

From: Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal [mailto:natasha.chichilnisky-heal@yale.edu]
Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2013 11:27 AM
To: Hyde, Susan
Subject: Two-level game question

Dear Professor Hyde,

Following up on our brief conversation from Friday, I'm writing to ask you about any suggestions you may have for literature that involves two-level games that might have bearing on a model I'm working on. I'm attempting to model strategic bargaining among IFIs, MNCs, and host governments (first level) and also host governments and the electorate (second level). The issue over which these actors are bargaining is national policy regarding the extraction of natural resources.

The timing of the game looks roughly like this:

t = 1

Exogenous economic shock (collapse of USSR in my cases)

t = 2

Elections take place in host country

t = 3

Host government announces the need for financial support

t = 4

IFIs announce conditions under which they will provide financial support (i.e., rewriting of natural resource extraction regulations)

t = 5

Host government announces whether or not it accepts conditions, and if it does, announces regulatory reform (considering both desire to remain in power and possibility of rent-seeking)

t = 6

Elections take place in host country (full elections game)

t = 7

Reiterate

Any suggestions for literature would be greatly appreciated. See you in class tomorrow.

Best,

-Natasha

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On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 3:17 PM, Hyde, Susan <susan.hyde@yale.edu> wrote:

Dear Natasha,

The names I couldn't think of after class were Jongryn Mo and Keisuke Iida. I'm sure you've found those pieces, as they are now rather old. I know there are a lot of aspects of these games that are quite difficult. I went down this path for a month or two when I was in graduate school, but I haven't kept as up to date on the formal work in this field as I should have. For some reason I just don't hear people using this framework all that often anymore. I don't know if it is because people found that the games become too complex to be useful or if there was some other reason.

Andrew Little's work might be relevant (he is just starting as an Asst. at Cornell), as he is a theorist who works on elections and often references the international environment, and Milan Svoblik's recent stuff is, although also not two-level games, potentially relevant. Svoblik's is more of a stretch. But, if you are going to extend the scope conditions of the model to all election-holding countries (rather than just all new democracies, for example) then I think his work might be important. Some of Adam Przeworski's recent stuff on competitive elections comes to mind, but again, he is not using the two-level games framework. Rather, he'll occasionally bring in (or discuss in passing) an international parameter, and doesn't do much modeling of the international level.

I think you also said you'd be interested in empirical work that could be related. There are plenty of those who work on democracy promotion who make a nod to the two-level games framework (Jon Pevehouse does this quite a bit, for example). Your general area of interest reminds me of a lot of Irfan Nooruddin's work. If you are not already familiar with it, I will try to think of specific pieces that would be most relevant. I would also recommend reaching out to him directly, even though he is not a formal theorist. I'm sure you're already looking at Jim Vreeland's older work as a foil. For some reason that I can't quite articulate with precision, your question is also reminding me of Layna Mosley's recent book on labor rights. It is not the same angle, but some of the motivation strikes me as similar. I think the connection is that she is explaining domestic policy with international-level non-state actors playing an important role.

At any rate, I'm happy to talk further. And, I'm usually best at brainstorming and commenting if I have a few pages to read of what you're working on.

Best,

Susan D. Hyde
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Appointments & Contact Information

Author of *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*

From: Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal [mailto:natasha.chichilnisky-heal@yale.edu]

Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 11:02 AM

To: Hyde, Susan

Subject: Re: Two-level game question

Hi Susan,

Thanks very much for this detailed response. I've looked into the suggestions you made, and they've been quite helpful. I'll be developing this model as a concept for a presentation I'm making at ISA in March, so I will definitely come back to you when I have a next phase ready for critique. Have a great weekend!

Best,

-Natasha