Congress: The Electoral Connection – the original longhand draft

Back in the 1970s, how did we go about doing our writing? Here is an instance. In the summer of 1973, I wrote the original draft of Congress: The Electoral Connection in longhand on (mostly) yellow lined 8x14 legal-sized pads using a number two pencil. That was the way to go. No computers back then. I didn’t use an electric typewriter or even a manual one. As for devising a figure (on page 64) and a table (page 92), I drew them by hand. Once I got it all done, I whipped it off to a professional typist. I kept a photocopy, which I found and fished out of a closet a few years ago. This is that photocopy. I have left it alone except to supply a more legible version of page one. That old page is uniquely messy since I seem to have stuttered at getting into the writing.

I wrote this book draft paragraph by paragraph, footnote by footnote, in a form that went into print at Yale University Press in 1974 virtually unchanged. I drew on stacks of note cards and other materials that I had accumulated previously. The actual writing took thirteen weeks. It was a June-into-September enterprise wedged in between teaching semesters. There was a rhythm: I wrote during the days and watched the reruns of Sam Ervin’s Watergate hearings during the evenings.
Congress: The Electoral Connection

— David R. Mayhew

Note to typist: When a Congressman has an identification tag after his name it should be spaced like this:

John Smith (D. – N.M.)
George Brown (R. – Calif.)

Double space except where specified

Footnotes at bottom of page
For their most useful counsel as I was preparing this work I
should like to thank Chris Arlen, Alfred Avr, Joseph La Palombara,
David Bux, Douglas Lee, and David Feldman. I could not have written
without having spent a year on Capitol Hill as a Congressional Fellow in
the American Political Science Association's program. In that year I enjoyed
access to the offices of two members who serve in the Public Interest --
Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr. (D.-N.J.) and Senator Lee Metzeny
(D.-Mont.). All the arguments in the following work are mine, except
where I have explicitly appropriated from others.
I Introduction

The first study I make here is one question that does not concern
a preconceived answer, an opinion or belief.

An old theory of economic equilibrium includes the idea
that something should be explained. The theory
suggests a relationship between consumption (C) and
saving (S). It is the same kind of relationship
between the items that might be found in a
budget. In fact, it is

does not have


Case 4

Lichtenstein and Lichtenstein

R. M. B. Hett, "Economic Concepts. An Attractive Case," ch. 4 in Hett and
The first page of the original C:EC draft is uniquely hard to read. Where was I going? There is a lot of stuttering and crossout. Here is an upgraded version.

I INTRODUCTION

How to study legislative behavior is a question that does not yield a consensual answer among political scientists. .................. An ethic of conceptual pluralism prevails in the field, and no doubt it should. If there is any consensus it is on the point that scholarly treatments should offer explanations—that they should go beyond descriptive accounts of legislators and legislatures to supply general statements about why both of them do what they do. ................................................................. What constitutes a persuasive explanation? In their contemporary quest to find out, legislative students have ranged far and wide, sometimes borrowing or plundering explanatory styles from the neighboring social sciences.

The most important borrowing has been from sociology............................. In fact it is fair to say that legislative research in the 1950’s and 1960’s had a dominant sociological tone to it. The literature abounded in terms like “role,” “norm,” “system,” and “socialization.” We learned that some U.S. Senators adapt an “outsider” role;¹ that ..................

The House Appropriations Committee is certainly looked on as a spending bloc. Some legislators categorize it as a "coincident" with "defense" objectives. However, the "fiscal" policy. The U.S. Senate has followed these findings analagous like them, present of research based for the first time for partisan elite interests.

From another social science has borrowing borrowed in a
so urgent. *But it is possible to point to anti-
and indeed, to family should be a root assumption of economics.

One difference between economic and sociological models is
shape to which it is extent. "The economists" model of consumption, which
develops hypotheses about social behavior from models of aggregate
behavior by individuals, contrasts with the "collective" model of
sociology, which develops hypotheses about social behavior from models of
behavior as a group.

To my knowledge, no political scientist has explicitly addressed the question in economics,
but a number have done so in ways somewhat

The argument is "empirical evidence" against the argument. Therefore are three
articulated by Schelling which can foster the collective action which Congressmen
will find it in their interest to engage in legislative oversight.

There is Wilder's work on reorganizing the budgetary process,

Riker's general work on jurisdiction—building with it

More recently, Manski and Fornas have given
a clear "empirical" example of their, collective action. Fornas, thinking

He is afraid to the point where they perceive some
on detecting why Congressmen join special committees and what
they get out of being members of them.

1. [Book Title] by [Author], (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961), ch. 5.


They are probably adjusting their thoughts to the purpose, a drift, so to speak, from the economic toward the social. I think it occurs at a time when some economists are themselves shifting over into the legislative field. There is mention of writing on the subject of public finance, and the public finance-orientated, with its legislative-minded, has grown.

They are recent writings of economists in the public finance tradition. Public finance has its agenda and agenda, the former has grappled with the problems of legislative decisions, making appeal to Buchanan and Tullock. Nickerson develops the difference that is the agenda in his work, positing it as a basis for reasoning, and he establishes that for his agenda, that is the agenda of legislative councils. Public finance scholars seem to have gotten involved in legislative studies as a result of their awakening to the issues of the Buchananite legislature; that is, they have come to display a concern for clear public officials, which actually do rather than an assumption that officials will automatically translate good policy into law. Once somebody finds out what it is, with political scientists exploring the purposes and economists the socio-economic approach of the three from the effects of future relation between private and public and private and public institutions. We should be able to develop policies that are not the product of political economy.
All this is an introduction to a statement of what I intend to do in the following pages. Mostly through personal experience on Capitol Hill, I have become convinced that sanction of "press behavior" offers the best route to an understanding of legislatures—or at least of the U.S. Congress. In the fashion of economics, I shall make a simple abstract assumption about human motivation and then speculate about the consequences of behavior based on that motivation. Specifically, I shall conjure up an "a vision of" U.S. Congressmen as single-minded seekers of re-election, so what kinds of activity best galvanize and move them? More of these Congressmen somehow are likely to go about judging and sanctioning legislative institutions and making policy. I find an effort on the re-election goal attractive for a number of reasons. First, I think it fits the political reality rather well. Second, it places the spotlight directly on men rather than on parties and pressure groups which are far more often central, determining American politics, as well as, in fact, Third, I think politics is best studied as a struggle among men to gain and maintain power and the consequences of that struggle. Further, and perhaps most important, the re-election quest conveys an accountability relationship with an electorate and any means of judging that relationship have a central place to accountability itself. The clearest assumption withstands testing, I regard the venture as an adventure in political science rather than economics.

For leaving aside the fact that I believe economists cannot do anything,

I feel that comments that study legislators bring to bear into the analysis of other economic scientists, that the public decision, whether they voice government's decision as by initiative, I shall give an apology to spending that does not governmental policies and infra-marginal behavior. As I shouldit upon such traditional political science subject to elections, parties, government turmoil, and reform stability.
The attention here is that economics research has been infused with the motivating assumption that policy decisions should be judged by how well they meet the standard of Pareto optimality. This is an assumption that I do not share, and yet I do think it merits critical scientific scrutiny. There will be no need here to set fully my alternative assumption. I may say, for the record, that I find the model of group legislative activity above to have a good deal more appeal than any that could be built on foundations of Pareto optimality.

By subjecting a single legislative institution, the U.S. Congress, to the same, I argue, for Congress, so a unique or unusual thing. It is partly the most highly "professionalized" of legislatures, in America that it promotes diversity among its members and greater than the values, if it also promotes due respect, the criterion of the collective experience. Its judges are exceptionally different. It is widely thought to be especially "strong" among legislatures because of its collective system. Like most others, however, it fails, in the shadow of a qualified elected executive, any decision to focus on the Congress. However, a Belief has been growing in the view among many among many, but not in the general election, a particular and important institution. But here is something that is to be believed as well, the exceptionalism argument. It should not be carried too far. The good thing was the Congress, like as it is in a larger family of legislative bodies, I shall find its political role as well in the development of its role in Congress, with European parliament, and with American state legislative and city councils. I shall raise the question of what "factors" as the concept are possible, and what is an important question that can be answered with the study of the legislative model.


Functions to be given special attention are those of legislating, overseeing the execution, representing public opinion, and starving constituents. No formal chart is on this page. Instead, the very form of "merit" is at question. As such, it confuses structure and function. Accordingly, I shall refer to the more advanced but more neutral term "representative assembly." To list members of the class of bodies inhabited by the U.S. House and Senate. Whatever the term, a definition of these institutions as the only ones in the class to have been established by law is not at issue. All such entities are formally equal to each other in status, by virtue of the principle that all members are equally entitled to be members of the same group, claimed to represent the entire community in some sense. If that statement means anything, it is that representation is "(10)"

The following discussion will take the form of an extended theoretical essay. To stress it will raise more questions than it answers. If it is the custom in serious essays, the opening section of the essay will set forth the problem, and the next section will outline the strategy for the remainder of the essay. The following section is titled, "The re-election prospect in American politics."

This essay will be divided into chapters, with each chapter serving as a running bibliography. Each chapter is devoted to a specific policy, political, and theoretical issue. I have found useful in writing about the subject. Chapters 2 and 4 will deal with the electoral process and the institution it reflects. Chapters 3 and 5 will deal with institutional arrangements in Congress and with Congressional policy-making.

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(17) "It is equally true, though not of necessity, that the United States was more than a little fallen in the respect for the protection of property. The risk involved..." "The School of the United States," Washington, D.C.: National Defense University (1997), p. 107.

"Congress has declined into a battle for individual survival. Each of the Congressmen and (only a few Senators) has the attitude: 'I've got to be re-elected for myself.' If you remember the old farm advice, you can hold a cow away if milking with: 'Here's money.' This applies to Congressmen, and so we have to buy or sell votes. Most of them are willing only to follow these things that will create extra and give them the elevation which allows them to blend into their respective districts or their respective states. If you don't stick your neck out, you don't get it chopped off."

-- Senator William B. Saxbe (R-Ohio)

The discussion today will hinge on the proposition that U.S. Congressmen are interested in getting re-elected -- indeed, in their role here as representatives, interested in nothing else. Any such assumption does some violence to the facts, so it is important at the outset to state one as firmly as possible in reality. A number of questions about that reality immediately arise.

First, is it true that the U.S. Congress is a place where members wish to stay once they get there? Clearly there are representative assemblies which do not fulfill their members for very long. (Illinois.) The Colombian parliament lasted seven single terms and then was over. Voluntary turnover is quite high in some American state legislatures -- in Mobile, Alabama. In his study, the late and lamented Connecticut Legislator Walter Leland said of his subjects "reluctants" -- people not very much interested in politics who were briefly "involved" by others. An ethic of "voluntarism" pervades the politics of California city councils.

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20. Where the center does not suggest elections, the term "Congressmen in" (refer to as "MCC"") refer to members of both houses and senate.
Congress itself voluntary turnover was high throughout most of the Nineteenth Century. Yet in the modern Congress it is unmistakable that the "congressional career," is shorter. Representative tenure in the House dropped from approximately 10 years in the 1840's to 4 years in the 1940's. Senator tenure fell from 20 years in the 1830's to 6 years in the 1930's. Turnover figures show that in the past century increasing proportions of members of a given Congress hail from fewer Congresses -- members who have both sought re-election and won. Membership turnover critically declined away Southern Senators as early as the 1850's, among Senators generally just after the Civil War. It was followed five decades later throughout Senatorial life in the late Nineteenth Century and continues to decline through the Twentieth. Average senatorial terms served have gone up and now with the House in 1971 registering an all-time high of 20% of its members who had served at least half terms. It seems fair to characterize the modern Congress as an assembly of professional politicians spinning out political careers. The jobs offer good pay and high prestige; they do not want applicants for them. ... Successful pursuit of a career requires continued re-election.


Indeed, it has been proved that professional politicians could be gotten rid of by running re-election campaigns. In a plan to select non-partisan legislators by ranked voting, the authors see Dennis Mueller et al., "Legislative Government Via Random Selection," in George C. Chase, 57-68, 1972.
A second question is this: Are all Congressmen seek re-election, does it make sense to attribute that goal to them as the exclusive goal of all others? Of course, the answer is that a Congressmen's or any other person's would require attention to more than just one goal. There are even occasional Congressmen who intentionally do things that make their own electoral survival difficult or impossible. The late Richard Kelly wrote of Congressional "problems in courage." (29) Former Senator Carl Graham (D.-N.C.) talked of how he tried to persuade Senator Mark Hatfield (R.-Ore.) to take his position in order to survive a 1950 primary. Graham, a neophyte to the office, refused to listen. (30) For a "saint," such things are "the worst." He lost his primary. There are not many saints. But surely, if it is common for Congressmen to seek the role alongside the electoral one, it is not necessarily incompatible with it. Some try to get re-elected, a great many are not interested in re-election at all. (31) Former Senator John F. Kennedy, (D.-Mass.) wrote, "All members of Congress have a primary interest in getting re-elected. Some members have no other interest." (32) Recalling nothing else, it should not be surprising if we see it.
Frank E. Smith (D-Miss.)

of Kansas the worst Congressman from Mississippi (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 127. It will not be necessary here to reach the question of whether it is possible to detect the grade of Congressman by asking him what they are, or indeed the question of whether there are unconscious motives lurking behind conscious ones. In Lasswell's classical formulation, "political types" are power seekers, with "private motives displaced as public objects rationalized in terms of public interest." Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Viking, 1948), p. 38.
Expect that the relation between politicians and public will be one of accountability. What justifies a focus on the re-election goal is the justification of those two aspects of it — its public's cynical psychology and its pragmatism as an accountability link. For analytic purposes, therefore, Congressmen will be treated in the press as if they were single-minded re-election seekers. Whatever electric news seeks will be given passing attention. And the analytics will center on the electoral connection.

Yet another question arises. Even Congressmen are single-mindedly interested in re-election, are they in a position as individuals to do anything about it? If they are not, if they are inexorably shoved to and fro by forces in their political environment, then strictly it makes no sense to pay much attention to their individual activities. This question requires a precise answer, and it will be useful to begin seeking for one by pondering whether individual Congressmen are the proper analytic units for an investigation of this sort. An important alternative view is that politicians rather than some politicians are the prime mover in electoral politics. The new classic account of what a competitive political universe will look like with parties as its analytic

Of other kings, lettuce we are entitled to be suspicious. "They can be no doubt, after all, that power is granted to a body of men, called Representatives, they like any other men, will use their power not for the advantage of the community, but to their own advantage, if they can. The only question, therefore, how can they be prevented?" James Mill, On Government in Essays on Government, Incorporation, Libby, The Press, and Law of Nations (New York: Adrienne M. Kiley, 1877), p. 149.

Madison's view was that the U.S. has "...a peculiar system, which has an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Representative elections are unquestionably the only bond by which the legislature and society can be effectively secured." The Federalist papers, selected and edited by Henry抄写 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1941), No. 52, p. 165.
units as Dewey, E. B., "The Power of Democracy." In the American political world parties are entirely selfish. They seek the rewards of office, but in order to achieve them they have to win and keep it. They kill for sport to regal as high as they can and enjoy their victory. A party can control over government during the term in office. In a two-party system, it decides how to cast his ballot by examining the record and promises of the party in power and the previous record and current promises of the party out of power. The computation an expected vote, differentiated in the coming term, count his own party preferences and site accordingly. These on the government of the people. Legislative representation as nearly as possible " representative." If the governing party, they gather information on groups, voters, preferences and select to the government, and the party is possible constituents back home that the government is doing a worthy job.

How will a party model of its kind capture the reality of any given regime, an empirical question. The difficulty lies in the need for parties as cohesive "teams," where goals can be viewed as a single, consistent preference- ordering. In all non-automatic regimes, governments are made up of a plurality of elective officials—not just one man. How can a group of people work together so that it looks something like a "democratic" team? Globally perhaps (in a non-automatic regime) does a group achieve the political fusion of preference-orderings needed to satisfy the model's party government in Britain, for example, proceed.


36. ibid., ch. 2, 3.

37. ibid., pp. 85-96. Because the influence and opinion spread by representatives are important in decision-making, Dewey suggested in effect some decision power desirable for representatives. And this is the constant. But really, important will continue to steadily the power will the marginal gain in vote from automatic conformity to opinions be outweighed by the marginal cost in votes of less ability to coordinate its actions? (p. 85, 96.)
substantially by inter-party bargaining. Nonetheless, it is plain that some regimes fit the model better than others. For some purposes, it is quite useful to study British politics by using parties as
analytic units. Britain, to start with, has a constitution that centralizes national government. But beyond that, British MPs' votes in collective party blocs not aggregate
'trans. It is not irrelevant that they should be so, and indeed free, individualistic, in the Commons.

would we deny that MPs submit to party discipline? There are at least three reasons why they do, and it will be regrettable to describe them in order to allow little contest with the American regime.

1. First of all, in both British politics, the nominating systems are geared to produce candidates who will vote the party line if and when they reach Parliament. This happens not because nominations are centrally controlled, but because the local nominating committees are small elite groups which serve in effect as nationally-oriented chauffeurs for the Commons
party leaderships.2

2. Second, British MPs lack the resources to set up shop as politicians with bases independent of party. Television time in campaigns goes to parties rather than to individual independent
candidates.41 By custom, rule, and both, the two parties strongly limit the funds that Parliamentary candidates can spend on their


Once elected, M.P.'s are not supplied the kindly office resources—still help, free newspaper subscriptions, and the like—that can be used to achieve public notice. Consequently, should not be carried too far; M.P.'s are not citizens, and obviously dissident leaders like Mr. tafran and Enoch Powell manage to build important independent followings. But the average backbencher is constrained by lack of resources. It comes as no surprise that a number of M.P.'s add little to (or nothing at all for) are certain electoral strength in their constituencies; the lion's share of the variance in vote change from election to election is changeable to national swing rather than local or regional conditions.

Third, with the executive entrenched in Parliament, the only posts with building power are those held by party leaders. Up to a third of majority party M.P.'s are never included in the Ministry. In the ambitious backbencher, the role is to impress ministers and particularly the Prime Minister. Party loyalty is rewarded: the assignment.

The object of all this is that British M.P.'s are coveted for the arrangement of incentives and resources, elevates parties over politicians. But the U.S. is very different. In


(2) 595-599, 555.

(2) "For Senator Congressmen, it is said, collapse with shock on being shown the writing-rooms and the library of the Congress fall of men writing letters in England; Member of Parliament examining the constituency mail," Vernon Clarke, *The World of Parliament* (Garden city, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 533 and generally, Clarke, pp. 555-559. They have changed somewhat since Clarke's account, but the contrast is still valid. See also Anthony Linker and Michael Rush, *The Member of Parliament* and *The Information* (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1970).
Loosening regexp that, in West Germany, "the average member of the
proletariat looks under Spartan conditions." Gerhard Loewenberg,
_Civilization in the German Nation_ (Ithaca: Cornell University

(45) Lord Acton, "Church and the Nationalization of Political Power,"
ch. 7 in William E. Channing and Walter D. Kickham, _The American

attained, beyond the wildest dreams of political avance of a Walpole
in Newcastle." p. 81.

America the underpinnings of "feudalism" are weak or absent, making it possible for politicians to influence events. It should be said that traditional structure and Danish "feudalism" are not necessarily incompatible. Connecticut state government, in which party organization plays a substantial role over nominations and political access, comes closest to the British model. Government and state legislative parties are bound together by party organization. But Connecticut is exceptional, or, more accurately, it is at one end of a spectrum toward the other end of which there are states in which parties have little binding effect at all.

In American politics the place where Democratic logic fully applies in the election of individuals to executive posts — executives, governors, and big city mayors, To choose among candidates for the Presidency of the New York City mayorship is to choose among "executive teams" — candidates with their retinues of future high administrators, financial experts, journalists, stools, student radicalism, journalistic flocks, hangovers, occasionally fugitives, and so on. In executive election the candidates are highly visible; they bid for favor in Democratic primary; they substantially control government.

Tabled in city states, here is the standard functional case:

That cohesive parties may arise to deal with problems caused by constitutional deficiencies. See, e.g., in Chicago, Edward C. Banfield, Political Crime (New York: Free Press, 1961), Ch. 8. American parties have traditionally been strongest at the national level. But something similar begins to show as we move to the city. Where parties are held together by patronage, and where they are so geographically synthetically formed which can serve as independent political forces. There is a strong tendency for party politics to become monolithic rather than competitive. Political politicians have little incentive to sustain an opposition party and every incentive to join the ruling party. The same argument generally holds for national political in mid-Eighteenth Century England.

See Durham, Race, and Reform (London: Longmans, 1965), Ch. 1.

In the California Senate, for example, at least until recently, committee chairmanships have been given out to the most senior members regardless of party. Alvin D. Sokolow and Richard W. Gransma, "Partisanship and Seniority in Legislative Committee Assignments: California After reapportionment," 24 Western Political Quarterly 741-747, 1971.
(as appear to) and can be charged with its accomplishment and 
achievements (Secretary Nixon for inflation, Mayor Lindsay for crime);
elections are typically close (perhaps in most old industrial cities);
votes can swing in "spatik differentiation," when the Cold War 
spent, Key, Jr., wrote The Responsible Executive (50) a book in the Roosevelt 
spirit, he had the ingenious good sense to focus on competition 
between incumbent and prospective Presidential administrations rather 
then more broadly on competition between parties. Indeed it can be 
argued that American representative governments have declined in power 
in the Twentieth Century (especially at the city council level) and 
executives have even chiefly because of the executive who often 
attains something like "downstream accountability." (51)

But at the Congressional level the Representative model breaks down. To 
look back to the British discussion, the specified leisure andiciente 
arrangements conducive to party unity among M.P.'s are 
absent in the Congressional environment.

First, the way in which Congressional candidates win party 
nomination is not, for say the most part, one which favors 
party choice in Congress. For one thing, 435 House members and 
96 senators (all but the Indiana party) are not nominated by 
state primary (overseas, in the few states with challenge 
primaries), rather than by caucus or convention. Then it is no reason 
to expect large primary electorate to honor party loyalty. 
(An introduction of the direct primary system in Britain might in 
part get party cohesion in the Commons.) For another, even 
where party organizations are still strong enough to control 
Congressional primaries the parties are locally rather than 
principally oriented; local party unity is "vital to them."

(51) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.)
(52) There is Hatfield's point that Henry Clay's 1840 campaign "was not 
merely national but only at the representative level." Samuel P. Hartley, "Congressional Recruitment in the Twentieth Century," ch. 2 in David E. Truman (ed.), The Congress and America's 
(53) In Chicago, for example, see Leo M. Snowiss, "Congressional Recruitment and 
national party unity is not. Apparently it never has been.

Second, unlike in M.P. the typical American Congressman has his own resources to win initially, a reputation to win election and win re-election. He builds up his own electoral cushion and sustains it. He raises and spends a great deal of money in doing so. He has at his command an elaborate set of electoral resources. But the Congress looks upon all its Members. They will be more in these points later. One important point here is that a Congressman can indeed must be strong a part of his constituency, independent of party. In the words of a House member quoted by Clark, "I have defended on the party organization. That settled, more of me would be here."

Third, Congress does not have to sustain a cabinet and hence does not engage the ambitions of its members in cabinet function in such a fashion as to induce party cohesion. It will be wrong to posit a a role-to role relation here between party cabinet and cabinet sustenance. On the one hand, there are nothing preventing Congressmen from building disciplined Congressional parties anyway if they wanted to do so. On the other hand, as the records of the Third and Fourth French Republic show cabinet regimes can be continued in relatively

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On the fluid behavior of machine Congressmen back when there were far more of them, see M. Oskie (1964) Democracy in the Organization of District Senators, Vol. II, The United States (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 286-289. Tammany Democrats were party leaders to save Speaker Joseph G. Cannon from Inaugural Day's Democratic attack in the Sixth Congress, a year before his famous "Not Blair"

Jacobsen pointed out that, to gain the prosperity in statistical terms, other than deterministic from the need for an assembly to sustain a "critical" probability rather than the likelihood that it will spawn disciplined parties.

The fact is that no theoretical justification for U.S. Congress which points parties as autonomous units will ever far come. So we are left with individual Congressmen, with 535 men and women rather than bodies as units.

Attention is the discussion to come. The style of argument will be somewhat like that of Daniel Bell. The reality more like that of Norman. Whether the choice of units is sufficient can be shown only in the future. Marshall and the arguments established present them with the limits placed upon still. I put forward the question of whether Congressmen in search of re-election or for a position to do anything at all...

Here it will be useful to deal first with the minority subject of Congressmen, who serve marginal districts or states—such as fairly evenly balanced between the parties. The reason for taking up the marginals separately is to consider whether their election precarious enough to induce them to engage in distinctive electoral activities. Marginals have an obvious problem: to a substantial degree they are at the mercy of national partisan electoral events. But general vote awareness of Congressional legislative activities is low.

Hence national swings in the Congressional vote are commonly

Judgments on what the President is doing rather than on what Congress is doing. In the long run, where parties controlling the presidency have House seats for the mid-term, votes seem to have a judgmental effect rather than reflect the election cycle. Here along a judgmental line, there has been an upward trend in real income among voters. The pattern of voters for the congressional party of a president who reigns during economic prosperity and against the party of a president who reigns during economic depression. Rewards and punishments may be given by the same circuitous route for other states of affairs, including electoral involvement in wars. With votes behaving the way they do, it is in the electoral interest of a marginal Congressman to help ensure that a presidential administration of his own party is a popular success or that one of the opposite party is a failure. (Partly for the strategic electoral interest, there is reason why a Congressman with a safe seat should care one way or another.)

But what can a marginal Congressman do to affect the future of a Presidency? She shorthand course a marginal member under a President of his own party can take is to support his legislation in roll call voting; there is ambiguous evidence that relevant marginal do behave disproportionately in this


It is clear that the strategy may not always be the best one. During the 1982 recession, for example, it may have been wise for marginal Democrats to support more expansionary policies to counteract the recession. In the 1988 election, however, economic policies seemed to be more important. The opposition party had been running on a platform of deficit reduction.

There is much to be said for trying to influence the economy to see how much it would help if the President were to change his economic policies. It is clear that in the economy, there are many of whom the President could potentially work with. Although the President's economic policies seem not to give much attention to strategies of the sort, whether ingenious or ingenious, what we are pondering is whether individual policy makers can realistically hope to do anything to affect the national economy of the various private interests in Congressional election campaigns. And the answer seems to be no. What can be done is to contribute little to the problem of generating collective Congressional action. It is the root problem of knowing what to try to do. It is hard to point to an instance in recent decades in which a group of Congressmen (marginal or not) has done something to clear the way in which the President is able to change the national economic climate. In a situation in which the group intended to change the economy, there are too many impossibilities. Most importantly, freedom of the press is now a matter of concern. So do events. Not even economists can have a clear idea of what such economic measures will be. The election cycle adds its own kind of uncertainty. The famous creation of President Johnson's Great Society legislation (in all its policies) was followed in 1966 by the largest Republican gain in House popular vote percentage of the last quarter century. Hence there is a lack of usable hope among Congressmen on which actions will}

64 As in Shin, op. cit.
There is a well-established tradition of Congressmen who can watch national election percentages, electorate and presidential come and go with relative impunity. All in all the nature of the national way for marginal Congressmen to deal with national events is to ignore them, to treat them as Acts of God even which they can exercise no control. It makes much more sense to concentrate do things even which they think they can have some control—there is evidence that margins do think and act distinctly. House margins are more likely to turn up as "district-oriented" and "delegates" in role shifts; they introduce more-earlier longs in general margins of both houses despite more-earlier national election—national activites. But, those activities are not directed toward compounding national election percentages. And although they may differ in intensity they do not differ in kind from the activities engaged in by everyone else.

The House Congressmen are in a position to do anything about getting re-elected? If an answer is sought in their ability to affect national percentages they remain in no. But if an answer is sought in their ability to affect election percentages in their own primary and general election, the answer is no. At least so the case here will be. More specifically, the case will be yes. They...

Nevertheless there are interesting questions here that have never been asked. Nowhere Congressmen, except members generally as the party not in control of the presidency try to sabotage the economy? Of course they must not appear to do so, but there are "vegetative" ways of doing it. But what do public opinion The Eighteenth Congress with that for cutting a time of depression? Or Congress with their spending programs under President Nixon—during a recovery of inflation? The answer is probably yes. It would have to be yes, clearly as some Congressmen act as order under circumstances of different playing and expensive. Congressmen do not. Strategies like this not only require ingenuity and they require a rigorous consciousness ofInstant effects of a sort, not...
Think first they can expect their own percentages, that in fact they
expect their own percentages, and furthermore that there is reason
for them to try to do so. This last is obvious for the marginals,
but perhaps not as obvious for the non-marginals. Are they not often
occasions of "safe seats"? This is an image of Congressmen who
inhabit party bastions and who guard their way through their
careers without ever having to worry about elections. But this image
is misconceived and it is important to show why it is misconceived.

First, when looked at from the standpoint of a career Congressman
one's own seat is as safe as any may seem. Of House members serving in the
Ninety-third Congress 58% had at least one or another in their careers
won by a majority of less than 55% of the total vote; 77% with less
than 60%. For Senators the figures were 70% and 83% (no data for
15 of the 22 Southerners).  

Second -- to look at the election figures from a different angle --
in U.S. House elections only about a third of the variance ingetting percentages
over time is attributable to national surges. About half the
variance is local (for some people, color, the variance not
explained by national and state components). The local component is probably
at least as high in Senate elections. Hence vote variation over which
Congressmen have reason to think they can exercise some control
(i.e., the primary vote, and the local campaign, the November vote) is substantial.

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Over the long haul, the proportion of seats switching from party to party
is quite surprising. Of Senators serving in the Ninety-third Congress,
43% had succeeded members of the opposite party; 43% had succeeded members of the same party, and one
(eisenhower, R.-N.H.) had come into the Senate at the same time that
both his parents (both Republicans) were serving in the Senate during his childhood.
36% had originally succeeded members of the opposite party. 51% members of

Some party, and 13% had originally taken newly created seats. (Dotted entirely at first). Movement toward a two-party system continues to a low extent too in institution. The two are not equals.

Sparks, op. cit., p. 186. Ohio had a ranking of vote components in order of importance. The ranking differs from the British ranking.
What this comes down to in general elections is that district vote fluctuations beyond or in opposition to national trends can be quite striking. For example, between 1968 and 1970, the Republican share of the national House vote fell 2.3%, but the vote for Congressman Charles M. McCrea (R. -Kern) fell from 67.6% to 45.0% and he lost his seat. In 1970, four incumbent Republicans lost their seats; in general it was not a bad year for Congressional Republicans, and all four districts had won in 1966 with at least 52% of the vote. In addition, there are the primaries. It is hard to make a case absolutely secure in an electoral environment of this sort. In Engin's interview study of candidates who had just run for office in Wisconsin (about a third of whom were in Congress), the parties who recalled having seen "vacuum" about electoral outcomes during their campaigns was high, and the incidence of uncertainty was only moderately related to actual electoral outcomes. But the local vote cannot be made as easy or as easy as possible, so presumably the goes. In particular, it seems to be real for incumbent to dp by their November percentages beyond second party debts in other contexts. On the House hill (but Aga sitting in the Senate) the over-all electoral value of "vacuum" seems to have been in the past decade -- although of course some House incumbents still lose their seats.

In the 1971-1972 period few House committee chairmen got their primaries.


From about 20% in the 1950's to about 5% in 1966 and maybe higher by 1970-1972. See Robert S. Erikson, "The Advantages of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," 3 Petley (95-9571); Erikson, "Inertia, Centrality, and Party Factions in Congressional Elections," 20 American Political Science Review 1275, 1972; and Richard Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginal," Politics in America (Spring 1974). This sort of statement simply reflects the issue in a symptomatic role, and one can add that it is attributable in an electoral model to attitudinal and partisanship, and the data of the electoral process around the only statistic. This is the case of the Wisconsin 7th District, where the percentage was 65.7% in 1968 and 67.6% in 1970. The total vote in the district was 2,350,000, and the margin was about 150,000. William. J. American, 3,514. William. A. Ludwig, 3,514. William. A. Ludwig, 3,514. William. A. Ludwig, 3,514.
Third, there is a more basic point. The ultimate concern here is not in how probable it is that legislators will lose their seats, but whether there is a connection between the things they do in office and their need to be re-elected. It is possible to conceive of an assembly in which no member ever comes close to losing a seat, but in which re-election is what requires member behavior. It would be an assembly with no saints or fools in it, an assembly packed with skilled politicians, giving each their bonus. When we say "Congressman Smith is unbeatable," we do not mean that there is nothing he could do that would lose him his seat. Rather, we mean "Congressman Smith is unbeatable as long as he continues to do the thing he is doing." If he stopped running for re-election, or stopped visiting his district, or began voting randomly in roll calls, or stopped his

intervened 80 percent of all roll calls, or elected his

co-sponsor equal-pay legislation for women.

Time is very important for these reasons. There is no Congress for his job to make an experiment. But normal activity--money, patronage, with what characterizes "safe" Congressmen is not that they are beyond
tact to reach, but that their effects are very likely to bring them

unquestioned electoral success.

Whether Congressmen think their activities have electoral

import, and whether in fact they have won--are two

separate questions. Of the two, we can be little doubt that the

successful 1978-1979 campaign of a "congressman - patronage

man," a tendency for congressmen to take personal credit for victories and to lose their seat for failures, is the

17. As actual evidence of politicians' activity is more difficult to assess, we have evidence only of intent, and the point is

soft and somewhat. It is hard to find evidence in activity undertaken in a manner that public scrutiny indicates. There is no

Kempin, op. cit., p. 31.
On next step then is to offer a brief conceptual account of
the relationship between Congressmen and their electorates. In the
Doornan analysis, which party leaders must worry about is
electors’ expected voting behavior. 15 But to Congressmen this is in practice
irrelevant for reasons specified earlier. If Congressmen’s attention
must remain be directed to what can be called an ‘expected
incumbent differential’ let us define this ‘expected incumbent
differential’ as any difference perceived by a relevant political actor
between what an incumbent Congressman is likely to do if returned
to office and what any possible challenge (in primary or general
election) would be likely to do. And let us define ‘relevant political actor’
as anyone who has a resource that might be used in the election in
doubt. At the ballot box there are obstacles that employ various
costs in attempt to voters: money, the ability to persuade
mobilization efforts, etc. By this definition, a ‘relevant political
actor’ need not be a contestant; one of the most important
resources many offices where the country in Congressional
campaign years. 17
Now it must be emphasized that the average voter has only the remotest awareness of what an incumbent Congressman is actually doing in office. And an incumbent has to be concerned about acts which do some impression about him, and especially about acts which can work real harm to him then their own votes. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) feels a "little bit" of 2,545 West Virginians are regularly kept in touch with. A Congressman's assistant interviewed for a Nixon project in 1972 reported the "thought leadership" back in the district of campaign resources was the most vital in securing. An incumbent not only has to assume that his own election funds are adequate to the task but to minimize the probability that an active will conduct an effective campaign against him. There is the story that during the first Nixon term Senator James B. Heflin (R-Kans.) was told he could face a well-financed opponent in his 1972 primary if he did not display some party regularity in his voting. Another resource of significance is organizational expertise, probably more important than money among labor union offerings. Single ability to do electioning footwork is a resource the invocations of which may give campaigns an interesting twist. Lenchek found in studying the 1964 House elections in the San Francisco area that 50% of campaign workers

For thousands of November voters literally poisonous of candidate particularities, the

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Shriver's administrative assistant was asked what the main theme of the Congressional Appropriations Committee was, to which the reply was, "Project-wise, it's been valuable... I recall that one member of the Appropriations Committee had asked if I could tell him who the Project Leader was. I think the majority of his constituents probably think the Appropriations Committee is very much a second string—just like I would from the (highly ambitious) underwriting." The interview


Here is the following report of an election ploy by Congressman Torbert H. MacNeil (D-Mass.), chairman of the Communication and Power Subcommittees of the House Judiciary and Foreign Affairs Committees:

"His first appropriation was a basic step toward increasing his overall success in recent years. He secured a political edge when the election

Congressional hearings had been held in his district last year. Since then

according to [Capra], "[A] Tito in [D.C.], MacNeil will not touch 'em."

The interview is continued: "He didn't spend a lot of money, but Marty Kuhn, his right-hand man (a former Tony "the Kid"

detail in a New York band), was very active. No doubt he worked in kind of


"The Senate and House Committees on Commerce." (Midwest on and 1968, The reference is apparently to the election of 1968, and in Michigan's percentage fell to 62.5. It is normally well over 65.
held college degrees (as against 12% of the bay area population), and that the
parents were more issue-oriented than the general population. The
need to attract workers may induce candidates to take positions
they otherwise would. Former Congressman Alfred K. Landon (D.-N.Y.)
was this key irreducible resource of a corps of candidate volunteers who
will follow him from client to district, making him an unusually
credible candidate.

Still another highly important resource is the ability to make
persuasive endorsements. Manhattan candidates can use the
around endorsement of the Manchester Union Leader. Labor union committees
exercise their approved lists. Chicago Democratic politicians seek the
endorsement of the Mayor. In the San Francisco area and
closer, whoever can win candidates by scoring points by winning endorsements from
officials of the opposite party. As Neustadt argues, the influence
of the president over Congressmen (of both parties) varies with his public
acceptance and with the personal ability to punish and reward. One
presidential tool is the endorsement, which can be carefully calculated
andingenious. In the 1970 election Senator Charles Goodell
R.-N.Y.), who had achieved public salience by attacking the
Nixon Administration, was apparently设计ed by the Republicans called
forth by that attack. Vice President Ford embraced his Conservative
campaign and the Administration acted to channel materially relevant
money away from Goodell.

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86
What a Congressman has to try to do is to prove that in primary and general elections the primary balance (will all other support) remains firmly decided in favor of himself rather unalterably so. Tomorrow successfully he must remain constantly aware of what political acts, "incidents," doings are, and he must act in a fashion to influence that balance in favor himself. Combating this task is the problem of slack resources. That is only a very small portion of the resources (other naivete) that are constantly deployable in Congressional campaign are even in fact deployed. But these resources may if striking will suddenly become present and with what consequence. For example just after the 1948 election the American Medical Association unwerved by the medical program of the all-government and by Democratic campaign promises had to institute national health insurance, decided to venture into politics. By 1950 Congressmen could recall as supporters of health insurance fund themselves captured by a million-dollar A.M.A. advertising drive, local "healing arts committees" making Candi date celebri ties and even doctors sending out campaign literature with their mailers. By 1952 it was widely believed that the A.M.A. had decided. such election, and few Congressmen were mentioning health insurance. 87

In all his calculation the Congressman must keep in mind that he is seeking two electorates rather than one -- a November electorate and a primary electorate rooted inside but not a representative sample of it. From his standpoint of the primary a primary just as in the election to be followed 88. A typical scientif ic tool of a constituency yields a Congressman information on the public standing of people challenging to him in the other party, but also in his own party. In a precinct with a firm "surgency" coalition of elite groups in his party the primary electorate is normally quiescent. But there can be sudden turbulence.

The convention slogan of the Nineteenth Century official campaign pivots.

Favoritism in public and in private life was highly prized and that there
was an ethic that they should be reflected. "An ambitious Congressman
is frequently forced to think day and night of his re-nomination,
and to secure it not only by procuring, if he can, grants from the
Federal Treasury for local prejudices and places for the relatives and
friends of the local wire-pullers who control the nominating
Convention, but also by sedulously 'nursing' the convention
during its vacation." James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*,

But it sometimes happens that the median view of growing and
November elections is so divergent on so little reasons that a
Congressman finds it difficult to please both electorates at
once. This has been a recurrent problem among California-Catholics.

A trial can find point with in what we call Capellmen's
Behavior should be characterized as "maximizing" behavior. Does it make
sense to visualize the Congressman as a maximizer of vote percentage
in elections -- November, or primary, or with one complex together, both?
For two reasons the answer is probably not. The first is to win the goal itself,
which is to stay in office rather than to win all the popular vote.

More precisely this goal is to stay in office over as number of elections
which grows so that "maxing" completely in any one of them (except the
last) is more desirable than winning by a narrow plurality. The logic
here is that a narrow victory (in primaries or general election) in a sign of weakness that can inspire hostile political acts to
deploy resources intently, the next time around. By this reasoning
the higher the election percentages the better. No doubt any Congressman
will pegs in his seat to raise his November figure from 80% to 90% if the candidate
could absolutely sure that the act would accomplish his end (without affecting
his primary percentage) and if it could be undertaken at low personal cost.
But still trying to "win emphatically" is not the same as trying to win

Although the direct primary system is uniquely American, there are
variants that face similar problems for politicians. In Italian
parliamentary elections, each vote registers a vote for a favored party;
candidates lost, but their can also cost preference votes for individual
candidates for that list. Whether a given candidate gets elected depends
both on her whole party's vote against other parties and how well she
does, given resources of his company. Large organizations (e.g., labor
and farm groups) capable of mobilizing preference votes reap benefits in the
parliament, "where nothing seems counted so much as the ability to
distribute the required number of preference votes." -- Joseph LaPalombara,
"Interest Groups in Deliberative Politics" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963),
pp. 248-249.
general elections to try to gain places on the benches.

This concession can be carried only so far. It requires a
limited degree of venturousness just to break out of old
coalition tactics and for an entrepreneur in good electoral
shape again, (as it is)

may not dare to revolt at present innovation.

Whether or not this conjuring, cautious and cautious,
Congressman
must constantly engage activities related to re-election. Here
will be differences yet again, but all of them show the need
to do things tangibly is a major
table to do things tangibly is a major

The activity here is to present a

typology—A short list of the kinds of activities, Congressman
finds the electorally useful to engage in. The case will be that
there are three basic kinds of activities. It will be important
to lay these out with some care, for arguments in later chapters
will be built on them.

One activity is advertising, defined here as any

entirely to disseminate one's name among constituents in such a

fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having little

more than content. A successful Congressman builds upon

amateur table names, which may have a generalized electoral

value for others if they are given in the same fashion. The personal qualities of

character, experience, knowledge, recognition, current,

sincerity, independence, and the like. Just getting one's name

across is difficult enough; only about half the electorate, if asked,

can supply these names' names. It helps a Congressman to be

known. In the main, recognition carries a positive valuation; to be perceived

at all is to be perceived favorably.

An added advantage enjoyed by

these newcomers is that they are much better known among their own

constituents than others who are

Shleis and others, op. cit., p. 205. The same may not be true.

and may say, we say.
Send a good deal of their energy and money trying to make
themselves better known.

There are standard routines— frequent
visits to the community, non-political speeches to local
audiences, the sending out of infant care brochures, and letters of con-
gratulation. By 1963 House insiders estimated that 121
said that they regularly sent newsletters to their constituents.

Some routines are more
standard. Congressman Otis P. Skillings (D-III) claims to have
met personally half his constituents (i.e., 500000) in 20 years. Congressman
David J. Ford (D-CA) in a radio program featuring himself as “Chairman of the
Joint
Committee on Printing” said, “I am a very
famous figure at public expense. Use of the franking privilege has increased
in recent years; in early 1972 it was estimated that 200 House and Senate
members would send out about 476 million pieces of mail in the year 1972.

In Cliff’s interview study, “Conversations with more than fifty House members
uncovered only one or two which to share with others on strategies
designed to increase communities will the voices.” Of cit., p. 88.

A statement by one of Cliff’s Congressmen: “The best speeches are the ones that
are least like speeches. I think a commencement speaker should talk about what
he has done before he can talk about what he will do.” Of cit., p. 90.

Another Cliff Congressmen: “I was looking at my TV set today... I’ve never
been... and when I own a television... and when it was on, but I own a
Television.” Of cit., p. 92.

Ellen Spitz, Native Profiles on Sheffy, p. 12. The Congressman also certified given. "When Sheffy is in his district and a drowning occurs, he is sometimes asked to dive down for the body. 'It gets in the papers and actually, it's pretty good publicity form,' he admitted." p. 3.

Whether dive should be classified under casework rather than advertising is difficult to say.

Lenore Cooley, Native Profiles on Dijes, p. 2.

Anne Zandman and Arthur Magida, Native Profiles on Ford, p. 2.
A second activity may be called credit-claiming. The

level of acting is so degenerate a belief in a relevant, rela-
tive act (or acts) that he generally regards his for his own

As a critical, or some part thereof, to do something about the act (or acts) he

He is the Congresman's point of view, so that an act, who believes that a member can make pleasing

Credibility will be built with keeping him in office, so that he can

make pleasing things happen in the future. The emphasis here

is on individual accomplishment (whether, say, party or governmental

accomplishment) and on the Congresman as leader (whether from an eg-

sionary constituency point). Credit-claiming is highly important.

Norman C. Mailin, "Yes, You Are Getting More Political Mail: And It Will Get


After saying his tribute to the late President Eisenhower, Paul A. Craig, Conclu-

sion is nothing a Congressmen like better than forget his name in the

headlines, and first to be published all over the United States." From

to Congressmen, will the consequence be much of Congressional "gift" in a
relentless search for opportunities to engage in it.

Where can credit be found? If this were only one Congressman
rather than 535 the answer would in principle be simply enough.
Credit (or blame) would attach in domestic fashion to the doing of the
government as a whole. But there are 535. Hence it becomes necessary
for each Congressman to try to feel off pieces of governmental accomplish-
ment in which he can believe in general a sense of responsibility. For the
average Congressman the simple way of doing this is to traffic in what
may be called "patronage benefits." 4) In "patronage benefits
governmental benefits, as its term would in part here, there
are two classes. 1) Each benefit is given out to a specific individual,
group, a constituent constituency; in other words, a single Congressman is to be recognized (by political action
and other Constituents) as the claimant for the benefit (other Congressmen being
precluded as "independent constituents"). 2) Each benefit is given out
to problems or one position (welfare, say, social security claims) with a
Congressman associated having a hand in the administration. A "patronage benefit"
regularly to persons are becoming a class. That is, a benefit granted to an individual, group, or constituency can usually
be allocated and Congressmen so one of a class "general benefit" given out to create
numbers of individuals, perhaps as constituents. Hence the advantage can arise that
a Congressman is getting thus the "claim" that it is the government is offering. (The claim may be very
definite. Some state legislatures draft in whose names members call "a local legislator")

In other words, the bulk of patronage benefits come
under the heading of "casework"—the thousands of town congressional
offices perform for constituents in ways that normally local require
personal action. High school, "into the tax, " hospitals mental,
sells of personal matters, pensions to local government for grant information, and so on. Each office

\[\text{(125)}\]
This skilled profession who can play the bureaucracy like an organ—pulling the right pedals to produce desired effects. But many benefit require legislation, or at least significant allocative decisions or matters covered by greater expertise. Here Congress can fill the traditional role of agencies and to the issue related. It is a believable role, which a member claimed for a benefit and reading a woman may well receive it. Shady construction projects seem especially useful. In the decades before 1934, a justified federal regulation were major commodity. In recent years, awards given under grants in aid programs have become more complex, but they have become more numerous. Some quests for credits are ingenious; in 1971 the story broke that Congressmen had been earmarking foreign aid money for specific projects in Israel in order to win favor with home constituents. It should be said of sanitatory benefits that Congressmen are quite capable of taking the initiative in drumming them up; they can be no automatic assumption that as Congressmen's activity is the result of pressure brought to bear by organized interests. Firms shows

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109

Sometimes, without justification, there is comment by a legislator regarding the House Public Works Committee.

110

The announcement of projects are not important (and I delete them) but the facts that the House are funny about this — if your name is associated if you get off the committee written you get it through or not. James T. Manning, "Construction and the House Public Works Committee," 75th Congress, 1st Session, Special Committee Report, p. 12.

111

"They get to see something; it's the kind that other people that exist the building, the community, the office, the other office buildings, the highways. They want to know what's been done." A comment by a congressional member of the House Public Works Committee.

112


113

The significance of social justice is in the reduction of the House Select Committee.

A fund, just as many as the wills of the donors. The examples given show the
benefit of each group from the contributions of recipients. However, (the letter
including the House residents who opposed the Israeli projects). But the
properties of paternalistic benefit were carefully specified so as not to
exclude the possibility that some benefits may be given to recipients outside
the bar association. Some probably are. Narrowly drawn ine.


People's security as paternalistic benefit, and some of them are probably
covered by the recipients outside the bar district. (It is difficult to find such
evidence on the print.) Campaign contributions flow into districts from the
counties, so it would not be surprising to find that benefits go where the
resources are.

How much paternalistic benefits could be at first, is embarrassing
difficult to say. But it would be hard to fail at a Congressman who claims he can afford
to allow without pressing any further is easy. The beneficiaries that they must
fulfill, generous expectations, that they must be builder in regular periodic
ensures an automatic to stay electrically even with the Board.

Awareness of fewer may spread beyond their recipients,
"Building for a member a general reputation as a good provider. " he said.

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113 Farina, Congressional Committee 6. 40 6. 60. Cf. This statement on another in
the House's Third Report: "Most homes really charge more than their fair proportion
profit without thinking about it." Bernard F. Brown, "Truman Politics in America",

114 In a description of the picture of the Argyle and Stanley S. Swainey, "The City
and the "Whig' - Nazi Social Tax Committee, Get Together,"

115 This is an example of a "sensible" city. The world's greatest publicity again is still the Roman
through... When you get sensibly $25,000 from the Social Security Administration, he
publishes it freely and neglects about it. After a while, nothing grows until you've
blog.howtobuildadigitalreport you've obtained $2,500 for your book. who was on the board of

"He can be noted as well. A good example is the Capital Hill case on which an impact is given in the account of the activities of Congressmen. There is a question of how much impact the case has."

"In 1968, the 4th district was decided by a small vote of 23,000. The winner had 23,000 votes. The 2nd district was decided by 12,000 votes, with 30% of the vote. The 4th district was decided by 25,000 votes, with 30% of the vote. The 1st district was decided by 20,000 votes, with 30% of the vote. The 3rd district was decided by 15,000 votes, with 30% of the vote. The 5th district was decided by 10,000 votes, with 30% of the vote."

So much for accounting benefits. But is credit available elsewhere? For governmental accomplishments beyond the scale already discussed? The general answer is no. The prime mover role is a hard one to play. The Congressman needs an audience and says, "I am responsible for passing a bill to curb inflation."

On an accomplishment of a sort that probably engaged the interest of more people, it is reasonable to suppose that credit should be appropriated among them. But second, there is an overwhelming problem of information costs. For typical voters, Capital Hill is distant and mysterious place; few have any idea of what Congressmen do. Hence there is no easy way of knowing whether a
Congressmen are staking a valid claim or not. The odds are that the
information falls into different ways on different, broad, and
particularized benefits. It may work in a Congressman's favor;
he may get credit for the deal the had nothing to do with building.
Sprinkling a disjointed word or phrase is something a Congressman is supposed to be
able to do. But on larger matters, it may work against him. For a
voter, voting is an easy way to set an agenda for invalid claims the
Senators, because it's the easiest. Hence, it is unlikely that Congress
will much mileage out of credit-claiming on larger matters before
them electronically.

Yet, there are obvious and important qualifications here.
For many Congressmen, credit-claiming on non-particularized matters is possible
in specialized subject areas because of the Congressional division of labor.
The term "governmental unit" in the original definition of "credit-claiming"
is broad enough to include committees, subcommittees, and the two
majority Congress itself. Thus many Congressmen can believably claim
credit for blocking bills in subcommittee, adding an amendment in
committee, etc. The audience for these actions of this sort is usually small.
But it may include important political actors (e.g., an interested group
in the Senate, the New York Times, Ralph Nader) who are capable of both
organizing Capitol Hill information campaigns and deploying electoral resources. These
are well-documented examples of how in Susan's treatment in [citing the
1960s]. In total, these electoral means work to set very clearly who is the House
and Senate for a special interest, and to rally valuable electoral resources (money, volunteers)
by members who are doing nothing for their bills. Of course, there are many examples

Any leader of American politics has had strident, ask J. Stevens naming
for the presidency (Goldwater, McGovern, McCarthy, any of the
Kennedys), "But what bills have they passed?" There is no unswerving answer.

Foley, Congressman in Committee, pp. 248-255.