of the kind studied, and there is more to be said about it. The subject will
be explored more exhaustively in the next chapter. “Credit-cleaning” can
falsely reward or alienate its complainers. Having been introduced,

The third activity Congressmen engage may be called
position-taking, defined as the public enunciation of an explicitly or
implicitly normative statement on anything likely to be of interest to political
actors. The statement may take the form of a roll call vote. “The war should be ended.” is
an example of an explicitly normative statement; “Inflation has reached 10%” and “I
suggest we proceed in this matter” are examples of implicitly normative statements when they
are uttered by politicians in a political climate. The essential requirement is not that he make
placing claims happen but that he make placing “judgmental” statements. The position taken is
political canniness. Especially on matters where governmental responsibility is
widely shared, it is not surprising that political actors shall fashion their actions,
facts of precedents, and virtue. For voting against Congressmen processes the
requirement is more severe. The following comment by one of Doyle’s Four Interviewees
is highly revealing: “Recently, I went home and began to talk about the
act. I was pleased to have suggested that bill, but it came
clearly to me. And in fact wasn’t getting through at all. What I was getting
through was that the act might be a tool of politics. I changed the
emphasis: I didn’t want my role as a tool, but I stressed my
support of the legislation.”

On ways in which politics can be进场ed are numerous and
offered imaginatively. There are cross-references ranging from weighty
acts to more mundane “notions of personal orientation.” These,
speeches, book reviews, television personalities, letters, newspaper interviews,
ghost-written books, playby articles, even interviews with political scientists.

120 In the terminology of crowds, statements may be either “positive” or “negative.”

121 Doyle et al., “Political Leadership” (cf. 19 in Complete List).
Congressman addresses the point: "I introduce about sixty bills a year, two 100's a Congress. I try to introduce bills that illustrate, by and large, my ideas -- legislative, economic, and social. I do like being able to say when I get criticized, 'yes, boy, I introduced a bill to try to do this in 1934.'" Op. cit., p. 141. But voters probably give claims like this about the value they deserve.


On occasion Congressmen, quite at variance with their constituents, may vote to approve bills.

A clear consensus of the American people is needed to set priorities, and a clear statement is needed to set priorities. In a time of uncertainty, it is necessary to clarify our position on Vietnam.
Indebtedness. Versatility of this sort is occasionally possible in roll call voting. For example, a congressman may vote one way on one bill, and the other way on roll call voting, joining in common just how he stands on a bill. Members who cast identical votes on a measure may give different reasons for having done so. Yet still it is on roll calls that the crunch comes; there is no way for a majority to produce anything like a record on hundreds of issues, some of which are controversial in the home constituencies. Of course, most roll call positions rendered in isolation are not likely to cause much stir of either kind. But broad voting patterns can and do matter; member voting calculated by the American Institute for Legislative Action, Americans for Constitutional Action, and other outfits are used as guidelines in the formation of electoral strategies. And particular issues often have their special follow-ups. Various national interest groups watch the vote of all Congressmen on single issues and are willing to penalize or punish members for their positions; over the years some notable examples have been the Anti-Saloon League, the early Farm Bureau, the American Legion, the American Medical Association, and the National Rifle Association. On rare occasions single roll calls achieve a rather high visibility among the public generally. This seems especially true of the Senate; which, every now and then, winds up for what might be called a "the hangover with presence on all sides. Presidential involvement, media attention given to individual senators' positions, and suspense about the outcome. Encyclopedic re-

128 "Electoral indexes of politicians and their records were kept at Washington and in most of the cities, and preferences of voting were reflected with detail. In cities were registered, organized the largest new representatives, Peter V. Odegard, Better Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925), p. 97.
130 "If we get away from the issue of party and the time of significant times; A Study of a Pressure Group and Electoral Mortality," Journal of Politics, 27, 4 (1964).


On the defeat of Sen. Joseph Tydings (D.-Md.) in 1970: "Tydings himself tended to blame the gun lobby, which in turn was quite willing to take the credit. 'Nobody in his right mind is going to take on that issue again. [i.e., gun control],' one Tydings strategist admitted." John F. Bibby and Roger J. Davidson, \textit{On Capital Hill: Studies in the Legislative Process} (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 1972), p. 50.

Civil rights clause again in 1975.


Controversies on roll calls like those on also reveal in subsequent campaigns, the Senate Senate elections of 1970 with their Haynsworth and Carswell vote being a case in point.

Professors' best position-taking strategy for most Congressmen at most times is to be conservative — to file to positions of the past, when possible and to reach for concessions with great caution where necessary. Yet another form of strategy the suggestion was made that it might be strategic for senators in electoral danger to revert to innovation. The form of innovation available is entrepreneurial position-making. As logic being that for a member facing defeat with his political fortunes it makes good sense to gamble on some innovation. It may be that Congressmen marginal and fill an important function. Fix a)

Issue pioneers — experimenters who test out new issues will be found that other politicians can see which ones are possible. An example of such a pioneer is Sen. Warren Magnuson (D.-Wash.), who regarded it as a

surprisingly narrow victory in 1962 by leading for a reputation in the area of consumer affairs. Another example is Sen. Ernest Hollings (D.-S.C.),

A Senate a shaky weak recently botching none Southern constituency who

launched "Hunger" on issue in 1969 — at race pointing to a problem and giving a well-rounded rationalization. One of the most successful

issue entrepreneurs of recent decades was the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R.-Wisc.); he worked

his way into the 1966 race for governor of Wisconsin, and his success in 1956 against the Republican candidate for governor is

"Communists might just as the vote."
Marjorie Wester, "Voting Fight in Kansas Is Stirring the South," New York Times, March 5, 1954, p. 14. The local reaction was formidable. "Already Senator Herman E. Talmage, Democrat of Georgia, has indicated he will begin a hunger campaign in his own state. Other Senators have hinted that they may do the same."

The effect of position-taking on electoral behavior is thus as hard to measure as the effect of credit claiming. Once again there is a variance problem: Congressmen do not differ very much among themselves in the methods they use to win the support of their constituents. All of them, after all, are professional politicians. There is intriguing hard evidence on some matter where variance can be captured. Schoenberger has found that House Republicans who signed an early pro-Goldwater petition garnered support significantly higher than their colleagues who did not sign. (The signature record naturally tells less about identification with Goldwater than an electoral one.) Eriksen has found that not all call records are interestingly related to election outcomes: "[A] resistant electorate is not an amenable style. Republican Representatives get at least 6 percent more of the initiative vote than the extreme Conservative contingent in a safe district." In other words, training helps. (Here specifically, if not in November.) Sometimes an inspection of availbale pass files shows. There is the idealized clipping of former Congressman Walter Bingham (D. - N.H.), whose centrist Congressmen at a time a less regular Democrat in the mid-1950's. But who moved over to appear when he was the most conservative House Democrat outside the South for the late 1960's. The Nevada electorate reacted predictably to Bingham's November percentages were extraordinarily high (82.5% in 1970), but he encountered guerrilla warfare in the primaries which finally cost him the nomination in 1972--otherwise the seat turned Republican.


They can be no doubt that Congressmen believe political parties make a difference. An important consequence of this belief is their constant washing each other's elections to try to figure out what picture is salable. Nothing is more important in Capitol Hill politics than the shuffling convention that election returns have generated. Thus the 1950 returns were read not only as a rejection of the new movement but also as a validation of McCarthyism.

When two North Carolinians, men-saying the 1956 Senate Manifesto immediately lost their primaries, the message was clear to Senate members that there would be no staying from a hard line on the school desegregation issue. Any effort to build a party base in the cause of school busing was squeezed out by House returns from the District area in 1972. Senator Hugo's giving up petting on the passage of the first minimum wage bill in the Seventy-Fifth Congress. In 1937 the bill was held up in the House Rules Committee, and there was an effort to get it to the floor. However, on a discharge petition, "Two primary elections in North and South made a brand new law," Claude Boggs (D-Fla.) and Liute Hill (D-Mo.) were committed to fill the Senate seat. Both campaign as a school of the Vargas and Moss bill and both were making victors... Immediately after the result of a primary in the Tennessee and Mississippi primaries became known, there was a stampede to sign the petition, and the necessary 218 signatures were quickly obtained. The bill later passed. It may be useful to place this section in another taking with a piece of political lore in an impact that can stand beside the piece on credit claiming judicialBranch action. The discussion of the pre-1972 Sixth California house district:

Griffith, op. cit., pp. 122-131. The defeat of Sen. Markham Tylings (D-AK) was attributed to pressure on a number of homes, in the Senate, on a united front by McCarthy... "And if Tylings can be defeated... then who can be safe?" Even the most conservative and entrenched senators began to fear for their seats, and in the months that followed, the legend of McCarthy's political power grew." P. 123.

Dwyer, op. cit., p. 140.
"Since 1952, the richest congressman has been Representative William S. Moorhead, a wealthy member of a well-known California family. The many years he has been in office are reflected in his voting record. He has a record of ability, winning elections by large margins, and has been a Republican. Moorhead's standing is that of a major in the Democratic party. More recently, Moorhead seems to have become the increasing concern of the state's Republican party and the increasing leader of his constituency.

After Governor Ronald Reagan's victory in 1962, Moorhead's record became critically important. Because of his close relationship with the governor, he was nominated in the 1962 election and was re-elected in 1964. In 1966, however, he was defeated by New York's Governor NYC Strong, who had been endorsed by the governor in the previous election. Moorhead's record became important in the national scene, as he was a major in the national Republican party. In the 1968 election, he was re-elected by a large margin.

These three are the three kinds of elected officials: Congressmen, senators, and governors. It remains only to offer some brief comment on the character of the different members. The different members are relatively free to build their own political coalition and to build their own personal political fortunes. Yet these are not political fortunes, for the party leaders have access to the media, and they have a wide range of contacts. Congressmen from the traditional political machine cities rarely have such opportunities. They are not as free to build their own political coalitions and to build their own political fortunes. In fact, they are often forced to rely on their own personal political fortunes. Congressmen William S. Moorhead.

Barrows v. State, 146 Cal. 53. Moorhead was given a seat on the 1972 ballot due to the 1972 election.

On re-tender or 146 Cal. 53, pp. 496-497.
Perritt (D.,-Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), chairman of the House Subcommittee of the Free Banking and Currency Committee, claimed in 1971 to have studied "fireworks in Washington in the preceding six years. He noted, in part, such events as 1:00 to 2:00 a.m. [his hour, Eastern]; "Fireworks Light Up the City" were put on their program. On the other hand, Congressmen with upper middle-class backgrounds (suburban, city, reform, or so on) tend to deal in positions. In New York City, the switch from regular to reform Democrats is a switch from members who must change benefits to members who emphasize positions; it reflects a shift in consumer taste. The same difference appears geographically rather than temporally across streams from the inner suburbs to the outer suburbs of Chicago.

Another kind of difference appears. The initial assumption of a re-election quest is relaxed to take into account the "progressive" ambitions of some members--i.e., the desire of some to move up to begin. Political offices rather than keep the one they have. There are the present elected senators in the Congress--those senators who would like to be senators (over the years about a quarter of senators have come directly from the House, and senators who would like to be representatives or vice-presidents (in the thirty seconds between reading the Senate roll and one time or another running for their office have been seriously "mentioned" for them). In both cases higher aspirations seem to be the same distinctive mix of activities. For one thing, credit--claiming is all but useless. It does little good to talk about the bacon you have bought back to a

[Notes: 43 by Linda M. Kuglerstein on William A. Barrett (p.43), p.1.
This note goes a very good job of a marriage Congresswoman/activist.
44
One Comment in: New York, "Temporary for the media. The common"
that may be learned (passionate politicians). A result is that 'younger members feel
This comment is on the House floor in the chili and say, 'While they have
important, like foreign affairs and Governmental Operations, with those, he will
and -- better options.' Donald Haring, "The New York City Congressmen's Opinion,"
City Almanac (purchased bi-weekly by the Center for New York City Affairs of the New School for
Sound Research), vol.7, no.6, April 1973, p.11.
45
Sources, op. cit.]

ibid., p. 92; Haltiner, note, p. 35.
selected you are trying to abduct. And, as Lyndon Johnson found in 1960, claiming credit on legislation maneuvered in no way to reach a new mass audience; it appealed only to the persuadable. Office advancement seems to require a judicious mixture of advertising and partisanship. Thus a letter written aiming to win Senate credits his quest with press releases: "Now we have our 'image' creeping up, an ideological appeal to make ready for the next constituency."

Senators aiming for both Houses do more for the same thing — advertising to get the name across, partisanship ("We can do better"). In recent years presidential aspirants have sought Foreign Relations Committee membership as a platform for making statements of foreign policy.

There are those distinctions, but it would be a mistake to elevate them to the Communiques. For most Congressmen, most of the time, all these activities are essential. This closing vignette of Sen. Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.) making his peace with universal suffrage is a good picture of how American legislative politics is all about: "The Senate was meeting in 1971 to a 1970 premiere. Griffith was the story, the role in which black turnout was high..."

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Thus right to New York Republicans moving to Senate Commonly shift to the left. It is a well example of the advertising and partisanship taking place. That case goes with turning a House member into a Senate career. The account is Sen. Robert P. Griffin (R.-Mich.) in James M. Burns, America's Congress (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1968), ch. 4.

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Senate, Congressmen in Committee, 110-141-142.
"Since then, the Ferguson Senate has done the following things:

- Hired Thomas Hoci, a black political organizer who directed Negro Voter registration efforts for the North Carolina Voter Education Project. He has
  shifted both办事, and a black secretary to his Washington office.
- Approved Federal grants for projects in three cities including a court
  case service that he addressed to predominantly black audience to announce a
  named legal project and reminded Americans to that's book.
- Issued milestone statements on social issues.

The statement to Flaming magazine first one say Dunwoody wrote himself
he said. "I want to tell you that the here time in common
as Southern and we have reason to oppose each other because race.
Equality. Opportunity for all is a part upon which blacks add.
Suffrage solely can agree."

PART II: Processes and Values

"We live in a cocoon of good feeling -- no doubt. The compensation for the cruel buffeting I received in the world outside."

-- a comment by the late Cler Milleder (D-CO) on serving in the House

The purpose of Part I of this essay has been to show what activities are electorally useful to Congressmen. The goal of Part II will be to show what happens when members who need to engage in these activities perceive a collective return. The argument will be argued complicated, with some back-and-filling, but with this general outline of subjects: first, an examination of the salient structural units of Congress (offices, committees, parties) and the ways in which these units are arranged to meet electoral needs; second, an exploration of the "functions" Congress fulfills in order to fulfill a fluid, an examination of structural arrangements in Congress that serve the end of institutional maintenance; fourth, a discussion of the place of personalities in governance in this role and elsewhere; and fifth, a presentation of "reform" efforts provided by dissatisfaction with congressional performance.

But it will be useful to start here with two preliminary points -- to be substantiated as the discussion proceeds. The first is that the organization of Congress must be a reflection of the electoral needs of its members. To put it another way, if a group of planners sat down and tried to design a pair of America's national assemblies with the goal of serving member electoral needs -- year in and year out, they would be hard pressed to improve on what exists. The second point is that satisfaction of electoral needs requires remarkably little knee-slam contact among members. The key to a remarkable degree of cooperation among members is in electorally useful activity without denying other members the opportunity...
successfully to engage in them. With credit--claiming their joint requires collaboration further on. With advertising it is perhaps obvious. The members all run different markets, so that any one member does not air incurrence to any other. There are exceptions, however,--those members do sometimes throw into distinct categories, Senators have to match.

The advertisement of ambitious house members within their states, and Senators from the same state have to keep up with each other. But the case generally holds. With position-taking the point is also reasonably clear. As long as Congressmen do not attack each other,--and they rarely do--any member can champion. The most extraordinary cause without incurring any of his colleagues. The Congressional Record is largely a series of disjointed reports prepared for the express purpose of political action, with each member enjoying final sitting rights on the materials.

A scrutiny of the basic structural units of Congress will yield evidence to support all these predatory points. First, here are the 535 Capital Hill offices, the small personal empires of the members. Annual staff salary schedule now ranges about $140,000 per office on the House side, with variation upward according to state population on the Senate side. The Hill office is a vitally important political unit, just campaign management, and just political medicine. The availability of its staff members for election under-mandate out of season gives it some of the properties of the former, its research capability, some of the properties of the latter. And

“Each Senator orates the popularity of his colleagues very closely indeed, and every sale has been touched off by the fact that two Senators seemed to be getting better popularity than the other. Sometimes full-scale, ‘popularity battles’ will break out between the two Senators. The relations between two Senators from the same state are almost always strained and their reputation in the same area receive in the manner for the cordial,” Matthews, op cit., p. 216. It may be that the problem is especially acute when two Senators are members of the same party with similar voting records. Senator Douglas, recalls his former chief of staff: “Every Senator (R. - N.Y.) had a genuine for hitting the first slot of the New York Times and New York Times morning. The rivalry newspapers attention between Jack and his Republican colleagues, the Senator getting the most local, was both intense and amusing. When one would make a brief and catching statement on the floor during the morning hour, the other would soon rush in to deliver another speech on the same topic, but with a different twist.” Op cit., p. 216.
A congressional norm easily arrived at and well ingrained is that members should not attack each other — even across party lines: "Public disparagement of colleagues is strongly disapproved; it is not the way to play the game. Personal attacks are sharply censured, and members seldom invade the congressional districts of colleagues of the other party to campaign against them. Democrats reacted strongly to the action of one House Ways and Means member in sending a letter into the district of a Republican colleague criticizing the letter for apparent inconsistencies between a Third Position and a vote." Clay, op.cit., pp. 16-17. See also Matthews, op.cit. pp. 97-99. These references are to personal attacks. Substantive disagreement between members "on the issues" can sometimes be helpful to both sides if the constituencies differ.


The speech was made in Congress a century ago. See Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New York: Macmillan, 1908), p. 76.
see with finding printers for their office equipment. The dollar value of these services on an elected campaign is difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, it gives a 1961 value of $25,000 to each member (excluding a small percentage for salary). In 1971, a House member spent $100,000 (excluding a small percentage for salary). The value has certainly increased over the last decade. It should be noted that the availability of these services is a great advantage to many members. In the early 1970s a series of court decisions brought the franking privilege under attack. The decision of the House made it clear that some of the more questionable uses, but also rendering the frank less valuable to the public interest. The spirit of the reform was evident in a statement of the bills floor manager: "the facts is that 99 or 99 percent of the material going out of the room is good, solid information and in the public interest." A final comment on Congressional Office is perhaps the most important one: office resources are given to all members regardless of party, seniority, or any other qualification. They come with the job.

Second among the structural units are the committees, the 21 standing committees in the House and 17 in the Senate -- with a scattering of special and joint bodies. Committee membership can be elected by a majority vote in a different body. Some committees are very good platforms for partitioning. The best example over the years is probably the House Appropriations Committee (now the Interior Security Committee), whose members have shown a sizable interest in legislation. (Note: a chart showing members of the party divided to Houseversus in Congress for the Eighteenth through the Eighty-ninth. The chart, as a single chart, showing perennial volume of partitioning and subversion and related matters.) By inference it can also be read as a measure of popular demand (the peak years were 1949-1956).

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151 (1971) of 511.
154 Morris Udall (D.-Ariz.).
155 The more interesting characteristics of the House Rules, Ways and Means, and Appropriations Committees will be left for treatment later under institutional maintenance.


Shils had this assessment of the investigations of the late 1940's: "The congressional investigation is often just the instrument which the legislator needs in order to remind his constituents of his existence. That is the reason why investigations often involve such unnecessary use of the organs of publicity. Authority is the next best thing to the personal contact which the legislator must forgo. It is his substitute offering by which he tries to construct the personal contact which his rivals at home have with the constituents." Edward A. Shils, "Congressional Investigation: The legislator and His Environment," 18 University of Chicago Law Review 523, 1950-51.
Joseph Hartnett worked the Senate Government Operations Committee as the investigatory base in the Emergency Civil Liberties Act in the 1960s. Senators Abraham Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) and William Proxmire (D.-Wisc.) used subcommittees of the same unit to call attention respectively to auto safety and depository

With membership on the Senate Banking Committee goes a license to make speeches on foreign policy. One committee member's designation, "House Committee" mentioned on Thompson's memo, attracted on the Senator's identity given with salient public presence. An example of the House Education and Labor Committee, whose members, in Ferris's analysis, have two "strategic premises:

1. To present policy position itself.
2. To present or individual policy preferences, regardless of party." Committee membership good deal changing about on education, poverty, and similar matters. In recent years Education and Labor has attracted media-conscious members such as Shirley Chisholm (D.-N.Y.), Herman Badillo (D.-N.Y.), and Louise Day Hicks (D.-Mass.).

Some committee traffic in particularized benefits. Just how benefits of these are likely to be distributed by government has been of subject of political questions. Buchanan and Tullock suggest a kind of round robin rip-off model, with narrow senator majorities, colluding to act in excluded minorities. Barry refines their criticisms when

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(161) See Ribicoff v. FPC, 325 U.S. 140.
(162) See RE, Congressional Committees, 1. 189.
(163) Ibid., pp. 75-76.
(164) Ferris assigns his three members three basic goals: i) making more influence inside the house than other Congressmen, ii) helping their constituents and thereby increasing their re-election chances, and iii) helping to make good public policy. Ibid., ch. 1.

The second of these makes what

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(165) Buchanan and Tullock's op.cit., p. 135-136.
to deal with each other over time are more likely to come up with an 'obvious solution' that more securely protects their interests. The Congressional interest is overwhelming with favor. Specifically, in giving out particularized benefits, when the costs are diffuse (falling on taxpayer's account), and when benefiting one Congressman is not obviously to deprive others, the previous follows a policy of universalism. That is, universalism, regardless of party, seniority, or any other criterion, has a right to his share of benefits. There is evidence of universalism in the distribution of projects and funds in public works, projects in Senate Appropriations, projects in House Appropriations, projects in Senate Finance, and (by inference from the reputed bids) under the committee on Finance and Currency. The House Interior Committee, in its account, "takes as its major decision rule a determination to process and pass all requests and to do so in such a way as to minimize the chances of passage in the House. Subsequently, then, Interior's major strategic premise is to secure House passage of all constituent-requested, House-approved bills."  

Brian Barry, Politics of Agrarian (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 255-256. "It would require, then, but hardly altogether, for all to Cordell Hull to settle on some scheme from which all would benefit compared with the alternative of mutual antagonism." P. 255. There can be controversy of course over specific benefits, if only one federal office building is to be built in the midwest it cannot simultaneously be put in Des Moines and Omaha. But over time, office buildings can be sites of geology that can be given out in fair shares. Another kind of political price is the 1934 tariff, beginning, a game not all Congressmen were in a position to play. But the game is that mostly the front lines were with the play one dealt in (e.g., Pennsylvania and Louisiana Democrats). Members who held no protectible products suffered no political degradation for they could all back on anti-tariff position-taking.

In Poland in the time of the Vere, some of the properties of an 'institutionalized' organization. Poland, op. cit., p. 145.


Munsey, *op. cit.* (cit. 78-84); Surry, *op. cit.*

Fenno, *op. cit.* (cit. 156-159); Surry, *op. cit.* Depletion allowances offer a good example of precious metals. Initial allowances for products like oil, gold, and silver are tied to sources like rock, ash, and coal.

“Since 1942, the list of tax-favored minerals has become all-encompassing, and there is likely not a single state without its own built-in pro-senatorial lobby.”

Surry, *op. cit.* p. 298.


Fenno, *op. cit.* p. 58.
House Public Works, under Murphy, has a "principle of mutual advantage" in the work of its members. [We] have a rule on the Committee, it's not a rule of the Committee, it's not written down or anything, but it's just the way we do things. Any time a member of the Committee wants something, or wants to get a bill out, we get it out for him. It makes no difference -- Republicans or Democrats. We are all Americans when it comes to that. [178] Not surprisingly, then, some evidence that members of these investigative committees gain more for them than non-members. [179]

But there is also evidence that committee members, for reasons far beyond their own state or region, are interested in promoting the committee's interests in terms of state or region. An interesting aspect of particularistic politics is its special brand of "rules." This has the allotting a budget to a particular state or region, but not always in a way that is beneficial to the committee. [180]

The House Appropriations Committee has its own set of rules. [181] Particularism is often the default position in Congress.

In the 1970s, attention by Congress to the allocation process itself led to some changes in the way members interacted with bills. [182]

See Murphy, op. cit., pp. 225. [178]
See, e.g., id., p. 23, and also Carol F. Hess, "Military Committee Membership and Testimony: Partisan Benefits in the House of Representatives," 25 Leg.

In the late 1970s, the Congress faced a complex set of allocation problems. [181] Based on differences between home and foreign assistance cost of individual projects, the economy of scale, this was definitely desirable, and the cost figures were actually more accurate. But the idea was critically sensitive. See Schattschneider, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

Douglas, op. cit., pp. 264-270, 314-315. "Other members of the Senate had little to gain and everything to lose by supporting a specific cut, and so they had no incentive to stay on the floor to vote. As a result, although I tried for years to make cuts, always with a thorough case, I was constantly beaten. Often I failed to get the necessary one-fifth for a quorum roll call, and even if I did, I was overwhelmingly defeated." P. 315.
Finally, and very importantly, the Committee system aids Congressmen simply by allowing a division of labor among members. The freelancing of legislation among small groups of Congressmen by self-interest has two effects. First, it creates small voting blocks in which membership may be valuable. An ad hoc interest group will prize more highly the positions of members of committees surrendering to it territories that it controls, no matter how small a portion of Congressmen. Second, it creates specialized small-guy settings in which individual Congressmen can make things happen and be perceived to make things happen.

"I put that bill through committee. " This was my amendment. " I talked them around on that. " This is the Congress of credit-claiming. It comes easily in the committee setting and falls away when "report" committees rewrite whole bills on the floor. To attentive audiences it can be believable. Some political action films committee activities closely and mobilize elected resources to support deserving members. The postal unions have been mentioned. In the late 1960s the tobacco industry got together a campaign "Kitty" to finance House Commerce Committee members who had been talking a position against tobacco labeling. In 1970 the American Tobacco Company, a bankers' conduit, distributed money among senators for low-cost heating and utility rates. In 1970 campaign Congressmen George H. Fallon (D-Md.) and John J. Probst (D-Minn.) faced a House Select Committee on Un-American Activities, which at the time was investigating allegations of illegal contributions to congressional candidates.

Money, granted in only an indirect manner, can seem an important resource to candidates and campaign managers. It can be used in sophisticated ways to bolster the most modest candidates. Funds may be used to "burnish" the image of candidates, to "pave" the way for future contributions, or to "buy" a seat on a subcommittee. And even in 1970 a group representing cable-TV interests gave $25,000 to the Committee for Effective Government, to influence a committee on education and culture. Money flows in only an indirect manner, and it can be used to good effect by good committee members.

In the 1970s there have been enough published data to allow statistical analyses of the strategies groups using in giving money to Congressional candidates. No one has done any. These strategies are detectable - - some of the basic strategies are detectable. Some of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Committees in political science is an example. - - follow a "marginal-ideological" strategy. They give funds to candidates of a particular ideological view and try to influence public opinion in the marginal states and districts. The official Democratic and Republican campaign committees juggle money more or less equally among their incumbents. And some groups (including some referred to already) follow an "interest" strategy. That is, they
give money to members of particular committees, with little regard for its allocation, and with lesser contributions going to senior members who are usually in rather safe districts.


Irons, "Banks of Politics," p. 52. Fellow still managed to lose his primary.

Ibid.

"In example, at the Washington headquarters of the National Federation of Commercial Clubs, a computer operation has been set up to make the most of the money its members have donated to members of Congress. When a bill that the association is interested in comes up in committee, a specific list of who gave how much to which member of the committee is produced by the computer. Workers in the headquarters then telephone the donors—often men with wide influence, since they usually sit on

Ibid., p. 56.
A list of the standing committees only begins to show the Congressional division of labor. At the beginning of the Ninety-third Congress there were 143 subcommittees in the Senate and 132 in the House. With regimentation carried to this extreme, the number of members covering subject fields becomes so small as to permit relatively easy credit-claiming. Thus in the House Agriculture Committee there are in some cases about half a dozen members handling each commodity. In small working units formed on an ad hoc basis, voting tends to recede in importance, and what individual members do with their time and energy tends to reemerge. Whatever else it may be, the quest for specialization in Congress is a quest for credit. Every member can aspire to occupy a part of at least one piece of policy and can claim personal responsibility for some of the things that happen in it. Better yet, he can aspire to rise in seniority and claim ever more responsibility — perhaps eventually to have one “seat” or a wheel — and the Congressional seniority system does as it is supposed to do. But the problem here seems to be not that members are against the system but that there is not enough to go around. Those members are staying on as if they belong, with the result that there are more junior members who have contact with certain offices and the feeling among representatives is that there is not enough to go around. The reform drive has produced a division (in some committees) of staff and budget resources to the subcommittee level, and a democratic rule that no member can hold more than one subcommittee chairmanship. But the House may have to

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(123) As cited in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, April 28, 1973. Cited also in 16
subcommittees of the joint committees.

(124) Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Congressional Subcommittee," 6 Midwest Journal of

(125) James W. Murrill (1947): "Sniffing and fishing ... was a way of life.
Murrill had been interested since his first years in Congress in 1937. They once..."
Important to the states of Washington, and the groups involved wielded considerable influence over and controlled sizable campaign chests. As Magowan gained seniority and influence, he was increasingly in a position to change the interests of American shipping and fishing. This assumption of that role worked to his and industry's mutual advantage.” Price, Who makes the laws? P 63.


(194) In the Eighty-eighth Congress House members were polled to find out their position on 32 proposals for reforming the House. The proposal with least support (14% “strongly for” or “for,” 86% “strongly against” or “against”) was one to “require members to forfeit seniority privileges after each six consecutive terms.” (The only proposal with a majority “strongly for” it passed allocating more money for staff salaries.) Danforth et al., Congress In Action, Appendix B. In the Senate, with Matthews, the seniority system “is almost universally approved.” Matthews of 117, 10 163.

(195) It should be kept in mind that some subcommittees are useful, if for nothing but taking — with hearings, investigating, and such. This may be an consequence of a recent publication I chairmanship on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. See Senate, S. 674, H.R. 283, 285.
create more subcommittees to satisfy its members. This is still
reform as well as material, with more subcommittees than there
are senators.

So much for committees. The other structural units in Congress
are the parties. The case here will be that the parties, like the offices
and committees, are tailored to suit senators' electoral needs. They
are no more useful for what they are said to be than what they are.
It is easy to conjure up visions of the sort of zero-sum political game
that could import into a representative assembly. One possibility -- in line with the
analysis above -- is that a majority party could deprive minority
members of a share of patronage benefits, a share of committee influence, and
share of revenue, a victory of sorts or their positions seem. Congressional majority
members do not shut out minorities in this fashion. It would make no sense to do so.

The costs of getting in minority members are very low whereas the costs of
keeping majority control in a context of partisan politics would be very high.
A more prevalent zero-sum vision is the one in which assembly parties
organize in disciplinarian fashion for the purpose of creating general party
"programs" as battle is the one whose programs shall prevail. It should be obvious
that if they wanted to, Congress could immediately and permanently
enforce these in disciplinarian fashion for the purpose of programmatic combat.
They do not. Every party and a member does with a visibility equal to program and
colleagues. But these exhortations fail to ensure much real interest.

The fact is that the enactment of party "programs" is electorally not very
important to members (although some may find it important to take position on
programs).

Discrimination of any sort might also be a recipe for civil war, and it is
deplorable whether any assembly anywhere engages in it. Where
assemblies have important decision powers, a pattern of militant position-
taking on the floor, coupled with visible partisanship (competing and
interest-group servicing) in committee, seems to have come to
the Italian parliament. Communist negotiators seem to get their share of
partisan benefits and they seem to have little trouble working with
Christian Democrats in the committee chair. See Giorgio Galli and Alfonso
Praovi, Patience Political Participation in Italy (Harvard, 7 Yale University Press, 1973),
pp. 268-274.
In the plan of Congressman Richard G. Bolling (D-Mo.) "The party leader would become the true leader of a legislative team that would produce a coherent and co-ordinated legislative program." Bolling, House Out of Order (New York: Dutton, 1965), p. 247.

Former Senate Joseph Clark (D-Pa.) puts forth this objection: "To change the party leadership structure so that within both parties and in both houses a majority will decide party policy and enforce party discipline against recalcitrant members."

What is important to each Congressman, and vitally so, is that he be free to take position to serve his advantage. There is no member within his own party or at least who would not feel politically injured -- or at least who would not think he would be injured -- by being made to vote a particular way on all issues (unless he were able to determine why). There is no congressional bloc whose members have identical position needs across all issues. Thus on the school-busing issue in the Ninety-second Congress it was vital to Detroit white liberal Democratic House members that they be free to vote one way and to Detroit black liberal Democrats that they be free to vote the other. With these needs the best service a party can supply to its Congressmen is a negative one; it can leave them alone. And this is what the organized parties do. Party leaders are chosen not to be program salesman or vote mobilizers, but to be "whipping" heads, "presiding" over each other, and protectors of established institutional "whipping" heads. Leaders in both branches have a habit of counselling members to "vote their constituencies."

The Senate Democratic whip, Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), studies the voting records of House members and when any appear on the floor of the Senate he will tell his colleagues in the Senate "Vince, I am in their corner of the political world, but when they go on record I will do the same thing as they do."

In fact, the Congressional party demands anything like a faith test of its members. Anyone who survives as a Republican (or Democrat) primary and a November election is entitled to appear in Washington and proclaim himself a Democrat (or Republican) Congressman. But the Senate can pose some problems --

Cf. Hitt on party platform: "The platform of the party of Congress shows the people is precisely the same as that of the President, he repeats, condemning it as a mere "pash" in dealing with his constituencies. The constituencies have a virtually "unassailable" voice to the President. If the member chooses, his party leader can fall prey (as he does not), no national party organization can save him."

See Nelson W. Polsby, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962," ch. 3 in Polsby and Polsby, op. cit.; and

"Many new members of the House express surprise that so little pressure is exerted by the party leadership regarding voting. Clearly they had anticipated more frequent guidance or
inflection. Their more senior colleagues also indicate that leadership intervention is minimal. Activities of the party whip prior to a vote generally consist of
informing members that they have prepared requests to be on the floor in a coordinated check on the intended vote of the member.eldom is advice given a party position.\"\n
Claffy, op. cit., p. 150.

Froman and Claffy report data on polls the House Democratic Whip's office took in 1963 to find out how members stood on upcoming bills. The office took soundings on only 10 bills, and the predictions on whether a member would vote were correct in only 90.5% of cases.

A ten percent error rate! Party leaders work in a context in which member positions are pretty well fixed, and in which it is surprisingly difficult to figure out which they are. Lewis A. Froman and Randall B. Bigley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," 57 American Political Science Review 54, 1963. One problem is the sense that Democratic leaderships are uncertain about party causes. See Randall B. Bigley, "The Party Whip: Organization in the United States House of Representatives," 58 American Political Science Review 569, 1964.


Byrd achieved his position by being a good friend, close. Byrd's strength in the Senate is made up of two loyalty to the club, his toughness in
negotiation (depending on your perspective), his willingness to do the dirty work and take care of the details." Sherwell, op. cit., p. 52.
a Republican litmus would find it difficult to win an appointment to the Ways and Means Committee. Even so, a member can build a quite significant career within either Congressional party regardless of his issue position. At the same time, the Senate system protects him from party incursion. The issue salience of the Congressional parties probably accounts for the fact that reality-congressional service are independent of members of third parties. With no plausible standards it is easy enough to escape to a demand onignon.

Of course, Congressional parties are still important pieces of Capitol Hill furniture. These remain significant differences between parties, and those differences in their roll call voting. Partisan electoral swings, by taking out members sustained by one kind of supporting coalition and bringing in members sustained by another, can change the parties. Taking Reforms in both houses with effective Reformation effort. (After the Eighteenth and Eighteenth Congress.) The custom of changing committee and subcommittee membership to minority parties remains one of the two leading forms of incivility discrimination on the Hill (the other being discrimination by seniority). Yet as time goes on, this will be less and less. "Party unity" in the House has declined, has been declining since the turn of the century and has reached a record low in the last decade. Partisan seat shifts in the House have declined similarly in amplitude, as reason to act as a fall in the proportion of incumbents.

Ratifying seats in the marginal range has lowered the casualty rate in times of voter volatility. Alternation in party control has caused the Democratic

In recent years, these Democrats have decried these numbers as evidence for enduring resentment against the Republican candidate. But the occasion for such candidates who need to keep their seniority. It is astonishingly easy to refrain from unbalancing the electoral candidacy of other parties.

When compared with essentials in other countries. The American Congress is exceptional in its lack of major party members. See the discussion in Douglas Adair, The Political Congress of American Law (New York: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 141. The proportion of the three popular vote cast for major party candidates have declined during the century -- from figures as in the 1870s

In the Eighteenth and Eighteenth Congress. 824 The proportion of the three popular vote cast for major party candidates has declined during the century -- from figures as in the 1870s to figures as in 824 for example, 24.8% to 1910-1912, 55% figures generally used after 2%. See C. H. Kemerer and Hans J. Milligan, "Congressional Elections," in William O. Fendall et al., The Dimensions of Congressional Behavior.
In Henry (Chapel Hill: University Press, 1972), pp. 264-265. The
decision is probably a consequence of the adoption of the direct primary system at
the state level. Reforming gives each of the major parties a great deal of issue flexibility at
the nominating stage, and popular causes can find expression in an article, party,
and any politician, regardless of his views, can try to win a major party
nomination.

For context, see: Chapter 4.7. Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency:*
Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970 edition, reprinted by
Edward V. Schneller, Jr.); David R. Mayhew, *Party Loyalty among Congressmen* (Cambridge:

Turner, op. cit., ch. 2. In his 1970 update of the 1951 Turner work,
Schneller notes, "By comparison with Julius Turner's original *Party and
Constituency*, the single most striking finding of this study is the continuing
decline of party voting in the House of Representatives." p. 239. Perhaps
what has been going on here is that politicians have come to rely on party cues
less as the information explosion has made other cues available.
(e.g., cues for polling data).

For the *Congressional Election: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals*, Tuft
defines a "swing voter" as a "voter's translation of votes into seats" that yields an
Something of a "party of one" at the congressional level; in both Houses, including Democrats.

In the years 1955-1974, the so-called bicameral system, once unmatched since the rise of the two-party system in the 1830's. As for chairmanship discrimination against Republicans, it is made sensible by the fact that minority members on joint committees share in the decision-making implicit at stages. Some committees look like dual (limited) majorities, with Democratic chairman and ranking Republican originally sharing influence. The notable partnerships of recent years have been those of J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark) and George D. Alton (R-Mo) on Senate Foreign Relations, Wilmer D. Mills (D-Ohio) and John W. Byrnes (R-Wis) on House Ways and Means, and Emanuel Cellar (D-NY) and William M. McCulloch (R-Ohio) on House Judiciary. The general picture of the congressional party system is one of a system in which, if one draws a line on the map, the House has more "Republican" members. To state it another way, a system where the distribution of congressional power is not between Democrats and Republicans but between politicians in and out of office. Looked at from one angle, the system's problems have the appearance of a cross-party conspiracy, among incumbents to keep their jobs.

There are records of minority exclusion in the past. In the 1920's, the 15 Warpp and Mean Appointments, and Townsend's lynching bill, by themselves. See F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1931), p. 471. When the Republicans came to power in the Eighteenth Congress, they used similar tactics against the Democratic minority on the House Appropriations Committee. See Glenn, Cowpens, pp. 245-249.

Yet more does remain the discrimination. One wonders what kind of thinking produces such a rejection. It is not a question of justifying it. Committee chairmen hold together to put across a party program. No such thing. Party slates of chairmen differentiated by division to separate sets of party principles? Very dubious. Alternation in control between slates of chairmen? There is none. What lingers on is a sort of demographic discrimination.
One place where unincorporation prevails over party division is in House districting. Whenever Congressmen have a say in line-drawing they seem to prefer cross-party districts assuming safe seats for all incumbents.


"Most of the [Illinois] Republican incumbents preferred a map that cut the party a chance to win three

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Now, with Congressmen having the electoral needs they do, and with Congressional institutions tailored to meet those needs in the pragmatic way that happens? What are the policy components of these arrangements? A joint meeting of the House takes the form of a debates of "sine die" (a joint) representative assemblies. That will be no more briefly pursuant. One function recalled by John Thurber "is that of simply expressing public opinion."

At doing this, not giving voice to opinions held by significant numbers of voters back in the constituencies. The U.S. Congress is extraordinarily effective. There is just payment for serious realignment, the politics of position-taking. The diversity of the constituencies marked likely being friction will find an outlet where somewhere. Hence Congress eminently a cacophonous place; its members sing different tunes but always singing something. One effect is that criteria of executive conduct is both more pernicious and more voluminous. Par in a typical cabinet regime.

There is no constraint of party loyalty to keep majority members from criticizing or minor minority members from developing their own independent lines. The idea of an "opposition" achieves pragmatic realization. In recent decades Presidents have been harassed most seriously not by official opposition-party spokesmen (Can we get an opposition leader? The usual dilemma?) but by Congressmen operating on the presidential party will amount policy-going. Or national security policy, where opposition has been most active.


(212) C. Bryce in W.J. "There is no country where representative are more dependent on popular opinion, more ready to trim their sails to the last breath of it." Quoted, p. 48.


(214) The Congressional reaction to Teapot Dome was generally more predictable than the reaction to Watergate. Still the Teapot Dome investigation sustained for several years by a Senate with a formal Republican majority. See the account in Burke Noggle, Teapot Dome: Oil and Politics in the 1920s (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1959)
Julius Oppenheimer policy experts without any fear being passed. Presidents, bureaucrats, and judges, anticipating trouble with Congress, take action to avoid it. Thus the Congress that empowers during the Tet Offensive of 1968 (no legislation was passed) was a contributing element in President Johnson's decision to stay. Escalating the Vietnam War.

As an expressive institution, Congress, in short, is merely, invariable, and effective. But it is with pointing out how versatile it looks over time. Political shifts can be registered without changing the underlying when politicians have been around.

A second function is that of sending constituent requests — sometimes when the requests have to do with grievances against officials. The “ombudsman” function. Here again there is direct payment for services rendered. The political credit resulting gives Congress a strong incentive to supply services, if not on a quid pro quo basis, then quickly and efficiently. With their office friends, U.S representatives are very often better equipped than mentioning any other method of Parliament not only to answer but also to the constituents. The overall effect of Congressional sponsoring activities has been given little scholarly attention. Gelb has suggested the argument being for a “fine tuning” of the already existing structure.

Another problem is how the law is implemented; a few years in sponsoring activities, a bias that appears to influence in data or what kind of people write letters to their Congressmen. A 1965 national survey asking the question: “How many letters to your Congressmen during the last 12 months?” yielded three projections of optimistic responses: 10000 letters, 197096, 4.8% (1970); 50000 letters, 9.1% (1970). The results are: 197096, 14.5% and 15000 letters, 21.0%. And by education: not completed high school, 3.8%; completed high school, 13.0%; completed college, 25.0%. In the occupation range, executive class is filled with 19.4%, unskilled workers lagged at 9.7%. Yet when preparing the people high enough to support and argues are

Waltz, Gelb on When Bureaucrats Complain: Governmental Ombudsmen Procedures

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) pp. 72-86. If Congressional intervention has the role of speed up produces for one constituent. Here is another difficulty: raising one can help the pay of the state and learn about the others may contribute nothing to the sense of a human satisfaction. P. 77.

millions of letters annually in each class category. The Congressional office is there for anyone who is aware of it and wants to use it. It may give a way of projecting need, intensity, and available through administrative channels.

Moreover, in an age of proliferating bureaucracies, it would be foolish to disregard any governmental process that offers individual attention. In Political Ideology and the People, the author cites an instance of a Congressman using the working-class facilities: "From the Congress and more particularly from the idea of a representative congressman, there was clear a sense of justice of a human being, who is not likely to be protected by a number of secretaries. The right of petition here is expressed in personal, human control, and through a few forms and a few channels."

With the function of legislating and exercising administration (to be considered together), the story is all the more interesting and vastly more complicated. As individual responsibility for what Congress passes, the government does become less readily attributable. The relation between payment and services becomes obscured. On the other hand, there are great opportunities for claiming credit. Analyzing what happens in legislating would be simple enough if measures to be voted on in Congress were prepared and worked by some unspecified outside source. If Congressmen did not communicate with each other or the source, and if all approved measures were automatically implemented. In these circumstances Congress would be something like a referendum electorate, and the activities of its members would be reduced into just petition-taking. But in these circumstances Congress would end up looking like an American legislative body. There are several things Congressmen can do that revive the referendum principle: if they engage in mobilization activity or passing legislation. They may require only one vote, in itself an exhausting enterprise in an assembly of 100 or 435. They also require bargaining and talking.

Any vote on a bill or modifying an existing legislation is hard to attract support. a) They determine the content of measures they will on. Acceptance b) properly formulated in a way that alternate views but acceptance is staff a choice. c) They can affect the way legislation is implemented by getting past-resonate cases to be implemented. c) When the cases, the thread of future legislation, but in a selection of anticipated responses, the cases may be replaced. d) The reverse is the case, Congressmen do these things, and in the cases of a) and b) the result is which they do then, are the products of navigating between credit-claiming bold position-taking implications.

Vote participation in legislative bodies has been the subject of a good deal of theoretical speculation but surprisingly little empirical research. Probably the dominant image is from the political perspective of the legislative body and the results to form minimum winning coalitions. The logic being that members of winning coalitions can maximize benefits for their parties by splitting the least as few ways as possible. A possible corollary of this idea is that we should expect Congress and roll calls to be close. The least cogentical responses to form most of them are not. Figure 2 gives frequency distribution of proportion of House and Senate roll calls won by percentages in spade ranges in the year 1972. (Whether or not majority carried is irrelevant here. What is important in each case is the vote percentage won by the winning side.) No data are included for the many situations contained within. Fraction roll calls. The distributions for both houses are bimodal, with a mode in the marginal range (50–59.9%) and a mode in the unanimity or near-unanimity range (90–100%). In both Houses, fewer than 30% of the roll calls turn up in the 50–59.9% range. It is hard to
Figure 4: Proportion Distribution of Provinces of House and Senate Roll CALL Voting Results in Specific Bills, 1972

Legend:
- Senate: Hull
- House: Hull

Proportion of Votes Won or Lost by Hull Voting Sites

- Senate: Hull
- House: Hull

Legend:
- Senate: Hull
- House: Hull

Legend:
- Senate: Hull
- House: Hull

Legend:
- Senate: Hull
- House: Hull

Legend:
- Senate: Hull
- House: Hull
Recognize what is at stake of these marginal votes. They could be evidence that at least some members of Congress may be voting for or against legislation to build minimum winning coalitions.

But the same votes, would appear from the 1910 legislation, as if member were voting against because the members were voting against bills with no member voting for. If there is a lack of evidence if members of at least to try to get the votes straight. On legislation supplying particularized benefits, two points may readily be made. The first is that a vital interest is to win victories; a plan is no good unless it is achieved and tested. The second is that winning victories can be quite easy; the best way for members to build on particularized benefits. The particular is to establish exclusive relationships; the House uses a committee chair, heads a committee that 95% of the time issues bills with roll calls at least. In the past, some effort can be achieved by use of committee bills. Hence on particularized benefits, there is no reason to expect to find minimal winning coalitions or else roll calls.

First, on legislation benefit of particularized benefits, there is another reason not to look for minimal winning coalitions. The members' extrinsic interest in winning vanishes; the bills promise no governmental effects, members can claim minimal credit for. Hence the image of minimal winning bills is "nothing to the sort" in Washington. There is no politically relevant last. A good example of legislation devoid of any trace of particularized benefits is the previously mentioned school building legislation of the Ninety-Second Congress. The Detroit Congressmen had every reason to worry about whether they were voting on the right side; but no reason to worry about what passed was implemented. The elected official was purely for position. Of course Congressmen must at all times generate an impression that they are interested in winning victories, but they may not be much behind the impression. The single fact that Congress needed a bill, with little interest, supplies no evidence that Congress was figuratively in any winning activity.

A real problem in the history of legislation is that it is driven by winning the relationships between elected officials and non-elected officials to be a "fencing" relationships. (Note 19). At the start, there is no plan in the act. In fact the elected official's generation would have been in a fencing relationship, but only that official would make it appear as a zero-sum one. The distinction is critical.
When will they mobilize? The short answer is that they will do so
when somebody of consequence is exerting, when there is credit to be gained
for legislative maneuver. The most alert watchers are probably representatives
of attentive interest groups — or, more broadly, of attentive clientele groups
affiliating the public and private sectors. They may be able to detect whether
or not a Congressman can "deliver." Surprisingly little precise evidence
exists on just how programs like the agricultural and merchant marine subsidies
with Congressional magnitudes year after year. But the thing is likelihood
is that relevant Congressmen are sufficiently motivated by clientele
sacrifice to engage in the bargaining needed to keep them going. To use
Lipshon's term, "partisan natural adjustment" prevails. Of course there
are other watchers besides clientele agents. "Good government" outfits
might spot which Congressmen are taking the flak for failure of their programs.
On occasion the audience forarseille becomes quite large, as in 1964
when CBO's staffers Roger Hudd outside the Capitol for several weeks
to give daily television accounts on who was doing what in moving along
the civil rights bill for public accommodations.

Yet scrutiny has its limits. Congressional processes are so
complicated that it is very difficult for outsiders to tell what is going on.
On matters where the audience for Congressmen's activities is not a clearly
sacrificing audience, the incentive to mobilize diminishes. Mobilization, after
all, requires time and energy; it may require the giving away of valued
goods. Congressmen always keep their fingers crossed — making
whatever promises, looking into passen, etc. — for members who wish the
motion carried. The other hand, there may be a value in running, but how much
is a value? A Congressman can hardly be blamed if there are not enough
right-thinking members to allow him to carry this particular bill fighting.
The goal fight. On large, contentious issues with broad audiences, observers realize that most members' positions are fixed anyway. In the Nineteen-seventy Congress, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) was doubt found it quite useful to be the ostentatious purveyor of an anti-busing amendment, but did it make much difference to him whether it carried? In fact, doesn't anybody remember whether it carried? World Sense.

Mark O. Hatfield (R-Oreg.) and George McGovern (D-S.D.) have been any more astute by their followers if their anti-war amendment had won rather than lost? Particularized benefits aside, the blunt fact is that Congressmen have never staked their own victories more personally than they normally do.

Indeed, do look at the postmodern way, we do not usually think of losses as being politically harmful. We can all point to good many instances in which Congressmen seem to have gotten into trouble by being on the wrong side in a roll call vote, but who can think of one where a member got into trouble by being on the wrong side? A decade ago the Southern Senators fought a last-ditch stand on civil rights; they lost heavily, but at no time were their jobs in danger. That the pressure to win is only onerous in an environment where every member of the Senate and House in Congress can lose his job in any one instance generally. If members had to win all the time they would lean each other against the wall. When confronted with universalism or particularized benefits, the ability of its members to survive losses renders Congress the most effective, integrating institution in American politics, its members can live in a "cocoon of good feeling."

In their study of Texas roll calls, Latz and Harney found that the clearest vote were on "real issues" -- prostitution, blue laws, legionnaires' disease, etc.

Or cit., pp. 11, 28. These are precisely the kind of issues on which a model of minimum winning coalition is least applicable. Every member worries about how he should stand and even feels that if he wins. If a constituency is homogeneous in its views, every member is in some sense a "winner" regardless of how close or close the roll calls are.
Journalists commonly offer better insights on Congressional affairs than social
scientists. According to Congressman Elizabeth Bross: "The quality of ego that
motivates people to seek political office is not conducive to collective action once
they succeed. Each member of Congress is sent to Congress himself a sort of
autonomous principality, sent forth to Washington by an admiring constituency.
Having arrived, they find it difficult to accommodate their views, work for
legislation that does not bear their name, or spend time on the dreary
business of seeking each other's support and counting the votes on forthcoming
bills. What's more, the legislators come to learn that this is not the sort of
thing to which glory attaches. A changing speech is more likely to attract
the attention of the press galleries and the hometown papers than is quiet work in
the corridors to change national policy." Drew, "Member of Congress the
How much mobilization occurs in Congress, especially in the minority party?

Probably less than is commonly supposed. Members in both parties seem to offer a lot of floor amendments without anything accompanying them in their speeches. An interview with Sen. James L. Buckley (R., N.Y.) shortly after he took his seat, he was still agitated by the idea that the Senate is a good place. He said, "It's a law that so many things happen in the Senate for symbolic reasons rather than practical reasons, such as the practice of Senators offering amendments that they know are absolutely no chance of passing."

Fenno's account of the activities of the House Education and Labor Committee is a classic picture of non-mobilization. An executive official: "When an education and labor bill is on the floor, things are so crowded that the Members don't even know who is in charge of the bill. They are a rare one, coming out of your ass...."

Fenno: "More often than on other five Committees, in the Fenno study, [education and labor bills] will be reintroduced as something over the hill. More often than the other five, they will push the live political issue of a passed Congress bill."

Clift points intriguingly to what may be barriers in enrolling activity between what passes in particular areas and what gets on the floor: "Although the legislation are sympathetic to the plea of colleagues that they support projects that may be expected to benefit the state or area districts, they work in a much more detached and objective way to the arguments of associates who have come to be recognized as spokesmen for important interest groups. The importance of the local project to the electoral success is a matter which they are quite aware, and a member pleading his own cause receives attention, understanding, and usually cooperation, particularly if he does not request the support of his colleagues often. Congressional who request large amounts are less successful."


Of course, maintenance of the committees closely. But a "career" beyond career management relations. The wing themselves community play a quintessentially role.
Committee's success rate in the House fell to 20%. It is an interesting question how much mobilization activity went on in the Senate anti-war campaign of the late 1960's and early 1970's. One constant problem was a kind of mutual distrust—Senators each coming up with their own peace plans. Overall, it may just be that the level of mobilization activity in Congress is declining. Electoral demand for position-taking seems to be on the rise. In the House, factional machine Congressmen are being replaced by volatile city reformers and suburbanites. City and state forces once maneuverable for coping purposes are crumbling. For a minute with a reasonably alert mind-set, continuing the process is probably to register an elaborate set of plebeian positions, a course which reduces one-party vote-trading. An approximation of Congressional behavior the referendum method is requisite if pursuit is meaningful at all.

What happens in determining the content of proposals and in overseeing implementation is also the result of an interplay between credit-claiming and position-taking tensions. (Of course, credit can be shared by more than one in mobilization.) The important point here is that for measures, especially particularly benefit the Congressmen's intrinsic interest in the impact of legislative vanishes. Hence it is a misallocation of resources to devote time and energy to presiding on scrutiny of impact, unless again, credit is available for legislative maneuvering. On matters where credit-claiming possibilities wear thin, therefore, one shall not be surprised to find that members display only a meek interest in what goes into bills or what their passage accomplishes.

Thus, after interviews with late 1960's with scores of staff and Congressmen on the military committees, it concluded that their members had a vigorous interest only in particular real estate functions. -- "The location of installations, and related housing, money, and role of jurisdiction."

On other military matters:

Ibid., p. 225.


These city machine Congressmen have been more willing to vote for farm price support programs [probably a trade] than city progressives. An infinitesimal deal politics would encourage vote trading in its own entirety, and progressivism is not infinitesimal. At times, American reformers have tried to get rid of legislator logrolling. Thus, reports Truman, the Mississippi constitution of 1890 "required legislators to take an oath that they would not misvote."

David B. Truman,

This point is relevant to those economists in the public finance tradition who look only at budgets. (Niskanen is an exception.) Where analysis stops with budgets, all governmental expenditures are in principle transfer payments; the impact of spending is irrelevant. Looking at impact becomes important when government is conceived as an agency for making things happen rather than just for cutting up pies. Some of the most significant governmental decisions require no spending at all.

the relevant committees reach their decisions and evaluate the projects made by the states? The answer is often to be found usually in such evaluation.

327 On the House Committee, the member did, of course, suggest that both cells, the "rhetoric of justification." On the Senate Committee, with no restate hearings to work with, it seems to be difficult to get members to sit and take any legislation, work at all. For the thing Foreign Relations has a serious attendance problem; in committee it is a 15-minute, a man sitting right next to. This is the kind of committee that Senator of an issue like to be on, but they don't like to do anything. On House Education and Labor, the concern for programmatic impact, is to say the least, not true; an executive official's approval: "The work habits of the members are lousy and it makes for bad legislation. These habits become the norm... The young members of the committee have a unique opportunity. They can get amendments in the bill, amend the bill, the amendments, get. They can speak up and participate all over the place. Nothing about being seen and not heard on this committee. They can make speeches knowing that no one will contradict them, because nobody knows enough. No one knows the bills." In recent years, the House Foreign Affairs Committee has attracted a small corps of members dedicated to the cause of environmentalism, rather than to satisfying committee members. But they seem to skimp on their homework. One can also count on an official of Friends of the Earth, a "presumption group." They are usually present with their other committee.

237 Ibid., p. 185.
238 Ibid., p. 172. In a 1971 interview, generally indicates that they have little tendency to be more critical of military policy in terms of its meaning, is some regard; a significant political objective, a goal... In fact, during the 1970-74 period, such examples could be found where congressional Committee could any impression of severity, or meeting, decisions about weapons, negotiations, personnel, missions, operations or administration, in terms of specified or international goals, objectives," p. 172. In a more recent conversation, Congress, or military, and policy inputs, see Charles L. Schleifer, ed., Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1972) pp. 177-178. The conclusion is about the same as this?

240 Finno, op. cit., p. 104.
consequent. So they don't provide any leadership. They vote with us, but they don't take the time to learn about the subject matter. They don't have a real interest."

And so goes. The Congressmen's lack of interest in acquiring a substantive or of interest in "research." To assign committee staffs or the Congressional Research Service to do research on the non-partisan effects of legislation (research before and after enactment) would be to misallocate resources. Hence, generally speaking, Congressmen do not so assign them. They can find a good many more useful things for staff members and the CRS to do. The conclusion that holds here for enactment of legislation would also be over-weighing; generally, members intervene selectively on measures or matters where they can claim credit for intervention.

Now, all these are the implications behind comparing and contrasting what are the effects? What seems to happen is that Congressional policy-making activities produce a number of specific and predictable policy effects. Taken together, these effects display what might be called an "assembly column." An overall policy pattern that one might expect any set of assemblages constructed, like the U.S. Congress, to generate.

One effect is delay -- or more properly, since the eyes of the beholder create it, a widespread, perceived delay. Not too much should be made of this, but it is fair to say that in the years Congress has often lagged behind public opinion in enacting major legislation. Thus a perceived "rashness" was the major source of dissatisfaction with Congress in a survey of a

Forno, op. cit., p. 266. Forno adds: "The Committee members who do know the subject matter and do take a real interest are those with great stock of authoritative service and re-election. Mostly Westerners, the states are far from pure, juristically, and there is a cautious to punitively Rodgers." P. 287.

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