleavages were essentially political ideological ones between Islamists and secularists whose demands centered on their different visions for the future of the state. Both sides aimed to build a post-Mubarak Egypt that would be more just and prosperous for the people of Egypt, but they differed on how to achieve this goal and on what the final product should look like. Through successive rounds of transition political power shifted, but nonetheless the cleavages remained these ideological ones. In Libya meanwhile, where nationalism is weak or even absent, cleavages were predominantly along tribal and regional lines. During and after Gaddafi’s fall, the country split as different groups had demands that were particularistic and sub-national, concentrating on political and military control in their city or region. There was thus a failure to form a cohesive credible government with authority over the entire country, and some groups even proposed federalism or autonomy in ensuing years.
Finally, the comparison of violence and implications for the future of the states of Egypt and of Libya is consistent with hypothesis III. In Egypt, violence during the transition period has been smaller-scale political violence and has not threatened the viability of the country. Violence in Egypt has been principally between mass groups of protestors and regime paramilitary or security forces (first Mubarak’s and then Morsi’s), as well as some clashes between Islamists and secularists – both nationalistic – during protests over the future character of the nation-state. Overall though, the strong national military has maintained security and stability, and the violence among Egyptian people has not approached any level that would threaten the future of the unified country. While political competition, protests, and even minor clashes in Egypt may continue, the Egyptian nation-state will persist. However in Libya, violence has been constant, chaotic, and intense – by 2015 threatening the viability of a continued unified Libyan country. From the onset of the regime rupture period, tribal, local, and regional loyalties fostered the creation and growth of militias and revolutionary brigades that were more focused on maintaining control of different cities, areas, or regions than on building a stable democratic Libyan state. The conflict and chaos has escalated after various incidents over the past few years, and by now there is a civil war. This intense inter-militia violence, and the lawlessness that can spread in this atmosphere, threaten the viability of Libya going forward.

The transitional struggles in Egypt – a country with a strong nation-state identity – have been about political ideology; whereas those in Libya – a country with a weak or no nation-state identity – have been between various sub-national groups vying for territory and control. This contrast predicts disparate future trajectories for these countries in the post-Arab Spring period.

[8] Implications for the Middle East state and beyond

The argument and analysis put forth in this paper provide insight as to the potential transition trajectories in other MENA states that have experienced regime ruptures in the Arab Spring. Additionally, the findings of this paper suggest meaningful theoretical and broader policy implications stemming from relationships among nationalism, revolutions, and transition trajectories worldwide.

In the wake of revolts and revolutions in MENA states in the past several years, and amidst ongoing violence in many countries, it is crucial to examine the factor of nationalism that may shed light on the progression and outcome of revolutionary upheaval in the Middle East.
The Middle East exhibits significant variation in the degree to which countries in the region are nation-states. The two cases of Egypt and of Libya may be revealing in consideration of others in similar or intermediate circumstances. If, as this paper has argued, nationalism is indeed a relevant force in the political transitions that MENA states have been experiencing since late 2010, then there is reason to believe that the fate not only of a state’s political system, but also of the viability of a country as a geopolitical unit, could be quite different depending on varying degrees of national identity.

Countries that, like Egypt and Libya, have experienced regime ruptures include Tunisia, Yemen, and Syria. Tunisia is more similar to Egypt in its possession of historical nationalistic sentiment, and thus this paper would predict that Tunisia would see similar results to Egypt in terms of discourse of the uprisings, cleavages and demands, and violence and the future of the state. Yemen’s fractious history positions it as a somewhat intermediate case. Syria meanwhile is similar to Libya in that it was compiled and carved out by colonial powers and it is not one full nation-state; Syria has suffered similarly to Libya in its transition trajectory since the Arab Spring uprisings. As of this writing, the fractionated and violent conditions in Syria are fluctuating daily such that its future is quite uncertain.

Of course, some qualifications apply to the expansion of this analysis to these and other MENA states. First, in this paper’s consideration of the proximate question of how nationalism affected the transition process in the Egyptian and Libyan cases, the emphasis has been on what the role of nationalism is once a regime rupture begins; this paper has not analyzed how nationalism may propel or impede the uprisings themselves, although that is certainly another important topic for investigation. Second, this paper has focused on the specific cases of Egypt and Libya because of their ideal comparative positions on the question of how nationalism affects the transition process of regime rupture, and while it is reasonable to draw some broader patterns and implications for MENA states in similar conditions and facing similar circumstances, ultimately each country has nuances in its historical and contemporary nationalism (or lack thereof) that would have to be included in a full and thorough analysis. Overall, as observers and participants endeavor to assess the transition trajectories and viability of states in the MENA in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, whether or not a given country is a nation-state, and the corresponding level of nationalism in the country, will likely be a relevant factor to take into account in terms of academic predictions as well as policymaking.
More broadly beyond the MENA region, this paper adds to the general inquiry regarding the relationships among nationalism, revolutions, and transition trajectories, particularly in consideration of whether a regime rupture will precipitate a propensity for a country to break apart. The relationship of the fundamental independent variable of the presence or absence of nationalism in a country affecting the ultimate dependent variable of propensity for the country to stay together or break apart as a geopolitical unit after regime rupture, is likely not unique to the MENA region. In terms of theories of transition in political science, the progression of mechanisms is also likely broadly applicable: nationalism impacts discourse of political uprisings in terms of how the citizenry understands the revolts, which in turn also affects cleavages and demands during the transition period, which is then followed by different types and levels of violence that produce outcomes relating to the future of the state. This may be a useful way to study factors that stem from the nationalist or non-nationalist baseline condition as they operate semi-chronologically in a post-regime rupture period of transition.

In terms of broader policy implications worldwide, this paper suggests meaningful considerations for the calculations that are made when national governments and international or supranational institutions are contemplating intervening in a country that is about to experience or has experienced regime rupture. When a country that has a strong nationalistic sentiment endures a regime rupture, it may be unwise or unnecessary to intervene, since the transition trajectory should proceed without serious violence and because it is the role of the political ideological cleavages of that country to settle disputes regarding what the next government of the nation-state will look like. However, when a country without strong nationalism experiences regime rupture, intervention is potentially wise and necessary, since the non-nation state will have the propensity to experience serious violence and the potential for breakup as a geopolitical unit, as sub-national groups vie for territory and control. Under this analysis, the international reactions so far in the cases of Egypt and of Libya were appropriate and logical. Nonetheless, the post-regime rupture transitions in other MENA countries are not yet finished, and moreover around the world there will undoubtedly be future revolts and revolutions. For years to come, nationalism will likely be an important force to consider in predicting the outcome of a state after revolution and in determining the appropriate policies of intervention or non-intervention.
Bibliography


Bellin, Eva. “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring.” Comparative Politics, 44 (2) (January 2012): 127-149


Brynen, Rex. “Political Culture and the Puzzle of Persistent Authoritarianism.” Interuniversity


Danielle Bella Ellison


Hatem, Mervat. “The Intellectual Debate on Youth and its Role in the Arab Uprisings (part I).” Center for Mellemostudier, April 2014.

Heydemann, Steven. “Social Pacts and the Persistance of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.” In


Danielle Bella Ellison


“Repression and Activism among the Arab Spring’s First Movers.” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, 2013.


Phyllis, Bennis. “Tunisia’s Spark and Egypt’s Flame: the Middle East is Rising.” Foreign Policy in Focus


