The best historical treatment of the topic is in Sizer, "Conditions for Legislative Credibility."

In recent years, the study of policy effects has flourished among analysts writing in a variety of different scholarly traditions. The range of writing on policy outcomes shaped by Congress includes the following:

- James W. Davis, Jr., and Kenneth M. Dolibois, "Selective Service and Military Manpower: Induction and Defection Policies in the 1960s," ch. 5 in Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Service and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968);

Schatz et al., op. cit., ch. 15. There is an analysis of the attention Congress gave to a subject at the time it considered a policy decision in


Thus, for example, this critique: "The people of this country ... are, as it seems to me, thoroughly tired of the stagnation of business and the general inaction of Congress. They are disgusted; do you see any good and great measures affecting the business and political interests of the country? ... Congress and never reach the stage of action." The author was Henry Cabot Lodge in 1889. Quoted in

generally disinterested public in 1963. To this delay may exist in the eyes of some elitist
President Kennedy's tax cut proposal of 1963 and President Johnson's
veto of a Democratic Congress. Recurrent questions of the
Congressional delay on non-partisan matters should cause little surprise.
Mobilization may be half-hearted; there are so many other things to do; some issues may
be more likely to vote on at all; a live issue may be better than a live program;
the effects are not important anyway.
A second effect is particularism -- that is, a strong tendency to urge
policies in packages that are salable to particularized benefits. Not only do Congressmen
aggressively seek out opportunities to supply such benefits (little are "passed" so often),
they look for ways, laws, or methods to give a particularistic cast to matters that do not obviously
require it. The only benefits traditionally worth anything, after all, are those that can
be packaged. The majority of Congressmen seek for "bipartisan public works"
and "political" projects in the various districts; President prefers more general
fiscal objectives. In the education field, a Congressional favorite is the "improved
school" program with its overtures; grants to target schools (a favorite
of the veterans of one-party politics). Congressmen are capable of closing a hundred
private hospitals, all in the interest of "efficiency," Congressmen combine to
sell their programs. The handling of revenue policy is particularistic; in Kennedy's
legislative treatment of Congressional tax (presumably hardly augmented by interests)

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Leukheed et al., Congress in Crisis, pp. 56-59.
An obvious point is that in any sense are the costs. And improve information
of a political system. Thus, "in the fair and balanced": "... [I]t is perhaps easy to
question long-running welfare conditions of ignorance. Without information, will tend to give
over-investment in projects which a specific benefit to determine groups,
because such benefits are highly visible to the concrete whereas costs are not so
visible to the general taxpayer." p. 175.
social effort (though the members may vary about how it looks to set it in a tax and in tax increase). And the process is with distributive effects. The highly talented staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue, Theodore, serving both sides Senate and House Ways and Means, it is in the business of explaining...Few individuals and many will be affected by changes in the Internal Revenue code..."[29] Persons paying taxes generally the programmatic majority of Congress in the categorical grant. In fact, the categorical grants for modern Democratic Congresses are revenues and dollars and taxes and the taxes benefited by pre-New Deal Republican Congresses. At any given goods in small packets Congressmen...like categorical programs because they opportunities they afford to interface in administration and thus to secure special treatment, or at least the appearance of it, not to mention among whom...state and local as well as federal agencies sometimes figure prominently. The great in the particular nonteels Congressmen to take a regimen instead the organization of the federal bureaucracy. Thus, for example, the Corps of Army Engineers, structured to undertake discrete distinct projects, must be quarantined from Presidents who would undermine it in a quest for "gleaning." [22]

A Third factor is the reviving of the organized. This takes two functions. First there are specialized nationally organized groups will enough widespread local clout to engage favorable well-call passing among a majority of members. These make four Residues in a row -- Making through process! -- Corps posted veterans' groups Bills, the interest voted them, and the House voted decisively to override the veto. [23] In recent years, the National Rifle Association

Mainly, op. cit., p. 309. Glenn makes the relevant joint had Keynesian

macroeconomic is often an "again-type thing," not built by aggregating individuals' preferences. [24] The fact that Keynes' goal is a decentralized one, suggests beneficial to the people, who often advocated the fact that his perspective is that of the state and that here is no microeconomic abstraction through which individual judgment

their interest leads to a Keynesian policy." Op. cit., p. 53-54.

Edward C. Banfield, "Revenue Sharing in Darcy and Practice," The Police

Institute, Spring 1971, Op. 41-42.

On struggles over the Corps under Fiercevelt and Taftman see Lazenby, op. cit., ch. 9-5.

Partisanship is no doubt enviable. It is hard to stop his complex drama for the experience. The history of the late Nineteenth Century: "The key in fact, in foreign currency as agents of pressure from a for their constituents, and a dynamic denominator of the select
To which this carried is furnished by the difficulty the government found in
managing the railroads in running fast express trains, on account of the
interference of the members of the chamber, who insisted that all the trains passing through their
districts should stop at any station. A. L. Lowell, Government and Parties

Sets of voters who are organized for political action should not be confused with set of voters who
have intense preferences. Whether the latter become the former depends upon whether there are
incentives to organize and stay organized. One specific pattern is that producers have better
incentives than consumers. In the general point see Maureen Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective


In the 1930's, 1931 and 1936 were the only years in which the fiscal effects of tax and
spending activities of American governments (at all levels) were clearly countercyclical. In both
years, the Keynesian instruments were apparently viewed by both fiscal and presidential voters (Hovav's and Formicola).

This weight is against presidential legislation. Second, there is deference toward groups with large electoral resources whose representatives keep close watch on congressional proceedings. Clientelism at the committee level is the result, with the manifesting range of policy areas. Agriculture in an obvious example, with its form of federal bureaucracy. Congressmen protect clientelistic systems — alliances of agencies, Hill committees, and clientele — against the incursions of presidents and cabinet secretaries.

A fourth effect is symbolic. The term requires explanation. It is generally best to say that vaguely symbolic congressional acts are one expressing an attitude but producing no policy effects. An example would be a resolution denying Congress power. But the term "symbolic" can also usefully be applied when Congress prescribes policy effects but does not act (in legislating or overseeing) so as to achieve them. No doubt the main cause of prejudice —

achieves gaps in the integrality of human affairs. But there is a special reason why a legislative body, engaged like the U.S. Congress can be expected to engage in symbolic action. By this, a general construction of the House. An essence of Congress is that in a large class of legislative undertakings the electoral process is positions rather than for effects.

An interesting election. Here consists of conditions that are "clientelistic" in nature. That is, they are designed to benefit people other than the ones whose justification is the payment for passage. If the people would receive something through a campaign, the occasion. The actual supplying of the preferred beneficiaries is a distinctly secondary congressional concern. Thus the civil rights act of

Natural polls have been on gun control. Congress Enrile, the. "It is difficult to imagine any other issue on which Congress has been less responsive to popular sentiment of a long period of time." Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Gun Control," 36 Public Opinion Quarterly 456, 1972.

There is an analysis of agricultural clientelism in Louis. The End of Liberalism, pp. 107-110. A clientelistic system is developed in Congress. It seems likely that the farm Congressmen will serve as a buffer between independent interest groups (agriculture, farmers). The result will serve educational groups for agricultural purposes.

This argument is taken from Gordon Tullock, “Incentive Without Project,” in Tullock, op. cit. On charitable activities: "They are 'selling' a feeling of satisfaction derived from sacrifice. Whether the sacrifice does or does not improve the well-being of someone else is not of direct interest to the donor. He is interested, not in what actually happens, but in his image of it. The entrepreneur accordingly should polish the image." P. 146. The reasoning holds where no financial sacrifice is involved — i.e., when some people write underwriting checks for libraries.
1957 and 1960 were expressed to benefit minority Salt Lake communities to please Northern audiences. No one should be surprised if they had little effect in the South.

Title I of The Education and Secondary Education Act of 1965 allocated money to aid the poor. The audience for this provision was the black police. In the implementation, the money went elsewhere. Laws regulating private conduct have a "chastity" focus to them. Thus prohibition — its audience to sex offenders and its beneficiares, even those who were given the pleasure of having their legs taken away. That the expression was defiant should generate controversy.

In the more general case, there is reason to expect Congress to ask "symbolically" whether particular category beneficiaries are separate, peculiarizing, or identical. Rather, taking criteria may for instance states that are long on goals but short on means to achieve them. On committees, programs that serve little Congressional interest are apportioned. On effort to achieve incumbent goals may run againt Congressional particularism or chauvinism. On all these things may happen. Thus when water pollution becomes an issue it is rare or less predictable that Congress would pass a law sanctioning an anti-pollution act. That the law would take the form of a grant-in-aid program to localities, and that it would not achieve its proclaimed ends. Obviously, the few examples of Congressional chauvinism are those arising out of efforts to replicate behaviour. Regulatory statutes are in by-products of Congressional faction-taking at times of public dissatisfaction. They find to be vacuously clear.

The Civil Rights Acts of 1864 and 1875 did so for some considerable impact in both.

For another legislative venture, the 1965 Voting Rights Act was a remarkable exercise in bipartisan legislation, and it is its impact on the law.

See James T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Facts of Implementing Federal Education Reform," Harvard Educational Review 35-13, 1971. "Most federal legislators are more responsive to the wishes of state and local school officials than to the desires of bureaucrats in the executive branch. As a result, the Title I program administrators act as though they were constitutionally elected by Congress, and that state and local school officials, rather than among the low-income schools. The regulation is supposed to exist."

Within the Congress words are sometimes quoted with doxas. Very few get final acts. There is a reason with administration, but it is found primarily in those elements which directly affect constituent interests or committee jurisdictions. Legislation...
proposals seldom are debated from the viewpoint of their administrative feasibility." Scitzen, op.cit., pp. 65-66.

(261) See A. Myrick Freeman and Robert H. Haveman, "Clean rhetoric, dirty water," The Public Interest, Summer 1972, pp. 51-65. The article is only incidentally about Congress, but its arguments are opposite.


A special mode may be in order here. The politics of transfer (page 174) What distinguishes these transfer programs is not that they are "residualistic" - they are no more so than some other programs -- but that they offer legislators or particularized benefits. Who gets a check of what size?
266 The state of Mississippi once had a prohibition law, widespread bootlegging, and at the same time a liquor tax. Would any other arrangement have seemed good? See Key, Southern Politics, p. 233.


In some circumstances, what can be said about the politics? A first point is that Congress will favor the passage of transfer programs when they are championed by powerful interest groups against organized opposition. The obvious example is the veterans' bonus. A second point is that Congress will legislate incrementally, favoring increases in existing programs over new, little-organized sentiment for new ones. Hence, the biennial hike in social security benefits. The public assistance program has been enriched in an ad hoc, unplanned way over the years, mostly through the efforts of Senate floor amendments. A third point is that Congress will be reluctant to legislate new programs benefiting the organized over the opposition of the organized. The third point is important. Senator Hill's refusal to move the 1960 lack of progress to a conference on the influence of organized opposition. Hence, major transfer programs are unlikely to come from individualistic societies.

The justices are from elsewhere — mostly from regime veterans. Lloyd George for party reasons, Roosevelt (social security), Johnson (medicine), and Nixon (family assistance) for presidential reasons. A fourth and last point is that the politics of transfer would be vastly different if Congressmen were allowed to put their names on the checks.

The final argument is that Congress is the legislative function has a different cast. The argument is that Congress is a peculiar way is an extraordinary democratic body. If, on matters that are political, Congressmen are judged by their names on the floor, then what kind of laws are they likely to enact? The answer is that they are much more likely to incorporate popular exceptions of instrumental rationality into the statute book.66 Attentive public policy-makers may pass as well as on brackets. Hence, the Congressional penchant for the blunt, single action — the national debt limit, the minimum wage, the price rollback, the one across-the-board budget slash. The amendment cutting off aid to Communist countries, the amendment ending the war in

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[67] Politically attractive but economically daunting. The analysis in a fairly large literature is frozen, specific.
A good example of an issue where popular expectations prevail is crime; one side tries to bring back the death or silence the Supreme Court. On the other side (with a taste of sociology) goes after "real crime". If it is widely believed that spending money will "solve social problems" then Congress will spend money. Keynesian economics received a chillier reception by the Hill than in the White House not because Congress is more "conservative" but because it is in a sense more democratic; The image of a balanced, nonparty budget is a powerful one. The fact that Keynesian economic reasoning makes it necessary that large governmental ventures remain Capital Hill approval is explained in advance. A failure to make persuasive explanations probably underlies the defeat of President Nixon's family assistance plan. The ability of mass politics to prescribe means as well as ends in a neglected subject of democratic theory. If, as Morton White argues, the question of whether ordinary citizens are capable of making economic decisions is a central one in democratic theory, so also is the question of whether we are capable of making cognitive arguments. An institution like the U.S. Congress can try to resist only if the public goes into means and objectives is severely motivated. It does try to resist, although not as clearly now and then. Partially by the absence of participatory change in Congress by state is an indirect criterion of the public itself. Over time the effectiveness of Congress as a decision-making body can be expected to vary with


Ways and Means chairman William Miller (D-Mt) was still speaking of a balanced federal budget as a desirable norm in its own right in 1969. Back, 1973, p. 15.
The plan made it through the House but was sandbagged in the Senate Finance Committee.

Daniel P. Moynihan, the author of family assistance, says that another committee might have acted differently—perhaps constructively—when it revised the House bill. "But the Senate Finance Committee was not bent to any such norm of Gnostic,周末化like persistence. The Senate were individualists, and more than a normal quota were exhibitionists as well. At the expressive, symbolic level of politics, they are hardly to be faulted, but they were lacking an essential seriousness which is the hallmark of mature government." Moynihan, The Politics of Guaranteed Income (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 482.

Yes indeed. But the Senators, after all, were worried about how the program looked rather than about what was in it. The symbolism was confusing; it was hard to know what Guatin & Tate meant. Morton White, Science and Sentiment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
Public awareness and also with the inherent complexity of governmental affairs.

The mention of staying alert can serve as a lead-in for a discussion of a different topic. How prudent does Congress stay alert? The problem is a slow one, insidious enough to require a conscious realization to deal with it. Consider "assembly line"-castigating junior pages — delay, particularly servicing of the organization, symbols. It is easy to perceive my visiting, gawking, junior pages in search of mundane affairs, churning Congress and dealing their business elsewhere. Efficient pursuit of elected goals by members gives no guarantee of institutional survival. Quite the contrary. It is not too much to say that if all members did nothing but pursue their elected goals, Congress would decay or collapse. Simple institutional maintenance problems are implicit in the earlier discussion, including a serious one arising from the difficulty of getting members to do policy and unceasing "as needed" work. Sometimes it is even hard to get them to appear and vote. All these kinds of problems can exist in the handling of money. A basic Congressional perspective the question of which is central to money is given to. The first: "Are we talking about different levels of revenue? Will they distribute to bowman's fund?" These may be predictable; they are somewhat "underpaid" in some areas — e.g., transfers. It is easy to see how particularism and obstruction could produce "obstructions" in both taxing and spending. The old image of Congress as a pork barrel outfit can be locked up as an

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(276) See the title is Care, speed, and "The Japanese built it?" p. 108-110. The public image of Congress is one of complexity during a slow moving and changing office. In the classic 1939 film, "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington," the hero, Jefferson Smith (James Stewart) chose as his weapon the building of a boys' camp alongside Willow Creek. And in Senate Rules Taylor (Edward Arnold) wanted to build a dam in the same place. Senator Smith had to fasten until he dropped from exhaustion.

(277) Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont): "How can we control a situation like this? I don't know. But I am the end of my days. I do not know any way to keep them from turning the local newspapers start publicizing the obstruction of these Senators." John W. Finney, "Senate's Inaction Exaggerates Leading," New York Times, February 7, 1977, p. 24.
Institutional maintenance problems. The second has to do with fiscal-economic effects. There are the effects of Congressional taxing and spending decisions on general employment levels, and the effects of Congressional actions decide on price levels and trade flows. (Whether the tariff should be raised under current policy is of course unclear. The tariff is a tax. But the exact magnitude does not come out of the Treasury.) Any institution changes rules from the fact that Congressmen have little, or no, elected mission among their policy objectives. Yet, an institution that generates these kinds is an institution in trouble. The third kind of problem is fiscal in nature, but in a way it is more fundamental. Spending generally popular and taxes are not. To the public mark the connection between taxes in this fact, it is decidedly ambiguous. If Congressmen reflect public opinion what does prevent them from systematically voting in favor of spending but against taxes? Alert public opinion cannot do that: see check on behavior of this.

There is a theoretical economics literature on social democratic governments that has been rejected various matters at optimal levels — i.e., levels geared to the preferences,


Buchanan and Tollison agree that a government central in a majority-rule assembly endowed in the absence of lobbying. But the policy innovation contingent. Buchanan allows for information costs (e.g., taxes; in quite sure what the activities of bureaus accomplish) and argue that, of certain assumptions about public opinion, decision are made, a government with close relations between bureaus and suggestive assembly committees will prevail in the areas of those relations. Op. cit., ch. 14.

What happens, in effect, is that particularism or clientism or both lead to overspending. Dewey argues that a democratic government (structure assumed) will systematically underachieve because of its informational costs. To view it in another where the money comes from. The General Revenue 1960, Why the Government Budget is So Small in a Democracy? 840-863, 1960. A possible criticism of this argument is that a government central in an individualistic society will spend less than an organized else, say, the British — the reason being that a government like the British can joint through ill-understood programs and yet have their effects for five years later. These kinds raise important questions but have not nor certain answers. One problem is a virtual non-existence of empirical analysis —
either of these but matches public opinion reading with spending levels or of the second Congress spending levels in systems with different governmental arrangements.

A critical problem in allocation thinking is that government budgeting differs from family budgeting in an important respect — on many salient matters we can be some what confident of what effects spending would be. Arguments about cutting up the pie quickly turn into arguments about the effect of giving out slices.

While ideologues can be incorrect on such questions parallel the spending can reduce poverty. (Boren discusses the problem in detail at 170. P. 584.) On the U.S. Congress it may be that both Niskern and Boren are right. That is, they may be underestimating in some areas for the same reason and overestimating in other areas. In Niskern's view (although it is not clear that Brodian agrees) building menu

goes in the picture for positive few in interest groups pressure to reduce overemphasizing. This was seen in less Woodrow Wilson's conclusion. Op.cit., ch. 3.

It is surprisingly difficult to figure out what independent impact Congressional money decisions have on price and employment levels. Some spending authority is discretionary and some extends over many years. Bokman concluded in 1971 that the net effect of Congressional decisions had virtually been fully too restrictive for the preceding decades. Joseph A. Bokman, Federal Tax Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1971), p. 49.

It may be that the filing of categorical grant programs in the 1960's has tipped the Congressional balance to the right tilting side. But this is

See Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960),

[0.175—197]

Smith Douglas writes: "One of my closest associates never voted against any organization for any purpose, no matter how unprincipled or foolish it was."

soul, but how much of a check? There is a primal danger here. Not any
taking and spending body has to come to grips with.

One way to stay aloof is to hire people to man the helm. This is effective.

What Congress, too. It seems proper here to discuss institutional maintenance, as
a collective good problem, following Olson’s argument on the Logic of Collective
Action. The case goes as follows. If members hope to spend careers in Congress,
they have a stake in maintaining its prestige as a permanent institution. They also have
a stake in maintaining Congressional control over resources that are useful in electoral
gains. But if every member pursues only his own electoral goals and
Congress wanes with time away. What can be done? The inclination to do
anything at all is, of course, minimal. Congress is more fragile than it looks.
Yet from the member point of view, the maintenance of the institution is a collective
good of some importance. What is needed is a system of “selective incentives” to
induce at least some members to work toward keeping the institution in
good repair.

And it is just such a system that has evolved over the decades.

Prestige and power within the Congress itself are accorded to upholders of the
institution and to those who keep it in good repair. Members are paid in internal currency for intellectually
innovative activities that are beyond a mere against their own interest.

To see exact how incentives apply generally assess the membership:

Thus the chief of the Hill is not the chief of the airwaves. The member who comes prestige
among his peers in the lonely garage who presides over news conferences, cocktail


Fenno does point out, hearing with incumbent House members in their districts.

He reported what he saw in the Congress: “Every representative with whom I
traveled criticized the Congress and contrasted himself by contrast as a fighter
against its manifold evils. Members run for Congress by running
against Congress.” Richard F. Fenno, Jr., “Signs of Life under fire, Congress in the 1980s,” in The American

It would not be if members did not fear to spend careers there. But it would not
supply a persuasive argument against reform effort to limit members to a
few years in office. Institutional maintenance would suflf. An analogous argument
held in universities, where permanent faculty have an institutional stake lacking
among institute and junior faculty. But at least so it is said.

It may occur to the reader that the earlier discussion of policy-making could have been set up as a collective goods problem. That is, on matters like regulatory policy, members could have been portrayed as seekers of effects, penal to achieve them because of the difficulty of generating collective action. But to argue this way would have been a mistake. The notion of incentives as seekers of effects needs a more formal treatment; the electoral calculus is for positions, not effects. A related point is that the "selective incentives" discussed above work quite clearly in the interest of institutional maintenance and not in the interest of general programme performance.
Caucus, sometimes even marriage, in order to devote his time to "legislative "knowhow." But the most interesting field protects us here in official positions --
elected leaders in both houses and members of the three "caucus committees" in the House. Party leaders may not amount to much as "partisans," but they
are vitally important as institutional "protectors." As Ferey says of the more
successful House minority leaders and Speakers, "They have been men whose
devotion to the House was considered greater than any devotion to ideological
causes." Keeping legislative business moving is a major source in
itself. But leaders are also on the alert for media activities that threaten
to earn Congress a bad reputation. Thus, Democratic House leaders found a
danger in the House Un-American Activities Committee in the Eighty-First Congress after the
H.U.A.C. circus in the Eighty-Fifth. Speaker Sam
Rayburn (D., Tex.) placed a general ban on the televising of House hearings. Leaders have
grown for the more potent statements in interest-group scrutiny and
particularly. Control of the agenda allows them to "bury" matters like
Vietcong bills or media "sensational reports requiring a two-thirds vote.
They know the dangers of the "ticket." Caucus, indeed, will give an account of Rayburn
pleading with House members not to open an Eisenhower trade bill to floor
amendments. Some of the major achievements of the Texas leader can be
interpreted as acts of institutional maintenance — Johnson's maneuvering in 1954
to bring about the McCarthy censure. Johnson's maneuvering in 1957 to place a
civil rights bill (symphonic or not, it proved that Congress could pass one). Rayburn's maneuvering in 1961

Institutional maintenance in the Senate was first to formal position. For years the
Chief Senate man was "Richard Russell (D., Ga.)"

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The Internal Distribution of Influence: The House," in
Truman (ed.), The Congress and America's Future, p. 63.

See Goodman, op. cit., p. 273. At no time since 1938 have a majority of those members
been willing to take a position against the committee. But there has been intense opposition
to the committee in sections of the public press to have a position to cast general doubts on Quesen's
reputation.
Ryburn's biographer quotes him: "When a man has to run for re-election every two years, he explained, 'The temptation to make headlines is strong enough without giving him a chance to become an actor on television. The neural processes toward good law are not even dramatic, let alone sensational enough to be aired across the land.'" Booth Robert, *Mr. Speaker* (Chicago: Follett, 1964), p. 167.


Barber et al., *op. cit.*, p. 64. Ryburn's attitude has been handed down to his successors. Thus this statement by the new House majority leader, Thomas P. O'Neill (D.-Mass.): "The country's becoming more protectionist again," he said. "I got a tariff bill on the floor today with an open crack, and there will be 10,000 amendments to it. There are going to be people who want to protect the shoe industry, protect the glass industry, protect the fish industry..." Marjorie Hunter, "O'Neill Sets House: A Majority Leader's Perspective," *New York Times*, January 20, 1973, p. 21.

to seek a "reps. Committee" helping up bills found by public opinion.

The three "central committees" of the House -- Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means -- are deliberately arranged to contribute to institutional maintenance. (In this respect none of the three has a functional analogue in the Senate.) The inducements to serve on them are the power and prestige within the House that goes with membership. Appointments are not easy to get; for several decades Congressmen have more eagerly sought places on these committees than on any other.

Appointments on the three go to "reps." legislative, with this definition of the term: According to the party leaders and the members of the committees, a "reps." legislator is one whose ability, attitudes, and relationships with his colleagues serve to enhance the prestige and influence of the House of Representatives.

Membership on any of the three is not an electoral liability, and in the case of Appropriations or Ways and Means it can be a considerable asset. That what makes the committees interesting is the set of subcommittees, each supplied to Congressmen in particular and to the Congress as an institution. In our rules each committee gives direct services; it makes decisions that are helpful to individual Congressmen in their electoral quests. In another role, each committee supplies indirect services; it does things helpful to the Congress as an institution that go beyond a single member's electoral quest.

This may seem an odd mix but there is institutional wisdom in it; the committees have to offer the right combination of power and prestige to induce talented members to serve on them.

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Footnotes:


295 For Appropriations and Ways and Means recent direct interviews with past Congressmen seek membership because of the general prestige it offers. See, e.g., Carley, op. cit., p. 32.

296 For the 1914-1916 period there are data collected by John C. Eberhart and reported in George B. Galloy, Congress at the Crossroads (New York: Crowell, 1946), p. 90.

The Rules Committee’s services derive from its power to hold or expedite rules. It can aid members directly by moving alone bills they want on the floor, blocking bills they find it unwise to vote on at all. The best recent example of the latter is probably the Rules blocking action on federal aid to education in 1951. From the members’ viewpoint, the Kennedy education bill was a majortas; few were cross-cutting, partisan clearances in race, or religion, and on the issue federal aid to education. Rules voted 8 to 7 to kill the bill with James J. Delaney (D.-N.Y.) casting the deciding vote. In the floor press Delaney was a villain to the House. So was a basic: Newsweek rejected: “When Delaney cast his vote in the Senate said, 8/29 “You call for the spirit of relief all over the Capitol.” And “now it is he Speaker’s oblied, up and down, even here. But Rules also supplies indirect service with the public interest among the House agenda. In blocking bills it probably means as a check on partisanship and interest-group servicing, as Robinson reports that the standing committees used more direct rules for their bills. It needs the same analysis. As “Rules of the House,” p. 283. For an account see James A. Robinson, Rules of the House (Indi, 1963), ch. 2, p. 3.

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The Board of Directors has adopted the following amendment to the bylaws:

Amendment to Bylaws

Article XII, Section 1: The Board of Directors shall have the power to establish and maintain a fund for the purpose of providing for the payment of any indebtedness of the Corporation.

Signed:

[Signatures]

Date: [Date]

[Company Name]
most of the appropriation bills were specified out away from the budgetary committees, with committee suggestions of programs being dealt with in the authorization and the appropriation. There, a spirit of openness and this arrangement produced more coherent spending in the area of appropriation. Certainly, appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation. Appropriation members believe that did so in the era of segregation.

The House Ways and Means, like Appropriations, serves members directly—in this case mostly by processing special tax provisions. (The Democratic delegation also handles appointments to the other subcommittees.) But again, the indirect services are more important. In effect, Ways and Means is stuck to put a damper on particularism in tax and small welfaristic programs to protect what he considered to be the "actuarial soundness" of the Social Security program. The Senate, where the Finance Committee assumes no such role, finds it difficult to do so. The House by voting for loan an annual budget, a high traffic, and more literal. Congressmen. The current Senate instrument for the "Christmas tree bill," laden with goodies of all sorts, was often added on by some amendment. Given their mission, Ways and Means members consider it vital that the House members not unravel their bills. The first statutory provision for

"Such a devolution of fact action was fatal to becoming mines and cities."


"With many of the department heads and bureau chiefs sharing in the general irresponsibility of the spending key in the deficit growth of federal expenditure, the need for a more central resolve in the scandalful Congress. No congressional budgets were seen, or funds were procured and unlisted for such projects as improvements for rivers and waterways, meat inspection, and superficies..."


Chairman George Mahon (D-PA) makes the case in a speech celebrating the 100th anniversary of the House Committee. Congressional Record (daily ed.), March 7, 1965.
312. On social security see Manley, op. cit., p. 281. On the rest, Manley, ch. 6 generally.

313. Ibid., pp. 272-279.

314. Ibid., pp. 281-291.

315. Ibid., pp. 279-281.

316. Ibid., p. 258. "To [Way and Means] Committee members, the Senate is characterized by irresponsible legislation and by capitulation to politically popular but unwarranted demands; by the kind of decision-making, in short, that one could expect in the House without the closed rule." P. 250.
committee, in Demo's formulation, is "to write a bill that will pass the House." Accordingly, the committee has maintained. The custom of using the "clerk rule"—extending from amendments—on tax, tariff, and transfer bills.

"The clerk rule acts as a shield for Ways and Means bills against hundreds of intense group demands that would be activated if not fulfilled by the bill itself, ordered on the floor." Ways and Means bills, like Appropriations, may subdivide Congressmen into immediate quagmires; now and then, find its members are jotted for their institutional service.

It will be heard, of course, to claim that the institutional maintenance effort of the leadership and the "control committee" offer a cure-all for Congressional problems. No one exercises much of a check on spending; the Appropriations members swing to their search for "write" a manner accounting mentality. But to demur is not to extinguish the Ways and Means Committee's deal after all in tax loopholes, and it is hard to get on the committee at all without displaying support for the oil depletion allowance. Over is the possibility that Congressmen "undergo" in areas where they are not satisfied by petite crinoline or organized pressure. And Congress has no clear way of generating intended fiscal effects; the effort to set up a joint budgeting committee in the late 1970's foundered in disarray. The fiscal problem surfaced in the winter of 1972-1973 as an "impeachment-clincher" with President Nixon lashing out at Congress for its alleged "infectious activities." It was difficult to tell whether the conflict between executive and Congress was likely to be temporary (i.e., caused by an ephemeral difference in setting title credits between President and Congress) or chronic (i.e., caused by a shift in Congressional programs and process giving Capitol Hill activities an infectious bias). The Congressional response to impeachment was once again to try to reestablish a joint budgeting process. Whether it would work was another issue; again, the was a collective goods problem. But if the
The liberals tend to think so. But congressmen do so is deduced from the argument in Downs, "Why a Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy." (See the implication above in footnote 278.) What "understanding" means is of course problematic. The public finance theorists tend to think that aggregate popular preferences. A Randian definition of "understanding" would be different. See Goodpaster.

A weary reflection on Congressional spending programs by Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R.-Pa.): "It is difficult because, as I said yesterday, we are all responsible. We voted for these things last year and some of us will vote for them again. When they come before us after a veto and the veto is not sustained, we go through the debt ceiling by our own legislation and we contribute to inflation, which we collectively deplore. Then we face a congressional tax increase, which we always call "tax reform." Congressional Record (daily ed.), February 21, 1973, p. S2945.

Existing political arrangements, however imperfect, are nevertheless good. They help to prevent the president from acting rashly. They are blunt and negative -- the three "punts committees" are the governors to which all too easily become a runaway engine. Within their limits, the arrangements are effective. It is hard to see how Congress could maintain its prestige and power without them. And there is an urgent constitutional point here. To check the modern presidency, the Congress after all cannot maintain its prestige and power. One of the main tasks of congressional "reformers" should be to help the Congress get rid of the closed rule and to rid it of the closed rule and to restore the Congress and strengthen the presidency.

Surely it is easy enough for assemblies to frame a collection. The United States, with its flexible constitutional arrangements, decided power can be transferred to other governmental organs. The history of American city reform is largely a history of taking power away from city councils. In several big cities, council reforms have been council participations. In Chicago, reformed council reforms, council participations, participations, participations. There was a time, to be sure, when "bosses" were informally heads to governo, and Chicago was the party bosses. The mayor's office still serves as a depot for machine people in council participations, but in the large city, formal institutional changes have been the pattern -- at-large elections to make councils serve the city as a whole rather than their wards, from votes to give mayors control over projects, rules outlawing council overrides in budget estimates, laws generally strengthening the mayor's office. City councils are voted out burned-out, vacate, here and there disfiguring the urban landscape.
Of course, to give up selective presidential recommend would place both the loss of power on Congress. Representative William (R. Mass.) makes the case: "When we went to the Congress, it was to the executive branch, the right to select Congress and programs to go forward and then to be ratified. If we lost, there is no further need for Congress, for Congress will have given up its place so Congress's branch where prime responsibility is to look after the people." Congressional Record (October 10, 1972, p. H 9375).


Banfield, Political Tribesmen, chs. 11, 12.

The American Congress, with its bicameral features, is the central focus of American government.

The Constitution provides for a single legislature. Congress is bicameral, with the Senate representing the states and the House of Representatives representing the people. The Senate is more powerful, with each state having two senators, regardless of population. The House of Representatives has more members, with each state's representation proportional to its population.

The President is elected by the Electoral College, which is made up of the members of the House of Representatives and the Senators. The President is the head of the government and has the power to veto laws passed by Congress.

The Supreme Court is the highest court in the land and has the power to interpret the Constitution. It is made up of the Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices, who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Court has the power to strike down laws that are unconstitutional.

The federal government has jurisdiction over matters of national concern, such as foreign affairs, defense, and interstate commerce. The states have jurisdiction over matters that affect only their own citizens, such as education, police, and public health.

The system of checks and balances is designed to prevent any one branch of government from becoming too powerful. The President can veto legislation passed by Congress, but Congress can override the veto with a two-thirds vote in both chambers. The Supreme Court can strike down laws it deems unconstitutional, and the President can appoint federal judges, including Supreme Court justices, who serve for life.

The Constitution also includes the Bill of Rights, which protects individual liberties such as free speech, free press, and the right to bear arms. The Bill of Rights also limits the power of the federal government to infringe on individual rights.

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Bamford and Wilson, op. cit., p. 95.


See Lowell, op. cit., Ch. 133-134; Philip M. Williams, Criticism and Consensus: Gaul and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1958), pp. 154-155, 349, 355. Rosenthal makes a case that Gaulish deputies in the Fourth Republic individually attended their assembly using a local credential marks:

"... it was a game political game of shifting one's position in order to win majority control. Consideration of what is necessary to win in a constituency may then dictate the deputies' decisions in the legislature." (I. Rosenthal, "The Electoral Politics of Gaulists in the Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interest?" American Political Science Review, 48, 1954).

The difference between French and American is that a quarter and a half of the non-Communist deputies of the Fourth Republic were simultaneously local mayors. Duncan MacKenzie, Jr., Parliament, Partis and Society in France, 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's, 1969), p. 54.

See MacKenzie, op. cit.

See Williams, op. cit., Ch. 234-241.

I'll summarize a few of the points. See, e.g., Williams, op. cit., Ch. 205-212, 217.

Lowell, op. cit., Ch. 220.

Williams, op. cit., Ch. 349.
Full appeal of the French Republic to the electorate was a political and cultural phenomenon. Parliamentary assemblies clashed with political realities on policy, like venalism, patronage, and factionalism. Managing parliamentary business was in itself a formidable task. It was held to keep order in these. To serve the needs of institutional maintenance, the government, which was dominated by the central committee of the American House, decided to mobilize the nation. The French had a vast idea of state -- "mobilization." Social policy, the mass of men and women, and the economy were profoundly susceptible to the needs of the nation. The Fourth Republic was profoundly committed to the needs of the nation. All its documents and acts were based on the individualistic assembly.

The Fourth Republic, with its occasional German intervention, was a two-party regime that lasted for 57 years. It was a 57-year period in the fourth century. Indeed, in the long run, a particular regime may give more stability than an efficient bureaucratic state without social roots. And it should be recalled that the French republic, unlike the American, was an experiment in democracy in foreign to elected party regimes. France was a limited monarchy. Neutrality in the balance of power, enmity, and policy ventures in individualistic circumstances. Yet the French republic was profoundly had problems. There were critical crises du régime. In every election during the Fourth Republic, at least 40% of the electorate voted for anti-system parties. The Napoleon system.

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Dunno, "French Politics in History" p. 715. On committees, see also "Politics in the Age of Reason" (p. 26-29).

Williams, p. 272-279. "In refusing to accept a minimum of incentives in the context of parliamentary sessions, the deputies denied themselves the attention and continuous deliberation to which matters of state are sensitive. As the main array of policy, which in practice frequently came from their control." (p. 272).

Thib. p. 252-253, 258-261. "The unwillingness of the deputies to vote for higher..."
"Indeed, the institutional barriers set up by the Assembly against legislative occupation are wholly dependent for their perpetuation on the decline of the Finance Committee. As partisan of the 1..." (p. 243).

"It is the most 'governmental' of committees, with at the same time..." (p. 243).

David Thewlis, *Democracy in France Since 1870* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 5. "Thus the experience of the pre-war years..." (p. 243).

Aron, op.cit., p. 19.
The basic problem in an assembly regime is to link a clear accountability relation between electorate and government. Voters find it hard to get a handle on government. Then is a tendency, dangerous regime, for assembly members to be individually elected but collectively apathetic. As in France in America. Fenno writes, "We do not agree, love our Congressmen.... Only in the 18th, it seems, quite clearly, that we do not love our Congress." The tie between Congress and the U.S. electorate is in some ways a curious and difficult one. As Table 1 shows, there has been no direct relation in recent years between voter disapproval of Congressional performance and voter inclination to deprive incumbents of their seats.

In the circumstances, keeping Congress effective for two centuries has been a considerable achievement, and it makes sense to close this essay by speculating briefly on the ways Americans have tried to deal with the problems inherent in Congressional rule. A good way to do so is to bring up the American "reform" tradition, which is something that has been explained partly as appealing or despised. By American usage as well as ancient etymology, the term "reform" carries a meaning of rationalization—of conforming from a reason where it is lacking. The term is overworked all improve, but it can properly be applied to either of both of the two

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The popularity ratings of Fifth Republic presidents. Among the four presidents, under the same or lower ratings by Truman and Norman in their worst years. The exception were the first years of Macmillan, de Gaulle, and de Gaulle (in his tenure as first president of the Fourth Republic), who needed for public support within the parliament. See Moreau, op. cit., pp. 207-210.
"Does Ralph Raines say, 'Congress in the Citizen's Corner,' No! Can We Love Our Congressmen?"

"How would you rate the job which has been done by Congress in 1968—Excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?" Excellent, pretty good, 46%; fair or poor, 46%; not sure, 8%.

"How would you rate the service your Representative gives in looking after his District in Washington—Excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?" Excellent or pretty good, 59%; fair or poor, 22%; not sure, 19%.

Data supplied by the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina.
Table 1. Public Ratings of Congressional Performance Compared with Membership Turnover

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Ratings of Congress</th>
<th>Number of Incumbents Defeated in Primary or General Election</th>
<th>Not Cast in Special Election</th>
<th>Open Congressional Seat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Harris survey data, compiled by the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina. The responses are to a question posed to a national sample at the end of each biennial period: "How would you rate the job Congress did in 19__ -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?" The first two choices are coded as positive; the last two as negative. Voting in the House has varied slightly over the years.

(b) Data from Congressional Quarterly election reports. Some of the defeats of House members occurred necessarily where redistricting threw two incumbents of the same party into the same district in a primary election or two incumbents of opposite parties into the same district via a November election. There were 3 such defeats of one kind or the other in 1967, 4 in 1966, 5 in 1968, and 2 in 1970.
following kinds of activities: 1) Efforts to impart instrumental rationality to governmental undertakings. In the Congressional context this means attempts to deal with symptomology and delay. 2) Efforts to apply universalistic distributive standards in the activities of government, or, more broadly, to have the government venture forth and impose universalistic distributive standards on society. This last we call "social reform." In the Congressional context universalistic standards impinge on particularism on the servicing of the agencies. There is no need here to decide what instrumental rationality or universalistic standards "relieve." The meaning change from time to time; in that the cumulative meaning of efficiency and justice change over time. It will suffice here to take a historical detour and say that reform demands on government mean a class of popular programs expected or discussed in the language of efficiency or functionality. Truly, every regime generates its own style of reform. The American system distinctive and it fits the contours of American institutions. Its most vigorous program is the "progressive" tradition, with emphasis on streamlining government, strengthening executives, rooting out particularism, exposing official corruption and dejection. Progressivism is largely a smaller group tradition associated only contingently with redistributive ventures, whether with the label of "social reform." Indeed, the ideological confusion of American reform movements stems from the fact that they have simultaneously insisted upon the quests for efficiency and justice. In dealing with Congress there are at least four theoretically interesting "reform responses" to which Americans have turned or thought about turning.
is alleged — it is alleged that the political attitude that makes suburban white people pockets electorally attractive. Hence it is alleged that some school districts and hence some students profit unjustly at the expense of others — an over-all violation of minimistic standards. There are no certain answers on questions like these but there is a language for dealing with them. The Supreme Court makes judgments of this sort in construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is an interesting question whether social classes differ in their attitudes toward the various business and social institutions. Some intriguing data from the 1952-1953 sample survey with college degree and high school degree were asked to give their views on Congressmen and on high level government appointments. In the college sample 75% gave a favorable judgment of the appointment, 65% gave a favorable judgment of the Congressman. In the other sample the rankings were reversed; the Congressman ranked ahead of the appointment by 61% to 50%. This is not much to go on, but it suggests a middle-class admiration for efficiency qualitatively found in the executive college. See M. Kent Jennings, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and Franklin P. Kilpatrick, "Trusted Leaders: Perceptions of Associated Federal Officials," 30 Public Opinion Quarterly 377-389, 1966.
The first and most urgent necessity has been to strengthen the
Residential office in the interest of democratic accountability. (So to the cities
with the agencies.) One logic here is reasonably clear. Since Presidents can be
held primarily accountable for broad policy effects and states of affairs, they are
likely to go about their businesses with a vigorous insistence on instrumental
realities. And both because they are paid for effects and because votes
of controlling their activities are lower, Presidents are less likely than
Congressmen to trade in particularized benefits or to defer to the organized.
So goes the logic. How about the facts? The American record lends a good
deal of support to the logic, and indeed it gives a reminder of how often
American political controversy has flared between institutions rather than
between parties or ideologies. Cleveland's tariff reform, founded in
a Democratic Senate; Taft was mired by the tariff leg-rolling of a Republican
Senate. Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley bill, but it was far from what he wanted.
Even McKinley suggested reciprocal agreements that were given short shrift in a
Republican Senate. The tariff was only one pre-World War Woodrow Wilson's
1885 work on was a thinly titled Congressional Government -- a system in which revenue came
in through the tariff and went out for veteran pensions and river and harbor
projects. Small wonder that Cleveland earned a reputation as a reformer simply by
vetoing bills.

The dignities of office have persisted in the modern period. Now in
retirement, the subject of categorical grants sounds like Cleveland on pensions.

John Stuart Mill views the following distinction between cabinet ministers and assistants:

"To a minister, in the head of an office, it is of more importance what will be thought
of his proceedings some time hence, than what is thought of them at the moment:
and the majority of the civil servants of any moment goes with it, however hastily
rushed or
artificially stirred up, thinks itself and is taught by everyone to be

In an essay on predictability, conflict between Presidency and Congress see the prescient

On the congressional side the pre-Mondale tariff was a truly astonishing
political creation. Schattschneider has the best account, and he uses the
term "unavoidable" to characterize the way Congressmen agreed among
themselves to distribute benefits. Industry followed a policy of
"reciprocal non-interference." If there was a duty on a raw material a "concurrent

duty" was levied against finished materials to satisfy manufacturers of the latter.

An established duty once regarded as a vested right was as if an
agency's "base" in the appropriation process. It would add as an

again suggesting the appropriation process. Not surprisingly the

fell into more high and higher decade after decade. To demons the all
this in the 1930's was to destroy an elaborate political system. See
Schattschneider, Politics, Pressure, and the Tariff, pp. 86,
130-131, 135, 144. His summary judgment: "The history of the
American tariff is the story of a dull, then economic policy turned into a

great political success." P. 283.

Wilson, op. cit., ch. 3.
Almost every President starting with Coolidge (Johnson and the early Reagan are exceptions) has offered Congressional farm programs. Every President starting with Kennedy has offered an import access program. Every President starting with Kennedy has had to call Keynesian economics to a skeptical Hill audience. Presidents surround themselves with deputies of efficiency — Louis Brownlow, Robert Heilbroner, Robert McNamara, and Roy Ash have been student among them — providing skeletons with Congress on the organization of the executive branch.

Nixon's design for reorganizing the executive in 1971 was not far from a carbon copy of Roosevelt's in 1937. Legislative and executive branches attract different personalities types — one oriented to particular relations with persons and another which abstracts them persons to principles. Of his insistence of office there is no shortage; to find a man with a contempt for Congress matching John Ehrlichman's one only has to go back to Henry Hopkins. In the area of social reform, of the last six Presidents have proposed ambitious redistributive transfer programs and usually met indifference or hostility on the Hill; Truman, Kennedy, and Nixon respectively got nowhere with health insurance, Medicare, and family assistance.

The Presidency is in short a vitally important democratic office which complements one branch of democratic relations offered by Congress. One explanation of why Congress has maintained its strength reasonably well over the years is that it has checked off to the Presidency some of the policy problems it is incapable of handling; thus the Bureau of Budget. The Budget was lodged in the executive in 1921 and the tariff went over to a Commission in 1934.

Carnegie, et al., op. cit., p. 446.

Opinion polls assessing presidential performance give a kind of accountability relation that fills in the blanks between quadrennial election returns. See John E. Mueller, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson," 64 American Political Science Review 18-34, 1970. There is an analogy in Britain where monthly opinion readings on Cabinet performance

In a sense, the American Supreme Court is a democratic institution also—an indirectly elected legislature dealing in general rules. But Congress is

enjoyable of enacting itself but unwilling to strike down if the Court enacts them. Before the New Deal, the rules mostly had to do with domestic free help, afterwards with

civil rights and civil liberties.

At while time Congressional tariff politics shifted largely (but not entirely) from

credit claiming to position taking. The modern pattern: "The individual representative can place a local industry by writing to the Tariff Commission about an existing claim, or proceeding on to the Committee on Ways and Means. Information on a trade agreement is about to be negotiated. But letters are cheap. He can also make a speech on the floor of Congress or before a trade association. Having done his bit for local industry in this way, he is not necessarily called upon to try to translate local interests into

the law of the land." Bauer et al., op. cit., p. 247.
France has few French enemies. The French invented the plebiscite; the Americans the presidential election. The latter has proven a more durable electoral institution and the French have more adapted it. In fact, the French have built a Fifth Republic which is far more continuous than its American prototype, where executive power essentially strong and independent. By reducing the president's power, moreover, the French have attempted to change the duties of executive power. How structural restraints can restrain an office without leaving aside the practices inherent in centralized decision-making—-which are serious—-therefore single points of behavior. A growing novelty of an assembly is that its actions are more or less predictable. Some of the parties may find it too crooked, insufficient, perhaps, megalomaniac, or saintly. But whatever will be few and will not change much over time. But no amount of presidential cult can exercise the fact that a man present one in office may prove a crucible. The new-arriving feature of the Théodore Roosevelt and Warren G. Harding in not whole Administrations existed in previous. All the Presidents have to go knowing often until their time or a place in the history books is a real one; American foreign policy can sometimes be a confusing choice between presidential pragmatism and Congressional skepticism. Moreover, when electors are given a chance to choose national executive they display a sobering tendency to choose generals. In the future, what is a military man often all but a package of instrumental rationality? From the Benjamin Harrison to Hoover and to Coolidge, the executive presence in France (by censure election) has been weaker. Faulkner, going to the case of President Roosevelt's military. A President takes elected generals whenever they have been available. It is striking that the founder of the Jacksonian tradition was General Jackson—Vanguard of the British and latter of the Cherokees. All in all, it is democratic to lodge power in an elected executive is a risky business. But Americans have taken the risk in order to overcome the policy deficiencies of Congress.

354 See Philip M. Williams, The French Revolution: Politics in the Fifth Republic (New York: Putnam, 1988), pp. 79-80, 81. Some Americans, including Warren Leggins, have found it odd to watch Congress vote Presidential bills up or down within a given time period. See Washington, op. cit., p. 20.

355 See ibid., op. cit.
A second American "reform era"—more in thought than in action—has been to try to strengthen the parties within Congress specifically and in the system generally. The familiar logic of focused accountability has been especially appealing to academicians. Relying on the parties was Woodrow Wilson's first reform nostrum in the year before he discovered the potential of the Presidency. One is now left wondering where on the theory of party government.

In fact the main thrust of reform in Twentieth-Century America has been to destroy parties, rather than strengthen them: Progressivism and the revolt against The rooted partisanship of American parties at the local level within Congress there does remain as an historical curiosity. The Venite in strong, party leadership and collective party voting—around the turn of the century—especially in the House between the laying down of the Reed rule in 1899 and the weakening of the Speaker's power in 1910. In its time the boldness of the Speaker's power was perceived as a reform. The Reed rules allowed more expeditious handling of House business. Taxing gives an economic judgment that the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 was ineptly having been packaged and jammed through by party leaders. But the party experiment was short-lived. Strong Speaker's clashed with Presidents and the public accountability relations of the former were inevitably more ambiguous than those of the latter. Speaker Cannon may have been trafficking in a fractional form of assembly cohesion.

Downs makes the abstract clear first. Barry discusses the trade-offs between having a "power-concentrating" system and a "power-distributing" system. Oyez, p. 237-243. Uniform results on the left have favored government by party, in the center, government by individualistic assembly, and on the right government by single-man executive—making for a politics in which controversy has thrived as often over institutions as over policies. Most of the argument against the party paradigm are familiar. Two
perhaps not. One raises the question whether voters who live in a system of
distracted parties in fact agree with its arguments. Survey sections on British"in
one locale suggest that they would prefer M.P.'s to be more constituency-oriented. See
Raymond E. Wolfinger et al., "Popular Support for the British Party System," paper
presented at the 1970 convention of the American Political Science Association. Another
argument raises the question whether the abstract assumption of party competitiveness
is necessarily the proper assumption to make. Just what everyone takes for

granted that it is. Writers following Downs have refined the logic of competition with
the density of Thirteenth-Century metaphysics. And why has anyone built
a model positing oligopolistic collusion? (Or monopolistic collusion?) The
New York party system, moreover, offers ample material to flesh out such a pace. Some
elements of a collusion model appear in G. William Domhoff,

See Nye, op.cit.

See Galbraith, History of the House of Representatives, pp. 52-53.

On its face passage: "In the main, the committee scheme was adopted with
stock, being accepted once for all as the party measure and passed under the
pressure of rigid party discipline. The whole procedure was doubtless not in
accord with the theory of legislation after debate and discussion. But it was
not without its good side also. It served to concentrate responsibility, to prevent
harmful amendment, to check in some measure the log-rolling and the
give-and-take which breed all legislation involving a great variety
Part, as it were, of the truth, it was an assembly whose existence rested on New Reform overthrown the old. Until late, the Progressives insisted on Congress an elite of members, individualism. That was more because he rose. Freedom to take positions is so firmly established among modern Congressmen that something of a revolution would be required to uproot it. The current attitude of democracy generated toward the idea of holding national partisan conferences to hammer out party policies is remarkably brittle.

A third reason, and the favorite of the journalistic profession, is "spoofer." The logic here is that the differences of American governmental institutions make it hard for voters to keep track of most incumbent politicians, so it is difficult for them to assist them. In the Washington, D.C., and the effect of this upon doing. Information costs are high. Hence the need for such a persistent craft by journalists and their to reduce information costs.

To enlarge the picture, a Congressional issue can be to change the outcome. Thus when auto safety came to an issue in the Eighty-Ninth Congress, one optimistically would have expected the House Commerce Committee to side with its manufacturer. "The reason it did not become an issue of public importance..." In this case, the pressure was supplied largely by Ralph Nader. In the case of both the Nader organization and Commerce Committee have set up shops in Washington as that the rise of Capitol Hill activities. Over the long haul, much of the substance raising in Congressional politics has been the achievement of journalists. Indeed, the relation between regular and office-held in American politics is one of the more important instances of ambition, though ambition. The logic of exposure has less face in a system where voters can more clearly judge


While a symbolic reform party using Congress and sympathetic politicians, with Congress, see Matthews, op. cit., ch. 9. If others supply a collection of counter-arguments.

governments by their efforts, and in fact the British have not sustained an equivalent tradition of exposure.

A fourth and final receber has been to try to regulate the deployment of resources in Congressional election campaigns. The chronic effort to regulate campaign finance is distinctively American; in other systems, where decentralized parties speak for identifiable social groupings, in most cases where the campaign money comes from. For better or worse, almost all Congressional enactments on campaign finance have been symbolic—bold in theory but hopelessly drafted and unenforceable in practice. An exception is the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which placed ceilings on radio and television spending by Congressional candidates. The law is unenforceable because states keep records of their advertising revenue. Congressional inaction had an indirect impact because it made the law more effective because it protected them from media blisters by denying orNovembl challenges. One certain yield of Watergate is a resurfacing of attitudes on campaign finance—but whether they will have much effect is difficult to say.

These receivers are as central to American politics as Congress itself. Indeed it is fair to say that in indirect ways two of them—the increasing number and total of expenses—have contributed as much to the institutional maintenance of Congress as formal arrangements. And again, keeping individualistic assemblies, predatory political parties, an easy task. On current trends, there are two points worth nothing. The first is that American national government has failed are capability of registering government—an instrument in which assemblies have not finished. The second is that candidates running for Congress have been relying increasingly on question-taking; we now have talk-show Senators, a House rife with substantial, a great and insatiable California delegation, a renewed New York City delegation. Whichever system—question-takers can make an institution work in a different way. No fault academics and reformers have added, the emphasis on parties by elevating role-of-elite voting as a test of political virtue. Making up ideological dimensions is an agnostic activity, but from the voter standpoint
It ignores, at least, two other dimensions, of considerable importance. These are:

- a "visibility" dimension, gauging the scope of Congressmen's activities. And here, are could be, an "international" dimension, gauging the inclination of Congressmen to try to accomplish what they say they are after. Approaching Congressmen in these ways requires a good deal more information than that supplied in the roll call, and the Watergate of 1972 was probably a response to a felt need for such information. In the Heyman, Congressional survival may require institutional maintenance, something more sophisticated than the ever-increasing sacrifice in the past. It may be necessary to build "selective incentives" to reward members who take an interest in programmatic impact. To do so may be possible in an institution where life-time careers are the norm. But, to do so would be to violate the essence of American legislative practice as we have come to know them.